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ABSTRACT 
American engagement with international law is regularly criticised as fraught with contradiction and 
distorted by beliefs in “exceptionalism.” That raises a puzzling question: Why is American international 
legal policy framed by commitment to the “rule of international law” when this systematically provides 
a benchmark for challenging the legitimacy of American global power? To answer that question this 
thesis addresses a gap in international legal scholarship on the influence of foreign policy ideology 
over the design and development of international law. It is argued that the very meaning of the rule of 
international law is contested according to competing ideological beliefs: between American 
policymakers and their global counterparts, and among American policymakers themselves. 
Opposition to US legal policy has been structured by forms of “legalism,” as a set of beliefs that law 
consists of non-instrumental rules, and that the international legal system should be developed by 
analogy with municipal law. Drawing from the International Relations subfield of Foreign Policy 
Analysis it is theorised that, in contrast, American legal policymakers receive international law through 
competing ideologies that correspond with divisions evident in both legal scholarship and diplomatic 
history. An internationalist-nationalist jurisdictional dimension intersects with a liberal-illiberal values 
dimension to form four ideal type conceptions of the rule of international law: Liberal Internationalism, 
Illiberal Internationalism, Liberal Nationalism and Illiberal Nationalism. These ideal types, including 
legalism, are applied to reinterpret the classic formulation of the rule of law comprised of three 
elements which, when translated to the global level, are concerned with: developing non-arbitrary 
global governance; defining equality under international law; and the ordering of international legal 
power. It is hypothesised that American legal policymakers will systematically contradict legalist 
principles while adhering to the structure of the four ideal types. The model is tested through a 
longitudinal case study on American policy toward the International Criminal Court. Documentary 
evidence is used to demonstrate that policy decision-making was structured by the theorised 
conceptions of international law, rather than by tactical compromises between “law” and “politics.” It is 
concluded that the role of foreign policy ideology sets hard limits on the ability of the US to reach 
consensus on rule of IL ideals with even its closest allies. 
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American Foreign Policy Ideology & The Rule Of International Law: 
Contesting Power through the International Criminal Court 
  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
CONTESTING THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
In The Epochs of International Law Wilhelm Grewe periodised the history of modern international law 
(“IL”) according to the rise and fall of great powers.1 As Spain, France and Britain in turn enjoyed 
global predominance, so each moulded prevailing international legal doctrines according to distinctive 
national ideologies. That pattern has continued in the “American Century”2 with the United States 
seeking to distinguish itself for promoting the “rule of law” in international affairs.3 President Truman, 
in authorising the 1950 Korean War, argued that: “A return to the rule of force in international affairs 
would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.”4 President 
Eisenhower, in his 1959 State of the Union address, expressed hope that “the rule of law may replace 
the rule of force in the affairs of nations.”5 Perhaps most notably, in his 1991 national address at the 
commencement of the Persian Gulf War, President Bush envisioned “the opportunity to forge for 
ourselves and for future generations a new world order – a world where the rule of law, not the law of 
the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.”6 This thesis sets out to explain how the very meaning of 
the “rule of international law,”7
The puzzling aspect of these Presidential statements is that they invite immediate charges of 
hypocrisy: that America has failed to honour the rule of IL ideal, with practice instead fraught with 
contradiction and distorted by beliefs in “exceptionalism.”
 as deployed by President Bush’s predecessors and successors, has 
been informed by long established ideas of American foreign policy ideology, and the challenges that 
presents for future US engagement with international rules and institutions. 
8
                                               
1 Grewe, Wilhelm G., The Epochs Of International Law; Translated and Revised by Michael Byers (Walter de Gruyter, 2000). 
The first edition of the book was published in Germany in 1944 and has been criticised on the basis of this wartime association: 
See Koskenniemi, Martti, ‘Book Reviews: The Epochs of International Law. By Wilhelm Grewe. Translated and revised by 
Michael Byers.’ (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 746 
 The standard inventory starts with the US 
presenting itself as architect and chief advocate of the League of Nations at the conclusion of the First 
World War (“WWI”) and then failing to join the organisation. At the conclusion of the Second World 
War (“WWII”) it again assumed this leadership role in the creation of the United Nations (“UN”), this 
2 Luce, Henry R., ‘The American Century’ (1941) 17 February Life Magazine 61 
3 For an early review of these pronouncements see Bishop, William W., ‘The International Rule of Law’ (1961) 59 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 553 at 554-555, 562-563. See generally Byers, Michael & Georg Nolte, United States Hegemony 
and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003); Krisch, Nico, ‘International Law in Times of 
Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 
369 
4 Truman, Harry S., Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea (27 June, 1950) 
<http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=800> 
5 Eisenhower, Dwight D., Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Developments in Eastern Europe and the 
Middle East (31 October, 1956) <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10685> 
6 Bush, George H.W., Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf (16 January, 1991) 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19222> 
7 This term is preferred to “international rule of law,” which has often been used merely to signify strengthening the municipal 
rule of law within the various states of the international system 
8 See for example Luck, Edward C., Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919-1999 (Brookings 
Institution Press, 1999) at 5-6; Slaughter, Anne-Marie, ‘The Partial Rule of Law,’ The American Prospect (19 September, 2004) 
<http://www.webcitation.org/6DCYk2Vz9>; Mowle, Thomas S., Allies at Odds?: The United States and the European Union 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) at 85; Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘The Paradox of US Human Rights Policy’ in Michael Ignatieff (ed), 
American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton University Press, 2005); Gosalbo-Bono, Ricardo ‘The Significance of 
the Rule of Law and Its Implications for the European Union and the United States’ (2010) 72 University of Pittsburgh Law 
Review 229 at 347-348; Fehl, Caroline, Living with a Reluctant Hegemon: Explaining European Responses to US Unilateralism 
(Oxford University Press, 2012) at 4-5; Scott, Shirley V., International Law, US Power: The United States’ Quest for Legal 
Security (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 2-3 
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time as a founding member. Yet the US subsequently became a conspicuous critic of the institution, 
and was the greatest defaulter on UN dues by the close of the twentieth century.9 The US has 
repeatedly used military force outside of UN prohibitions, withdrawing consent to jurisdiction before 
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) in part for ruling to that effect,10 and notoriously in the 2003 
Iraq War.11 More broadly the US has led or strongly supported efforts to create the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”),12 ban anti-personnel landmines13 and establish the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (1982),14
In his 2006 book Lawless World, British jurist Philippe Sands launched an influential critique 
of contemporary American legal policy by asking the question: “How could it be that a country as 
profoundly attached to the rule of law and principles of constitutionality as the United States could 
have so little regard for international law?”
 while in each case ultimately failing to ratify the relevant treaties. 
15 Reviewing US rejection of the founding statute of the 
ICC, Sands charged that US policy came down to a question of: “When can brute political power 
override the rule of law and legal processes?”16 Similarly Michael Mandel has charged that references 
to the rule of law in American ICC policy were mere “hypocrisy” in the sense that the US “claims to be 
acting for some principled reason, but in fact has something less noble in mind.”17
Such challenges have been no less intense within the US itself. Then legal adviser to the 
Department of State William Taft IV argued that America’s use of force in the 2003 Iraq War “was and 
is lawful,”
 
18 yet in the same period Taft’s eventual successor Harold Koh characterised the Iraq policy 
as a violation of IL that set the US against its historical mission of creating “a multilateral world under 
law.”19
 
 Charges of weak fidelity to the rule of law by American allies have been no less passionate 
amongst American legal policymakers themselves. That dynamic forms the puzzle animating this 
thesis: Why is American international legal policy framed by commitment to the “rule of law” when this 
systematically provides a benchmark for challenging the legitimacy of American global power? 
                                               
9 See Luck, Edward C., ‘American Exceptionalism and International Organization: Lessons from the 1990s’ in Rosemary S. 
Foot, Neil MacFarlane & Michael Mastanduno (ed), US Hegemony and International Organizations: The United States and 
Multilateral Institutions (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 42-46 
10 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) [1984] ICJ Rep 392 
11 The legality of the war has been almost universally rejected: See Johnstone, Ian, ‘Security Council Deliberations: The Power 
of the Better Argument’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 437 at 477-478; Duffy, Helen, The “War on Terror” 
and the Framework of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 197; Chesterman, Simon, ‘Just War or Just 
Peace After September 11: Axes of Evil and Wars Against Terror In Iraq and Beyond’ (2005) 37 International Law and Politics 
281 at 295; Bellamy, Alex J., ‘Ethics and Intervention: The ‘Humanitarian Exception’ and the Problem of Abuse in the Case of 
Iraq’ (2004) 41 Journal of Peace Research 131 at 134-136 
12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). See Scheffer, David J., ‘Staying the Course with the International 
Criminal Court’ (2001) 35 Cornell International Law Journal 47; Feinstein, Lee & Tod Lindberg, Means to an End: U.S. Interest 
in the International Criminal Court (Brookings Institution Press, 2009) 
13 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction (1999). See Efaw, Andrew C.S., ‘The United States Refusal to Ban Landmines: The Intersection between Tactics, 
Strategy, Policy, and International Law’ (1999) 159 Military Law Review 87 
14 See Richardson, Elliot L., ‘The United States Posture toward the Law of the Sea Convention: Awkward But Not Irreparable’ 
(1982) 20 San Diego Law Review 505; Malone, James L., ‘The United States and the Law of the Sea’ (1983) 24 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 785 
15 Sands, Philippe, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (Viking, 2006) at xv 
16 Ibid at 58 
17 Mandel, Michael, How America Gets Away with Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against Humanity (Pluto 
Press, 2004) at 215 & 219 
18 Taft IV, William H. & Todd F. Buchwald, ‘Preemption, Iraq and International Law’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International 
Law 557 at 557 
19 Koh, Harold H., A Better Way To Deal With Iraq (21 October, 2002) <http://www.law.yale.edu/news/4407.htm> 
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Hypothesis and Argument 
Critiques in the form levelled by Sands and Mandel establish a binary opposition between the legal 
ideal of the rule of IL and the political interests of states: contradictions in American IL policy 
ultimately reflect a contest between law and power. Sands characterises his examples of 
contradictory US legal behaviour “as conflicts, between political values and legal rules, between 
competing conceptions as to the hierarchy of moral choices, between different interpretations of what 
the rules require.”20 The underlying conception is of the rule of IL as a universally understood ideal 
that remains independent of the ideological commitments and political identity of states. In this 
standard view the dynamics of American engagement with IL reveal the consistent logic of rational 
state interests causing inconsistent compliance with legal ideals. American policymakers show 
instrumental deference to the rule of IL where it aligns with US interests, but override its constraints 
wherever political expedience demands. The consequence from a legal perspective is “continued 
schizophrenia about global rules and foreign policies” as American legal policymakers challenge the 
rule of IL ideal through tactical political manipulations.21
This thesis refines the standard view by arguing that the commitment of American legal 
policymakers is to distinctive conceptions of the rule of IL that cannot be understood apart from 
American foreign policy ideology. This is an argument against an impartial and universal ideal of the 
rule of IL against which “politics is an external spectre threatening to undo its good works.”
 
22
Opposition to US legal policy has been largely structured by forms of “legalism,” as a set of 
beliefs that law consists of non-instrumental rules, and that the international legal system should be 
developed by analogy with municipal legal institutions.
 Rather, 
disputes between the US and its global counterparts reflect a power contest fought through competing 
conceptions of the very meaning of the rule of IL. Foreign policy ideology crystallises political interests 
and cultural ideas in distinct interpretations of legal principle such that contradictions are best 
explained as opposition at the level of competing legal ideals. These divisions extend outward 
between American legal policymakers and their global counterparts, and inward between American 
legal policymakers themselves. The significance of this distinction is that divergent global interests 
become more intractable than a mere political contest: they are constitutive of IL. By demonstrating 
the role of foreign policy ideology in the case of the ICC this study is expected to reveal hard limits to 
the ability of American legal policy to accommodate visions for the rule of IL advanced by even its 
closest allies. 
23
                                               
20 Sands, Philippe, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (Viking, 2006) at xvi 
 This is a conception of IL as impartial rules 
independent from and superior to the interests of any one state. In practice, however, legalism is itself 
structured by politics, with adherents having a common interest in substituting the advantages of 
preponderant American power with formally equal rights and duties. Following Martti Koskenniemi, 
this study accepts that international legal rules and institutions cannot be apolitical, but rather are 
understood “only by reference to substantive ideals about the political good we wish to pursue.” In 
21 Ibid at 252. See especially Sands’ concluding chapter at 240-256 
22 Simpson, Gerry J., Law, War & Crime: War Crimes, Trials and the Reinvention of International Law (Polity, 2007) at 11; 
Simpson, Gerry J., ‘Throwing a Little Remembering on the Past: The International Criminal Court and the Politics of 
Sovereignty’ (1999) 5 UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 133 at 141-142 
23 See Chapter 4 infra; Shklar, Judith N., Legalism (Harvard University Press, 1964) 
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short: “Institutions do not replace politics, but enact them.”24
The reason for making this intervention in the literature is to address a gap between the 
existing analytical tools available to legal scholars and practitioners and the task of establishing 
common ground with American legal policymakers. Specifically there is a gap in international legal 
scholarship on the influence of foreign policy ideology over the design and development of IL. In Philip 
Bobbitt’s sweeping account of international legal history The Shield of Achilles,
 IL is thus a site for contesting 
international power according to competing ideologies.  
25
formed by a particular view of law, and what law ought to be, and how it ought to be enforced. Every leadership of 
every state has such a view—self-interested, culturally idiosyncratic, haunted by historical threats, excited by historic 
visions—that is its own view of international law. The law thus viewed is an amalgam of the common practices of 
other states in an international context that reflects the collectivity of state views.
 he raised the notion 
that legal policy in each state is inevitably: 
26
 
 
Following in this tradition I argue that, far from engaging in tactical modifications to law, American IL 
policy exhibits a clear ideological structure such that contradictions emerge from conflicts between 
alternative but internally coherent conceptions of the rule of IL. American international legal policy 
framed by commitment to the “rule of law” adheres not to a universal benchmark, but to these 
ideologically informed conceptions. 
 The explanation of law consciously trumping politics also poses inconsistencies with the 
evidence from legal decision-making processes. For this claim to be true it must be asserted that 
international lawyers employed to develop and advise on American legal compliance systematically 
compromise recognised legal ideals. If American lawyers were indeed subverting an agreed 
conception of the rule of law to power, then repeated expressions of commitment to the principle must 
be interpreted as consciously disingenuous.27 This is a possible interpretation of what is happening, 
but not one that accords with the “direct historical evidence—of which there is a great deal—of the 
actual motivations” of policymakers,28 and beliefs “that the Legal Adviser’s key role is to promote the 
rule of law based on principle, not politics.”29 More broadly the evidence suggests that the US 
genuinely “conceives of itself as a nation dedicated to the rule of law, both at home and abroad.”30
                                               
24 Koskenniemi, Martti, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations 1870-1960 (Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 177, original 
emphasis. See also Wippman, David, ‘The International Criminal Court’ in Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The Politics of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 154; Hurd, Ian, ‘The International Rule of Law: Law and the Limit of 
Politics’ (2014) 28 Ethics & International Affairs 39 
 I 
instead expect evidence to show that policymakers genuinely take account of legal obligation, albeit 
according to ideologically-informed interpretations that systematically diverge from the assumed 
conceptions of global counterparts, and in many cases, from each other. 
25 Bobbitt, Philip, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History (Penguin, 2003) 
26 Ibid at 356 
27 For example Paris noted recurrent use of the word “bogus” by critics describing American objections to the ICC: Paris, Erna, 
The Sun Climbs Slow: The International Criminal Court and the Struggle for Justice (Seven Stories Press, 2009) at 75 
28 Golove, David M., ‘Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is: Goldsmith and Posner’s The Limits of International Law’ 
(2005) 34 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 333 at 348 
29 Koh, Harold H., cited in Scharf, Michael P. & Paul R. Williams, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of 
International Law and the State Department Legal Adviser (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at xiii. See in particular the 
comprehensive account of all living State Department Legal Advisers in this volume 
30 Wippman, David, ‘The International Criminal Court’ in Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) at 162 
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To establish the influence of ideology my research relates insights from the International 
Relations (IR) subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to legal scholarship in order to specify the 
structure of beliefs informing conceptions of IL. Empirical survey research combined with a rich history 
of diplomatic thought has shown American foreign policy ideology to be structured according to two 
ideological dimensions. I approach American IL policy as a species of foreign policy concerned with 
the conception of and strategies taken in relation to international legal rules and institutions, and 
therefore exhibiting the same ideological structure. A jurisdictional dimension measures whether 
policy is primarily concerned with establishing and exercising American power through international 
institutions, or conversely whether it prefers to advance US foreign policy interests through domestic 
law and institutions. A second values dimension measures whether US policy is constructed to 
promote the values of individual liberty through law, or whether it is used primarily to promote illiberal 
values of national security or non-universal cultural values. Accordingly IL policy can be located along 
an internationalist-nationalist dimension and a crosscutting liberal-illiberal dimension which together 
form four ideal policy types. I term these Liberal Internationalism, Illiberal Internationalism, Liberal 
Nationalism and Illiberal Nationalism. 
 These four ideal types set the universe of legal conceptions capable of structuring American 
IL policy, and the limits to engagement with global counterparts. The ideal types are treated not as 
mere policy positions, but as expressions of law itself. American jurisprudence is distinctive for 
theorising IL as a process of achieving international policy objectives, rather than as a body or rules 
and doctrines. American policymakers acknowledge that politics is integral to the functioning of IL, 
with the objective being not to eliminate politics but rather to foster the right sort of politics within law. 
The ideal types, including legalism, are accordingly applied to reinterpret the classic conception of the 
rule of law comprised of three elements which, when translated to the global level, are concerned 
with: developing non-arbitrary global governance; defining equality under IL; and the ordering of 
international legal power. Each element of the rule of law has been interpreted in a distinctive form by 
the competing ideologies, thus establishing a clearly structured contest over the principles for 
designing and developing global legal institutions. 
This therefore becomes, not a story of political power challenging legal principle, but a story of 
competing understandings of power constituting multiple meanings of the rule of law. It is 
hypothesised that American legal policymakers will systematically contradict legalist principles while 
adhering to the structure of the four ideal types. Competition between these legal conceptions may at 
times frustrate a coherent IL policy, but this does not deny the essential contest as one within law 
rather than one against law. The implication for the case of the ICC is that political interests are 
imbued into the law such that even principled commitment to a court designed in accordance with the 
rule of IL will mean different things to differently situated legal policymakers. The battle identified by 
Sands and others is thus one often fought between policymakers guided by legal principles that are 
equally clear and deeply entrenched, but are fundamentally incompatible. Entreaties for the US to 
abandon parochialism and accept the rule of law rely on an artificial understanding of the nature of 
legal ideals. 
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 This intervention is not intended as the basis for a normative argument: that because US 
policymakers’ divergent legal conceptions demonstrate IL is radically contested, legal scholars and 
practitioners should yield to American conceptions. The study could well be used to make that 
argument, with Michael Glennon being one prominent example of an American legal scholar arguing 
that what IL “should look like must be a function of what it can look like.”31
 
 Conversely, the insights of 
this thesis are equally valid for those who wish to understand American policy in order to challenge its 
ideological assumptions. What I am advocating is that legal scholars and practitioners take seriously 
the proposition that American IL policy is often guided by sincerely held beliefs about the nature of IL 
and its role in global governance, but that these conceptions are not those articulated in conventional 
legal scholarship. Identifying a clear ideological structure to American legal conceptions allows 
proponents and challengers alike to move beyond critiquing American policy in the negative (in terms 
of what principles US policymakers have contravened) to a positive account of the distinct principles 
setting American legal policymakers apart. Creating a particular global legal order will be more 
effectively achieved when advocates appreciate that simply asserting legalist conceptions of the rule 
of law is limited not merely by preponderant American power, but by the transformation of power into 
legal ideals. 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW POLICY 
The object of analysis in this thesis is American international law policy. This is the specific form of 
foreign policy concerned with the conception of and strategies taken in relation to international legal 
rules and institutions. Framing the research in this way requires some explanation, as it is not the 
standard approach to analyse American international legal practice as a species of foreign policy, 
while the term itself is not one that appears in the literature.32 The dominant methodology in legal 
research remains “doctrinal analysis” which directly focuses on doctrines of IL as the object of 
analysis.33 This is defined as “research which provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing 
a particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty and, 
perhaps, predicts future developments,”34 and the use of “interpretive methods in order to 
systematically expose the law and to find out what the law is.”35
                                               
31 Glennon, Michael J., ‘Why the Security Council Failed’ (2003) 82 Foreign Affairs 16 at 31, original emphasis. See also Krisch, 
Nico, ‘More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in International Law’ in Michael Byers & Georg 
Nolte (ed), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 174-175; 
Bradford, Anu & Eric A. Posner, ‘Universal Exceptionalism in International Law’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 1 
at 6 
 In a strict sense the methodology 
treats law as a sealed set of norms to be analysed by reference only to its internal content. However 
questions of why the US advocates a particular “institutional design” while qualifying its support for 
32 For rare references to “Soviet” and “Russia’s international law policy” see respectively: Schweisfurth, Theodor, ‘The 
Acceptance by the Soviet Union of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the ICJ for Six Human Rights Conventions’ (1991) 2 
European Journal of International Law 110 at 117; Ginsburgs, George, From Soviet to Russian International Law: Studies in 
Continuity and Change (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998) at i 
33 Vick, Douglas W., ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 163 at 177-179; 
Hutchinson, Terry C.M. & Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17 Deakin 
Law Review 83 at 102 
34 From the “Pearce Committee” (1987), cited in Hutchinson, Terry C.M., Researching and Writing in Law (Thomson 
Reuters/Lawbook Co., 3rd ed, 2010) at 7 
35 Gelter, Martin and Kristoffel Grechenig, ‘The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. 
German Doctrinalism’ (2008) 31 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 295 at 295-296 
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another “are not susceptible to resolution through simple application of pre-existing legal principles.”36
 Foreign policy more generally has been defined as actions of government representatives 
“directed towards objectives, conditions and actors—both governmental and non-governmental—
which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy,”
 
Rather a concept is required that moves beyond doctrinal analysis to capture the influence of political 
ideas on legal doctrine. 
37 and “the strategy or 
approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external 
entities.”38 IL policy falls within these definitions for all such actions directed specifically at the 
international legal system. This is the rationale for analysing “international law policy” as a compound 
concept concerned with the structure of political ideas about legal obligation. The concept necessarily 
weakens the conceptual bright-line between law and politics, but a distinction can nevertheless be 
maintained. Harold Lasswell, a cofounder of the “New Haven School” of jurisprudence,39 memorably 
defined politics as the determination of “who gets what, when, how.”40
 
 In that sense IL is undeniably a 
form of politics, since its rules and institutions represent the ongoing bargains between states about 
how to allocate international rights and resources. Yet the concept of the rule of IL invokes an ideal of 
foreign policy made by reference to principles external to the immediate objectives of policy itself. In 
this sense, what distinguishes IL policy from general foreign policy is an ongoing commitment to 
reconciling policy with obligations established by international legal rules and institutions. The lens of 
ideology may cause policymakers to receive the reach and depth of obligations in sharply divergent 
ways. But commitment to foreign policy that makes its terms with processes of the international legal 
system remains the necessary foundation for any conception of the rule of IL. Conversely, truly 
lawless foreign policy is that in which policymakers lack any conception of international legal 
obligations, and any commitment to engaging with institutions and rules in those terms. To 
demonstrate the value of the IL policy concept I will first consider the current state and purposes of 
interdisciplinary research between IL and IR. From this it can be seen that, even on IL scholarship’s 
own terms, the integration of empirical insights of political science will significantly strengthen legal 
analysis. 
Interdisciplinary Research 
In one sense it seems desirable to approach this project by attempting a synthesis speaking to the 
disciplines of both IL and IR. The objective of interdisciplinary research, however, is not to dissolve 
disciplinary identity, but instead to situate research within a distinct discipline, and then to enhance 
that scholarship by arbitrating insights from another.41
                                               
36 Wippman, David, ‘The International Criminal Court’ in Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) at 153 
 IL and IR are prime examples of disciplines that 
37 Carlsnaes, Walter, ‘Foreign Policy’ in Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons Walter Carlsnaes (ed), Handbook of International 
Relations (SAGE Publications, 2002) at 335 
38 Hudson, Valerie M., ‘The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis’ in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield & Tim Dunne (ed), 
Foreign policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 12 
39 See Chapter 2 infra 
40 Lasswell, Harold D., Politics, Who Gets What, When, How (Peter Smith, 1950) 
41 Vick, Douglas W., ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 163 at 165 
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share an overlapping “territory,” but are separated by distinct “tribal cultures.”42 The shared territory is 
a fundamental concern with forms of governance in the international system.43 But, as this thesis 
demonstrates, they have generally approached the task armed with divergent epistemologies and 
agendas. It is therefore important to emphasise that legal scholarship most closely resembles my 
interest in the norms and legal obligations guiding American policymakers. Although the present 
research is indeed based on key methods and insights drawn from political science, a consequence 
of “disciplinary identity politics”44 is that interdisciplinary work is most valued where it conforms to the 
conventions and culture of a distinct discipline rather than attempting to straddle many.45
A further reason for this distinction is to avoid the pitfall in interdisciplinary research of 
reproducing shallow understandings of another discipline. Drawing usefully on the insights of an 
adjoining discipline requires a level of literacy in that field sufficient to avoid caricatured 
understandings that defeat the benefits of collaboration.
 Accordingly, 
for reasons of both analytical substance and academic convention, this thesis remains a work of 
interdisciplinary legal scholarship. 
46 A threshold requirement is thus that 
interdisciplinary legal research clearly circumscribes what type of knowledge is being brought in from 
political science.47 Much of this thesis builds upon the “Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau” (WHR) model of 
foreign policy beliefs which was constructed primarily through large-N survey research, and 
regression analysis of statistical data.48
 
 The focus of this thesis is not on testing the robustness of the 
model, which requires specialised knowledge appropriately reserved for political science. Consistent 
with the guidelines for interdisciplinary research set out here, the structure of the WHR model is 
instead taken as adequately established by an extensive literature, with the focus rather on 
determining the fit between the given model and American IL policy as a specific form of foreign 
policy. The WHR typology is an empirically grounded representation of foreign policy beliefs, but with 
the complexity of those beliefs broken down into four ideal types based on two dimensions. These 
discrete elements resemble those that often comprise legal doctrine and are therefore sufficiently 
parsimonious for integration into legal scholarship. In this way empirical insights are translated into a 
comprehensible form with which lawyers can usefully engage. 
International Law and International Relations Scholarship 
Historical cycles of convergence and divergence between these disciplines have received extensive 
treatment within legal scholarship. Louis Henkin’s landmark text How Nations Behave begins by 
lamenting the mutual impoverishment caused by an ongoing “dialogue de sourds” between lawyer 
                                               
42 Becher, Tony & Paul Trowler, Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual Inquiry and the Cultures of Disciplines (Open 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2001) at 25 & 60. Beck questions whether the distinction between the two disciplines is even real, 
and therefore whether the concept of “interdisciplinary scholarship” is useful as a category: Beck, Robert J., ‘International Law 
and International Relations Scholarship’ in David Armstrong (ed), Routledge Handbook of International Law (Routledge, 2009) 
at 13-14 
43 Ku, Charlotte, International Law, International Relations, and Global Governance (Routledge, 2012) at 4 
44 The term is from Wight, Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) at 1-2 
45 See Becher, Tony & Paul Trowler, Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual Inquiry and the Cultures of Disciplines (Open 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2001) at 45-47 
46 Vick, Douglas W., ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 163 at 185 
47 Rhode, Deborah L., ‘Legal Scholarship’ (2001) 115 Harvard Law Review 1327 at 1340 
48 See Chapter 3 infra 
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and diplomat.49 Given that the two disciplines appear to be looking at the same subject matter, it is 
tempting to compare the division to the fable of blind persons each feeling isolated parts of an 
elephant, but with none seeing and understanding the complete animal.50 Critics argue that the 
traditional organisational structure of the disciplines has sometimes come at the expense of 
substance, resulting in a “fragmentation of knowledge.”51 The academic response can be seen in a 
growing body of review articles tracking the state of disciplinary collaboration and mapping out areas 
for joint future research.52
 There are nevertheless important and substantive differences that justify some elements of the 
traditional division of labour. Law continues to address the normativity of interstate conduct in a way 
unique from other disciplines. Keohane characterised the difference as a case of “Two Optics”: The 
“instrumentalist” optic of political science sees law as a tool designed by and reproducing states’ 
material interests, while the “normative” optic of IL treats legal norms as an independent influence on 
state behaviour.
  
53 Charlotte Ku emphasises that each discipline serves a distinct but complementary 
function in developing the rule of IL. For Ku, these “are distinct disciplines because their fundamental 
objectives differ. In international relations, the objective is to understand behaviour. In international 
law, the objective is to direct behaviour.”54 Specifically this involves legal scholars identifying and 
articulating which norms and doctrines have achieved the status of law, while leaving explanations of 
state behaviour to the realm of IR.55
 The real value of interdisciplinary research is where legal analysis relies on assumptions about 
matters outside law’s own field that cannot be explained according to legal methodology. In these 
cases the methods of political science (and IR specifically) can provide an account of the context and 
effects of the law that enhances the unique analysis of legal scholarship. Abbott argues that “IR is not 
a ‘legal method’” but that when “coupled with the study of law and legal institutions...it can be the 
 
                                               
49 “Dialogue of the deaf”: Henkin, Louis, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (Columbia University Press, 2nd ed, 
1979) at 2-4. See also Abbott, Kenneth W., ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers’ 
(1989) 14 Yale Journal of International Law 335 at 337-340 
50 The story originated in the Indian Subcontinent but is well known in Western literature: 
“So, oft in theologic wars 
The disputants, I ween, 
Rail on in utter ignorance 
Of what each other mean, 
And prate about an Elephant 
Not one of them has seen!” 
 
From Saxe, John G., ‘The Blind Man and the Elephant: A Hindoo Fable,’ The Poems of John Godfrey Saxe: Complete In One 
Volume (Ticknor and Fields, 1868) at 259-261 
51 Vick, Douglas W., ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 163 at 170 
52 Abbott, Kenneth W., ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers’ (1989) 14 Yale Journal 
of International Law 335; Slaughter Burley, Anne-Marie, ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’ 
(1993) 87 American Journal of International Law 205; Keohane, Robert O., ‘International Relations and International Law: Two 
Optics’ (1997) 38 Harvard International Law Journal 487; Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Andrew S. Tulumello & Stepan Wood, 
‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship’ (1998) 92 American 
Journal of International Law 367; Beck, Robert J., ‘International Law and International Relations Scholarship’ in David 
Armstrong (ed), Routledge Handbook of International Law (Routledge, 2009); Raustiala, Kal & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’ in Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons Walter Carlsnaes (ed), 
Handbook of International Relations (SAGE Publications, 2002); Cox, David & Andrew O’Neil, ‘The Unhappy Marriage Between 
International Relations Theory and International Law’ (2008) 20 Global Change, Peace & Security 201; Hafner-Burton, Emilie 
M., David G. Victor, Yonatan Lupu, ‘Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the Field’ (2012) 106 
American Journal of International Law 47; Irish, Adam, Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl, ‘Bridging the International Law-
International Relations Divide: Taking Stock of Progress’ (2013) 41 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 357 
53 Keohane, Robert O., ‘International Relations and International Law: Two Optics’ (1997) 38 Harvard International Law Journal 
487. See also Kennedy, David, ‘The Disciplines of International Law and Policy’ (1999) 12 Leiden Journal of International Law 9 
at 103 
54 Ku, Charlotte, International Law, International Relations, and Global Governance (Routledge, 2012) at 26 
55 Ibid at 21-22 
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cornerstone for a deeper understanding of international governance.”56 Precisely because of legal 
scholarship’s necessary distance from empirical methods it remains reliant on social science to 
“provide an understanding of the forces that act upon the legal system and of the impact of legal 
decisions.”57 In this sense “legal scholars are not shopping for a methodology, but for a 
correspondence in subject matter.”58
By this logic interdisciplinary research becomes valid where legal scholarship is assessed on 
its own terms and deficiencies are revealed in areas addressed by political science. A driving purpose 
of legal scholarship is to specify the rights and obligations of states to advance an international rule of 
law. The necessary correlative of this task is that legal scholarship requires some understanding of 
how norms are actually received within a named state and what status they hold for legal 
policymakers. For a universal conception of the rule of IL to be fully realised it would require that all 
states internalise its constitutive norms in identical form, as part of their own normative commitments, 
and that foreign policy be structured to promote this ideal both domestically and internationally.
 
59 It is 
clear that to the extent that states do internalise rule of law norms it is not in a theoretically pure form, 
but rather in a form received through a state’s particular interests, culture, historical experience, and 
ideology. These influences “condition and limit the range of options viewed by the participants in the 
process as possible” and can include “shared notions of what legal institutions ought to look like.”60
For Hutchinson doctrinal research is best seen as a two-part process in which the researcher 
first locates sources of law, and then interprets and analyses this “text.”
 
Assessing the meaning of the rule of IL among US policymakers is not a theoretical question, but an 
empirical one of what these influences are. It is here that doctrinal approaches to legal scholarship 
exhibit blind-spots by virtue of being divorced from political science. 
61 In this way the method is 
clearly distinguished from empirical and evidence-based methods. The researcher is not involved in 
observing social phenomena, but rather in correctly identifying authoritative sources and then critically 
analysing the internal rules and doctrines contained in those sources.62 This method is defensible 
where the objective is merely stating what the law is in a given context, irrespective of its political 
status. However in the specific case of analysing contradictions in American IL policy, it is clear that 
legal scholarship is interested in more than merely declaring legal rules. A basic feature distinguishing 
legal scholarship from the natural or social sciences is that it is explicitly prescriptive. Doctrinal 
analysis is used to identify the content of law for the purpose of influencing policymakers in the 
ongoing development of the legal system.63
In the case of American IL policy, it becomes crucial that legal scholars understand the 
structure of world views that cause legal obligations to be systematically interpreted in ways different 
 
                                               
56 Abbott, Kenneth W., ‘International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal 
Conflict’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 361 at 379 
57 Rubin, Edward L., ‘Law and the Methodology of Law’ (1997) Wisconsin Law Review 521 at 521 & 553 
58 Ibid at 553 
59 See Franck, Thomas M., ‘The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an age of Power 
Disequilibrium’ (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 88 at 91 
60 Wippman, David, ‘The International Criminal Court’ in Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The Politics of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) at 158 
61 Hutchinson, Terry C.M. & Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ (2012) 17 Deakin 
Law Review 83 at 110 
62 Ibid at 114-115 
63 Rubin, Edward L., ‘Law and the Methodology of Law’ (1997) Wisconsin Law Review 521 at 542 & 546 
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from universal legal conceptions.64
International law in particular is not a self-contained abstraction, or even a distant star for nations to steer by. It 
affords a framework, a pattern, a fabric for international society, grown out of relations in turn. The law that is made or 
left unmade reflects the political forces effective in the system. Law that is made is a force in international affairs, but 
its influence can be understood only in the context of other forces governing the behaviour of nations and their 
governments.
 This engagement with empirical factors is especially important for 
international legal scholarship, which depends on an understanding of political context to be effective. 
For this reason Henkin reminded international lawyers that: 
65
 
 
In the case of American foreign policy these “other forces” include American foreign policy ideology. 
For legal scholarship to meet its normative objectives it will be most effective where it takes account 
of the ideological structures through which legal norms are received, and moreover, is able to specify 
how those structures modify the design and development of law. 
The value of importing the insights of political science becomes evident at the stage of 
applying legal analysis to understand and influence actual US legal practice. Conceptions of IL are 
relevant to two tasks for legal scholars and practitioners engaging with the US. The first is in 
achieving a meeting of minds about the proper role of IL in global governance and what form the 
international legal system should take. Policymakers internationally help construct the architecture of 
the international legal system through every legally relevant foreign policy action taken. These actions 
range from involvement in the negotiation of treaties, debates over the role of the UN, responses to 
the legal behaviour of other states, to the stance toward IL in domestic courts. This process goes to 
the heart of establishing a clear understanding between participants about the meaning of the rule of 
IL. The second task is then assessing the probability and extent of US compliance with these 
institutions and rules. Raustiala and Slaughter define compliance as “a state of conformity or identity 
between an actor’s behaviour and a specified rule.”66
 
 Whether the US is likely to comply with 
international legal obligations will depend in part on whether there is any disparity between the design 
and obligations created by legal institutions and American conceptions of the proper function of IL. 
Where legal scholarship has a clear conception of the structure of competing IL concepts influencing 
American policymakers it will be able to better explain why the US is likely to comply and endorse 
legal developments in specific areas of IL, and why it is less likely to do so in others. For both tasks 
the objectives of international legal scholarship will be served by a clear understanding of how 
American policymakers conceive the international legal system compared to other states, and 
therefore what strategies international lawyers should adopt to most effectively engage with the US to 
strengthen the rule of IL. 
Foreign Policy Analysis 
Having set out the rationale for undertaking interdisciplinary research, and the parameters of what IL 
scholarship can gain by drawing upon the insights of IR, I now turn to consider what specific IR 
                                               
64 Ibid at 545 
65 Henkin, Louis, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (Columbia University Press, 2nd ed, 1979) at 4-5 
66 Raustiala, Kal & Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’ in Thomas Risse & Beth 
A. Simmons Walter Carlsnaes (ed), Handbook of International Relations (SAGE Publications, 2002) at 539 
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content would actually meet these objectives. The puzzle being addressed is contradictory American 
legal behaviour and how this is explained by the structure of legal policymakers’ ideas about the 
nature of IL and the international legal system. As such, I am interested in IR scholarship that directly 
analyses the beliefs of decision-makers. Mainstream theories of IR do not focus on such 
particularised frameworks for analysing the foreign policy of a named state, but rather strive for 
generalisable principles of state behaviour.67 The most well-established of these is Kenneth Waltz’s 
parsimonious theory of neorealism.68 This theory argues that the key determinant of state behaviour 
is not the identity of named states, but the structure of the international system comprised of states as 
“like units.”69 The idiosyncrasies of domestic institutions, personalities and, in particular, ideas, are 
excluded from the concept of structure, yielding a billiard ball conception of states. Neorealism is thus 
underdetermining if the focus of inquiry is on understanding particular decisions in American foreign 
policy. For that reason Waltz explicitly disavowed that neorealism was a theory of foreign policy.70 He 
explained only “why states similarly placed behave similarly despite their internal differences.” A 
specific theory of foreign policy was instead required where the objective was to “explain why states 
similarly placed in a system behave in different ways.”71
 My research turns to the IR subfield of FPA, which is so designated because it is committed to 
the unit level of analysis; eschewing questions of what behaviours exist between states in favour of 
analysing how these behaviours are determined by what happens within a state’s foreign policy 
processes.
  
72 This level of analysis aims for idiographic analyses of particular states, aiming to 
understand the key variables in specific cases. For this reason FPA provides a promising avenue for 
integrating ideas about IL as causal explanations into the existing literature. It is after all at this “actor-
specific” level that legal beliefs necessarily exist.73 Valerie Hudson argues that the rationality 
assumptions of IR theory have eroded the theoretical foundations of the mainstream discipline. FPA 
redresses this weakness through its assumption that “human decision-makers acting singly or in 
groups are the ground of all that happens in international relations.” This permits development of 
theories capable of encompassing the identity and ideas motivating foreign policymakers in a named 
state. The agency of “human decision-makers” is thus placed at the centre of theory in 
contradistinction to the structural focus of conventional IR.74
                                               
67 See Singer, J. David, ‘The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations’ (1961) 14 World Politics 77 
 This yields a further distinction in FPA’s 
68 Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979). See for example Rose, Gideon, ‘Neoclassical 
Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’ (1998) 51 World Politics 144 at note 1; Freyberg-Inan, Annette, Ewan Harrison & 
Patrick James, ‘What Way Forward for Contemporary Realism?’ in Annette Freyberg-Inan, Ewan Harrison & Patrick James 
(ed), Rethinking Realism in International Relations: Between Tradition and Innovation (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009) 
at 4 
69 See Mearsheimer, John J., ‘Structural Realism’ in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith (ed), International Relations 
Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2007) at 72 
70 Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979) at 71-72; Waltz, Kenneth N., ‘International Politics Is 
Not Foreign Policy’ (1996) 6 Security Studies 54; Elman, Colin, ‘Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign 
Policy?’ (1996) 6 Security Studies 7 at 37 
71 Waltz, Kenneth N., ‘International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy’ (1996) 6 Security Studies 54 at 54. Emphasis added 
72 See Walker, Stephen G., ‘Foreign Policy Analysis and Behavioral International Relations’ in Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici 
& Mark Schafer (ed), Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International 
Relations (Routledge, 2011) 
73 Hudson, Valerie M., ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations’ (2005) 1 
Foreign Policy Analysis 1 at 2 
74 Ibid at 2-3 
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focus on “decision-making” rather than “out-comes.”75
microcosm of the variety possible in a given society. Culture, history, geography, economics, political institutions, 
ideology, demographics, and innumerable other factors shape the societal context in which the decision-maker 
operates.
 As Hudson argues, the mind of each decision-
maker under analysis is a: 
76
Many of the theoretical insights of the major IR debates have been operationalised within FPA, with 
no single theory defining the subfield. The role for ideas in FPA is indebted to IR’s theorisation about 
informational, cognitive and institutional limitations of decision-makers. However, in the subfield, these 
idiosyncrasies become the variations to be explained, rather than anomalies to an assumed mode of 
rational state behaviour.
 
77
The advantages of arbitrating FPA insights into legal scholarship aligns precisely with Ku’s 
observation that law is limited to making “broad propositions with regard to governance” but that 
social science is needed to: 
 As a whole, FPA provides a rich literature on methodological approaches to 
understanding how ideas matter in foreign policy. 
test and to understand law’s specific effects. We realize more and more that the functionality of a governing unit may 
differ dramatically in different contexts. It is therefore important to create a mode of inquiry that can explain the 
behaviour of actors at a fine grained level, but still maintain the ability to enhance understanding of the broader system 
within which these actions take place.78
 
 
The FPA approach directly addresses the question of why American IL policy exhibits contradictions 
at this “fine grained level.” The Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau typology of foreign policy beliefs moves 
beyond not only legal methodology, but IR itself in seeking to answer questions about legal policy 
outcomes. James Rosenau is himself considered a founder of the FPA subfield, by virtue of his early 
call to integrate system level with actor-specific theories in IR.79 Rosenau realised this approach in the 
surveys conducted in conjunction with Wittkopf and Holsti on the structure of foreign policy beliefs 
among leaders and the mass public.80 Consistent with FPA, the aim was to ground understanding of 
American foreign policy behaviour in the empirically verifiable agency of foreign policy actors. 
Researching American IL policy according to the WHR model directly incorporates policymakers’ 
ideas about legal decision-making as a causal factor. The model enables analysis at a level capable 
of drawing out particularistic elements of America’s foreign policy ideology to permit finely grained 
explanations of the current and future trajectory of IL policy.81
  
  
                                               
75 Ibid at 6. Original emphasis 
76 The “milieu of decision-making”: ibid at 10. See Sprout, Harold & Margaret Sprout, Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in 
the Context of International Politics (Princeton University Press, 1956) 
77 Hudson, Valerie M., ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations’ (2005) 1 
Foreign Policy Analysis 1 at 7 
78 Ku, Charlotte, International Law, International Relations, and Global Governance (Routledge, 2012) at 14 
79 Hudson, Valerie M., ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations’ (2005) 1 
Foreign Policy Analysis 1 at 5-6. See Rosenau, James N., ‘Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy’ in R. B. Farrell (ed), 
Approaches in Comparative and International Politics (Northwestern University Press, 1966) 
80 For an early example see Holsti, Ole R. & James N. Rosenau, ‘Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American 
Leaders’ (1979) 32 World Politics 1 
81 Hudson, Valerie M., ‘The History and Evolution of Foreign Policy Analysis’ in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield & Tim Dunne (ed), 
Foreign policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 12-13 
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Legal Policymakers 
In this study the focus turns to “legal policymakers” as a unit of analysis. Foreign policymakers more 
generally are the focus of analysis in the subfield for the epistemological reasons identified by 
Hudson.82 In the present investigation the concern is with the real people conferred with power to 
make “authoritative” decisions83 about the American government’s interests and strategy in engaging 
with IL. By treating IL policy as a specific form of general foreign policy this analysis necessarily 
encompasses legal advisers and senior foreign policymakers irrespective of legal training. Senior 
foreign policymakers within each branch of government regularly face the task of authoritatively 
deciding on the importance and role of particular international institutions and rules to America’s 
general foreign policy, both as lawyers and non-lawyers. The prevalence of lawyers among these 
senior policymakers is notable however – including half of all US Presidents and three-quarters of US 
Secretaries of State.84 Moreover, under these senior figures sit large teams of lawyers trained to 
advise on international legal obligations.85 IL policy is the primary responsibility of the Department of 
State and the Office of the Legal Adviser within.86 However, other key stakeholders include the Office 
of Legal Counsel within the Department of Justice,87 the Department of Defence and the National 
Security Council,88 each with its own team of international lawyers. Each department and body 
potentially operates according to distinct legal ideas,89 but even within departments the evidence is 
that legal advisers may hold “a diverse array of perspectives and have differing opinions as to their 
role in ensuring proper adherence to international law.”90
 The significance of identifying the role of lawyers in policymaking is that these individuals can 
be expected to adopt a distinctive approach to IL policy compared to other possible stakeholders.
 
91 
The determinacy of law, and therefore difference from general foreign policy, can be overstated in that 
IL “grades seamlessly into policy” to a far greater extent than municipal law.92 International legal 
policy is not infinitely malleable however, but must make its terms with existing structures and 
methods of international rules and institutions. Legal policymaking “has points of reference in the 
Constitution, statutes, and court precedents,” and therefore “should be more objective and reliable.”93
                                               
82 See Hudson, Valerie M. & Christopher S. Vore, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow’ (1995) 39 
Mershon International Studies Review 209 
 
International legal policymaking is thus a constrained form of policymaking which must proceed within 
83 For a discussion of policymakers as comprising a “authoritative decision unit” see: Hermann, Margaret G., ‘How Decision 
Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework’ (2001) 3 International Studies Review 47 at 48 
84 Scott, Shirley V., International Law, US Power: The United States’ Quest for Legal Security (Cambridge University Press, 
2012) at 10. For an exhaustive list see Scott’s appendix (tables 1-3) at 249-262 
85 Ibid at 10 
86 Kaye, David, ‘The Legal Bureaucracy and the Law of War’ (2006) 38 George Washington International Law Review 589 at 
591; Scharf, Michael P., ‘The Torture Lawyers’ (2009) 20 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 389 at 409; 
Scharf, Michael P. & Paul R. Williams, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of International Law and the State 
Department Legal Adviser (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at xi 
87 See Bruff, Harold H., Bad Advice: Bush’s Lawyers in the War on Terror (University Press of Kansas, 2009) at 63 at 67-71 
88 See Rothkopf, David, Running the World: The inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American 
Power (PublicAffairs, 2009) 
89 See Murphy, John F., ‘The Quivering Gulliver: US Views on a Permanent International Criminal Court’ (2000) 34 International 
Lawyer 45 at 58-59; Bruff, Harold H., Bad Advice: Bush’s Lawyers in the War on Terror (University Press of Kansas, 2009) at 
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Department Legal Adviser (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 1 
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Law Review 121 at 129 
92 Bruff, Harold H., Bad Advice: Bush’s Lawyers in the War on Terror (University Press of Kansas, 2009) at 1 
93 Ibid at 1 
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more pronounced structural limitations than general foreign policy. Former British legal adviser Daniel 
Bethlehem describes the task of being a “keeper of the bright lines”: the responsibility to protect “a 
certain core of legal rules that form the irreducible minimum of what we understand to be a society 
governed by law.”94 This distinguishes the general foreign policymaker from the international legal 
policymaker, as the latter must “ensure that, even in dangerous times, regard is given to the strategic, 
to the system of law by which we live—not only to the tactical, the operational, the imperative of the 
moment.”95 This creates unique challenges for legal policymakers, who must balance their role in 
advising government against a duty to uphold law as something other than naked politics.96 At the 
very least legal policymakers must “exercise the self-discipline of questioning the legal significance of 
their acts and, often, of providing explicit justification for those acts in legal terms.”97 The evidence is 
that US State Department Legal Advisers have not perceived their duty as merely promoting 
government interests – as they would if retained by a private client. Rather, there is recognition of “a 
special or higher professional responsibility to provide a disinterested assessment, because...advice 
is not normally tested in courts of law or by other outside checks.”98 The legal policymaker of any 
named state is engaged in a process of advancing foreign policy interests through institutions and 
rules of law that have many other masters in the form of other states, but are uniquely authoritative for 
that very reason. Particularistic state interests contend with the universal pretentions of IL so that the 
“challenge of reconciling parochialism with cosmopolitanism is thus inherent in the basic structure of 
international law.”99
 
 
 
CONTESTING POWER THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
International Criminal Courts through American History 
The project of establishing an international criminal court has a history that predates the twentieth 
century and rise of the US as a great power.100 Indeed the US actively thwarted the creation of such a 
court as early as 1919 when the prospect was raised pursuant to a provision in the Treaty of 
Versailles. The court proposed there had jurisdictional reach extending from the foot soldiers of 
Imperial Germany all the way up to Kaiser Wilhelm II but American leaders rejected the proposal as 
an unacceptable incursion on state sovereignty.101
                                               
94 Bethlehem, Daniel, ‘A Transatlantic View of International Law and Lawyers: Cooperation and Conflict in Hard Times’ (2009) 
103 American Society of International Law Proceedings 455 at 459 
 The US has nevertheless long championed the 
95 Ibid at 459 
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Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 115 at 134-135. See also Bruff, Harold H., Bad Advice: Bush’s Lawyers in the War on 
Terror (University Press of Kansas, 2009) at 74 
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Against Congress’ (1986) 71 Minnesota Law Review 461 at 491-492 
98 Scharf, Michael P. & Paul R. Williams, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of International Law and the State 
Department Legal Adviser (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 206 
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Press, 2012) at 3 
100 See Hall, Christopher K., ‘The First Proposal for a Permanent ICC’ (1998) 322 International Review of the Red Cross 57 who 
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more sweeping historical overview of international criminal law going back millennia see Bassiouni, M. Cherif, The Legislative 
History of the International Criminal Court: Introduction, Analysis, and Integrated Text of the Statute, Elements of Crimes and 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Transnational Publishers, 2005) at 3-40 
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idea of an international court for prosecuting war crimes and other breaches of IL by individuals.102 
The US strongly advocated the creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals, which 
reproduced key elements of due process available in American municipal courts. As military tribunals 
with jurisdiction over personnel only from the defeated enemies, these fell well short of the level of 
protections offered by regular civilian courts.103 Nevertheless, they were created in the face of 
considerable scepticism by British Allies who preferred a more summary treatment of defendants, and 
of Soviet leaders who relished the idea of courts only in show trial form.104
 It was in these immediate post-WWII years that the UN General Assembly commissioned and 
acted on a report by the International Law Commission (“ILC”)
 More particularly, US 
enthusiasm for the tribunals flowed from a specific strategy for augmenting its rising political power by 
fostering a rule of IL that positioned the US as the exemplar of that ideal. 
105 that recommended the creation of a 
permanent court.106 A founding statute was drafted along with a code of offences. However the 
project failed to gain adequate state support and ultimately stalled with the onset of the Cold War.107 
Despite the long history of American and ILC interest in an international criminal court, it was not until 
1989, in the waning years of the Cold War, that a resolution was passed in the UN General Assembly 
mindful of the Charter obligation of “encouraging the progressive development of international law and 
its codification.”108 The resolution called once again on the ILC to consider and report on the creation 
of a court for consideration by the General Assembly at its next session.109
Renewed enthusiasm for the criminal court proposal undoubtedly coincided with favourable 
global conditions, and most especially the perceived rise in America’s relative power at the end of the 
Cold War. This fostered an internationalist stance in the general foreign policy of both the George 
H.W. Bush (“Bush 41”) and Clinton Administrations and openness to a renewed role for IL.
  
110
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 At the 
same time, there was increased “supply” of political will brought about by the end of the Cold War 
rivalry that had hitherto overwhelmed the UN, and a related increase in “demand” for justice created 
by outbreaks in humanitarian atrocities that accompanied political fragmentation and rising 
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Department of State, in Margaret S. Pickering, Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart (ed), Digest of United States Practice in 
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nationalism. The fracturing of power that came with the end of bipolarity yielded humanitarian 
atrocities of which the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are only the most prominent examples. This 
created a new challenge of how best to secure international stability to fortify American national 
security. It was increasingly clear that only a court that addressed individual criminal responsibility 
would be able to use IL as a tool for peace and security in these cases.111 On this basis then UN 
Ambassador and later Secretary of State Madeleine Albright led efforts to create the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as the first such tribunal since Nuremberg, and 
later the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).112 Global conditions combined with the 
administration’s experience in supporting the ad hoc tribunals can be seen as both permissive and 
substantive causes of the process that ultimately produced the ICC.113
The ICC project was finally realised between June-July 1998 at the United Nations 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (“Rome 
Conference”).
 
114 One hundred and sixty states convened along with 33 international governmental 
coalitions and more than 200 nongovernmental organisations (“NGOs”).115 After negotiations lasting 
five weeks, the court was established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome 
Statute”) with jurisdiction over three crimes, and potential jurisdiction over a fourth: genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and the future crime of aggression.116
 
 On 17 July 1998, 120 states 
voted to adopt the Rome Statute, 21 states abstained and seven voted against – including the US. 
Case Selection 
The negotiation and establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court emerges as the 
leading case for testing American policymakers’ expression of commitment to the rule of IL, and 
countervailing charges of contradiction and hypocrisy. The case has been described as “perhaps the 
classic example of an interpretive challenge to observers of international law” due to inconsistent 
policy approaches.117 Schabas depicts US policy as a “muddle of arguments,”118 while Van der Vyer 
sees it as “confusing” and beset by “schizophrenia.”119 Du Plessis describes US policy as “ironic” 
where “an important element of the United States’ conception of its own national interest has been the 
development and maintenance of an international rule of law,”120
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opposing the ICC reveals “contradictory attitudes towards international adjudication.”121 The 
frustration is evident in Cherif Bassiouni’s statement after negotiations establishing the court that “the 
interests of the United States in having an ICC far outweigh the marginal and far-fetched concerns 
that have been articulated by political opponents.”122 Ambassador David Scheffer, as one of the most 
forceful advocates among US legal policymakers, has noted the contradiction of the US creating and 
associating itself with the principles of the post WWII tribunals yet appearing “awkwardly conflicted” 
with the more robust regime of the ICC. In consequence the project “has proven to be an enigma for 
Americans from its beginning to the present day.”123
What is not documented adequately in the literature is the extent to which contradictions stem 
from contestation over the very concept of the rule of IL – between key parties and the US, and 
amongst American legal policymakers themselves. Opponents of US policy have specifically 
characterised its incompatibility with the rule of IL. Van der Vyer concludes that US policy has failed to 
“uphold the rule of international law,”
 
124 Sadat perceives “a profound rejection of what makes America 
great: our deep and abiding commitment to the rule of law,”125 while British Queens Counsel Cherie 
Blair and US legal policymakers Chayes and Slaughter have all described US policy as “a high-profile 
rejection of a major initiative for the rule of law in international affairs.”126 Yet the historical record 
equally shows that American attitudes to the ICC always exhibited the influence of competing beliefs 
about the nature of IL,127 and have often been defended as a good faith commitment to the “rule of 
law in international affairs.”128
Part I of this thesis develops the theoretical framework for considering these questions. Part II 
is devoted to analysing the history of US ICC policy as a single longitudinal case in which global 
power was contested through ideologically informed conceptions of the rule of IL. The explanandum is 
therefore the apparently contradictory IL policy positions taken by the US in relation to the ICC across 
four distinct observations comprised of the Clinton administration, first and second terms of the 
George W. Bush (“Bush 43”) administration, and the Obama administration. The explanans is the 
competition between theorised ideal type conceptions of the rule of IL in each observation.
 The ICC case seeks to specify the structure of competing conceptions 
of the rule of IL according to underlying foreign policy ideologies. 
129
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global governance; defining equality under IL; and ordering international legal power. The 
interpretation of each element is theorised to be drawn from the competition between five ideal legal 
conceptions. The four ideal types of Liberal Internationalism, Illiberal Internationalism, Liberal 
Nationalism and Illiberal Nationalism have each represented a plausible alternative resonating with 
US policymakers. At the same time America’s global partners converged on key elements of legalist 
thought. 
The ICC has been selected as the strongest case for testing the research question for two 
key reasons. The first is that this is the “crucial”130 or “critical”131 case for testing the hypothesised 
influence of the competing rule of IL conceptions. The case is broadly about the ‘legalisation’ of world 
politics, which is at the forefront of debates about the global application of rule of law principles.132 
The court itself has been described as potentially “the most important institutional innovation since the 
founding of the United Nations,”133 as heralding “a new world order based on the rule of international 
law,”134 and as representing “the establishment of the rule of law in the international community.”135 
The ICC has also been the most prominent focal point for claims of contradiction and hypocrisy in 
post-Cold War American IL policy with increasing recognition that opposition to American policy has 
taken the form of “legalist” interpretations of IL.136 Czarnetzky and Rychlak have described the ICC as 
the “apotheosis” of legalism,137 while for Moyn the concept is “indispensable” for understanding the 
ICC.138
The second reason for selecting this case is that it involves multiple observations across the 
period under analysis against which the hypothesis can be tested.
 If the hypothesis of competing conceptions of the rule of IL has any validity at all, it will be 
evident in this case. 
139 The hypothesis will be most 
apparent over periods where a significant national security issue involving IL has remained constant, 
but IL policy has shifted.140
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of IL policy.141 There is general agreement in the literature that the case involves four distinct 
observations of change in the dependant variable of policy outcomes.142 The first is the policy of the 
Clinton administration in expressing in principle support for the creation of the court but opposition to 
US membership due to the court’s institutional design. The second observation is of the shift in the 
first term of the Bush 43 administration to opposing not only the design, but the very existence of an 
international court. The third observation is of acceptance of the court’s existence and limited 
cooperation during the second term of the Bush 43 administration. Finally, under the Obama 
administration, policy shifted back to in principle support for the court combined with opposition to its 
design and therefore US membership. The longitudinal case exhibitis four distinct phases which is 
important because it provides multiple opportunities to test the hypothesis that competing rule of law 
conceptions are the most significant explanation for apparent legal contradictions within each 
observation.143 This additionally allows for a form of “cross-case synthesis,” in which inferences can 
be drawn about the longitudinal influence of legal conceptions.144
The longitudinal case therefore allows testing of the hypothesis that American legal 
policymakers systematically contradict legalist principles while conforming to the structure of the four 
theorised ideal types. It will provide evidence that American IL policy is based on an established 
structure of legal beliefs as opposed to tactical decisions tailored to political circumstances. The claim 
being made for the model is that it represents all conceptions of IL capable of politically influencing 
American IL policy.
  
145 Confirming the hypothesis would challenge the conclusions of scholars such as 
Posner who identify American policymakers such as Harold Koh as “global legalists.”146
Excluded from the case is the political science question of why a particular ideology prevailed 
over another at a particular point in time and what factors caused that set of ideas to be more 
politically successful. The objective of the case is to isolate the role of competing foreign policy 
ideologies informing decision-making from variables relevant primarily to policy outcomes. The unique 
institutional structure of US government, for example, is indispensible to understanding foreign policy 
outcomes, but is considered in this study only to the extent that an identified ideology incorporates a 
preference for promoting one branch of US government over another.
 Conversely, 
the hypothesis will thus be falsified if it can be shown at any point that American policymakers did 
recognise the ideal of the rule of IL in legalist terms, but contradicted it according to extralegal 
considerations. The implication is that the ability of US and non-US policymakers alike to reach a 
common understanding of discrete elements of the rule of IL was severely limited, irrespective of 
intervening personalities or historical circumstances. 
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political and institutional pressures in order to explain the direction of shifts in general foreign 
policy.148 The present analysis is more modest in seeking to answer the legal question of what 
political beliefs informed the interpretation and development of law at designated points in time. 
Neither does the case focus on US foreign policy ideology’s influence on the ICC itself, but rather on 
demonstrating the way ideology structured US ICC policy. Certainly the analysis provides substantial 
evidence that US legal conceptions had a disproportionate influence on the ultimate design of the 
court, but that is secondary to the primary analysis of substantive beliefs about IL.149
 
 
Methodology 
Research methods must be selected to show that theorised legal beliefs actually played a causal role 
in reaching decisions and were not simply used by legal policymakers to justify those decisions. This 
is an especially onerous task in the case of ideology, which necessitates analysis “through rich 
descriptive interpretive analysis rather than through quantifiable, reproducible measurement.”150 The 
ideal in the natural sciences is to identify two cases that remain identical in all respects but one, 
thereby allowing for a controlled comparison and drawing of a causal inference for the hypothesised 
effect.151 This can be difficult to achieve in the social sciences, with each case potentially influenced 
by an unknown number of variables.152 A single case with multiple observations of the dependant 
variable can be a valid research design for this purpose provided strict criteria are met, including most 
importantly the combining of multiple research methods.153
Counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to the ICC case, with the two dimensional 
model of IL policy types immediately providing four plausible alternatives at each point in time.
 The approach employed here uses the 
four-part typology to construct a counterfactual analysis of alternative policy options for each 
observation which is analysed through the methodologies of process-tracing and congruence testing. 
154
                                               
148 Dueck, Colin, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton University Press, 
2006). See at 41 for six stages of “strategic adjustment” 
 
These alternatives can be shown to have been advocated by actual actors involved in the 
policymaking process. Each policy alternative is disaggregated further according to its interpretation 
of the three theorised elements defining the rule of IL. For each observation across the case these 
three elements are considered in turn to analyse how they were defined by competition between 
various legal conceptions. Together this equates to an extremely diverse range of possible policy 
combinations for the period under examination. Thus the single case masks fertile ground for applying 
the model to explain unique American policy positions. 
149 For an example of such an approach see Byers, Michael, ‘Preemptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of 
Legal Change’ (2003) 11 The Journal of Political Philosophy 171 
150 Appel, Hilary, ‘The Ideological Determinants of Liberal Economic Reform: The Case of Privatization’ (2000) 52 World Politics 
520 at 547 
151 George, Alexander L. & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (MIT Press, 2005) 
at 151-52 
152 See King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane & Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research 
(Princeton University Press, 1994) at 199-207 
153 See George, Alexander L. & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (MIT Press, 
2005) at 80-81; Yin, Robert K, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Sage, 2009) at 150-151 
154 See George, Alexander L. & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (MIT Press, 
2005) at 167-169. For a well known example of this methodology being applied see Khong, Yuen F., Analogies at War: Korea, 
Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton University Press, 1992) 
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The development of a counterfactual scenario brings its own methodological drawbacks, but 
is especially useful for enhancing the other research methods employed.155 The most involved task in 
demonstrating causality is showing how the independent variable of legal conceptions produced 
observed effects on the dependant variable. Here process-tracing allows for identifying the actual 
ideas of legal policymakers in order to code them according to the two dimensions and four ideal 
types.156 This task is achieved by reconstructing the process of designing and developing the ICC 
through close analysis of statements and decisions of key legal policymakers and political institutions. 
Evidence is drawn from both open source material, including public statements and recollections, 
from archival material, and from research interviews with key US policymakers. What is being looked 
for at this stage is evidence of ideology intervening at each step of the policymaking process. 
Process-tracing is crucial to overcome the problem, inherent to a typological theory, of equifinality: 
that “the same outcome can arise through different pathways.”157 It is frequently the case that the 
divergent strategic ideas of the four ideal types converge on less than four possible policies in a given 
issue area. Tracing the process of policymaking is often the only method for identifying which set of 
ideas led to an observed outcome.158
The resulting framework allows for the application of the complementary method of 
congruence testing between the observed outcomes and the alternative policy paths. The congruence 
method uses the model of IL policy types developed in this thesis to theorise the effect that each 
belief is likely to have on the dependant variable of IL policy. A typological theory as employed in this 
research sets out generalised pathways by which variables produce outcomes.
 
159 If the outcome is 
congruent with the hypothesis for each observation, this, combined with evidence from process 
tracing, will form the basis for a strong causal inference.160
 
 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Part I of the thesis considers limitations in legal scholarship’s explanations for contradictory American 
IL policy and the insights from political science capable of addressing that gap. Chapter Two 
assesses the extent to which international legal scholarship provides compelling explanations for 
distinctive American IL policy. An increasing number of analyses have approached the task drawing 
on the pedigree of a long established literature on “American exceptionalism.” Unpacking these 
approaches reveals three possible sources of idiosyncratic policy: the expected rational behaviour of 
a state with uniquely preponderant global power; distinctive American jurisprudence; and unique 
political culture forged in the nation’s historical experiences. Reviewing this literature demonstrates 
the merit in each approach, but also shows that a clearer account is needed of the relationship 
between each distinct yet clearly correlated explanation. 
                                               
155 George, Alexander L. & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (MIT Press, 2005) 
at 231 
156 Ibid at 183 
157 Ibid at 235 
158 Ibid at 254 
159 Ibid at 235 
160 Ibid at 182 & 207 
Contesting the Rule of International Law 
 
23 
 
 Chapter Three draws insights from FPA to better explain the relationship between power, 
beliefs and interests as causes of distinctive American IL policy. The focus is on “foreign policy 
ideology” as the ideational concept that best captures the transformation of power into ideas capable 
of shaping global interests. To identify ideological structure I adopt the influential four-part typology 
developed by Wittkopf, Holsti, and Rosenau and corroborated by a vast intellectual and diplomatic 
history. Reviewing that scholarship reveals an avenue for bridging contradictions between legal 
scholarship and American IL policy through four discrete foreign policy ideologies: Liberal 
Internationalism, Illiberal Internationalism, Liberal Nationalism and Illiberal Nationalism. 
 Chapter Four integrates legal scholarship’s existing explanations for contradictory US policy 
into the four-part ideological typology to develop a model of competing conceptions of the rule of IL. 
The ideal types, including legalism, are applied to reinterpret the classic conception of the rule of law 
comprised of three elements which, when translated to the global level, are concerned with: how IL 
should be developed to advance non-arbitrary global governance; the meaning of equality under IL; 
and the proper ordering of international legal power. The meaning of “coherence” becomes that a 
legal policymaker’s interpretation of one of the three elements is a reliable indicator of positions taken 
on remaining elements. 
 Part II of the thesis applies this model to the case of American ICC policy. Chapter Five 
analyses the Clinton administration (1993-2000) where US policy was characterised as contradictory 
for traversing from being the most prominent advocate of the project in the early years, to 
conspicuously voting against the final treaty establishing the court, then signing it, but warning against 
Senate ratification. I argue that the dominant conception of the rule of IL was that of Liberal 
Internationalism, combined with competing Illiberal Internationalist beliefs. Despite similar policy 
outcomes this represented a shift from the primarily Illiberal Internationalist policy of the Bush 41 
administration. Nevertheless, the design advocated by global advocates was structured by legalist 
principles not recognised by US policymakers, such that US policy appeared contradictory for 
following internally coherent ideological conceptions of IL. 
 Chapter Six considers the first term of the Bush 43 administration (2000-2004) when the US 
“unsigned” the founding ICC statute, and used a combination of domestic legislation and bilateral 
treaties to obstruct its further development. I argue that this period demonstrated a clear rejection of 
both legalist and Liberal Internationalist conceptions of the court. The dominant conception of the rule 
of IL was instead that of Illiberal Nationalism combined with elements of Illiberal Internationalism, 
leading to widespread global criticism that US policy was contrary to the rule of IL. US policymakers 
nevertheless continued to defend US compliance with legal obligations and international criminal 
justice, while opposing a court advancing the principles recognised by legalist advocates. 
 Chapter Seven turns to the second term of the Bush administration (2004-2008) which was 
characterised by more pragmatic engagement and even tacit endorsement of the court, yet continued 
to insist on legal privileges through the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”). Here I argue that 
the US expressed an Illiberal Internationalist conception that appeared more complementary with 
legalism, but remained distinct from it. Significantly, the negation of exceptionalist ideological beliefs 
by the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal led to acceptance of limited equal rights under the UNSC 
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consistent with legalism. This did, however, reinforce ideology’s controlling role in interpreting legal 
principle, and the exclusion of legalist conceptions from American IL policy formation. 
 Chapter Eight concludes analysis of the ICC by considering the first term of the Obama 
administration (2008-2012) in which there was a conspicuous “reset” of ICC policy to positive 
engagement. The US attended annual meetings for the first time and contributed substantively to 
negotiations establishing the crime of aggression. There was no formal “re-signing” of the ICC treaty 
however, the aggression definition agreed by other states was rejected, and the US continued to deny 
any prospect of becoming a member of the court. This most recent period has less material, primary 
and interpretive, on which to make absolutely firm conclusions. Nevertheless, I argue that US policy 
reflected an amalgam of ideologies, but predominantly conceived the rule of IL in Liberal 
Internationalist terms, combined with strong illiberal and nationalist beliefs. The consequence was that 
US re-engagement was always distinct from the legalist position, and thus highlighted incompatible 
legal ideals, even as all parties pledged fidelity to the rule of IL. 
 The final chapter concludes that there is compelling evidence for foreign policy ideology 
structuring distinct conceptions of the rule of IL amongst American legal policymakers, and that these 
received principles set hard limits to reaching a universal understanding of the proper design and 
development of the rule of IL. Defining the rule of IL is accordingly a dialectical process in which 
ideological visions of global order compete through the shared space of the international legal system. 
Continued commitment to this contest is evidence nevertheless of the consequence of IL as a 
framework for sustaining discourse about global power and transcendent values. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I: The Ideological Structure of American International Law Policy 
 
 CHAPTER TWO 
 
AMERICA’S “EXCEPTIONAL” INTERNATIONAL LAW POLICY 
 
 
Part I seeks to identify limitations in legal scholarship’s explanations for contradictory American policy 
and then define the insights from political science capable of addressing that gap. The following 
chapter accordingly assesses the extent to which legal scholarship provides compelling explanations 
for distinctive American IL policy. Characterising US policy as an outlier is commonplace – most 
especially in terms of a “transatlantic” divide separating America even from allies sharing the same 
Western tradition.1 An increasing number of legal analyses approach the issue by drawing on the 
pedigree of a long established literature analysing “American exceptionalism.” As a term of art in 
political science American exceptionalism refers to the idea that history and values set the country 
apart from other nations in global politics.2 That meaning will be adopted as the most historically 
grounded and analytically useful for present purposes. By comparison the concept, as more 
commonly used in legal scholarship, has narrowed principally to a pejorative shorthand for the 
American practice of seeking “exceptions” to global legal rules.3 By stripping away the explanatory 
role of “exceptionalist beliefs” these approaches thereby fail to explain why the US repeatedly 
promotes and then retreats from global legal institutions, and thereby systematically exposes itself to 
the charge of hypocrisy. By reviving the richer meaning from political science the “exceptionalism” 
label is saved from reduction to a mere tautological restatement of the primary observation that policy 
is divergent.4
Unpacking approaches in international legal scholarship reveals three possible sources of 
policy distinctiveness. The first is that of relative political power and the consequences of its unequal 
distribution in the international system. The possession of preponderant global power has created 
incentives for the US to engage in “hegemonial lawmaking” to institutionalise advantages within the 
international legal system. Here the rules and doctrines of IL are influenced both to reduce constraints 
upon the US, and to enable greater global autonomy. This dynamic produces legal policy that 
diverges from states with less capacity and therefore incentive to reshape IL. This level of analysis 
matches that of conventional IR scholarship, and therefore relies on the same assumption of 
consistent state rationality. Such an approach replicates the limitation of being unable to account for 
specific policy outcomes, and therefore legal contradictions. 
 
                                               
1 Taft IV, William H. & Frances G. Burwell, Law and the Lone Superpower: Rebuilding a Transatlantic Consensus on 
International Law (Policy Paper, The Atlantic Council of the United States, April, 2007); Bellinger III, John B., ‘Reflections on 
Transatlantic Approaches to International Law’ (2007) 17 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 513; Bethlehem, 
Daniel, ‘A Transatlantic View of International Law and Lawyers: Cooperation and Conflict in Hard Times’ (2009) 103 American 
Society of International Law Proceedings 455 
2 See Lipset, Seymour M., American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (W.W. Norton, 1996) 
3 Gunn, Jeremy T., ‘American Exceptionalism and Globalist Double Standards: A More Balanced Alternative’ (2002) 41 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 137 at 138-139, n.9 
4 For a comparison of these alternative uses of the term that reaches the same conclusion see: Thimm, Johannes, ‘American 
Exceptionalism – Conceptual Thoughts and Empirical Evidence’ (2007) 13 Paper für die Tagung der Nachwuchsgruppe 
“Internationale Politik” der DVPW 14 
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The second explanation is an institutional one, in the form of distinctive American 
jurisprudence in the teaching and practice of IL. Accounts by American scholars and policymakers 
identify their most distinctive jurisprudential contribution in redefining IL as a policy process rightfully 
encompassing political considerations. The basic rejection of the assumption that IL exists separately 
from international politics translates into an approach to law less as formalised rules and doctrines, 
and more as a process embedded in a broader political and social context. Such jurisprudence can 
indeed facilitate distinctive outcomes in cases where policy overrides formal rules. However the 
conception of law as policy ultimately relies on an equally generalised explanation that cannot 
account for specific outcomes appearing to follow contradictory logics. Moreover, there is a clear 
nexus between this jurisprudence and hegemonic power, with the imprecision of a policy orientation 
complementing hegemonic impulses. 
The final explanation for difference is a cultural one. Scholarship has identified the contours of 
American IL policy with a unique political culture forged in the nation’s historical experiences. This 
comes closest to the insights of exceptionalist literature by identifying the importance of beliefs in 
American difference for explaining divergent legal policies. Yet, as with the institutional account, 
American cultural beliefs correlate with power based explanations in a way that indicates deep-seated 
connections between ideas and interests. Reading these accounts together suggests that a clearer 
account is required of the relationship between distinct yet correlated explanations. 
 
 
THE TURN TO AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
In 2013 “American Exceptionalism” became a focal point in Sino-US wrangling over alleged use of 
chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War. President Barack Obama advocated a military intervention 
over the top of strict legal prohibitions against the use of force outside of UNSC authorisation. To 
make this case he turned to American “ideals and principles” as the more fundamental source of 
legitimacy. For the end of “enforcing” international agreements Obama argued: “I believe we should 
act. That’s what makes America different. That’s what makes us exceptional.”5
It is extremely dangerous to encourage people to see themselves as exceptional, whatever the motivation. There are 
big countries and small countries, rich and poor, those with long democratic traditions and those still finding their way 
to democracy. Their policies differ, too. We are all different, but when we ask for the Lord’s blessings, we must not 
forget that God created us equal.
 These assertions and 
the attempt to “bypass the United Nations” were rejected by Russian President Vladimir Putin in the 
New York Times: 
6
 
 
The high-level conversation on exceptionalism concluded that month when Obama responded in the 
UN General Assembly that: “Some may disagree, but I believe America is exceptional – in part 
                                               
5 Obama, Barack H., Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria (10 September, 2013) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-nation-syria> 
6 Putin, Vladimir, V., ‘A Plea for Caution From Russia: What Putin Has to Say to Americans About Syria,’ New York Times (11 
September, 2013) <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html> 
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because we have shown a willingness through the sacrifice of blood and treasure to stand up not only 
for our own narrow self-interests, but for the interests of all.”7
References to “American Exceptionalism” have become ubiquitous in discussions of US 
foreign policy, with its use increasing exponentially in recent years.
  
8 In this process the term has 
swollen into a catchall explanation for every idiosyncrasy in American politics, and therefore an 
adequate explanation of less and less. The term is treated as if self-explanatory in accordance with its 
ordinary dictionary definition of “the condition of being different from the norm.”9 On this reading every 
deviation in American foreign policy from the behaviour of comparative countries could be seen as 
“exceptional.” More usefully defined, American exceptionalism is “the notion that the United States 
was born in, and continues to embody, qualitative differences from other nations. Understanding other 
nations will not help in understanding it; understanding it will only mislead in understanding them.”10 
Lipset’s leading work on the topic claimed that the concept properly used does not mean that 
“America is better than other countries or has a superior culture.” Rather it encapsulates the idea that 
America is “qualitatively different, that it is an outlier.”11 Yet it is clear that the idea has always been 
accompanied by a notion that the distinctive values of American political culture do offer a superior 
alternative to extant values.12
The term resonates by virtue of the long history of exceptionalist analysis, often traced back 
to the 19th century writings of de Tocqueville.
 
13 The defining formulation was in John Winthrop’s much 
quoted 1630 invocation that the American people “shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people 
are upon us.”14 The core of exceptionalist thought is the idea that the founding of the American polity 
marked a break from the values and practices of the Old World.15 Politics in the European continent 
were marked by relentless wars and the dominance of mercenary political interests over moral 
purpose. For Anatol Lieven “the most important root” of exceptionalist ideas is the geographic and 
cultural separation of America from the destructive experiences of war and revolution that beset 
Europe.16
                                               
7 Obama, Barack H., Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly (24 September, 2013) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly> 
 For the colonists of New England, the confluence of religious puritan values and secular 
enlightenment ideals of human progress forged the belief that America had a uniquely reforming role 
in its global relations, and thereby an exceptional place in history. In his 1776 rallying cry for 
8 Terrance McCoy of the The Atlantic found the term in national publications only 457 times for the 20 years up to 2000; 2,558 
times during the next ten years; and approximately 4,172 times when he published these findings in March 2012: See McCoy, 
Terrence, ‘How Joseph Stalin Invented ‘American Exceptionalism’,’ The Atlantic (2012) 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/03/how-joseph-stalin-invented-american-exceptionalism/254534/> 
9 Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary and Thesaurus <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/exceptionalism>. Notably, since this chapter was first drafted, the Merriam-Webster definition has been 
expanded to include a second meaning: “also: a theory expounding the exceptionalism especially of a nation or region” 
10 Shafer, Byron E., ‘American Exceptionalism’ (1999) 2 Annual Review of Political Science 445 at 446 
11 Lipset, Seymour M., American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (W.W. Norton, 1996) at 18. Lipset’s well known 
“American creed” sets out the exceptional elements of political culture as “liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and 
laissez-faire”: at 19 
12 Hoffman, Stanley, ‘The American Style: Our Past and Our Principles’ (1967-68) 46 Foreign Affairs 362 at 363. Anatol Lieven 
makes this point through a survey finding that “six in ten Americans in 2003 believed that “our culture is superior to others,” 
compared – against every stereotype of the snobby French – to only three in ten French people”: Lieven, Anatol, America Right 
or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 1st paperback ed, 2005) at 19-20 
13 De Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America (Knopf, 1945) 
14 Cited in Kennedy, John F., ‘“City Upon a Hill” Speech,’ Miller Center, University of Virginia (9 January, 1961) 
<http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3364> 
15 Ross, Dorothy, The Origins of American Social Science (Cambridge University Press, 1992) at 26 
16 Lieven, Anatol, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 1st paperback ed, 
2005) at 30; Whitcomb, Roger S., The American Approach to Foreign Affairs: An Uncertain Tradition (Praeger Publishers, 
1998) at 9 
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revolution Thomas Paine expressed the conviction that “we have it in our power to begin the world 
over again.”17
Because this thesis focuses on the influence of foreign policy ideology over policymaking, the 
truth or otherwise of appeals to normative superiority is not relevant.
 
18 What matters is that there has 
been “throughout American history a strong belief that the United States is an exceptional nation, not 
only unique but also superior among nations.”19 As long as policymakers genuinely hold such beliefs, 
and employ them in formulating and garnering support for policy, then “exceptionalism is a genuine 
and confirmedly empirical phenomenon.”20 Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explicitly 
affirmed her belief in American exceptionalism, which underpinned her frequent portrayal of the US as 
“the indispensible nation.”21 Irrespective of the veracity of the concept, she remained equally aware of 
the term’s political power. Acknowledging global allies’ negative associations with the idea of 
“American exceptionalism,” she defended her invocation of the belief for its power “to stir a sense of 
pride and responsibility among Americans, so that we would be less reluctant to take on problems.”22
 
 
In other words, whatever the empirical basis for the claim, it was a concept with real political influence 
in directing political actions. Starkly divergent formulations have been propounded under the 
exceptionalist rubric, but the core belief that America is exceptional persists and shapes discourse at 
the highest levels of political power. 
Exceptionalist Analysis in Legal Scholarship 
Legal scholarship has seized upon the concept with particular vigour, with critical assessments of 
American IL policy as beset by “exceptionalism” becoming an article of faith. The topic has likely been 
framed in this way precisely because it rides on the pedigree and familiarity of these ideas in 
American domestic and foreign politics. The problem is that adoption of the term in legal scholarship 
has often been disconnected from the insights and nuances of the rich body of thought giving the 
concept analytical worth. In legal scholarship the concept has primarily narrowed to a disapproving 
reference to a specific point of difference in US IL policy, which is its sometimes contradictory or even 
hypocritical nature – a policy of “international law for others and not for itself.”23
                                               
17 Cited in Reagan, Ronald W., ‘Ronald Reagan’s Announcement for Presidential Candidacy,’ Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library & Museum (13 November, 1979) <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/11.13.79.html> 
 A representative 
example is Hilary Charlesworth’s definition of exceptionalism to mean that “while other states should 
comply with international legal norms, it is not appropriate to subject the United States to the same 
18 For empirical research sceptical of the truth of exceptionalist claims see Lepgold, Joseph & Timothy McKeown, ‘Is American 
Foreign Policy Exceptional? An Empirical Analysis’ (1995) 110 Political Science Quarterly 369. See also Holsti, Karl J., 
‘Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy: Is it Exceptional?’ (2011) 17 European Journal of International Relations 381 
19 McCrisken, Trevor B., American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam: US Foreign Policy Since 1974 (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003) at 4 
20 Shafer, Byron E., ‘American Exceptionalism’ (1999) 2 Annual Review of Political Science 445 at 446; McCrisken, Trevor B., 
American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam: US Foreign Policy Since 1974 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) at 4-6 
21 Albright attributes the phrase to President Clinton from the period when she served as UN Ambassador: Albright, Madeleine 
K., Madam Secretary: A Memoir (Macmillan, 2003) at 506 
22 For empirical research that is sceptical of the truth of exceptionalist claims see Lepgold, Joseph & Timothy McKeown, ‘Is 
American Foreign Policy Exceptional? An Empirical Analysis’ (1995) 110 Political Science Quarterly 369 
23 Crawford, James, ‘International Law and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 24 Adelaide Law Review 3 at 8. See especially Ignatieff, 
Michael, ‘Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights’ in Michael Ignatieff (ed), American Exceptionalism and 
Human Rights (Princeton University Press, 2005); Koh, Harold H., ‘On American Exceptionalism’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law 
Review 1479. Discussed below. Shattuck, John, Freedom on Fire: Human Rights Wars and America’s Response (Harvard 
University Press, 2005) at 309; Sands, Philippe, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (Viking, 2006) at 14-15; 
Finkelstein, Lawrence S., ‘The Rule of Law, the United States, and the United Nations: An Ambiguous Record’ (2006) 28 
American Foreign Policy Interests 297 at 302 
America’s “Exceptional” International Law Policy 
 
30 
 
regime.” The reasons for this include a belief that “the United States is already an exemplary 
international citizen and its domestic legal system can be relied on to provide appropriate 
accountability and/or the expectation that international law will inevitably be used in a politicised way 
to discriminate against the United States.” For Charlesworth such exceptionalism, whatever its 
origins, is antithetical to the rule of law.24 Similarly, Natsu Saito defines exceptionalism in relation to 
“uniquely American” IL policy as the belief that “America is special, or exceptional, because it claims 
certain incontestable values; the possibility that its hegemony was consolidated and continues to be 
exercised at the expense of those values can be ignored in the name of a greater good.”25 This forms 
the basis for Saito’s argument that it is only by overcoming the “tremendous power of the narrative of 
American exceptionalism” that the US can contribute to strengthening the rule of law.26 Scott 
observes that the term has been employed “cynically” to mean “the perception that key figures in US 
foreign policy circles apparently believe that a different rule should apply to the United States than 
applies to the rest of the world.”27
Murphy sets out to address the apparent contradiction that, despite being the key proponent 
of the major Twentieth Century international institutions, the US has itself found it “increasingly difficult 
to adhere to the rule of law in international affairs.”
 
28 He argues that US legal policy is shaped by 
attitudes of “triumphalism, exceptionalism, and provincialism” which “stand in the way of US support 
of the rule of law in international affairs.” This troika of concepts encompass various aspects of 
exceptionalist thinking, with “exceptionalism” itself defined as the idea that “the United States bears 
special burdens and is entitled to special privileges because of its status as the sole surviving 
superpower.”29 Murphy does not however specify how the distinct “attitudes” he identifies enhance 
understanding of the particular policy approach adopted by the US toward the rule of law. Slaughter 
observes that, although Murphy’s approach identifies clearly relevant attitudes, his application of them 
has “shed no light on the microfoundations of U.S. decisions to take specific positions in individual 
cases.”30
A choice definition from a scholar and practitioner is in the memoirs of former US 
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes David Scheffer, which in part explore his difficulties securing US 
support for the creation of the ICC. For Scheffer “the siren of exceptionalism enveloped the entire 
enterprise of the International Criminal Court on my watch.” His subsequent definition of 
exceptionalism in US IL policy reveals that this single concept masks multiple competing influences 
on policy: 
  
By “exceptionalism” in the realm of international law, I mean that the United States has a tradition of leading other 
nations in global treaty-making endeavours to create a more law-abiding international community, only to seek 
                                               
24 Charlesworth, Hilary, No Country is an Island: Australia and International Law (University of New South Wales Press, 2006) 
at 147; Scott, Shirley V., International Law, US Power: The United States’ Quest for Legal Security (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) at 20 
25 Saito, Natsu T., Meeting the Enemy: American Exceptionalism and International Law (New York University Press, 2010) at 4 
26 Ibid at 229 
27 Scott, Shirley V., International Law, US Power: The United States’ Quest for Legal Security (Cambridge University Press, 
2012) at 20 
28 Murphy, John F., The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs (Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 4 & 
349 
29 Ibid at 7. Murphy provides more detailed definitions for these elements in his earlier work: Murphy, John F., ‘The Quivering 
Gulliver: US Views on a Permanent International Criminal Court’ (2000) 34 International Lawyer 45 at 46 
30 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, ‘Book Reviews: The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs’ (2005) 99 American 
Journal of International Law 2 at 516 
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exceptions to the new rules for the United States because of its constitutional heritage of defending individual rights, 
its military responsibilities worldwide requiring freedom to act in times of war, its superior economy demanding free 
trade one day and labor protection and environmental concessions the next, or just stark nativist insularity. We 
sometimes want the rest of the world to “right itself” but to leave the United States alone because of its “exceptional” 
character.31
 
 
Scheffer’s definition demonstrates the narrowness of identifying the influence of exceptionalist ideas 
only where the US seeks exemptions from international rules. At the same time it is too broad in 
including all such exemptions irrespective of whether they are explained by exceptionalist beliefs. 
Certainly divergent IL policy motivated by “constitutional heritage” fits squarely within an exceptionalist 
explanation. Analysing the contours of such policy would require an understanding of the unique 
elements of American constitutionalism rather than a general theory of IL policy.32
 
 On the other hand, 
divergent IL policy stemming from unrivalled military and economic interests is not necessarily a 
product of a belief in “American exceptionalism,” but rather a consequence of unrivalled US power. 
Loose use of the term hinders the understanding that is promised by an exceptionalist legal analysis, 
and therefore the implications of this body of thought for the rule of IL. 
Ignatieff and Koh’s Exceptionalism 
Beyond these partial analyses of American exceptionalism two works have adopted a more 
systematic analysis, thereby becoming standard references. Michael Ignatieff’s edited book American 
Exceptionalism and Human Rights33 and Harold Koh’s article On American Exceptionalism34
For Ignatieff American exceptionalism is the uniquely contradictory “combination of leadership 
and resistance” to IL which has produced the “paradox of being simultaneously a leader and an 
outlier.”
 each 
provide a definition and typology of American exceptionalism representative of the general usage in 
legal scholarship. Moreover, the works were produced contemporaneously and so usefully draw upon 
and critique each other’s approach. 
35 Ignatieff identifies three forms of policy labelled as exceptionalism: exemptionalism, double 
standards and legal isolationism.36 Exemptionalism is where America supports and even promotes 
international legal regimes, but exempts itself through treaty reservations, failure to ratify treaties or 
mere noncompliance. Double standards occur where the US judges its own behaviour and that of its 
allies according to different standards than other countries, and particularly its enemies.37
                                               
31 Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012) 
at 165 
 Finally legal 
isolationism is the resistance within sections of the US judiciary to the infiltration of precedents and 
jurisprudence of foreign and international courts. Ignatieff claims that these constitute an exceptional 
32 See Shafer, Byron E., ‘American Exceptionalism’ (1999) 2 Annual Review of Political Science 445 at 446 infra 
33 Ignatieff, Michael, ‘Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights’ in Michael Ignatieff (ed), American 
Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton University Press, 2005) 
34 Koh, Harold H., ‘On American Exceptionalism’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 1479 
35 Ignatieff, Michael, ‘Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights’ in Michael Ignatieff (ed), American 
Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton University Press, 2005) at 1. Ignatieff writes specifically in the context of US 
human rights legal policy, but makes it clear that his conclusions are relevant to US IL policy generally: at 2 
36 Ibid at 3-11 
37 Ignatieff cross-references Koh’s piece for this terminology and policy type: See ibid at 7 
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and harmful IL policy, in that no other democracy engages in these practices to the same extent as 
the US, and none does so while simultaneously claiming to lead the global human rights movement.38
Koh finds Ignatieff’s typology “both under- and over inclusive” in that it conflates some forms 
of exceptionalism and omits others.
 
39 Koh’s own piece engages more effectively with the 
exceptionalist literature in that he aims not to defeat exceptionalism, but rather to channel it positively 
to advance the rule of law. Koh acknowledges the indeterminacy of exceptionalist ideas by calling on 
the US to “preserve its capacity for positive exceptionalism by avoiding the most negative features of 
American exceptionalism.”40 To clarify the concept Koh adopts a four parted typology listed “in order 
of ascending opprobrium”: distinctive rights culture, different labels, the “flying buttress” mentality, and 
double standards.41 The greater nuance in Koh’s typology is in making a distinction between unique 
IL practices according to whether they strengthen or weaken IL. Invoking Gothic architectural 
imagery, the “flying buttress mentality” for instance describes the idea that the US has frequently 
provided crucial support for treaty regimes from outside the institution, while refusing to stand as pillar 
within.42 Koh concludes that, on the whole, this is a threat to America’s own interests far more than it 
is a problem for IL generally. It is only the final form of policy that Koh identifies as a challenge to the 
integrity of IL, where the US “uses its exceptional power and wealth to promote a double standard.”43
The key question for present purposes is what specific factors cause American IL policy to 
exhibit contradictory behaviours, including the disjunct between expressions of commitment to the 
rule of law and policy outcomes. In particular, are these outcomes explained by exceptionalist beliefs 
properly so called, thereby justifying adoption of the terminology? The typologies of Ignatieff and Koh 
mask a range of competing and perhaps interrelated causes of distinctive behaviour such that the 
exceptionalism label may do more to obscure than to clarify. Ignatieff identifies four possible 
explanations for distinctive US policy:  
  
a realist one, based in America’s exceptional power; a cultural one, related to an American sense of Providential 
destiny; an institutional one, based in America’s specific institutional organization; and finally a political one, related to 
the supposedly distinctive conservatism and individualism of American political culture. 44
 
 
Of these only the “cultural” explanation directly encapsulates the influence of exceptionalism as the 
term is used here. The distinct elements are not mutually exclusive however, such that exceptionalist 
beliefs indirectly shape each of the alternative explanations for the uniqueness of American legal 
policy. Ignatieff recognises these linkages to the degree that international institutions have been 
supported with an enthusiasm that cannot be explained by realist power based motives alone.45
                                               
38 Ibid at 4; Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘The Paradox of US Human Rights Policy’ in Michael Ignatieff (ed), American Exceptionalism 
and Human Rights (Princeton University Press, 2005) at 148 
 
American IL policy goes further than realism strictly requires in “defending a mission, an identity, and 
39 Koh, Harold H., ‘On American Exceptionalism’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 1479 at 1483 
40 Ibid at 1503 
41 Ibid at 1483 
42 The architectural analogy is Louis Henkin’s: “In the cathedral of human rights the United States is more like a flying buttress 
than a pillar – choosing to stand outside the international structure supporting the international human rights system, but 
without being willing to subject its own conduct to the scrutiny of that system.”: Henkin, Louis, How Nations Behave: Law and 
Foreign Policy (Columbia University Press, 2nd ed, 1979) at 183 
43 Koh, Harold H., ‘On American Exceptionalism’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 1479 at 1486-1487. Original emphasis 
44 Ignatieff, Michael, ‘Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights’ in Michael Ignatieff (ed), American 
Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton University Press, 2005) at 11 
45 Ibid at 13 
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a distinctive destiny as a free people.”46 A culturally entrenched faith in America’s mission to promote 
human rights has transformed the conventional conception of IL as a constraint on power to a system 
for enabling the US to advance a form of global governance. Cultural attachment to messianism is 
thereby a key explanation for the “power dynamics and the distinctive ideology” underpinning different 
forms of “exceptional” IL policy.47
Likewise, the institutional explanation reveals much about unique IL outcomes, but ultimately 
depends on exceptionalist and ideological factors to explain policy contradictions. The institutional 
power to develop and execute IL policy resides primarily with the US executive,
 At the same time the correlative of the messianic project is that the 
US is less willing to recognise IL as a legitimate constraint on itself. 
48 but is divided 
between the branches of federal government, and subject to prerogatives of the various states.49 
Constitutional scholar Edward Corwin characterised the effect as “an invitation to struggle for the 
privilege of directing American foreign policy.50 IL policy is not determined merely by a free-market of 
ideas across government, but through the amplification or suppression of certain ideas via 
“decentralized and fragmented political institutions.”51 Citing these institutional factors, however, 
merely begs the question of what divergent beliefs distinguish policymakers competing for influence 
across divided government. Within Ignatieff’s work Moravcsik identifies “in particular, 
supermajoritarian treaty ratification rules in the Senate, the federal system, and the strength of the 
judiciary” as subjecting US IL policymaking to competing voices.52 For Moravcsik, the outlier status of 
the US in failing to ratify key human rights treaties owes much to the unique constitutional 
requirement that treaties be approved by a super-majority of the US Senate.53 However, his further 
analysis identifies the root cause of resistance in “senatorial suspicion of liberal multilateralism” 
among a minority of senators “disproportionately representative of the conservative southern and rural 
Midwestern or western states.”54
Although Ignatieff takes a largely critical view of exceptionalism, his analysis corroborates the 
principle that exceptionalist beliefs have a variable influence on IL. Writing during the Bush 43 years 
Ignatieff concludes that the administration’s brand of American exceptionalism was “fundamentally 
explained by the weakness of American liberalism.” By extension it is the extent that liberal variants of 
American exceptionalism have “waxed and waned” that is decisive for IL, rather than the influence of 
 This suggests that the exceptionalist beliefs and ideological 
commitments of policymakers remain prior to institutional explanations for unique policy outcomes. 
Although institutional veto points are important for understanding the dynamics through which foreign 
policy ideologies inform legal policy outcomes, this thesis addresses the more basic task of specifying 
the content of ideology itself. 
                                               
46 Ibid at 14 
47 Ibid at 16 
48 For judicial approval of the “plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the 
field of international relations” see: United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936) 299 U.S. 304 at 320, per Sutherland J 
49 See Dueck, Colin, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton University 
Press, 2006) at 35-36 
50 Corwin, Edward S., The President: Ofﬁce and Powers 1787-1957 (New York University Press, 4th ed, 1957) at 171. 
Emphasis added 
51 Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘The Paradox of US Human Rights Policy’ in Michael Ignatieff (ed), American Exceptionalism and Human 
Rights (Princeton University Press, 2005) at 150 
52 Ibid at 150 
53 Ibid at 187 
54 Ibid at 187. This observation correlates with the geographical distribution of nationalist foreign policy ideologies identified in 
this study: See Chapter 4 infra 
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American exceptionalism per se.55
Despite its advantages Koh’s typology exhibits a similar limitation to Ignatieff’s, which is to 
inadequately distinguish the role of exceptionalist ideas relative to other influences on policy. In 
practice Koh’s first three forms of exceptionalism promote “double standards” as much as the fourth 
form of exceptionalism that Koh finds so troubling. His example of double standards in ambivalent 
American engagement with the ICC has variously been defended in terms of “distinctive” American 
constitutional rights or as an example of the “flying buttress” mentality. The constitutional right to a 
trial by jury, and the rule against double jeopardy, are both examples of distinctive rights that have 
been used to resist ICC jurisdiction over US citizens. Similarly US policy has been defended for 
supporting the ICC from outside formal membership. Accordingly any useful typology of 
exceptionalism must be built not upon policy outcomes, but rather on the exceptionalist beliefs guiding 
policymakers’ decisions and the ways these interact with other factors. 
 This reinforces the point that the actual content of exceptionalist 
ideas needs to be specified before any normative judgment about exceptionalism can be made. To 
the extent that exceptionalist ideas influence policy the label is appropriate, but Ignatieff’s 
classification inadequately sets out the relationship between competing causes of divergent IL policy. 
To his typology Koh adds a fifth positive element of exceptional global leadership.56 This term 
comes closer to describing the variable influence of exceptionalist ideas on American IL policy.57 Koh 
describes the US commitment to establish an international system “committed to international law, 
democracy, and the promotion of human rights.”58 Yet even here Koh diffuses this discussion with 
references to the exceptional nature of America’s “global interest and its global influence.”59 In this 
formulation, and that of the other four types, it is clear that Koh is not always describing expressions 
of “American exceptionalism,” but simply differences in American legal practice which may or may not 
be related to exceptionalist beliefs. He concludes by posing a choice between an American 
exceptionalism that is “power-based” and disregards IL, or “good exceptionalism”60 that is “norm-
based,” showing deference to “universal values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”61
 
 
Yet grounding in the ideas of American exceptionalism demonstrates that this is a false dichotomy. 
Exceptionalist norms guiding policymakers can promote or derogate from IL depending on the form of 
exceptionalist thought. At the same time there is clearly a relationship between norms and power in 
which even advocates of IL perceive fidelity to the rule of law as being consistent with American 
interests and power.  
 
                                               
55 Ignatieff, Michael, ‘Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights’ in Michael Ignatieff (ed), American 
Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton University Press, 2005) at 20 
56 Koh, Harold H., ‘On American Exceptionalism’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 1479 at 1487 
57 Koh’s divergent interpretations of “exceptionalism” lead Scott to set aside the concept altogether in favour of a “more 
analytically precise” term: Scott, Shirley V., International Law, US Power: The United States’ Quest for Legal Security 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 20 
58 Koh, Harold H., ‘On American Exceptionalism’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 1479 at 1487 
59 Ibid at 1489 
60 Ibid at 1501 
61 Ibid at 1526-1527 
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SOURCES OF UNIQUE AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LAW POLICY 
From this review of legal treatments it is possible to discern three distinct explanations for the outlier 
status of American IL policy. The first is that hegemonic power possessed by the US creates the 
capabilities and incentives to reshape or evade IL. This is not a product of exceptionalist beliefs, but 
rather a manifestation of general principles of great power behaviour. The second is that distinct 
institutional differences influence the American approach to IL. Specifically, jurisprudence ingrained in 
the academy and among practitioners is distinctive for reconceptualising IL as a purposive process of 
policymaking rather than as formalised rules. Finally are cultural explanations that identify the role of 
exceptionalist ideas in shaping American engagement with IL. The possible effect of these ideas is to 
alter American commitment to legal rules in ways directly influenced by national political culture. In 
analysing these separate possible explanations the focus will be on isolating the distinct influence of 
each variable. Analysis can then proceed to identifying how these variables relate to one another to 
produce “exceptional” legal policy. 
 
Power Based Explanations: Hegemonic International Law 
In the year prior to the 2003 Iraq War Robert Kagan surveyed divided transatlantic approaches to IL 
to conclude that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.”62 Europeans evinced a 
preference for “a world where strength doesn’t matter, where international law and international 
institutions predominate, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations 
regardless of their strength have equal rights and are equally protected by commonly agreed-upon 
international rules of behaviour.”63 The success of the EU in ending centuries of interstate conflict 
encouraged faith in this formula as the answer to a more peaceful world. The US in contrast 
continued to perceive a “Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where 
true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use 
of military might.”64 For Kagan “these differences in strategic culture do not spring naturally from the 
national characters of Americans and Europeans” but rather from underlying power differentials.65
When the United States was weak, it practiced the strategies of indirection, the strategies of weakness; now that the 
United States is powerful, it behaves as powerful nations do. When the European great powers were strong, they 
believed in strength and martial glory. Now, they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers.
 
Tracing a shift in global power over 200 years, he observed that: 
66
 
 
The disparity of transatlantic power has accordingly lain behind “a broad ideological gap” in which 
“material and ideological differences reinforce one another” to crystallise in irreconcilable conceptions 
of IL.67
                                               
62 Kagan, Robert, ‘Power and Weakness’ (2002) June-July Policy Review 3 at 3. For a fuller treatment see also Kagan, Robert, 
Of Paradise and Power (Vintage Books, 2004) 
 Kagan’s thesis was especially significant for its influence over the Bush 43 administration, 
63 Kagan, Robert, ‘Power and Weakness’ (2002) June-July Policy Review 3 at 10 & 15 
64 Ibid at 3 
65 Ibid at 5. For a similar analysis see Rabkin, Jeremy A., ‘Worlds Apart on International Justice’ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 835 
66 Kagan, Robert, ‘Power and Weakness’ (2002) June-July Policy Review 3 at 6. For a similar conclusion regarding the 
connection between 18th Century American military weakness and respect for IL see: Jay, Stewart, ‘The Status of the Law of 
Nations in Early American Law’ (1989) 42 Vanderbilt Law Review 819 at 839 
67 Kagan, Robert, ‘Power and Weakness’ (2002) June-July Policy Review 3 at 6. See also Shapiro, Jeremy & Daniel Byman, 
‘Bridging the Transatlantic Counterterrorism Gap’ (2006) 29 Washington Quarterly 33 
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where it was widely circulated and read in 2002. Then senior administration lawyer Jack Goldsmith 
wrote that the “essay gave structure to intuitions that top administration officials already possessed.”68
The decisive role of preponderant global power provides the first explanation for distinctive 
American IL policy. Oppenheim argued over a century ago that an effective balance of power 
between states is the supreme and necessary precondition for the survival of IL. Without a functioning 
balance of power, “an overpowerful State will naturally try to act according to discretion and disobey 
the law,” thereby becoming “omnipotent.”
 
69 Hedley Bull likewise recognised a mutual relationship 
between the efficacy of the balance of power and of IL.70 For Morgenthau the condition of 
international anarchy71 meant that enforcement of IL was ultimately left to “the vicissitudes of the 
distribution of power between the violator of the law and the victim of the violation.”72 Morgenthau thus 
recognised that applying a legal “positivist” account “cannot but draw a completely distorted picture of 
those rules which belong in the category of political international law.”73 The consequence was that 
“the rights and duties established by them appear to be clearly determined, whereas they are subject 
actually to the most contradictory interpretations.”74 This expresses political realism’s basic view of 
institutions as ‘epiphenomenal’: a mere expression of power distribution between states and of their 
self-interested behaviour. IL has an instrumental value when serving state interests, but any general 
commitment to its terms is anomalous.75 The bulk of IL may even command voluntary compliance by 
virtue of its useful administrative functions, but in cases where IL has a direct bearing on relative 
power between states, especially in matters of national security, power and not law determines 
compliance.76
The most influential modern account in these terms is Goldsmith and Posner’s The Limits of 
International Law.
 
77 The authors’ aim is “to explain how international law works by integrating the 
study of international law with the realities of international politics.” Specifically they summarise their 
theory as being “that international law emerges from states acting rationally to maximise their 
interests, given their perceptions of the interests of other states and the distribution of state power.”78
                                               
68 Goldsmith, Jack L., The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration (W.W. Norton & Co, 2007) at 
126-127. It is cited approvingly by former Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of 
Justice during the Bush 43 administration: Yoo, John C., War by Other Means: An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror 
(Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006) at 47 
 
They conclude: “the best explanation for when and why states comply with international law is not that 
states have internalized international law, or have a habit of complying with it, or are drawn by its 
69 Oppenheim, L. 1912, cited in Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 
(Knopf, 5th ed, 1973) at 274 
70 Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society (Macmillan Press, 2nd ed, 1995) at 125-126 
71 In the IR sense of an absence of global government rather than a world in chaos 
72 Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Knopf, 5th ed, 1973) at 290 
73 Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, ‘Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law’ (1940) 34 American Journal of International 
Law 260 at 279. Emphasis added 
74 Ibid at 279 
75 Taubman, Jarrett, ‘Towards a Theory of Democratic Compliance: Security Council Legitimacy and Effectiveness after Iraq’ 
(2004) 37 International Law and Politics 161 at 167; Kingsbury, Benedict, ‘The Concept of Compliance as a Function of 
Competing Conceptions of International Law’ (1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 345 at 350-351; Mearsheimer, 
John J., ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’ (1994-1995) 19 International Security 5 at 13. See generally Waltz, 
Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979) 
76 Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Knopf, 5th ed, 1973) at 273 & 291 
77 Goldsmith, Jack L. & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005). Golove notes the 
“puzzling” omission of any acknowledgment by the authors that the book closely aligns with political realism: Golove, David M., 
‘Leaving Customary International Law Where It Is: Goldsmith and Posner’s The Limits of International Law’ (2005) 34 Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 333 at 339-340 
78 Goldsmith, Jack L. & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005) at 3 
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moral pull, but simply that states act out of self-interest.”79 In this view the expectation that the US will 
act in the same way as every other state is implausible for expecting US policymakers to commit to 
the legal fiction of sovereign equality. The disjunct between the legal fiction and the reality of 
America’s global power renders such accounts an inadequate basis for theorising about US legal 
behaviour. In earlier writing defending an American “double standard” Goldsmith noted that: “The 
explanation is not subtle. The United States declines to embrace international human rights law 
because it can.”80
Bradford and Posner reject the utility of exceptionalist explanations altogether by finding that 
all great powers claim to be exceptional in some form. Their general position is that “great powers 
typically support a view of international law that embodies their own normative commitments but is 
presented as a universal set of commitments.”
 
81 This fundamental denial of the distinctive quality of 
law underpins their unorthodox redefining of “exceptionalism” to effectively exclude criticisms of US IL 
policy. The authors appear to agree with Koh and Ignatieff that the most serious mischief justifying 
criticism is the creation of double standards by the US. However they then proceed to adopt a 
terminological distinction that excludes the very possibility of the US acting in this way. They define 
exceptionalism as “the view that the values of one particular country should be reflected in the norms 
of international law.” This entails a belief by that country that it “is a model or leader in international 
relations because of its unique attributes.”82 This is distinct from their definition of exemptionalism as 
“the claim that the rules of international law, or of certain international treaties, should apply to all 
states except for one particular state.”83 The distinction is of questionable value when exemption from 
legal rules is a logical and natural implication of exceptionalism, as demonstrated by Ignatieff’s 
typology.84
The presumption that law is fundamentally an expression of relative power thereby precludes 
any non-political arguments for why one nationalistic interpretation of IL is more legitimate than 
another. “American Exceptionalism” is defined as the belief “that international law should promote free 
markets and liberal democracy” and that “Military force may be used by any country against threats to 
this order.”
 The distinction simply defines the mischief threatening IL in terms so artificially narrow that 
they inoculate the US from criticism. 
85 In contrast they define “European exceptionalism” as the belief that “international law 
should advance human rights (including positive or economic rights) and social welfare” and that: 
“Instead of resorting to military force, states should pool their sovereignty in international institutions 
that can resolve disputes.” Taken together with a definition of “Chinese exceptionalism” they argue 
that the “core of international law consists of the overlapping claims of these three states.”86
                                               
79 Ibid at 225 
 On this 
view there is nothing inherently more “legal” about the multilateralism of European or Chinese policy 
than there is about the American view. In each case “criticism of exceptionalism, then, is just a 
80 Goldsmith, Jack L., ‘International Human Rights Law & The United States Double Standard’ (1998) 1 Green Bag 365 at 371 
81 Bradford, Anu & Eric A. Posner, ‘Universal Exceptionalism in International Law’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 
1 at 12 
82 Ibid at 7 
83 Ibid at 7 
84 Ignatieff, Michael, ‘Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights’ in Michael Ignatieff (ed), American 
Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton University Press, 2005) at 3-7 
85 Bradford, Anu & Eric A. Posner, ‘Universal Exceptionalism in International Law’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 
1 at 13 
86 Ibid at 13 
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criticism of power, or the use of power to achieve ends of which the critic disapproves.”87
These various power-based explanations raise the key question of what effect hegemonic 
power specifically has in shaping legal policy. A preponderant power will be faced with a broad and 
frequent range of system wide tasks affecting its interests, thereby providing the greatest number of 
opportunities to engage in legally relevant acts.
 Treating IL 
as a form of rationally based politics entails the denial that exceptional ideas posses any explanatory 
power in evaluating transatlantic IL policy divisions. The exceptionalist beliefs of American, European 
and Chinese policy are in the end epiphenomenal. 
88 Grewe’s periodisation of modern IL according to the 
rise and fall of great powers turns on this “close connection between legal theory and State practice.” 
The upshot is thus “cohesiveness of the law of nations and the international political system.”89 
Writing in the immediate post-Cold War period, Grewe speculated whether “we have entered a new 
age of United States hegemony” in which the US would play a distinctive role in shaping the global 
legal order.90 The weight of evidence strongly suggests that changes in the international system at the 
end of each of the World Wars and the Cold War indeed galvanized US efforts to build international 
legal architecture developing and entrenching American interests.91 American hegemony has played 
out not as control over every legal development, but rather that the US is “the one against whose 
ideas regarding the system of international law all others debate.”92 The fact of political inequality 
creates incentives for the US to exercise its powers to entrench hierarchy in a manner antithetical to 
the notional equality underpinning the international legal system.93
This insight founds the “hegemonial approach” to lawmaking, which Brownlie defines as the 
translation of power differentials into specific advantages, maximising a powerful state’s ability to gain 
legal approval, and minimising occasions when approval is “conspicuously withheld.”
  
94 American IL 
policy never explicitly violates the law, even where existing legal rules are perceived to directly 
contradict national interests. A powerful state enjoys the privilege of disproportionately constraining 
weaker states through IL, while using those same rules to legitimate its own actions. Outright rejection 
of law would render the exercise of power less efficient, and create a form of disorder unnecessarily 
detrimental to American interests.95
                                               
87 Ibid at 53 
 Rather the general practice is for the US to apply its influence to 
establish favourable legal rights and privileges while defending the legal framework that sustains 
88 Byers, Michael, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and Customary International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 37; Duffy, Helen, The “War on Terror” and the Framework of International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 6 
89 Grewe, Wilhelm G., The Epochs Of International Law; Translated and Revised by Michael Byers (Walter de Gruyter, 2000) at 
6 
90 Ibid at 703 
91 See generally Byers, Michael & Georg Nolte, United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Krisch, Nico, ‘International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the 
International Legal Order’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 369 
92 Scott, Shirley V., ‘The Impact on International Law of US Non-Compliance’ in Michael Byers and Georg Nolte (ed), United 
States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 450-451 
93 Glennon, Michael J., ‘Why the Security Council Failed’ (2003) 82 Foreign Affairs 16 at 29 
94 Brownlie, Ian, International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) at 49 
95 Byers, Michael, ‘Preemptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal Change’ (2003) 11 The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 171 at 173 
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them. In the words of ICJ Judge Charles De Visscher: “the great powers after imprinting a definite 
direction upon a usage make themselves its guarantors and defenders.”96
The predicament for the US is how to avoid legal constraints on its foreign policy without 
destroying the system of IL it has helped create. In colloquial terms: how can the US have its cake 
and eat it? The answer lies in an altered conception of the conventional jurisprudential understanding 
of relationships between the subjects of IL.
 
97 The objective of both upholding the legal system and its 
own unique privileges creates an incentive for the US to observe legal rules, but in a way that blunts 
their constraining effect upon itself while enhancing their value as enabling instruments that facilitate 
strategic objectives.98
                                               
96 Cited in Schachter, Oscar, ‘New Custom: Power, Opinio Juris and Contrary Practice’ in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed), Theory of 
International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski (Kluwar Law International, 
1996) at 531 
 This practice challenges the basic assumption of orthodox legal scholarship: 
that by ensuring a hegemon adheres to legal rules international order is thereby made more secure. 
Hegemonial lawmaking shifts the boundaries of what can be sanctioned as lawful and, therefore, 
benign conduct. The extent of censure demanded by US non-compliance becomes indeterminate 
where the boundaries of legality shift according to hegemonic influence. The reliability of IL as a 
framework for international order is thereby not assured, lacking any necessary equivalence between 
law abiding behaviour and the preservation of the status quo. Scott explains apparent contradictions 
as the product of a US “quest for legal security.” This has taken both a “defensive” form in the sense 
97 The precise way that rules within a legal system create clear relationships is the basis for Hohfeld’s well known depiction of 
“fundamental legal conceptions,” which has come to form the cornerstone of the jurisprudence of legal rights, including within IL 
scholarship and practice: 
 
 
See Hohfeld, Wesley N., ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913-14) 23 Yale Law 
Journal 16; Hohfeld, Wesley N., ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 
710. 
For judicial application of Hohfeld in an international law context see East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) [1995] ICJ 
Rep 90 at 208-212, per Weeramantry J. For academic applications see Morss, John R., ‘The Legal Relations of Collectives: 
Belated Insights from Hohfeld’ (2009) 22 Leiden Journal of International Law 289 at 291-293; Mendelson, Maurice, ‘State Acts 
and Omissions as Explicit or Implict Claims’ in (ed), Le Droit international au service de la paix, de la justice et du 
développement: Mélanges Michel Virally (A. Pedone, 1991); Rodin, David, War and Self-Defense (Oxford University Press, 
2002); Carmody, Chios, ‘A Theory of WTO Law’ (2008) 11 Journal of International Economic Law 527 at 4-5 
98 Byers, Michael, ‘Preemptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality and Strategies of Legal Change’ (2003) 11 The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 171 at 176. This requires the reformulation of Hohfeld’s scheme to depict dynamic relationships that exist 
on a spectrum, rather than static and discrete binary relationships: 
 
 
Under this scheme US IL policy does not accept “duties” under IL, which implies fixed pre-ordained obligations. Rather the 
purported duties under IL are better thought of as “constraints,” a more apt term to reflect the amorphous nature of obligations 
IL places on the US. The correlative of a legal constraint is the “claim” of a legal subject χ to be immune from the actions of γ. 
This is something less than a “right” properly defined, suggesting “something asserted but not necessarily recognised,” but still 
with the character of a legal relation that can appeal to pre-determined criteria: Lloyd of Hampstead, Lord & M.D.A. Freeman, 
Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (Stevens, 5th ed, 1985) at 443. The opposite of constraint under IL is “enablement,” 
where the US exercises political power to interpret legal obligations in a form that increases the extent that its actions can be 
defended as ‘legal.’ Again this is weaker than having a clear “liberty” to act, as the precise nature of that liberty is dependent on 
contemporaneous political circumstances. “Enablement” nevertheless exists on the same spectrum as this category of legal 
relationship. The correlative of enablement is thus that affected states have “no-claim” to resist such action. Hegemonial 
lawmaking is essentially the process of applying power to transform legal rules from constraints at “A” to enabling interests at “B” 
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of seeking “protection of its domestic political and legal systems from external influence via law” as 
well as an “offensive” strategy of influencing the “legal and policy choices of other states via law.”99 
Identifying these strategies reveals a “remarkable degree of consistency” beneath apparent 
contradictions in legal policy.100 The explanation is effectively a description of hegemonial lawmaking, 
where the motivation to achieve an “increase in relative power” provides the logic of otherwise 
inconsistent policy.101
At times these impulses have translated into explicit US privileges under the law, as most 
conspicuously achieved in its designation as one of the five permanent members of the UNSC. The 
principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” has also been applied within international 
treaty regimes to reconcile the unequal obligations of states parties with the notion of sovereign 
equality.
 
102 However the most contentious debates over American IL policy relate to its de facto 
exceptional legal status rather than the limited cases where it is accorded de jure privileges. Byers 
notes two strategies through which the US has achieved hegemonial lawmaking within the existing 
framework of IL.103 Firstly, laws may sanction behaviour that is only practically available to a limited 
number of states. Preponderant military power over any other state or alliance means that broad legal 
rights may in practice form “exceptional” rights exercisable only by the US.104 An example is in the 
2001 US military action in Afghanistan, where a potential new rule of customary IL was established 
that self-defence extends to use of force against states which harbour terrorists. Acceptance of this 
interpretation broadened the rule beyond its previous ambit, which constrained rights of self-defence 
to attacks emanating directly from a state.105 This development yielded the benefits of legal 
compliance in a manner consistent with power political considerations, and in practice benefits only 
states with power projection capabilities.106 Preponderant US political power thereby translated into 
“de facto exceptionalism” within the doctrines of IL.107 A second form of hegemonial lawmaking is 
where rules remain deliberately indeterminate “enabling power and influence to determine where and 
when” actions are legal, thus deflecting criticism under the guise of legality.108 Rights can then be 
denied to weaker states pursuant to this discretion.109
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104 Krisch, Nico, ‘More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in International Law’ in Michael Byers & 
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recognised rules, generating further indeterminacy.110 Precise “rules” enable ex ante decisions about 
acceptable conduct, whereas creating vague “standards” enables ex post definitions of legality.111
 The observed effects of hegemonic power work in a corresponding way to shape the interests 
of states forced to adapt to conditions of international hegemony. Those who oppose preponderant 
American power and legal policy have a vested interest in an international legal system that 
diminishes political advantages. An overriding political interest thus exists to structure international 
legal rules and institutions in accordance with “counter-hegemonic” interests.
 
This weakens the quest for precision in law, being one of the features distinguishing it from other 
normative systems.  
112 In this vein, 
Koskenniemi persuasively argued that the shape of the international legal system represents a form 
of “hegemonic contestation” in which participants aim to “make their partial view of...[legal doctrines] 
appear as the total view, their preference seem like the universal preference.”113 For this reason 
Koskenniemi concluded that the “fight for an international Rule of Law is a fight against politics.”114
This counter-hegemonic dynamic corroborates the arguments of scholars who argue that 
“universal” legal rules pose a challenge to American political power.
 
Here the rule of law will be achieved through the levelling of international power via rules that are 
nominally universal, and therefore place a constraint on states that increases commensurate with 
political power. 
115 The validity of Kagan’s insight 
into the nexus between law and power is therefore highly persuasive, even for those critical of his 
ultimate conclusions.116 However, from the perspective of legal theory, his argument equally 
demonstrates the limits of a purely power based explanation for US IL policy. Kagan relies on a 
problematic assumption that divergent EU and US policy is formed against a binary opposition 
between American political interests and the ideal of the rule of IL. This is suggested in the way that 
Kagan characterises European policy as being “all about subjecting inter-state relations to the rule of 
law,”117 whereas the US chooses to operate outside of the rule of law.118
                                               
110 Morgenthau, Hans Joachim, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Knopf, 5th ed, 1973) at 277 
 It is more consistent with the 
evidence however to say that legal policymakers on both sides interpret legal principles through 
political interests, such that the concept of law itself is contested. The effect of preponderant power is 
thus intimately connected to the “exceptional” character of American IL policy in creating incentives 
and pressures to follow certain patterns of behaviour. But at the level of analysing policy outcomes, 
power is indeterminate as an explanation for the intensity of domestic debates between opposing 
legal policymakers each claiming to advance American national security interests. Explanation at the 
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level of political realism “discounts the influence of particular normative values, history, and culture, all 
of which shape the attitudes of a country’s leaders toward international law and foreign affairs.”119
 
 
Power alone cannot explain observed contradictions in policy whereby the US expresses fidelity to 
the rule of law while breaching the expectations this creates. 
Institutional Explanations: Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence 
A second explanation for distinctive American IL policy is that academic and government institutions 
impart and reinforce unique conceptions of the nature of IL. Institutionalised theories about the proper 
interpretation and practice of IL become a causal explanation conceptually distinct from either relative 
power or the cultural beliefs of individuals.120 The most distinctive feature within American IL 
jurisprudence is greater scepticism toward the basic assumption that IL exists separately from its 
social and political context.121 American international legal jurisprudence has instead been strongly 
influenced by various “policy-oriented” approaches. These conceptions of IL were a response to 
perceived limitations in legal positivism and have grown into the dominant IL jurisprudence in 
American scholarship and practice. The most well known is the distinctive “New Haven School,” but 
elaborate variants abound and continue to be fiercely debated.122 The precise formulation is less 
important than the general observation that “policy-oriented law is, by now, an accepted orthodoxy in 
the United States.”123
The chief innovation of the policy-oriented approach is its dissolution of the strict division 
between law and politics and its treatment of IL as a form of policy. Correspondingly, the concept of IL 
as a body of impartial rules is rejected as naïve at best and a threat to American interests at worst. 
Rules represent “merely the accumulated trends of past decisions” stripped of the context of their 
creation and their connection to contemporary circumstances.
 
124
merely formal diplomacy or cases from the International Court of Justice but that...it had to be conceived in terms of 
broader political processes or techniques that aimed towards policy “objectives.” A relevant law would be enmeshed 
in the social context and studied through the best techniques of neighboring disciplines.
 In Koskenniemi’s historical review of 
this jurisprudence he identifies the “one theme” connecting different approaches as a “deformalized 
concept of law.” By this it is meant that IL should not be seen as: 
125
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David Kennedy documents the rise of this approach across the twentieth century, where it was the 
proponents of IL themselves who: 
slowly abandoned the doctrinal purity and institutional isolation characteristic of the pre-war generation... They 
imported into public international law precisely the realist attack on doctrinal formalism which the pre-war generation 
had resisted. They rejoiced as the discipline lost its coherence – renaming it ‘transnational’ law. These men were also 
successors to the progressive faith in international administration – and they brought to the United Nations their faith 
in New Deal federal reform.126
 
 
The conception built upon the work of American Legal Realism, which had aimed to penetrate the 
legal formalist myth that law was a self-contained body of rules that could produce determinate 
outcomes.127 Legal Realism established policy considerations as an uncontroversial and necessary 
component for overcoming indeterminacy in judicial decision-making.128 Most significantly, for present 
purposes, is acceptance that “law” is more than merely the rules and principles set out in legal texts 
and court judgments. Rather it encompasses the relationship between decision-makers and law: 
“legal history could not simply chronicle the emergence and development of legal doctrines, nor treat 
them largely as intellectual insights divorced from the actual world in which they occurred.”129 This has 
created an enduring “tension between the [legal] realist understanding of law as an instrument of 
policy and the legalist view of law as a constraint on policy.”130
The “New Haven School” of McDougal and Lasswell aimed to move legal realism beyond 
mere critique toward a methodology that made these insights “operational in a systemic way.”
 
131 To 
this end the approach adopted the legal realist’s methodology of using social science methods to 
achieve set policy goals.132 ‘Law’ becomes the outcome of ‘policy-oriented’ decision-making, with 
legality conditional upon attaining underlying social, moral, and political goals. Law works in this 
conception as a purposive process of “authoritative and effective decision-making.”133 Authority is 
determined in each case by showing that policy decisions advance “world public order” and “human 
dignity.”134 At the same time decisions must be effective in the sense that they are backed by 
enforcement mechanisms and are therefore controlling.135
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In Michael Reisman’s formulation law is a “process of communication”136 where policymakers 
and political elites communicate decisions and justifications in a way that “shapes wide expectations 
about appropriate future behaviour.”137 In this way foreign policy decisions fulfil the legal function of 
creating a predetermined set of criteria that allows legal subjects to organise their actions with known 
consequences.138 These decisions thus constitute a form of law in setting precedents to guide state 
behaviour according to pre-existing policy criteria. With the twin criteria of authority and control the 
policy-oriented approach aims to overcome a misperception in IR and IL scholarship that “law is 
concerned with authority (but not power) and that international relations is concerned with power (but 
not authority).”139
Wiessner and Willard illustrate the distinctiveness of this jurisprudence by contrasting the 
policy-oriented approach with its “counterimage” of legal positivism which: 
 Decisions that lack one or both of the elements of authority and efficacy are 
distinguished from law and remain merely political acts.  
remains fixated on the past, trying to reap from words laid down, irrespective of the context in which they were 
written, the solution to a problem that arises today or tomorrow in very different circumstances... Moreover, positivists 
gain no help from their theory when asked what the law ‘should’ be. Indeed, their theory eschews any creative or 
prescriptive function.140
 
 
These distinctions shape the critiques American policymakers direct at other states who aspire to 
constrain the US through legal rules. The retort is that positive rules are no less politicised than the 
policy actions they are aimed at. An example is in the statements of former Legal Adviser to the 
Department of State John Bellinger. Bellinger highlights transatlantic differences in legal traditions and 
culture, in particular the divergence between the Anglo-American common law tradition and the civil 
law tradition of continental Europe.141
we probe the purpose and function of law, examine it through the lenses of other disciplines such as economics and 
sociology, weigh its costs against its benefits, test its flexibility against the facts at hand, judge its value by its 
effectiveness, and seek, where we can, an equitable solution.
 Consistently with the policy-oriented approach Bellinger 
characterises American jurisprudence as inclined toward “pragmatism and scepticism”:  
142
 
  
Moreover Bellinger emphasises the importance of devising law that reflects “the virtues that have 
been drummed into us.” This divergence is given as a key reason for the view in Continental 
jurisprudence that American IL policy is “opportunistic or, worse, self-serving.” Conversely the 
European conception is criticised as marked by “excessive formalism, a doctrinal inflexibility, and an 
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unwillingness to acknowledge that different paths may lead to the same end.”143 Although Bellinger 
relates this divergence to the common law tradition, the divergence is more specifically a product of 
American legal culture. Former ICJ President Rosalyn Higgins notes that divergent “American” and 
“British” views “now permeate the entire fabric of international law.”144 Higgins herself is a British 
jurist, but a protégé of the founder of the New Haven School at Yale, Myers McDougal.145 Her 
characterisation of the mutual misgivings between these two strongholds of the common law precisely 
mirrors Bellinger’s comparison with Continental Europe.146
A further illustrative example of a practitioner’s policy defence in these terms is in the writings 
of Abraham Sofaer, who served as Legal Adviser to the Department of State under Presidents 
Reagan and Bush 41. In a critique of the ICJ, Sofaer writes that: “Many, if not most international 
lawyers, have reacted to the need to use force in self-defense and in the defense of humanitarian 
rights by seeking to preserve what they consider the purity of international law.” In particular Sofaer 
critiques an article by Professor Tom Franck entitled Break It, Don’t Fake It, which argued that the US 
should have explicitly breached international law when it failed to obtain UN authorisation for the 1999 
Kosovo intervention, rather than trying to fit it into existing doctrine.
 
147
It would be like people in the 1930s dealing with Constitutional issues in the U.S. saying ‘Don’t make up new 
constitutional law, it’s going to mess up our Constitution. Just break the Constitution, violate the Constitution, with no 
explanation, and that way we will keep the purity of this rigid Constitution that the pre-New Deal Supreme Court was 
insisting on applying. Everything will be fine someday when we all return to the purity of the intended words.’
 Franck’s rationale was that in 
so doing the purity and therefore integrity of IL would be preserved. To this Sofaer responds: 
148
 
 
Policy jurisprudence sees such expunging of policy from law as chimerical, and instead aims to make 
law conform to the right sort of policy. The proper distinction for the policy-oriented approach is that: 
“the terms ‘political dispute’ and ‘legal dispute’ refer to the decision-making process which is to be 
employed in respect of them, and not to the nature of the dispute itself.”149 The precise formulations of 
the New Haven School have receded in prominence, but its legacy is the consensus that IL is a policy 
process rightfully encompassing political values. Oscar Schachter and Richard Falk identified 
themselves as key critics of the New Haven School during its heyday,150
The elaborate variations of policy oriented jurisprudence, and their forceful defence by 
adherents, suggest that the institutional explanation of a distinctive structure of conventions governing 
the teaching and practice of IL does have some explanatory value in addressing the issue of 
 but remain among the most 
distinguished exponents of policy-oriented jurisprudence. 
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contradiction. However this explanation also remains intertwined with explanations from both power 
and culture in ways that are not always clear. Connections exist between the political realism of IR 
and American legal realism: that “law was a ‘means to social ends and not... an end in itself; a 
‘distrust’ of ‘traditional legal rules and concepts,’ as a description of what the system actually does; 
and an ‘insistence on evaluation of any part of the law in terms of its effects.’”151 A comparable 
relationship exists between hegemonial lawmaking and policy-oriented jurisprudence, with the latter 
being heavily criticised for subverting law to American political values. Specific policy oriented 
theories developed across the twentieth century inevitably came to reflect national interests by virtue 
of the long fixation of US foreign policy on Cold War politics.152
Koskenniemi notes that this form of jurisprudence originated with American lawyers who 
“increasingly conceived international law from the perspective of a world power, whose leaders have 
“options” and routinely choose among alternative “strategies” in an ultimately hostile world.”
  
153 Some 
accounts of the New Haven jurisprudence effectively defined “world public order” as coinciding exactly 
with the interests of the Western Bloc.154 The all consuming influence on strategic thinking had the 
effect of locking IL into a mode that promoted more narrowly defined state interests than otherwise 
may have been the case.155 More generally, a well-founded criticism is that powerful states are able to 
use this jurisprudence to rationalise parochial interests as “law.”156 The clear prescriptions of legal 
rules and decisions of international courts are liable to be set aside for purported inconsistency with 
“fundamental goals of the international community.”157 A powerful state may or may not sincerely 
adhere to this universal principle, but in either case the rule of law becomes subject to the self-judging 
of that state. The procedural protection of pluralism drawn from sovereign equality is liable to be 
sacrificed to specific conceptions of justice emanating from a hegemonic state as “authoritative 
decision-maker.”158
Hedley Bull thus rejected the imprecision of the policy oriented approach as liable to render 
law unintelligible.
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fundamental customary principle nullum crimen sine lege.”160 Professor Oscar Schachter levelled a 
particularly strident critique while sitting on a conference panel with McDougal, warning that the 
tendency to conflate American national interests with “fundamental goals of the world community” was 
incompatible with an effective system of IL.161 The actual influence of the approach was to produce a 
“unilateralist version of policy jurisprudence in which law plays a secondary role and policy is 
determined by the [American] perception of self-interest.”162 On the same panel Professor Richard 
Falk wryly described the “miraculous” capacity of McDougal’s jurisprudence to coincide with US 
foreign policy interests.163 Even Higgins, as a strong advocate of the jurisprudence, accepts that there 
is “a very fine line between insisting that decisions be taken in accordance with the policy objectives 
of a liberal, democratic world community and asserting that any action taken by a liberal democracy 
against a totalitarian nation is lawful.”164 The jurisprudence is capable of providing a framework that 
advances IL in a manner consistent with more orthodox conceptions of IL where it is underpinned by 
complementary values.165 But it also remains open to the insertion of particularistic political values. 
Modern exponents have applied a policy-oriented analysis to support the legality of some of the most 
prominent examples of American IL policy diverging from orthodox interpretations of IL. This includes 
arguments for the legality of the 2003 Iraq War,166 and using a policy analysis to challenge the legal 
definition of torture.167
 
 In all such cases the choice of jurisprudence has political consequences in 
enabling the further entrenchment of American hegemonic power within international legal institutions. 
Cultural Explanations: Exceptionalist Beliefs 
The final causal explanation evident in “exceptionalist” accounts is the role of culturally specific beliefs 
about America’s unique role in the international legal system. These explanations come closest to 
justifying the exceptionalist label in its sense of a special role drawn not from hegemonic power or 
distinctive institutions, but from unique values and identity. John Murphy’s analysis of “exceptional” 
American legal practice is sceptical of Kagan’s argument that distinct approaches to IL are rooted in 
transatlantic differences in power and weakness.168 Focussing on the role of beliefs he argues that 
there “is no doubt that European states are much stronger proponents of international law and 
institutions than is the United States.”169
                                               
160 “No crime without law.” Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic (Appeal Judgment), Seperate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Cassese (1997) IT-96-22-A at par.11 
 In contrast he argues that, on the basis of political beliefs, the 
sovereignty limitations created by the EU “are simply inconceivable” to most Americans who possess 
161 Schachter, Oscar, ‘McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility Influence Controversy: Remarks’ (1985) 79 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 266 at 272 
162 Ibid at 273 
163 Falk, Richard A., ‘McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility Influence Controversy: Remarks’ (1985) 79 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 266 at 281:  
“I am not sure if it is just a matter of prophetic coincidence, or that somehow or other the U.S. Government, no matter which 
administration is in the White House, has managed to study the works of the New Haven School and assimilated the theory at such a 
fundamental level that their automatic response to overseas challenges is to promote the values of human dignity no matter what they 
do.” 
164 Higgins, Rosalyn, Themes and Theories: Selected Essays, Speeches, and Writings in International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2009) at 52 
165 See Koh, Harold H., ‘Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process after September 11th’ (2004) 22 Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 337 
166 For a contrary argument from a policy-oriented approach see: Reisman, Michael W. & Andrea Armstrong, ‘The Past and 
Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense’ (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 525 
167 Cheng, Tai-Heng., When International Law Works (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 227-248 
168 See supra 
169 Murphy, John F., The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs (Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 354 
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“an historical distrust of power, especially centralized power.”170
One of the most influential contemporary contributions to this debate has been Jed 
Rubenfeld’s 2004 article Unilateralism and Constitutionalism,
 Here culturally based attitudes 
remain a principle explanation of distinctive policy. 
171 which argued that American 
conceptions of constitutional democracy have produced an exceptional approach to IL. Rubenfeld’s 
argument for exceptionalism starts in the divergent political and normative lessons WWII had for 
Europe and America. For continental Europe WWII represented the perverse outcome of unrestrained 
democratic will. The nationalism and populism fuelling the war confirmed for European leaders that 
national politics must be answerable to the explicitly antinationalist and antidemocratic higher 
authority of IL.172 In contrast the lesson for America was confirmation that its nationalism and system 
of constitutional government was the surest guardian of individual liberty. Far from seeking to curb 
American popular will, the post-war years saw a US strategy to extend its democratic values outward 
and “Americanise” the rest of the world.173
The exceptional experience of the US translated to a strategy of creating international legal 
institutions reinforcing American political values. Yet as Rubenfeld emphasises, this entailed the 
contradiction that legal regimes created to moderate the politics of other states had no legitimate role 
modifying the US itself. Hence the US became both the principal architect of IL and its most 
conspicuously reluctant subject.
 
174 Rubenfeld argues that these formative experiences have evolved 
into two distinct understandings of constitutionalism in guarding liberty. For European states 
“international constitutionalism” recognises supranational legal institutions transcending state 
sovereignty as the ultimate guardians of liberty. Power is deliberately transferred from the control of 
popular sovereignty to “international experts – bureaucrats, technocrats, diplomats, and judges – at a 
considerable remove from popular politics and popular will.”175 In contrast American “democratic 
constitutionalism” identifies the legitimacy of constitutional law in its foundations as a special act of 
popular lawmaking. American jurisprudence is also more sceptical about the possibility of a strict 
separation between politics and law, and thus of the possibility of a higher law that maintains its 
integrity when divorced from democratic foundations.176
                                               
170 Ibid at 354 
 Nau concurs in this analysis in arguing that, 
from “the European point of view, law must be inclusive of all cultures and check democratic as well 
as non-democratic states.” In contrast, for Americans, “democratic politics legitimates law.” For Nau 
this explains much of the divergence in beliefs about the binding authority of the UN in the 2003 Iraq 
171 Rubenfeld, Jed, ‘Commentary: Unilateralism and Constitutionalism’ (2004) 79 New York University Law Review 1971. 
Described in Koh’s article as “a powerful statement” of a “deeply rooted American culture of unilateralism and parochialism”: 
Koh, Harold H., ‘On American Exceptionalism’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 1479 at 1495, n.52. For sceptical responses to 
Rubenfeld’s 2004 article see: Bradford, Anu & Eric A. Posner, ‘Universal Exceptionalism in International Law’ (2011) 52 
Harvard International Law Journal 1; Delahunty, Robert J., ‘The Battle of Mars and Venus: Why Do American and European 
Attitudes Toward International Law Differ?’ (2006) 4 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 11 
172 Rubenfeld, Jed, ‘Commentary: Unilateralism and Constitutionalism’ (2004) 79 New York University Law Review 1971 at 
1985-1986 
173 Ibid at 1986 
174 Ibid at 1981-1982 
175 Ibid at 1987 
176 Ibid at 1997 
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invasion relative to the democratic legitimacy of US policy.177
It is European international constitutionalism however that has dominated the institutions and 
jurisprudence of IL developed from WWII to the present day. US IL policy is thus an outlier consistent 
with exceptionalist beliefs, resisting the constraints of IL on what Rubenfeld sets out as principled 
legal grounds. In this Rubenfeld agrees with Kagan’s conclusion that, although US actions are 
exceptional, they are not thereby hypocritical in the proper sense of that word.
 The intentionally undemocratic 
foundations of IL are therefore illegitimate fetters on American constitutional government. 
178 The drawback of US 
resistance to legal constraints is that: “To the rest of the world, this is bound to look hypocritical. In the 
United States, it will look like an insistence on democratic self-government.”179
Although Rubenfeld’s thesis relies heavily on a cultural explanation for distinctive IL policy, he 
does recognise the important linkages between ideas and power that this chapter seeks to identify. 
Rubenfeld, like Kagan, acknowledges that exceptional conceptions of IL have complemented the 
exercise of exceptional American power possessed since WWII. America can act unilaterally and 
Europeans must act multilaterally, and each has acted accordingly. However self-interest does not 
explain why each state settled on a particular policy course. Rubenfeld emphasises that perceptions 
of self-interest are not determined objectively, but through a nations “history, culture, values, and 
worldviews.”
 That interpretation 
supports the approach of this thesis, which is that divergence from orthodox conceptions of IL by 
American lawyers cannot be treated as evidence of bad faith without further evidence. 
180 American promotion of internationalism was led by two interests: a “high-minded” 
messianic impulse to spread American constitutional rights, and a “geopolitical” motive to construct 
and order that augmented American economic and political power. Both sets of motives were united 
in the objective of establishing a new global order replicating American values.181
 Rubenfeld’s argument generated much scholarly debate, with a particular focus on the 
question of whether exceptionalist explanation provides any insight beyond the influence of power 
and political interests.
 In this the 
connections between these two distinct causal explanations begin to emerge. 
182 Delahunty argues that the explanatory value of Rubenfeld’s argument is 
“incontestable,” particularly in relation to the depth of commitment of each side to their worldview.183 
He accepts, consistently with Rubenfeld, that the US is distinguished by its concern for democratic 
legitimacy, construing treaty and customary obligations narrowly by reference to state consent. In 
contrast Europe identifies the legitimacy of IL in natural law, therefore interpreting it broadly by 
reference to universal aspirations.184
                                               
177 Nau, Henry, Perspectives on International Relations: Power, Institutions, and Ideas (CQ Press, 2014) at 266. Nau does 
however concede the problem of self-judging and justifications for unilateral action introduced by the American position 
 Nevertheless, Delahunty favours a theory of transatlantic 
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divergence based on national interests, as propounded by Kagan. He concludes that this more 
orthodox explanation has equivalent or greater explanatory power, while eschewing complex 
historical explanations.185
The justification for a richer analysis, as exemplified by Rubenfeld, lies in a different analytical 
purpose. Delahunty aims to develop an abstract theory of the fundamental principles of states’ IL 
policies, making it unecessary to move beyond the concept of “national interests.” However, when the 
objective is to develop a framework for understanding the IL policy of a named state in specific policy 
contexts, then an abstract concept of national interest is simply inadequate. The national interest is a 
collective concept comprised of multiple specific objectives; but what are these objectives? And how 
will the state interpret IL to advance the objectives? Upholding America’s national interest, as defined 
by Rubenfeld, entails constructing a system of IL that reproduces distinct American constitutional 
values, while using those same values as a shield against the penetration of that legal system into 
American domestic law. Each conception is compatible and equally valid. But just as a parsimonious 
approach best explains abstract motivations, it is weakest in providing an account of the conception of 
interests as they actually guide policymakers. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The most striking thing that emerges from the review of exceptionalist legal scholarship is insufficient 
rigour in the use of the central concept. Legal applications appear to ride on the pedigree of the 
broader literature, but have generally categorised any unique feature of American legal policy as 
“exceptional.” Questioning this use of language is no mere terminological dispute, as it weakens the 
analysis that an understanding of exceptionalist ideas can offer; believing that America is guided by 
exceptional values sustains support for IL just as often as it erodes it. Moreover, the idiosyncratic logic 
of exceptionalist ideas is only one potential explanation among others. Labelling all such policies as 
examples of American exceptionalism, and then employing exceptionalist ideas to explain them, 
introduces circularity in reasoning. This chapter demonstrates that a necessary step in explaining the 
initial puzzle of contradictory IL policy is disaggregating distinct causal explanations and mapping out 
the relations between them. 
A notable feature of the three broad causal explanations for distinctive American IL policy is 
the extent that they are correlated.186 In the case of power based explanations even strong defenders 
of IL policy based on American preponderance have sought reconciliation with normative 
explanations of why such might is also right. Kagan acknowledges that the “modern liberal mind is 
offended by the notion that a single world power may be unfettered except by its own sense of 
restraint...the spirit of liberal democracy recoils at the idea of hegemonic dominance, even when it is 
exercised benignly.”187
                                               
185 Ibid at 38 
 Responding in these terms he asserts that by “nature, tradition, and ideology, 
the United States has generally favoured the promotion of liberal principles over the niceties of 
186 For a similar observation see Fehl, Caroline, Living with a Reluctant Hegemon: Explaining European Responses to US 
Unilateralism (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 16 
187 Kagan, Robert, ‘America’s Crisis of Legitimacy’ (2004) 83 Foreign Affairs 65 at 70 
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Westphalian democracy.”188 Conversely, from a critical perspective, Charlesworth acknowledges that 
the exceptionalist ideas evident in American IL policy that she finds so problematic have “at least 
some basis in US political, military and economic dominance globally.”189
Likewise the substantive content of policy-oriented jurisprudence is provided by 
“exceptionalist” ideas as defined in this thesis. In the New Haven approach, conceptions of “world 
public order” and “human dignity,” and of the American role in bringing these values about, 
necessarily draw upon long established conceptions of America’s global mission.
 
190 By conceiving law 
in this manner the substantive norms drawn from American political culture become the basis for the 
very legitimacy of IL. McDougal and Lasswell’s extensive exposition of specific community values 
underpinning their system only highlights the way that policy-oriented jurisprudence institutes values 
at the core of legality.191 The main challenge to the New Haven approach was led by Richard Falk of 
Columbia University, who criticised his contemporaries’ overt parochialism. Yet, ultimately these 
approaches converged: “one on the right, the other on the left, but alike in projecting American values 
on the rest of the world.”192 In this way the dominant American approach to jurisprudence opens the 
way for messianic and teleological forms of exceptionalism to be instituted as a foundational element 
of American IL policy.193
So what does this observed convergence mean for our understanding of the “rule of 
international law?” One way of proceeding is treating these observations as located at different levels 
of analysis that reflect the distinction between IR and FPA.
 Interpretations of IL that are inconsistent with exceptionalist liberal values are 
able to be rejected as not only politically undesirable, but for that very reason, lacking legal authority. 
A central role is thus preserved for political culture. 
194
These explanations, when viewed in concert, challenge suggestions that American legal 
policymakers perceive a simple choice between the ideal of the rule of IL and national political 
interests. Through the intertwining of power, jurisprudence and culture, a legal policymaker could 
conceivably pledge good faith fidelity to the rule of IL and yet depart significantly from global 
expectations. Many policymakers may indeed value raw political power over legal principle and act 
 The rationality of relative power 
approaches the question of policy contradictions at the level of the international system and the 
incentives for a uniquely powerful state to institutionalise its position in law. Jurisprudential 
explanations provide the framework within which these interests can be flexibly promoted while 
maintaining fidelity to legal principle. Finally, cultural beliefs provide the substantive content of legal 
policy in line with exceptionalist ideas. These different sources of distinctiveness fail to provide a 
satisfactory explanation for observed contradictions in isolation, but complement each other when 
approached as nested levels of explanation.  
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accordingly, but the evidence suggests a more symbiotic relationship between law and power. The 
final approach based on beliefs in America’s exceptionalism is the level of analysis that can offer the 
ideographic explanation necessary to explain how these factors ultimately produce contradictory 
policies. For this reason the next chapter turns to the role of foreign policy ideology to demonstrate 
that exceptionalist ideas are not merely epiphenomenal, but retain independent explanatory power. 
Delving further to specify the influence of those ideas thus requires a theory of the precise role of 
ideas and ideology in policymaking, and the structure of beliefs held by American policymakers. 
 CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY 
 
 
Chapter Two identified the limitations in existing international legal scholarship when explaining the 
relationship between power, beliefs and interests as causes of distinctive American IL policy. This 
chapter seeks to overcome such limitations through “ideology” as the ideational concept that best 
captures the transformation of power into ideas that shape interests. “Foreign policy ideology” is 
shown to be a compound concept that connects power and ideas as a single variable influencing a 
state’s IL policy. Identifying the persistent and interrelated sets of ideas comprising America’s foreign 
policy ideologies provides a framework for understanding how US IL policy can be consistent with 
broad expectations of power based explanations, yet also conform to the core ideas of American 
political culture. 
To identify the structure of American foreign policy ideology I adopt the influential four-parted 
typology developed by Wittkopf, Holsti, and Rosenau (“WHR”). Survey research on both political 
leaders and the mass public has repeatedly demonstrated an underlying belief structure comprised of 
two orthogonal and intersecting dimensions relating to the level of US international engagement, and 
the type of values being promoted. This empirically derived belief structure is corroborated by a vast 
intellectual and diplomatic history of American foreign policy. Locating policymakers within the 
resulting four-part typology has proven a powerful indicator of foreign policy preferences. A small and 
largely disconnected group of legal scholars have taken up the task of applying this structure of 
foreign policy ideologies to American IL policy. Reviewing that scholarship reveals a fruitful avenue for 
bridging the contradictions between legal scholarship and American IL policies. 
To address identified limitations the WHR typology is synthesised with evidence from 
diplomatic history to develop four ideal types that together form the parameters of American IL policy. 
The jurisdictional scope of policymaker’s attention is arrayed along an internationalist-nationalist 
dimension, while values shaping legal policy sit along a liberal-illiberal dimension. The crossing of 
these dimensions produces four discrete ideal types of American IL policy: Liberal Internationalism, 
Illiberal Internationalism, Liberal Nationalism and Illiberal Nationalism. This typology provides the 
ideological structure applied in this thesis to analyse competing conceptions of the rule of IL. 
 
 
THE POWER OF FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY 
International Relations Theory and Ideology 
The question raised in reviewing legal scholarship is not whether the unique dynamics of American IL 
policy are best explained by power or ideas, since they are evidently correlated. Rather the question 
is: how do culturally ingrained ideas about America’s global role mediate between the fact of 
preponderant power and legal policymakers’ engagement with IL? In IR terms this becomes a 
question of how a state’s perception of its interests alters the way that it behaves within the 
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international system, and therefore the causal role of ideas. It has become almost ritualistic to begin 
such an enquiry by identifying the limitations of Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist tenet that “considerations 
of power dominate considerations of ideology,”1 and then to describe the advantages of a flourishing 
array of alternative IR theories that reassert the power of ideas.2 As a work of legal scholarship this 
thesis is reluctant to strongly identify itself within any one of the many IR “tribes” capable of integrating 
ideas into Foreign Policy Analysis. Katzenstein’s argument for “analytical eclecticism” is pertinent, and 
the merits of combining approaches according to their analytical value.3
In that spirit, the observation of material power interacting with cultural ideas can draw useful 
insights from the IR school of “neoclassical” realism, which effectively synthesises material and 
ideational theories. Steinberg notes that international legal scholarship has demonstrated a tendency 
to “perpetuate a common misperception that realism is a monolithic approach that denies any role for 
law.”
 
4 Yet among the theoretical variants the “softest realist position is that of the traditional or 
neoclassical realists,” who recognise power and ideas as mutually constitutive.5 Gideon Rose sets out 
the basis of neoclassical realism in recognising that “the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign 
policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative 
material power capabilities. This is why they are realist.” However neoclassical realists also argue that 
“the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic 
pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are 
neoclassical.”6 The “intervening variable” becomes ideas held at both the public and elite level. 
Foreign policy ideas “embedded in social norms, patterns of discourse and collective identities” 
operate as an “intervening variable,” with ideology forming the bridge between material power and 
policy.7 Ideology operates to “filter and limit options, ruling out policies that fail to resonate with the 
national political culture.”8
                                               
1 Waltz, Kenneth N., ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’ (1990) 44 Journal of International Affairs 21 at 31. See for 
example Haas, Mark L., The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (Cornell University Press, 2005) at 2-3 & 
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Journal of International Law 64. The standard triumvirate includes variants of “liberal institutionalism” and “constructivism,” each 
of which identifies a causal role for human agency and ideational variables. For liberal approaches to foreign policy generally 
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Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons (ed), Handbook of International Relations (SAGE Publications, 2002); 
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of World Politics (MIT Press, 1999) at 16-18; Katzenstein, Peter J. & Rudra Sil, ‘Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for 
Analytical Eclecticism’ in J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein & Allen Carlson (ed), Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, 
and Efficiency (Stanford University Press, 2004) at 4 
4 Steinberg, Richard H., ‘Overview: Realism in International Law’ (2002) 96 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American 
Society of International Law) 260 at 261 
5 Ibid at 261. For a classical realist analysis of ideas see: Williams, Michael C., ‘Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: 
Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics’ (2004) 58 International Organization 633 
6 Rose, Gideon, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’ (1998) 51 World Politics 144 at 146; Rathbun, Brian C., 
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policymakers’ beliefs and the material structure of the international system to become mutually 
constitutive.9 This renders realism compatible with “constructivist” theories in IR, which have 
conventionally been seen as the ideal entry point for IL scholarship.10 A review of interdisciplinary 
scholarship notes that IL scholarship often “echoes the flavour and ontology of constructivist theory” in 
treating ideas and identity as the fundamental building blocks of international politics.11 In these 
approaches IL policy can be analysed by reference to the “competing general conceptions of what 
legal institutions and rules should look like,” which are in turn “shaped by the actors conceptions of 
their interests and their identities.”12
The advantages of a synthesised approach can be seen in Rose’s analysis of America’s 
rising relative power and the concomitant assertion of its normative exceptionalism. He argues that 
“instead of viewing ideas as either purely independent or purely dependent variables” there is scope 
for identifying “how, in conjunction with relative power, they could play both roles simultaneously.” 
Specifically Rose considers shifting interpretations of the widespread belief that American “domestic 
institutions should be disseminated to others.” This idea has been expressed by both the “examplars” 
of the nineteenth century and the “crusaders” in the twentieth century.
  
13 By adopting a neoclassical 
realist framework he argues that the most important explanation for this shift remains the “massive 
increase in relative power” that gave the US the means to contemplate a strategy of shaping global 
politics. The role of political power and basic premise of political realism thereby remains intact. Yet 
analysts “still need to know the content of American political ideology...in order to understand the 
specific policy choices officials made in either era.”14
 
 The causal role for ideology and law is thereby 
preserved even when proceeding from an ostensibly political realist approach. The immediate inquiry 
thus turns to identifying the precise role of foreign policy ideology in policymaking processes. 
Ideas as Beliefs 
To achieve greater clarity in the meaning of ideology as it will be used here, it is useful to start with a 
more precise definition of “ideas” as its basic building blocks. There is a degree of imprecision in 
formulations that variously label the constitutive elements of ideology as “ideas,” “opinions,” “values,” 
“symbols” and “beliefs.” For the purposes of this study the approach of Goldstein et al. is instructive, 
which defines ideas simply as “beliefs held by individuals.”15
                                               
9 Ibid at 142-143 
 Focussing on beliefs is persuasive as it 
expresses the connection between political ideas and the actors who hold them, who are central to 
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Relations (SAGE Publications, 2002); Dueck, Colin, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand 
Strategy (Princeton University Press, 2006) at 18-20; Quinn, Adam, US Foreign Policy in Context: National Ideology from the 
Founders to the Bush Doctrine (Routledge, 2010) at 20-21 
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13 Rose, Gideon, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’ (1998) 51 World Politics 144 at 169 
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any research project of this nature. Focussing on “ideas” simpliciter is a more abstract endeavour, 
suggesting an object that exists independently of agents who possess those ideas. Accordingly this 
thesis will focus on “beliefs” as causal variables in foreign policy outcomes, and as the basic elements 
from which ideologies are constructed. For Goldstein et al. these are of three types: world views 
defining possible modes of thought and discourse;16 principled beliefs providing normative criteria for 
assessing right from wrong;17 and causal beliefs about the cause-effect relationships that will yield 
strategic outcomes.18
Building on from this treatment, George and Bennett argue that rather than exerting a 
deterministic influence, political beliefs increase the propensity of decision-makers to reach particular 
“diagnostic” and “choice” decisions. In the former case beliefs create in policymakers a propensity to 
reach a particular diagnosis about what is happening in a case. In the latter situation beliefs direct 
policymakers’ propensity in choosing what action to then take.
 As will be seen, all three forms of belief inhere in a single ideology.  
19 The distinction alludes to the role of 
political beliefs in not merely recognising interests, but in defining what they are.20 Blyth argues that a 
useful understanding of beliefs must distinguish between the concept of interests and the necessarily 
prior cognates of interest.21 Making this distinction permits interests to be “less about a priori structural 
determination and more about the construction of wants as mediated by beliefs and desires (i.e., 
ideas).”22 Blyth emphasis that, although structures such as relative global power remain important in 
determining interests, they “do not come with an instruction sheet.”23
 
 
Defining Ideology 
The reason for focussing on “ideology” is that it remains the leading concept integrating power and 
beliefs to bridge the putative dichotomy between “interests” and “ideas” in legal and political analysis. 
Michael Freeden provides a basic definition of political ideology as “a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions, 
and values that”: 
1. exhibit a recurring pattern; 
2. are held by significant groups; 
3. compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy; [and,] 
4. do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a 
political community. 24
 
 
This definition identifies ideology as pervasive in all political thought, being comprised of the “ideas 
and symbols through which political actors find their way and comprehend their social 
                                               
16 Ibid at 8 
17 Ibid at 9 
18 Ibid at 10 
19 George, Alexander L. & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (MIT Press, 2005) at 
193. See for a research design using this distinction Khong, Yuen F., Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the 
Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton University Press, 1992) 
20 Ruggie, John G., ‘The Past as Prologue?: Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy’ (1997) 21 International Security 
89 at 120 
21 Blyth, Mark, ‘Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in Political Science’ (2003) 1 
Perspective on Politics 695 at 697 
22 Ibid at 697 
23 Ibid at 698 
24 Freeden, Michael Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 32. For an application of this 
definition in a foreign policy context see: Nincic, Miroslav & Jennifer M. Ramos, ‘Ideological Structure and Foreign Policy 
Preferences’ (2010) 15 Journal of Political Ideologies 119 
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surroundings.”25 Constituent ideas are necessary abstractions from reality, providing a descriptive and 
prescriptive heuristic for taking action in a complex world.26 The way beliefs are configured in a 
specific ideology enables the “decontesting” of their meaning, thereby narrowing the valid policy 
implications to be drawn from a political situation.27 Nincic and Ramos approvingly adopt Freeden’s 
definition for highlighting ideology as a form of “structured thinking: a stable and coherent relationship 
among the cognitions and preferences people hold.”28
[Ideologies] interact with historical and political events and retain some representative value. But they do so while 
emphasizing some features of that reality and de-emphasizing others, and by adding mythical and imaginary 
happenings to make up for the ‘reality gaps.’ A constant feedback operates between the ‘soft’ ideological imagination 
and the ‘hard’ constraints of the real world.
 Importantly, for present purposes, Freeden 
addresses the question of the correlation between material power and belief. Ideology is 
characterised as both a representation of an objective reality, and as part of the discourse that 
constructs it: 
29
 
 
Crucially this approach recognises the dialectical nature of ideology. A nation’s political ideology does 
not develop in a vacuum, but rather through encounters with the constraints and opportunities 
afforded by power. 
Jonathan Zasloff explores the meaning of ideology in a context closer to home, albeit from the 
reverse angle to this thesis: analysing the influence of “legal ideology” on early American foreign 
policy. His account of the “notoriously treacherous” concept is on point for drawing attention to the 
causal role of ideology in mediating between power and international legal policy.30 Zasloff adopts 
David Davis’ definition of ideology as: “an integrated system of beliefs, assumptions, and values, not 
necessarily true or false, which reflects the needs and interests of a group or class at a particular time 
in history.” 31 Davis’ own further explanation is useful for reminding us that “there is a continuous 
interaction between ideology and the material forces of history.”32 This element comports with the 
observation that the rise in ideas about America’s “exceptional” global role has paralleled and 
reinforced the reality of growing preponderant global power. Zasloff’s most important point for present 
purposes is that, by so defining ideology, it cannot be approached as merely “a cynical cover for the 
naked pursuit of self-interest.”33
                                               
25 Freeden, Michael Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 123 
 That conclusion is central to the argument of this thesis which is that, 
although law is at times employed to promote political ends, the fact of contradictions in American IL 
policy cannot itself be evidence of hypocrisy. Zasloff puts the case well: 
26 See also Appel, Hilary, ‘The Ideological Determinants of Liberal Economic Reform: The Case of Privatization’ (2000) 52 
World Politics 520 at 527 
27 Freeden, Michael Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 54-55 
28 Nincic, Miroslav & Jennifer M. Ramos, ‘Ideological Structure and Foreign Policy Preferences’ (2010) 15 Journal of Political 
Ideologies 119 at 121 
29 Freeden, Michael Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2003) at 106 
30 Zasloff, Jonathan M., ‘Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded Age to the New Era’ (2003) 78 New 
York University Law Review 239 at 247-250. See also Zasloff, Jonathan M., ‘Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis’ (2004) 77 Southern California Law Review 583 
31 Zasloff, Jonathan M., ‘Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded Age to the New Era’ (2003) 78 New 
York University Law Review 239 at 247. See Davis, David B., The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 
(Cornell University Press, 1975) at 14 
32 Davis, David B., The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Cornell University Press, 1975) at 14 
33 Zasloff, Jonathan M., ‘Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded Age to the New Era’ (2003) 78 New 
York University Law Review 239 at 248 
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ideologies carry power precisely because they allow people to believe that they are acting properly while at the same 
time serving their own interests. Legitimation, then, is directed more at the producer of ideology than at the 
consumer. Put another way, an effective ideology enables action because it helps avoid the cognitive dissonance 
that arises when a person advocates something she knows to be unjust or destructive simply to further her own 
interest.34
 
 
In the case of American IL policy, ideology operates to translate power into legal principle – in effect 
deriving an “ought” from an “is”35
Zasloff notes that the power of ideology in the specific context of foreign policy is of particular 
consequence, since policymakers are faced with immense uncertainty about the intentions of external 
parties due to “gaps in distance, culture, and understanding.” Even more so than in domestic politics, 
policymakers are “forced to rely upon ideological assumptions to guide their action.”
 – which adherents can then adopt as both a good faith commitment 
to IL and simultaneously an affirmation of American power. 
36 The leading 
account of American foreign policy ideology remains that of Michael Hunt, who defines ideology in 
terms consistent with the foregoing insights as: “an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that 
reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggest 
appropriate ways of dealing with reality.”37 For George, foreign policy ideology is “a belief system that 
explains and justifies a preferred political order for society, either one that already exists or one that is 
proposed, and offers at least a sketchy notion of strategy...for its maintenance and attainment.”38 
Legro’s definition identifies three characteristics of ideas in the specific context of foreign policy that 
distinguish them from other sets of political ideas. These are that foreign policy ideas: “(1) are 
collectively held; (2) involve beliefs about affective means; and (3) refer specifically to national 
conceptions about international society.”39 For Legro these ideas “are not so much mental as 
symbolic and organizational; they are embedded not only in human brains but also in the ‘collective 
memories,’ government procedures, educational systems, and the rhetoric of statecraft.”40 Moreover 
his definition of ideology draws attention to the inherent “instrumentality” of foreign policy ideas, which 
are beliefs not just about the objectives of policy, but also the effective means for achieving them.41 
His final element is of particular interest to the present analysis, which is that a foreign policy ideology 
entails beliefs about the proper attitude toward the existing international order: whether to join, remain 
outside, or overturn it.42
 From these accounts, foreign policy ideology can be defined as a shared set of interrelated 
beliefs that interpret global power and help define a state’s international interests and strategies for 
achieving them. The nature of ideology as beliefs entrenched in a political community ensures that 
evaluations of success will be heavily biased by a conviction that an ideology is effective.
 
43
                                               
34 Ibid at 248. Citations removed 
 It is hard, 
35 A form of Hume’s “is-ought” fallacy: See Pidgen, Charles R., Hume on Is and Ought (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 
36 Zasloff, Jonathan M., ‘Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: From the Gilded Age to the New Era’ (2003) 78 New 
York University Law Review 239 at 248-249 
37 Hunt, Michael H., Ideology and U.S. foreign policy (Yale University Press, 1987) at xi 
38 George, Alexander L., ‘Ideology and International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis’ (1987) 9 Jerusalem Journal of 
International Relations 1 at 1 
39 Legro, Jeffrey W., Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Cornell University Press, 2005) at 4 
40 Ibid at 6 
41 Ibid at 7 
42 Legro typologises these positions as “Revisionist,” “Separatist” and “Integrationist”: ibid at 10 
43 Ibid at 26 
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if not impossible, to conclusively falsify beliefs about foreign policy once ideologically entrenched. 
They do not provide an “absolute truth” about foreign policy interests and strategies, but merely 
beliefs that have become influential as an article of faith.44
 
 Any established American foreign policy 
ideology entails a claim that its constitutive beliefs are a formula for strengthening national power and 
interests. Adherents therefore formulate policy on the basis that it resonates with both themselves and 
a significant segment of the American polity. 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY 
The Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau Typology 
Attention can now turn to the substance and structure of American foreign policy ideologies with the 
object of identifying the specific sets of ideas influencing conceptions of IL. The most well established 
and widely used model by political scientists analysing the structure of American foreign policy 
attitudes is the “Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau” typology.45 The underlying rationale for this typology is the 
same as this thesis, which is that it “is useful in understanding the frequent inconsistency of American 
foreign policy, for the maintenance of a coherent foreign policy is more difficult in a domestic 
environment characterized by the absence of consensus.”46 Although the foundational literature does 
not adopt the term “ideology” to describe this belief structure, it is clear that the underlying concept is 
the same. In a review of foreign policy ideology literature, Hunt cited the work of Holsti and Rosenau 
as an example of “a new concern with ideology” that had “infiltrated the field of diplomatic history.”47 
The authors’ own terminology of “attitude structures,”48 “worldviews”49 and in particular “belief 
systems”50 entails the key elements of interrelated ideas about the nature of the world and political 
strategies for responding to it.51
As a preliminary point, it is worth emphasising that the most analytically useful typology in 
social science is one that moves beyond mere listing and instead maps out the structure of how 
 The model will accordingly be adapted in this thesis to identify and 
classify the constitutive beliefs and structure of American foreign policy ideology and thereby of 
American IL policy. 
                                               
44 Davis, David B., The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Cornell University Press, 1975) at 14; 
Hamilton, Malcolm B., ‘The Elements of the Concept of Ideology’ (1987) 35 Political Studies 18 at 38 
45 Chittick, William O., Keith R. Billingsley & Rick Travis, ‘A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs’ 
(1995) 39 International Studies Quarterly 313 at 313; Rathbun, Brian C., ‘Hierarchy and Community at Home and Abroad: 
Evidence of a Common Structure of Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs in American Elites’ (2007) 51 Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 379 at 386 
46 Wittkopf, Eugene R., ‘On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique and Some Evidence’ (1986) 
International Studies Quarterly 425 at 443 
47 Hunt, Michael H., ‘Ideology’ (1990) 77 The Journal of American History 108 at 112-113. See also Martini, Nicholas F., 
‘Foreign Policy Ideology and Conflict Preferences: A Look at Afghanistan and Libya’ (2014) 0 Foreign Policy Analysis 1 at 3-4 
48 Holsti, Ole R. & James N. Rosenau, ‘The Structure of Foreign Policy Beliefs among American Opinion Leaders - After the 
Cold War’ (1993) 22 Millennium-Journal of International Studies 235 
49 As described by Baum, Matthew A. & Henry R. Nau, ‘Foreign Policy Views and U.S. Standing in the World’ (2009) 28 
Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series at 5-6 
50 Holsti, Ole R., ‘The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study’ (1962) 6 Journal of Conflict Resolution 244; 
Converse, Philip E., ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics (1964)’ (2006) 18 Critical Review 1 
51 See Martini, Nicholas F., ‘Foreign Policy Ideology and Conflict Preferences: A Look at Afghanistan and Libya’ (2014) 0 
Foreign Policy Analysis 1 at 3; Larson, Deborah W., ‘The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-
Making’ (1994) 15 Political Psychology 17 at 21. Note that economist Douglass North preferred the term “belief system” to 
avoid difficulties associated with “ideology: cited in Appel, Hilary, ‘The Ideological Determinants of Liberal Economic Reform: 
The Case of Privatization’ (2000) 52 World Politics 520 at 526, n.13 
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different types relate to one another.52 Collier et al define an analytical typology as “an organized 
system of types that breaks down an overarching concept into component dimensions and types.”53 
“Dimensionality” is a broader concept than “type” and refers to the “number of variables entailed in a 
concept or a data set.”54 Common variables may be evident in different types and so the goal of the 
analyst is to isolate each variable, then show how types are connected and differentiated through 
them. Where the concept under analysis exhibits multidimensionality a clear typology will be one 
constructed by the intersection of orthogonal dimensions to form discrete types. An underlying 
strength of the WHR typology is that it goes beyond merely listing different forms of ideology, instead 
meeting the more rigorous standard of mapping out how different types relate to one another. A 
further point is that the product of this typology is four “ideal types” of foreign policy ideology. In Max 
Weber’s terms “an ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view 
and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent 
concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized 
viewpoints into a unified analytical construct.”55
The WHR typology rests upon extensive survey research that has confirmed an extremely 
robust structure of two orthogonal dimensions crossing to form four discrete belief types.
 These types are therefore analytical constructs that 
usefully capture patterns of observed behaviour, rather than an account of any particular person’s 
belief system. Outlying cases and inconsistencies do not falsify the typology, but merely remind that it 
represents a synthesised ideal. 
56 Holsti first 
described a “Three-Headed Eagle” of foreign policy types in 1979 comprised of “Cold War 
Internationalism,” “Post-Cold War Internationalism” and “Isolationism.”57 Holsti noted that the three 
parted typology encompassed the “two versions of internationalism” identified previously by 
Mandelbaum and Schneider as “conservative internationalism” and “liberal internationalism.”58 Cold 
War internationalism/conservative internationalism emphasised elements of traditional Realpolitik, 
including a zero-sum contest between the US and its adversaries and the importance of US 
leadership to maintain a favourable balance of power.59
                                               
52 On typological construction see Collier, David, Jody LaPorte & Jason Seawright, ‘Putting Typologies to Work: Concept-
Formation, Measurement, and Analytic Rigor’ (2012) 65 Political Research Quarterly 217 at 222-223; Elman, Colin, 
‘Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics’ (2005) 59 International Organization 293 
 In contrast post-Cold War 
internationalism/liberal internationalism rejected the wisdom of pursuing US primacy, instead 
emphasising global interdependence and thus the need for cooperation – particularly in economic and 
53 Collier, David, Jody LaPorte & Jason Seawright, ‘Putting Typologies to Work: Supplementary Material,’ Political Research 
Quarterly (2012) <http://prq.sagepub.com/content/suppl/2012/03/30/65.1.217.DC1/10.1177_1065912912437162.pdf>. See also 
George, Alexander L. & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (MIT Press, 2005) at 
235 
54 Collier, David, Jody LaPorte & Jason Seawright, ‘Putting Typologies to Work: Supplementary Material,’ Political Research 
Quarterly (2012) <http://prq.sagepub.com/content/suppl/2012/03/30/65.1.217.DC1/10.1177_1065912912437162.pdf> 
55 Weber, Max, The Methodology of the Social Sciences (The Free Press, 1949) at 90; Watkins, John W.N., ‘Ideal Types and 
Historical Explanation’ (1952) 3 The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 at 24. Finnis used the term “central case” 
in the same way within law specifically: Finnis, John, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press, 1980) at 9-11 
56 See George, Alexander L. & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (MIT Press, 
2005) on mutual exclusivity and exhaustiveness in typologies 238 
57 Holsti, Ole R., ‘The Three-Headed Eagle: The United States and System Change’ (1979) 23 International Studies Quarterly 
339. See also Holsti, Ole R. & James N. Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1984) at 
Ch.4 
58 Holsti, Ole R., ‘The Three-Headed Eagle: The United States and System Change’ (1979) 23 International Studies Quarterly 
339 at 356; Mandelbaum, Michael & William Schneider, ‘The New Internationalisms’ (1978) 2 International Security 81 at 93 
59 Holsti, Ole R., ‘The Three-Headed Eagle: The United States and System Change’ (1979) 23 International Studies Quarterly 
339 at 343-345; Mandelbaum, Michael & William Schneider, ‘The New Internationalisms’ (1978) 2 International Security 81 at 
93-94 
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humanitarian issues.60 Mandelbaum and Schneider then arranged these types in relation to a third 
“noninternationalist”61 category to conclude that foreign policy is best thought of in terms of two 
dimensions: “an internationalist-isolationist dimension (whether the United States should play an 
active role in world affairs) and a cross-cutting liberal-conservative dimension (what kind of role it 
should play).”62
 In secondary analyses Wittkopf, and later Holsti and Rosenau, used survey research on the 
American public’s foreign policy attitudes to corroborate these findings. Data from both the Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations (“CCFR”)
 The “internationalist-isolationist” dimension measures perceptions of what degree of 
involvement with the external world will best serve American interests. The “liberal-conservative” 
dimension measures political values, specifically whether American interests are defined in zero-sum 
terms, or whether they are defined according to a commonality of interests that transcend national 
identity. 
63 and the Foreign Policy Leadership Project (“FPLP”)64 was 
used to identify a bi-dimensional structure of “support-oppose militant internationalism” and “support-
oppose cooperative internationalism.”65 “Militant internationalism” (“MI”) was evident in positions that 
supported American leadership in opposing the Soviet Union and a willingness to use American 
military power abroad. On Mandelbaum and Schneider’s dimensions support for MI is equivalent to 
holding “conservative” values, while opposition to MI is equivalent to a “liberal” foreign policy 
position.66 In contrast “cooperative internationalism” (“CI”) was evidenced by pro détente policies and 
a preference for cooperating with other countries rather than focussing on a zero-sum competition 
with the Soviet Union. Here support for CI is equivalent to an “internationalist” position, while 
opposition to CI indicates a more “nationalist” position.67 Wittkopf crossed these dimensions to 
produce four mutually exclusive belief types:68
                                               
60 Holsti, Ole R., ‘The Three-Headed Eagle: The United States and System Change’ (1979) 23 International Studies Quarterly 
339 at 346-347; Mandelbaum, Michael & William Schneider, ‘The New Internationalisms’ (1978) 2 International Security 81 at 
94-95 
 
61 Equivalent to Holsti’s “isolationist” category: Holsti, Ole R., ‘The Three-Headed Eagle: The United States and System 
Change’ (1979) 23 International Studies Quarterly 339 at 348-352 
62 Mandelbaum, Michael & William Schneider, ‘The New Internationalisms’ in Kenneth A. Oye, Donald Rothchild & Robert J. 
Lieber (ed), Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World (Longman, 1979) at 41. Original emphasis 
63 Since renamed: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Chicago Council Surveys 
<http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/files/Surveys/Chicago_Council_Survey_Home/files/Studies_Publications/POS/Public_Opinio
n.aspx>. See Reilly, John E., American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995) 
64 See Holsti, Ole R. & James N. Rosenau, ‘Liberals, Populists, Libertarians, and Conservatives: The Link between Domestic 
and International Affairs’ (1996) 17 International Political Science Review 29 at 32 
65 Wittkopf, Eugene R., ‘The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes: An Alternative View’ (1981) 62 Social Science Quarterly 108 
at 114-115; Maggiotto, Michael A. & Eugene R. Wittkopf, ‘American Public Attitudes toward Foreign Policy’ (1981) 25 
International Studies Quarterly 601 at 608; Holsti, Ole R. & James N. Rosenau, ‘The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes 
among American Leaders’ (1990) 52 Journal of Politics 94 at 96 
66 This is corroborated by the self-identification of survey respondents according to political ideology 
(ranging from “very liberal” to “very conservative”) and partisanship: Holsti, Ole R. & James N. Rosenau, ‘Liberals, Populists, 
Libertarians, and Conservatives: The Link between Domestic and International Affairs’ (1996) 17 International Political Science 
Review 29 at 52 
67 Maggiotto, Michael A. & Eugene R. Wittkopf, ‘American Public Attitudes toward Foreign Policy’ (1981) 25 International 
Studies Quarterly 601 at 610 
68 Wittkopf, Eugene R., ‘The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes: An Alternative View’ (1981) 62 Social Science Quarterly 108 
at 115; Maggiotto, Michael A. & Eugene R. Wittkopf, ‘American Public Attitudes toward Foreign Policy’ (1981) 25 International 
Studies Quarterly 601 at 610-611; Holsti, Ole R. & James N. Rosenau, ‘The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among 
American Leaders’ (1990) 52 Journal of Politics 94 at 96. A parallel structure of “Potential Divisions Among American Leaders” 
was suggested by Holsti and Rosenau in the following table: 
 Liberal Conservative 
Internationalist 
 
Post-Cold War Internationalists Cold War Multilateralists 
Isolationist 
 
Semi-Isolationists Cold War Unilateralists 
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 Oppose MI Support MI 
Support CI Accommodationists Internationalists 
 
Oppose CI Isolationists Hard-liners 
 
 
Accommodationists support cooperative internationalism and oppose militant internationalism. They 
adopt an internationalist focus according to a liberal world view that focuses on non traditional security 
threats such as democratisation and human rights, with a preference for working multilaterally through 
IL and institutions. Internationalists support both cooperative internationalism and militant 
internationalism. They have an internationalist focus, but according to a conservative world view that 
is willing to combine diplomatic cooperation with military superiority to maintain America’s global 
position. Isolationists oppose both cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism. They 
oppose unnecessary international involvement in order to protect liberal values at home. Finally Hard-
liners oppose cooperative internationalism and support militant internationalism. They adopt a 
nationalistic rather than international focus, but do so to uphold national security and America’s global 
position rather than for liberal objectives.  
 Subsequent survey research confirmed that these same dimensions structure the beliefs of 
American foreign policy elites. This rebutted the presumption created by the pioneering work of 
Converse, who previously found that elite foreign policy beliefs diverged from that of the mass 
public.69 Wittkopf analysed “leaders” beliefs within the CCFR survey data, being those respondents “in 
leadership positions with the greatest influence upon and knowledge about foreign relations.”70 Falling 
in this category are “policymakers” in the sense used in this thesis, which included members of 
Congress (in particular members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs committees) and the 
executive (including State Department officials and “officials with international responsibilities from 
other government departments”).71 The real difference between elites and masses was in the 
distribution between types. Survey results demonstrated a relatively even distribution of the mass 
public among the four types.72 In contrast leaders were more likely to support CI compared to the 
mass public, with a far greater distribution between the two internationalist quadrants 
(Accommodationists and Internationalists).73 This difference stemmed specifically from the occupancy 
of leadership positions itself rather than from the demographic characteristics of those leaders. 
However this did not alter the structure of leaders’ beliefs, which remained the same as masses.74
                                                                                                                                                  
Holsti, Ole R. & James N. Rosenau, American Leadership in World Affairs (George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1984) at 244 
 
69 Converse, Philip E., ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics (1964)’ (2006) 18 Critical Review 1 
70 Wittkopf, Eugene R. & Michael A. Maggiotto, ‘Elites and Masses: A Comparative Analysis of Attitudes Toward America’s 
World Role’ (1983) 45 Journal of Politics 303 at 308 
71 Ibid at 308-309, n.9; For the distribution of respondents between groups see Wittkopf, Eugene R., ‘Elites and Masses: 
Another Look at Attitudes Toward America’s World Role’ (1987) 31 International Studies Quarterly 131 at 133, n.1 
72 Holsti, Ole R. & James N. Rosenau, ‘The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among American Leaders’ (1990) 52 Journal 
of Politics 94 at 103; Wittkopf, Eugene R., ‘What Americans Really Think About Foreign Policy’ (1996) 19 Washington Quarterly 
88 at 94-95 
73 This finding is replicated in more recent analysis of CCFR survey data: Busby, Joshua W. & Jonathan Monten, ‘Who are the 
Hardliners? Public Opinion and Republican Elite Attitudes on U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War’ (2008) 2008 Annual 
Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA March 27-30 at 16-17 
74 Wittkopf, Eugene R. & Michael A. Maggiotto, ‘Elites and Masses: A Comparative Analysis of Attitudes Toward America’s 
World Role’ (1983) 45 Journal of Politics 303 at 322; Wittkopf, Eugene R., ‘Elites and Masses: Another Look at Attitudes 
Toward America’s World Role’ (1987) 31 International Studies Quarterly 131 at 134 
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Distribution of leaders and masses between types was determined foremost by political 
ideology and party affiliation.75 Data indicated that self identified liberals were more likely to adopt a 
support CI/oppose MI position. In contrast conservatives and moderates were more likely to adopt a 
support MI/oppose CI position.76 In terms of partisanship this translated into a greater number of 
Democrats identifying as Accommodationists, while Internationalists and Hardliners were more likely 
to be Republicans. Partisan affiliation of Isolationists was less apparent but leaned toward Republican 
or independent.77 Recent analysis of the CCFR data by Busby and Monten demonstrates that the 
proportion of Republican elites categorised as Hardliners has grown, thereby narrowing the gap 
between the mass public and elites in levels of support for both forms of internationalism.78 By 2002 
significant partisan differences had emerged, with growing support for CI among Democrat leaders 
matched by a sharp increase in support for MI among Republican leaders.79 Overall however Busby 
and Monten’s updated analysis confirmed both the persistence of the WHR structure of beliefs and 
the continued concentration of leaders between internationalist types.80
The WHR typology has been repeatedly verified through empirical data on the structure of 
foreign policy ideology among the American public and elites,
 
81 and through evidence that the types 
correlate with domestic political beliefs.82 The historical context of the typology was of course heavily 
influenced by Cold War thinking and US-Soviet relations. However, subsequent research has 
demonstrated a “remarkable continuity” in ideological structure following the end of the Cold War.83
                                               
75 This use of the term “ideology” to describe political placement on a left-right spectrum may explain part of the reluctance to 
adopt the term to describe the structure of beliefs as a whole 
 
Holsti and Rosenau have traced the evidence across a period spanning the immediate post-Vietnam 
War through to the post-Cold War era. Their conclusion is that foreign policy belief structures have 
“persisted through a period of historic international change.” That continuity is evident not only in “high 
politics” on the causes of war and peace, but also in emerging non-traditional security threats that 
76 Wittkopf, Eugene R., ‘Elites and Masses: Another Look at Attitudes Toward America’s World Role’ (1987) 31 International 
Studies Quarterly 131 at 134; Nincic, Miroslav & Jennifer M. Ramos, ‘Ideological Structure and Foreign Policy Preferences’ 
(2010) 15 Journal of Political Ideologies 119 at 122 
77 Holsti, Ole R. & James N. Rosenau, ‘The Structure of Foreign Policy Beliefs among American Opinion Leaders - After the 
Cold War’ (1993) 22 Millennium-Journal of International Studies 235 at 248 & 278. Isolationists have also been found to liberal 
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span state boundaries.84 Murray and Cowden agree in finding that American leaders effectively 
adapted existing Cold-War ideological attachments to new international circumstances.85 As such, 
there is strong evidence that the WHR structure of foreign policy ideology is invariant over time and 
independent of changing distributions of international power. Critiques of the typology have been 
offered over the years,86 including arguments that foreign policy beliefs are structured by either 
more87 or by less88 than the two MI/CI dimensions. None of these formulations has eclipsed the WHR 
scheme however in popularity or influence.89 More importantly, as Baum and Nau have more recently 
noted, the typology remains “impressively reliable at predicting support or opposition to U.S. 
approaches toward foreign policy in general, and specific policy initiatives in particular.”90 Alternative 
formulations may have merit therefore, but the WHR has been proven adequate to the task of an 
analytical typology of foreign policy ideology, while offering the advantages of parsimony and an 
impressive pedigree as the “gold standard” within the literature.91
 
 
Evidence from Diplomatic History  
A frequent observation within the WHR literature is that each belief type parallels long established 
traditions of thought found in American diplomatic history. The WHR scheme is valuable for using 
quantitative research to classify how types of American foreign policy beliefs interrelate. The typology 
nevertheless remains a parsimonious rendering of rich traditions of thought that have long shaped 
American foreign policy. Foremost this history provides clear evidence of analogous dimensionality in 
attitudes to foreign policy. An early analysis by Klingberg observed that the US foreign policy “mood” 
has cycled between periods of “extroversion” and “introversion.”92
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Lockean “liberal tradition,” which has manifested in two distinct forms.93 The first is an “exemplarist” 
strand that seeks to spread American values primarily by preserving the unique character of the 
nation as an example to the world.94 This has meant promoting the superiority of the American 
example within the confines of the existing international order. Alternatively American foreign policy 
has taken a “messianic” form in which the US seeks to actively spread exceptional values abroad.95 
Here the focus is on using American values as a platform for reforming the international order in line 
with its own values. For Hartz the connection between these divergent outlooks is that “absolute 
national morality is inspired either to withdraw from “alien” things or to transform them: it cannot live in 
comfort constantly by their side.” The consequence is that liberalism can manifest both in an 
internationalist and nationalist form so that for America “messianism is the polar counterpart to its 
isolationism.”96 Against Hartz’s “thesis” is an opposing tradition of thought that directly challenges the 
liberal conception of America’s place in the world. Lieven describes this as the “American antithesis” 
grounded not in universal values but particularistic ethnoreligious roots.97 For Brock the universal and 
liberal view of American purpose has been “constantly at war with the idea that Americanism belongs 
exclusively to the American people and must be defended against alien influences rather than shared 
with mankind.”98
 These connections were recognised in Holsti and Rosenau’s earlier work, which noted that 
their Isolationists “revived a theme with venerable roots in American political thought–that the ability to 
nurture and sustain democratic institutions at home is inversely related to the scope of the nation’s 
commitments abroad.”
 
99 They cite as evidence of this view George Kennan’s contemplation “I think I 
am a semi-isolationist.”100 Similarly the strong connection between domestic liberalism and 
Accomodationist beliefs is explained as the legacy of the ideas of democracy promotion, human 
rights, and collective security in the foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson.101 Finally Hardliners are 
described in terms directly attributable to what is sometimes labelled the “Jacksonian” tradition of 
foreign policy, with strong Southern roots and an emphasis on military virtues.102
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 In the WHR typology 
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Relations Committee Senator Jesse Helms,103 and “strongly pro-military and right wing, but staunchly 
nationalist and outspokenly protectionist opponents of the New Deal.”104
Fleshing out the WHR model requires attention to the sets of ideas that have developed 
around each point of intersection across American diplomatic history. Policymakers located along the 
two dimensions can be expected to hold specific sets of ideas consistent with their position within the 
typology. However, those ideas are not derived from the logic of the scheme itself but are informed by 
the cultural and historical influences of diplomatic history, which have rendered determinate sets of 
ideas about policy means and ends. Freeden notes the importance of cultural and historical 
influences rendering a circumscribed “range of meanings and arguments” from a broader ideology.
 
105 
Similarly for Hunt this process permits a “relatively coherent, emotionally charged, and conceptually 
interlocking sets of ideas,”106 while for Dueck “culture” establishes a “set of interlocking values, 
beliefs, and assumptions that are held collectively by a given group and passed on through 
socialisation.”107
There is now an identifiable body of literature that has drawn upon American diplomatic 
history to find that American foreign policies can be divided into four distinct types structured 
analogously to the WHR model.
 This suggests the formation of an American foreign policy Weltanschauung, largely 
defining the universe of acceptable policy options. The two dimensions of the WHR scheme provide a 
skeleton for analytically ordering these more diffuse sets of competing ideas that American 
policymakers hold about the nature of American power, and its purpose in the world. Perhaps the 
strongest evidence of the WHR typology’s external validity is that the four ideal types are corroborated 
by these well established sets of foreign policy beliefs that precede the specific typology by many 
decades and even centuries. 
108 These formulations necessarily differ given that they are 
developed through a forensic reconstruction of established patterns of conduct in diplomatic history. 
There are inevitable overlaps and inconsistencies between types, but a review of this literature 
reveals sufficient correspondence to treat these as corroborating the approach. The most well known 
is that of Walter Russell Mead, who argues that his classification of the Wilsonian, Hamiltonian, 
Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian traditions of thought allows for the interpretation of “American foreign 
policy as more of a unified whole and less as a sequence of unrelated episodes.”109
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van, ‘Transatlantic Bipolarity and the End of Multilateralism’ (2005) 120 Political Science Quarterly 1 at 65 
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four traditions as an organic product of the American experience, with each deeply rooted in regional, 
economic, social and class interests. More specifically he speculates that the traditions may be traced 
to the four “folkways” inherited from the regional cultures of the British Isles.110
 Wilsonians focus on the moral dimension of US political culture and the interests in spreading 
these values internationally through democracy promotion and the rule of law. Mead sees the roots of 
this tradition lying deep in 19th century American missionary activities
 
111 so that, despite the moniker, 
“there were Wilsonians long before Woodrow Wilson was born.”112 This tradition is more than mere 
idealism, emerging “as a middle way between reactionary militarism and revolutionary 
internationalism.”113 Hamiltonians focus on strengthening the state through an alliance between 
government and big business, which serves as the basis for policies directed toward protecting the 
nation’s economic power.114 Jeffersonians emphasise liberty at home as the pre-eminent American 
value, and thus focus on avoiding the corrupting influence of an activist foreign policy. For Mead this 
is the only tradition “that believes history is not necessarily on the side of the American experiment,” 
producing a fear that overseas commitments erode American liberty through both neglect and 
centralisation of government power that this necessitates.115 Brands’ “exemplarists” terminology 
captures the idea that America owes the world only the example of its constitutional freedoms. Going 
any further threatens to “jeopardize American values at the source. In attempting to save the world, 
and probably failing, America would risk losing its democratic soul.”116
Mead argues that US foreign policy is notable for the continuity of these four traditions in 
shaping America’s world view and the character of its international engagement.
 Finally Jacksonians represent 
the populist tradition in US foreign policy, which values national security above all else.  
117 The history of US 
foreign policy is thus viewed as one of the traditions vying for political influence separately and 
together in shifting combinations. Each has contributed to national power and shown themselves 
naturally capable of complementing one another as if led by Adam Smith’s invisible hand.118 The 
traditions represent a uniquely American paradigm, with the continuing influence of the Continental 
realism of the Cold War amounting to a perversion of US foreign policy.119
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banish from the realm of high international politics,” yet these concerns “are and inevitably will be 
central concerns of American foreign policy far into the future.”120
The parallels between the WHR and Mead typology are obvious. Holsti states that, although 
never attributed as such, the four types “bear more than a passing resemblance to the distinction 
between the Hamiltonian (internationalists), Wilsonian (accommodationists), Jeffersonian 
(isolationists), and Jacksonian (hard-liners) approaches to American foreign policy.”
  
121 The WHR 
typology has indeed been treated as synonymous with Mead’s for analytical purposes, with the 
primary difference being in its more rigorous structure.122 Mead himself disavows any intent to “prove” 
that policymakers hold these beliefs, or indeed to treat his typology as a model suited to empirical 
testing.123 His work is presented as a “classificatory typology” listing named types, rather than a 
“conceptual typology” constructed on underlying dimensions.124 Nevertheless, there is certainly 
evidence that Mead’s typology exhibits the same dimensionality as the WHR scheme. Mead classes 
Wilsonianism and Hamiltonianism together as specific types of a “globalist” tradition, while 
Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism are both types of a “nationalist” tradition.125 Moreover Mead 
emphasises the liberal values at the core of both Wilsonianism and Jeffersonianism, which 
distinguishes them from the other two traditions. Other variants of the typology confirm the same 
dimensions. In Nau’s examination his “internationalists” and “realists” are actively engaged in the 
international sphere, while his “neoisolationists” and “nationalists” resist international engagement.126 
Dueck is more explicit, setting out two dimensions of strongly/weakly committed to liberalism and 
strongly/weakly committed to limited liability, which closely mirror the WHR dimensions and resulting 
typology.127
A similar distribution of elites and masses between the historical and WHR types is also 
evident. Mead in particular emphasises the populist appeal of Jacksonianism and Jeffersonianism, in 
contrast to the greater support among foreign policy elites for his two globalist traditions.
 
128
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the American public.129 These suppositions accord with the empirical evidence that leaders and 
foreign policymakers are located in the internationalist quadrants in far greater proportions than the 
mass public.130
 
 
The Status of American Exceptionalism 
An important implication of thinking in terms of diplomatic history is that this brings the WHR structure 
to bear on the divergent strands of “exceptionalism” noted in legal analysis. American exceptionalism 
has itself been called an ideology that has “deeply shaped the structure of social and political 
thought.”131 However, in the context of foreign policy, McEvoy-Levy prefers to describe American 
exceptionalism as “the ‘para-ideological’ umbrella” encompassing the many recurrent themes of 
America’s global engagement. By this she means that the concept lacks the coherence of an 
ideology, but rather is “a crystallization of a set of related ideas which explain the world and the US 
role therein.”132
Mead directly describes Jacksonian thinking as combining “a firm belief in American 
exceptionalism and an American world mission with deep scepticism about the United States’ ability 
to create a liberal world order.”
 This is the conclusion preferred in this study, which does not find exceptionalist beliefs 
to meet the features of an ideology. Rather the interplay between America’s uniquely preponderant 
power and foreign policy ideology has produced exceptionalist beliefs as the inevitable outcome of 
grappling to explain its own normative significance. Each of the four American foreign policy 
ideologies has settled on distinct explanations for American uniqueness which, when taken together, 
represent the different faces of what has become known as “American exceptionalism.” These beliefs 
remain components of broader foreign policy ideologies however rather than comprising a distinct 
exceptionalist ideology. The term is empty as a categorical label, and only provides insight into 
American foreign policy where the particular variants of exceptionalist ideas are specified as liberal, 
illiberal, internationalist or nationalist. 
133 But the same logic applies to his Wilsonians’ perception of an 
“American duty to remake the world in its image,”134 and the Jeffersonian view that the American 
Revolution “was the start of a new era in the world.”135
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they have several distinct ones.”136 In particular their equivalents to the Accommodationists, 
Hardliners and Isolationists all explicitly encompass variants of exceptionalist beliefs.137
 For all treatments of the four-parted typology the outlier in terms of exceptionalist beliefs is the 
WHR “Internationalist” type or Mead’s “Hamiltonian” tradition. This is notably labelled simply as the 
“Realist” tradition by both Dueck and by Baum and Nau. For Baum and Nau adherents “do not 
consider America as exceptional at all but ordinary like all other powers.”
 
138 Likewise for Dueck the 
internationalist focus of this type flows not from exceptionalist liberal values but rather “from an 
attempt to promote the national interest in a balanced manner.”139
 
 Consequently this form of ideology 
represents approaches to policy that are least influenced by beliefs in American exceptionalism. 
Exceptionalist ideas nevertheless remain an integral component to each of the alternative three 
approaches to foreign policy. 
 
FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Legal scholarship has been unwilling to acknowledge the influence of foreign policy ideology on 
receptions of IL for deep-seated epistemological and disciplinary reasons. The legalist narrative 
remains one of a unified body of impartial rules, doctrines and institutions with universal validity.140 
According to this view, the content and obligations created by IL can be determined without 
distinguishing between the identity and ideological commitments of the state subjects of IL. Shirley 
Scott has addressed the significance of ideology in IL consistently with this view by approaching the 
idea of IL itself as a legalist ideology.141 The core belief of this ideology is that “international law is 
ultimately distinguishable from, and superior to, politics.”142 From this perspective the efficacy of legal 
institutions depends on the strength of state observance of core legalist beliefs; where that ideology 
loses its adherents IL ceases to exist.143 Scott concludes that, in practice, the obligation on states is 
not to comply with law per se, but rather to uphold the ideology.144
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49 at 54; Scott, Shirley V., International Law, US Power: The United States’ Quest for Legal Security (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) at 211-215 & 234-235 
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The IL as ideology approach is advantageous for identifying the way that law’s power is 
mediated through political ideology.145 However, the conclusion that the power of IL is encapsulated in 
a single legalist ideology is inconsistent with the insights from both legal scholarship and American 
diplomatic history.146 Scott appears to treat the ideology of IL as a free-floating concept rather than 
part of the belief system of any state or group of policymakers, with no requirement that any “believe 
the ideology to be true.”147 Ideological claims are however necessarily made by real states and 
persons promoting partial political interests. The power of ideology lies not in providing a rhetorical 
framework external to those it is directed at, but in its ability to constitute the beliefs and actions of its 
adherents. A rhetorical system of belief remains subordinate to internalised ideological commitments 
of legal policymakers. The insight from the present analysis is that there is likely to be an array of 
foreign policy ideologies, each upholding the “idea of international law”148
What is required is a specification of the content of the political ideologies that make “legal 
doctrine intelligible” to particular policymakers.
 through the very act of 
contesting its meaning – not by confirming a singular ideology of IL. 
149 That task has been undertaken in the analogous 
case of foreign policy ideology shaping competing interpretations of the US President’s constitutional 
powers. Trimble analyses the shifting balance of constitutional powers between the executive and 
Congress to find that “the dominance of the Presidency is intertwined with the prevailing ideology of 
U.S. foreign policy, which includes a notion of U.S. example and leadership in world affairs that 
requires executive initiative. The President’s constitutional foreign affairs power must be defined in 
light of this background.”150 Constitutional interpretation must thereby “accommodate the self-image of 
world leadership that the American body politic has adopted and that forms the core of American 
foreign policy ideology.”151 It is this approach of identifying the influence of ideology in constituting 
legal meaning that will provide the answers sought, rather than treating IL as its own ideology.152 
Consistent with this frame, a small handful of authors have endeavoured to integrate substantive 
beliefs of American foreign policy ideology with divisions in conceptions of IL.153
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153 Cohen, Harlan G., ‘The American Challenge to International Law: A Tentative Framework for Debate’ (2003) 28 Yale Journal 
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The sole book-length effort is Mark Janis’ series of essays in The American Tradition of 
International Law.154 Janis opens with the statement: “How we think about any aspect of the law is 
largely an inheritance,”155 setting the context for examining how attitudes toward IL in the early 
republic have formed the parameters of an American tradition of IL. In the context of competing 
foreign policy ideologies Janis recognises that “some of America’s fierce debates about the nature 
and advantages of international law have been generated by the disputants failing to acknowledge 
that they were actually talking about somewhat different things.”156
According to Janis two broad conceptions have historically competed for influence over 
American IL policy, termed “exceptionalism” and “universalism.”
 
157 “Universalism” is equated with 
“naturalist” jurisprudence, a “society-centered” focus and an “international community.” Universalism 
developed through the ideas of figures that Janis terms “American utopians”; defined by a 
determination to subject global politics to the authority of international institutions.158 Universalism is 
comprised of two presumptions. The first is that IL is just as much “real law” as municipal law, on the 
basis that it is recognised by judges and lawyers alike. The second is that IL is founded on a 
“universal civilization shared by all humanity no matter what their discrete histories or societies.”159 
“American utopians” are a broader category than Mead’s “Wilsonians,” but do encompasses that 
tradition. A chapter is devoted to applying Mead’s framework to answer the question: “how ‘Wilsonian’ 
was Woodrow Wilson?”160 Janis argues that Wilson was an IL sceptic in his early academic career,161 
and only lived up to his moniker in the aftermath of WWI.162 Wilson became the archetypal utopian in 
accepting that “it may be necessary to use the force of the United States to vindicate the right of 
American citizens everywhere to enjoy the protection of international law.”163
Janis’ competing conception is that of “exceptionalism,” which is “positivist,” “state-centered” 
and “volunteeristic.”
  
164
                                                                                                                                                  
Tribunals and U.S. Courts’ (2009) 1 Berkeley Journal of International Law Publicist 27; Bederman, David J., ‘Constructivism, 
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International Law and United States Foreign Policy’ (2001) 50 Emory Law Journal 717 
 Janis defines exceptionalism as the idea “that America is intrinsically different 
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157 Janis, Mark W., ‘The American Tradition of International Law: Exceptionalism and Universalism’ (2006) 21 Connecticut 
Journal of International Law 211 at 211. Koh identifies three “traditions” in Janis’ work which he labels the “universalist, or 
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A “revisionist” perspective, closely resembling the positivistic Realpolitik tradition; a “non-universal” view of IL that distinguishes 
between liberal and non-liberal states; and the “universalist tradition” identified by Janis and Koh: Noyes, John E., ‘Universalism 
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from other countries, and is therefore not necessarily a model.”165 The “American consensus” on the 
desirability of IL166 was destroyed by the searing experience of WWI and its political aftermath.167 This 
facilitated the rise of exceptionalism, led largely by “American isolationism” and its adherence to the 
principle of neutrality toward global political events. On this view the exceptional nature and position 
of the US militated against universalism’s desire to impose utopian ideals through IL.168 Janis’ 
meaning of “exceptionalism” is thus closer to the pejorative use common in legal scholarship to 
denote forms of exemption.169
Janis’s work has been recognised as an important contribution to understanding the historical 
development of American approaches to IL.
 
170 However, caution is required in his call to integrate 
competing traditions of thought; that “American international lawyers need to translate international 
law universalism to America’s exceptionalists, and to translate American international law 
exceptionalism to international law’s universalists.”171 The problem is that conceptions falling under 
the universalist banner define themselves in opposition to recognising “exceptionalism” in IL in the 
sense used by Janis. Janis identifies his own thought with the universalist tradition172 and its belief 
that IL should be founded on a “universal civilization,” without distinction to the historical or political 
“exceptionalism” of IL’s subjects.173
The other problematic feature of Janis’ argument is a failure to disaggregate distinct types of 
thought flowing from his observations, thereby yielding a framework too broad to capture the impact of 
ideology competing over IL policy. The problem is acute when Janis tries to draw conclusions from an 
aggregation of every non-universalist figure in US politics. His “isolationists” are a combination of 
disparate figures, united only by a less than total embrace of IL. Janis tries to specify the ideological 
beliefs shaping the Bush 43 administration’s IL policy, inferring that it was Kennan’s political realism 
that led to “simplistic and thoughtless repudiation of international law and morality.” “Mistakes” 
identified by Janis include the Bush doctrine of pre-emption and detainee policy, which “have hurt, 
rather than helped, American national interests.”
 The proper conclusion to be drawn from Janis’ analysis is that 
there are fundamentally incompatible beliefs about IL, with resulting tensions something to be 
managed, not resolved through synthesis.  
174 However in both these cases a realist IL policy 
could (and often did) support the contrary policy – emphasising a more limited understanding of 
national interests and a greater concern for upholding basic rules of the international system.175
                                               
165 Janis, Mark W., America and the Law of Nations: 1776-1939 (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 113 
 
166 Ibid at 195  
167 Ibid at 157 & 194-195 
168 Ibid at 199-200 
169 See Chapter 2 supra 
170 See the symposium on Janis’ 2006 book in (2006) 21 Connecticut Journal of International Law 185-212. For a highly critical 
review however see Koskenniemi, Martti, ‘Book Reviews: The American Tradition of International Law. Vol.1: Great 
Expectations 1789-1914. By Mark. Weston Janis’ (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 266 
171 Janis, Mark W., ‘The American Tradition of International Law: Exceptionalism and Universalism’ (2006) 21 Connecticut 
Journal of International Law 211 at 212 
172 See Janis, Mark W., ‘International Law as Fundamental Justice: James Brown Scott, Harold Hongju Koh, and the American 
Universalist Tradition of International Law ‘ (2002) 46 Saint Louis University Law Journal 345 at 345. Citing Friedberg, James 
J., ‘Book Review: An Introduction to International Law. By Mark. W. Janis’ (1990) 22 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 319 at 321 
173 Janis, Mark W., ‘International Law as Fundamental Justice: James Brown Scott, Harold Hongju Koh, and the American 
Universalist Tradition of International Law ‘ (2002) 46 Saint Louis University Law Journal 345 at 346 
174 Janis, Mark W., America and the Law of Nations: 1776-1939 (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 71 
175 See Mearsheimer, John J., Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism Versus Neo-Conservatism (2005) 
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/2522.pdf> 
The Structure of American Foreign Policy Ideology 
 
74 
 
Dueck also identifies Kennan as a “Realist” (equivalent in his typology to an Illiberal Internationalist), 
but argues that this tradition militated strongly against the Bush incursions on IL.176 The same 
criticism applies to Janis’ historical analysis of the debate over the Versailles treaty and ultimate 
rejection of the League of Nations.177 Henry Cabot Lodge was no “American utopian,” but was willing 
to support the treaty if it was amended to better reflect US interests, “while divesting the League of 
Nations of the supranational authority that Wilson wanted.”178 This nuanced approach reflects the 
influence of a realist IL policy supporting clearly circumscribed international institutions based on clear 
state consent. As a further example, the American Bar Association’s early efforts to oppose the 
International Declaration of “so-called human rights”179 and the 1951 Genocide Convention180 were 
underpinned by ideas that were neither universalist nor realist. In these cases policy was motivated by 
a belief that these constituted infringements of federalism, in that American states had the right to 
govern these issues according to parochial norms (in particular the institution of racial segregation).181
A sophisticated and more structured attempt to develop a framework for integrating ideology 
is in Harlan Cohen’s 2003 article The American Challenge to International Law: A Tentative 
Framework for Debate.
 
This is more consistent with Mead’s Jacksonian IL policy and the supremacy of particularistic cultural 
values over international engagement. 
182 Cohen’s key insight for the purposes of this research is in response to the 
question: “Can inconsistent [IL] policies be explained as mere hypocrisy, as the pragmatic application 
of hegemonic power?” Cohen’s answer is no:183
Pragmatic assessments of American self-interest undoubtedly played a role in...policy decisions... But such an 
answer seems empty. Observers have long noticed the power of ideas in American foreign policy, and it has become 
commonplace to discuss how American foreign policy history reflects various intellectual trends – some dating to the 
founding of the Republic. It seems strange to discuss American perceptions of international law as somehow 
divorced from these intellectual trends. Ideas have long shaped American perceptions of the outside world and the 
United States’ relation to it; it seems logical that those same ideas would play a role in defining the tools of American 
international relations – the possible, the useful, the dangerous.
 
184
 
 
His objective is “to re-explain the American perception of international law as an extension of 
intellectual trends in American foreign policy,”185 specifically citing Mead’s four traditions as exemplars 
of the “intellectual trends” informing his research.186 Cohen chooses to focus on one specific 
“foundational ideology” which he terms “liberal constitutionalism as a utopian world vision.”187
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 This is 
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180 Janis, Mark W., America and the Law of Nations: 1776-1939 (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 187 
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of International Law 551 
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protection of human rights” as a model for the rest of the world.188 Cohen argues that interpreting IL 
policy according to this set of ideas will demonstrate that apparent contradictions “may actually be 
informed by a coherent, specifically American conception of international law.”189 The liberal 
constitutionalism ideology has manifested in two forms, being the internationalist “Wilsonian” school 
and a non-interventionist “Isolationist” school. It is clear from Cohen’s description190
Cohen proceeds to outline the parameters of IL seen through this ideology. The basis of 
liberal constitutionalism in protecting individual liberty dictates that people not states “must be the 
fundamental unit of international law.”
 that these two 
schools align with the Accomodationist/Wilsonian and Isolationist/Jeffersonian types respectively. 
191 This renders conditional the sovereignty of states that do not 
accept the American utopian vision. The appearance of hypocritical US behaviour follows, as 
America’s “foundational ideology presupposes that it is the only truly legitimate state.”192 The logical 
conclusion is thus: “According to this ideology, the American utopian vision is in itself the most true 
international law.”193 This leads Cohen to specify the elements of IL policy in each of the two forms of 
ideology drawn from liberal constitutionalism as a utopian world vision. A Wilsonian IL policy 
privileges human rights over the sovereignty of states where they fail to uphold citizens’ liberty. IL is 
here utilised primarily as a sword to advance the utopian mission. In contrast an 
Isolationist policy privileges state sovereignty over competing claims that threaten to erode liberal 
constitutionalism at home. In this way IL is utilised as a shield to guard the integrity of the utopian 
mission as an example to the world.194
Both policy approaches present a challenge to orthodox IL scholarship. Positivist and 
cosmopolitan jurisprudence each define IL’s legitimacy as exogenous to state ideologies and 
traditions. In contrast “ideological foreign policy seems to expose such neutral principles as mere 
chimera.”
 
195 Positivism assumes sovereign equality as the constitutional principle of IL.196 In contrast 
American IL policy is premised on “sovereign inequality,” with states ranked according to their 
conformity with liberal utopianism.197
                                               
188 Ibid at 555, n.19 & 558 
 Cohen characterises American IL policy as a form of 
cosmopolitanism, drawing its legitimacy from the universality of human rights rather than from state 
consent. However, he further notes that this approach entails an inherent contradiction: American IL 
policy, notionally drawn from universal principles of liberal constitutionalism, is unavoidably based on 
interpretations that themselves lack universality. Cohen argues that this explains the incomprehension 
of other states in the US’ refusal to participate in the ICC “despite its seeming reification of American 
189 Ibid at 556 
190 Ibid at 559 
191 Ibid at 561. Original emphasis. 
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194 Ibid at 564 
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196 Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society (Macmillan Press, 2nd ed, 1995) at 134-35; Cosnard, Michel, ‘Sovereign Equality - 
“The Wimbledon Sails On”‘ in Michael Byers and Georg Nolte (ed), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 118; Glennon, Michael J., Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power 
(Palgrave, 2001) at 148 
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of International Law 551 at 569 
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values.”198
Cohen concludes that with the neutrality of IL exposed as “mere myth”
 The internal understanding of those values is in fact consistent with more qualified ICC 
engagement. 
199 international 
lawyers must be guided by two principles. First “international law cannot ignore ideology,” which must 
be integrated into its doctrines and practice to be accepted as legitimate and effective.200 The second 
is that international lawyers must consciously construct IL to give effect to the ideas underpinning 
state policy – constructing IL on a “pragmatic, parochial foundation.”201 Here Cohen approves the 
New Haven policy oriented jurisprudence, arguing that IL founded upon “parochial ideas” provides the 
surest avenue to establishing “self-perpetuating universal norms.” This argument provides crucial 
support to the argument that foreign policy ideologies express the “authoritative” and “controlling” 
norms that have been established at the core of IL policy, and therefore the source of legality itself.202 
For Cohen an IL grounded in foreign policy ideology will resonate most strongly with the American 
polity, who will thereby become more receptive to the cosmopolitan project through this dialectical 
relationship.203
The gap in IL scholarship filled by foreign policy ideology is reiterated by Cohen in a 
subsequent contribution on the topic of Historical American Perspectives on International Law.
 
204
Scholarship on American ideas about international law and justice seeks to fill a major gap in the legal literature. 
Despite voluminous scholarship on the history of the United States and international law, the intellectual history of 
American perceptions of, engagement with, and contributions to international law remain amazingly 
underdeveloped.
 
Cohen outlines the academic context of this review piece: 
205
 
 
In Cohen’s view existing histories mistakenly conceive of IL as “a body of rules either to be observed 
or violated” while ignoring their context “as part of a constantly evolving set of ideas and normative 
commitments about international relations, justice, and governance.” In particular Cohen emphasises 
the way that these broader ideas and norms206
Understanding the diverse positions the United States has taken toward international law in the past, e.g., support for 
the creation of the United Nations and the Nuremberg Tribunal but opposition to the League of Nations and the 
International Criminal Court, requires a fuller understanding of how each of those institutions either resonated or was 
in tension with other ideological commitments of particular groups of Americans. Predicting the positions future 
American administrations might take on international law and institutions requires a deeper understanding of 
international law’s place within competing foreign policy ideas and philosophies.
 have competed for influence over IL policy:  
207
 
 
As a whole Cohen’s framework provides fertile ground for introducing foreign policy ideology 
into explanations of American IL policy. Nevertheless, as with Janis, a limitation in Cohen’s argument 
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is that, although he is careful to narrow his analysis to “liberal constitutionalism as a utopian vision” 
and its dependant traditions, he is not so methodical in limiting his conclusions. Like Janis he 
analyses the “Bush Doctrine” as articulated in advance of the 2001 Afghanistan War208 and the 2003 
Iraq invasion,209 but unlike Janis’ characterisation of this as an expression of Realpolitik, Cohen 
argues that liberal constitutionalism explains these episodes. There is merit in arguing that these 
episodes bear the imprint of foreign policy ideology, but the evidence does not point to liberal 
constitutionalist ideology as the operative tradition. Cohen appears to be well versed in Mead’s 
Jacksonian tradition,210
Mead’s typology has proved the most adaptable for legal scholars for reasons most likely 
related to its pithy rendering of complex ideas and Mead’s own easily accessible, if not populist, 
writing style. Julian Ku has noted that Mead’s analysis of “liberal internationalist” and 
“neoconservative” variants of Wilsonianism is useful for its “classification of different approaches to 
foreign policy and international law.”
 yet does not consider the extent to which this illiberal approach contributed to 
the IL policy of the Bush 43 administration. In this regard Cohen appears to rely too heavily on the 
democracy promotion rhetoric of the administration in advance of each of these wars, without 
considering the broader ideological context of the first term of the administration, often in direct 
conflict with the strategic logic of liberal foreign policy ideologies. 
211 John Noyes and David Bederman have each demonstrated 
this value in taking the next step of specifically setting out the elements of IL policy drawn from each 
of Mead’s types.212 Noyes’ work is also notable for making the first attempt to review and integrate 
different literature on foreign policy ideology in IL by summarising Mead’s and Janis’ work.213
 [T]he stable system of rules embodied in...[UNCLOS] may appeal to people with different priorities: those who value 
international institutions and cooperative endeavours to address common space issues; those who favour open 
commercial relations; and those who support freedom of action for the U.S. military.
 Noyes 
advances this literature by moving beyond policy outcomes to disaggregate the role of competing 
forms of ideology, using US accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(“UNCLOS”) as a case study. He recognises that seeming policy consensus may mask the influence 
of competing beliefs: 
214
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In setting out four positions drawn from Mead, Noyes accepts that the impact of each type “cannot 
always be neatly compartmentalized” with “overlap in views” likely.215 Wilsonian IL policy emphasises 
“a U.S. version of the rule of law,” consisting of universally agreed rules, consistency with human 
rights norms, and the creation of an institutional framework for dispute settlement and further 
regulation of the oceans. Hamiltonians focus on the benefits of a stable system of rules that facilitate 
freedom of navigation and certainty in trade and commercial dealings. In contrast Jacksonian IL policy 
takes a “unilateralist/anti-institutionalist” approach, and therefore is defined by principles that limit the 
scope of IL. Because Jacksonians emphasise US national security, IL is developed to unilaterally 
implement policies through military strength. They are sceptical about the ability of IL to improve 
global politics through common values, the desirability of compromising US policy autonomy, and the 
importance of preserving national honour by not acceding to agreements which cannot be kept.216 
Notably this belief type will resist the promotion of IL even where there is strong evidence that 
engagement with IL will serve national interests – such as the navigational benefits that UNCLOS 
would deliver to the US military.217
Noyes’ approach is also notable for taking seriously the implications of the foreign policy 
ideology approach: employing his account of Jacksonian opposition to UNCLOS in order to engage 
Jacksonians on their own terms.
 Finally Jeffersonian IL policy is centred on a “human rights 
exceptionalist/sovereigntist” view, which emphasises resistance to IL infiltrating domestic institutions 
and US conceptions of individual rights. Because IL develops separately from the specific institutions 
of American constitutional democracy it can only erode the integrity of these institutions.  
218 This targeted dialogue is precisely the type of contribution that 
ideology can contribute to developing American IL policy. Nevertheless, Noyes’ approach, while 
valuable, could be refined to better distinguish different ideologies from each other. Problematic 
conclusions include the characterisation of George Kennan as a Jacksonian,219 and Bush 43 
administration lawyers Jack Goldsmith and John Yoo as Jeffersonians – despite the latter being the 
primary author of the illiberal “torture memos.”220
                                               
215 Noyes, John E., ‘The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention: U.S. Views on the Settlement of International Law 
Disputes in International Tribunals and U.S. Courts’ (2009) 1 Berkeley Journal of International Law Publicist 27 at 32; Noyes, 
John E., ‘U.S. Policy and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (2007) 39 George Washington International 
Law Review 621 at 626 
 This is perhaps explained by Noyes focussing on 
specific rhetoric employed by IL policymakers consistent with each of these belief types. But in each 
case there is evidence in public statements and policy actions that are far more consistent with 
216 Noyes, John E., ‘U.S. Policy and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (2007) 39 George Washington 
International Law Review 621 at 627. Here Noyes extrapolates Mead’s discussion of the role of Jacksonian codes of honour to 
the international level: 627, n.25, citing Mead, Walter R., Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the 
World (Routledge, 2002) at 251. Mead himself agrees with this analysis: Mead, Walter R., Personal Communication with Author 
(19 January, 2015) 
217 Noyes, John E., ‘U.S. Policy and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (2007) 39 George Washington 
International Law Review 621 at 638 
218 See generally Noyes, John E., ‘The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention: U.S. Views on the Settlement of 
International Law Disputes in International Tribunals and U.S. Courts’ (2009) 1 Berkeley Journal of International Law Publicist 
27 
219 Inferred in the conclusion that critics of “legalism-moralism” follow this tradition: ibid at 30. This is Kennan’s well known 
phrase: See Kennan, George F., American Diplomacy (University of Chicago Press, 1984) at 95 
220 Noyes, John E., ‘The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention: U.S. Views on the Settlement of International Law 
Disputes in International Tribunals and U.S. Courts’ (2009) 1 Berkeley Journal of International Law Publicist 27 at 30, n.10, 
which refers to Curtis Bradley’s definition of “Constitutionalist” scholars, a group encompassing Bush 43 lawyers Jack 
Goldsmith and John Yoo: Bradley, Curtis A., ‘The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order’ (2006) 3 The 
Supreme Court Review 59 at 60, n.3. 
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competing ideological types: Kennan and Goldsmith as Illiberal Internationalists, and Yoo as an 
Illiberal Internationalist and Nationalist. 
David Bederman’s approach is to adopt Mead’s traditions to distinguish divergent ideas 
underlying US debates for and against post-Cold war engagement with IL.221 In setting out the 
elements of IL policy he argues that resistance to US engagement with IL has “centered around 
Hamiltonian and Jacksonian idioms,”222 although also includes “Jeffersonian Neo-Isolationists.”223 
Hamiltonians reject moral justifications for extending US military power that are insufficiently 
connected to the national interest. In contrast “Jacksonians are fundamentally dubious of the ability of 
law to order relations in an international community that is strikingly reminiscent of a lawless Western 
frontier town.” Adopting these competing belief types in his analysis allows Bederman to emphasise 
that US resistance to IL stems from forms of ideology that are “irreconcilable in their underlying 
attitudes and policy prescriptions.”224 Bederman also applies this framework to consider the issue of 
human rights litigation in American courts, where Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians have been split over 
the desirability of shifts in political power from the executive to private plaintiffs.225
A comparable effort is made by Philippe Lagassé to set out the elements of Walter 
McDougall’s ideologies of “exceptionalism, unilateralism and Wilsonianism” in considering US policy 
toward the ICC.
 
226 Like the foregoing authors, Lagassé’s argument is that characterisations of US IL 
policy as hypocritical are misplaced to the extent that they overlook basic philosophical conflicts within 
foreign policy. McDougall’s exceptionalists mirror Jeffersonians in their rejection of any fetter on US 
sovereignty in the form of qualifications on the system of constitutional government and its absolute 
protection of individual liberty.227 Ratification of the Rome Statute conflicts with the constitutionally 
guaranteed right to a trial by jury, protection against double jeopardy and the status of the US 
Supreme Court as the truly supreme judicial body of the US legal system.228 Unilateralists reflect the 
concerns of both Jacksonians and Hamiltonians in rejecting constraints the ICC places on the full 
defence of US national security.229 This belief type recognises the political agenda of states wishing to 
constrain American hegemony, which has been institutionalised in the ICC structure. Of particular 
concern are the jurisdictional claims of the ICC, which cover all crimes committed in signatory states, 
even where the perpetrators are from a non-signatory state, and the undefined and inherently political 
“crime of aggression.”230
                                               
221 Bederman, David J., ‘Globalization, International Law and United States Foreign Policy’ (2001) 50 Emory Law Journal 717 
 Finally Wilsonians support the ICC as a key element of an overarching 
222 Ibid at 721 
223 Ibid at 735 
224 Ibid at 722 
225 Bederman, David J., ‘Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law’ (2000) 89 Georgetown Law Journal 
469. Prophetically Bederman has previously criticised legal scholarship attempting an interdisciplinary approach as prone to 
insufficiently rigorous analysis: Bederman, David J., ‘I Hate International Law Scholarship (Sort of)’ (2000) 1 Chicago Journal of 
International Law 75 at 81-2 
226 Lagassé, Phillippe, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Foreign Policies of the United States’ (2004) 59 International 
Journal 433. See McDougall, Walter A., Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 
(Houghton Mifflin, 1997) 
227 McDougall, Walter A., Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (Houghton 
Mifflin, 1997) at 37-38 
228 Lagassé, Phillippe, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Foreign Policies of the United States’ (2004) 59 International 
Journal 433 at 436 
229 McDougall, Walter A., Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (Houghton 
Mifflin, 1997) at 40 
230 Lagassé, Phillippe, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Foreign Policies of the United States’ (2004) 59 International 
Journal 433 at 437 
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desire to promote international legal structures for advancing rule of law principles.231 Lagassé 
concludes: “Were American foreign policy consistent and unified in its aspirations,…[accusations of 
hypocrisy] might be accurate. American foreign policy, however, is not driven by a single 
philosophy.”232
 
 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LAW POLICY 
Reviewing legal scholarship on the influence of foreign policy ideology produces two main 
conclusions. The first is that this arena of inquiry is a fruitful avenue for bridging the gap between 
existing scholarship and explanations for contradictions within American IL policy. The second is that 
the literature presents an opportunity for further development, including adopting insights from political 
science to refine the elements of IL policy drawn from ideological types. 
On the basis of this review there is a strong case for synthesising the inductive WHR typology 
with the deductive typologies drawn from diplomatic history to establish an analytical model of four 
ideal types of American IL policy. The attraction of adopting Mead’s and similar typologies for this 
purpose is that they present the complex conclusions from political science in a form that can be 
easily digested by legal scholars wanting to avoid specialised political science methodology. This has 
the advantage of providing a parsimonious analytical framework that still illustrates the basic 
connection between ideological commitments and conceptions of IL. Moreover, understanding the 
ideas of each of the WHR types is artificially limited if disconnected from their historical 
underpinnings. The drawback, evident in applications of Mead’s typology, is the conflating effect of 
focussing simply on named types. The objectives of legal scholars applying Mead’s typology will be 
better met by reintroducing the empirical foundations and rigour of the dimensions that structure 
general foreign policy ideology. 
With this object in mind, the WHR typology and variants informed by diplomatic history can be 
synthesised according to the intersection of an internationalist-nationalist jurisdictional dimension and 
a liberal-illiberal values dimension to form four ideal type IL policies: Liberal Internationalism, Illiberal 
Internationalism, Liberal Nationalism and Illiberal Nationalism:233
 
 
Liberal Illiberal 
Internationalist Liberal Internationalist 
(Accommodationists)* 
(Wilsonians)† 
 
Illiberal Internationalist 
(Internationalists)* 
(Hamiltonians)† 
Nationalist Liberal Nationalist 
(Isolationists)* 
(Jeffersonians)† 
 
Illiberal Nationalist 
(Nationalists)* 
(Jacksonians)† 
* Wittkopf’s terminology (1981) 
† Mead’s terminology (2002) 
                                               
231 Ibid at 431; McDougall, Walter A., Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 
(Houghton Mifflin, 1997) at 136 
232 Lagassé, Phillippe, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Foreign Policies of the United States’ (2004) 59 International 
Journal 433 at 442 
233 To avoid coining unnecessary terminology I have simply labelled each type by combining dimension headings. Dueck’s 
schema is also useful, but he confusingly labels those in Wittkopf’s “accommodationists” cell as “internationalists,” and those in 
Wittkopf’s “internationalists” cell as “realists” 
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1. Internationalist-Nationalist Jurisdictional Dimension 
Parsimonious explanations from political power predict that a powerful state will tend to “oscillate 
between two poles: instrumentalization of and withdrawal from international law.”234
Alternatively legal policymakers have identified the national interest in decreasing American 
enmeshment in international institutions and law. On this view law and institutions located at the 
national level remain sufficient to meet American foreign policy interests, which should therefore be 
shielded from increasing entanglement in international legal obligations. In particular policymakers 
with a nationalist commitment are concerned with how certain IL policies “will best advance the kind of 
domestic policies and order they wish to promote.”
 This dynamic has 
been reproduced in a jurisdictional ideological dimension that measures US commitment to advancing 
foreign policy interests through the international legal system. Legal policymakers have at times 
demonstrated a belief that American national security is enhanced by actively engaging to develop 
the architecture of international legal rules and institutions. In this view American interests and 
security are dependent on the nature of the world beyond national borders, with the international legal 
order being a meaningful determinant of how that world looks. This stance is expressed through a 
diversity of values and rationales, but there is evidence of a persistent belief in the strategic 
advantages of upholding and working through a system of IL. 
235 The jurisdictional dimension thus encompasses 
the WHR “support CI-oppose CI” dimension, Mandelbaum and Schneider’s “internationalist-
isolationist” dimension, and the internationalist-nationalist dimension evident in diplomatic history.236
 
 
2. Liberal-Illiberal Values Dimension 
The second dimension concerns the values informing American IL policy. At one end are American 
legal policymakers who identify the legitimacy of IL in its support for the liberal values of universal 
rights and freedoms of natural persons. Liberalism expresses the Lockean principle that law should 
rationally advance the liberty of citizens to pursue their own conception of “the good” – as prominently 
encapsulated in the US Declaration of Independence.237 Liberalism in IL policy is accordingly a 
bottom-up designation that natural persons rather than states or classes of people are the 
fundamental subjects of international law.238
Conversely IL policy has been motivated by illiberal values – being any values other than 
those that treat the defence of personal liberty as the primary object of IL. Specifically these include 
strengthening national security, using foreign policy to maintain a particular balance of global power, 
and upholding non-universal cultural values. Illiberal approaches to IL policy reject the principle of 
 To this end liberal conceptions have tied the status of IL 
to questions of its compatibility with democratic government and the municipal rule of law. 
                                               
234 Krisch, Nico, ‘International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order’ 
(2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 369 at 379 
235 Mead, Walter R., Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (Routledge, 2002) at 176. 
Emphasis added 
236 “Internationalist-nationalist” has been adopted as a label for this dimension to avoid the historically loaded meanings 
associated with the term “isolationist” 
237 Most obviously in the second and third sentences: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governed.” 
238 See Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’ (1997) 51 International 
Organization 513 at 516-517 
The Structure of American Foreign Policy Ideology 
 
82 
 
promoting universal values, focussing instead on guarding uniquely American values and interests. 
As such, there is an equally strong case that the values dimension captures the “oppose MI-support 
MI” dimension, Mandelbaum and Schneider’s “liberal-conservative” dimension, and the liberal-illiberal 
dimension evident in diplomatic history.239
 
 
As in the original typology, these cells represent a comprehensive account of mutually exclusive ideal 
types. Cells can be treated as mutually exclusive in the sense that each ideal type is more than simply 
the sum total of two dimensions: policy implications of each dimension are given their meaning by the 
intersecting dimension. For example a foundation in liberalism has starkly divergent implications 
depending on whether or not policymakers think in terms of America’s global role. Whereas Liberal 
Internationalism seeks to bolster American democracy by replicating its values globally, Liberal 
Nationalism seeks the same objective by protecting liberal freedoms against the corrupting influence 
of global entanglement. Thus, although each of these ideal types is situated at the liberal end of the 
values dimension, “liberalism” acquires entirely different strategic implications.  
There is some passing similarity between this typology and an earlier typology of four 
conceptions of IL identified by Wolfgang Friedman.240 In respective order to that presented here they 
were “a genuine belief in the supremacy of international legal order over national sovereignty”; “the 
use of international law as rhetorical argument”; “limited respect for the ‘live and let live’ rules of 
international law as an appropriate guide to the conduct of nations, subject to the overriding national 
interests of States”; and an “attitude of open contempt for international law as incompatible with the 
nature of man, which is controlled by the survival of the fittest, and the destiny of nations, which is 
realised in constant struggle and war.”241 Although this typology is an imperfect fit,242 Friedman draws 
the same conclusion that “much depends on the Legal Adviser’s conception of the appropriate role for 
international legal considerations in the formulation of foreign policy.”243
 
 The promise of both 
Friedman’s approach and that developed here is that the idiosyncrasies and contradictions in 
American IL policy will be revealed as the consequence of ideology structuring IL policy in ways that 
are quite predictable and internally coherent. 
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The evidence from both empirical analysis and American diplomatic history is that foreign policy 
ideology is all pervasive in structuring conceptions of IL. In this respect it is misplaced to treat power 
based accounts such as Goldsmith and Posner’s Limits of International Law as “stripping away the 
                                               
239 As with the first dimension “liberal-illiberal” has been adopted as a label to avoid the multifarious meanings of “conservative,” 
which is not necessarily the opposite end of a dimension measuring liberalism 
240 Friedmann, Wolfgang, ‘The Reality of International Law - A Reappraisal’ (1971) 10 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
46. For an application of this typology to the State Department Legal Adviser see Tompkins, Tamara L., ‘Theory of Ethical 
Conduct for the Legal Advisor to the State Department: Applied for a Fresh Look at Abraham Sofaer and the ABM Treaty 
Reinterpretation Debacle, A’ (1993) 7 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 523 at 543-546 
241 Friedmann, Wolfgang, ‘The Reality of International Law - A Reappraisal’ (1971) 10 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
46 at 46-51 
242 Apart from a lack of dimensionality, his types are also historically bounded to specific examples drawn from the Second 
World War, during which he had fled Nazi Germany, and from the Cold War during which he was writing 
243 Tompkins, Tamara L., ‘Theory of Ethical Conduct for the Legal Advisor to the State Department: Applied for a Fresh Look at 
Abraham Sofaer and the ABM Treaty Reinterpretation Debacle, A’ (1993) 7 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 523 at 546 
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veil of ideology.”244 Their Illiberal Internationalist account is shaped by a particular ideology in the 
same way that the Liberal Internationalist approaches they critique entail a particular conception of 
power and interests. The same proviso applies to Sands’ criticism of a legal advice rendered by 
Goldsmith to the US government; that “ideology infects the content of the actual advice, bending it to 
support a particular conclusion.”245
It is important to highlight the distinction between the present rationale for developing a 
typology of four American foreign policy ideologies and Cohen’s justification for undertaking a 
comparable exercise. He makes the normative argument that, because IL is best understood as a 
policy process, the content of that policy therefore ought to be constructed upon the “parochial ideas” 
of American foreign policy ideology.
 The “international rule of law” advocated by Sands is itself 
constituted by ideology, and thus the contention is really about the merits of competing ideologies 
structuring law. This chapter has sought to make these connections explicit by explaining precisely 
how power, jurisprudence and political culture are related through the concept of foreign policy 
ideology.  
246
 
 That argument is quite different from arguing that American IL 
policy already is shaped by these beliefs, and therefore identifying ideal belief types is necessary to 
provide a framework for understanding contradictions and continuity. The reason for elaborating here 
on the content of ideal types is not to advocate further institutionalisation of particularistic American 
interests, but rather to provide an analytical model for understanding unique conceptions of IL already 
guiding legal policymakers. Accordingly the purpose of the following chapter, and remaining task in 
Part I of this thesis, is applying the theorised structure of foreign policy ideology to define competing 
meanings of the “rule of IL.” Identifying divergent logics internal to law promises to provide an 
alternative and more compelling explanation for the observed contradictions in American policy at the 
heart of this study. 
 
                                               
244 Anderson, Kenneth, ‘Remarks by an Idealist on the Realism of the Limits of International Law’ (2005) 34 Georgia Journal of 
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Journal 1357 at 1364 
246 Cohen, Harlan G., ‘The American Challenge to International Law: A Tentative Framework for Debate’ (2003) 28 Yale Journal 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
This final section of Part I integrates the explanations for contradictory American legal policy from 
Chapter Two into the structure of ideology indentified in Chapter Three to develop a model of 
competing conceptions of the rule of IL. As a first step this chapter seeks a working definition of the 
“rule of IL” drawn from classic formulations in Anglo-American jurisprudence consisting of three 
elements. Translated to the global level, three questions must be answered to constitute an 
analytically useful definition, albeit without claiming to be exhaustive: How should IL be developed to 
advance non-arbitrary global governance? What is the meaning of equality under IL? What is the 
proper ordering of international legal power? A set of beliefs providing a coherent answer to each of 
these questions will constitute a distinct ideologically informed meaning of the rule of IL. 
Through this approach the chapter moves beyond any attempt to find a universal and fixed 
definition of the rule of IL by instead identifying various “received” conceptions of the rule of law which 
exist in the minds of identified legal policymakers. The first of these ideal type conceptions is the 
“legalism” evident in the scholarship and practice of states, NGOs and individuals who have 
challenged American IL policy. The elements of this conception are that the rule of IL requires 
formalised development of global governance; a commitment to the sovereign equality of states; and, 
the separation of international legal powers between state subjects of IL and international legal 
institutions. The approach of this thesis is to argue that opposition to US policy has converged 
sufficiently around legalist principles for this to constitute a meaningful ideal type, without denying that 
each state may hold its own idiosyncratic conception of law. 
Turning to the conceptions of American legal policymakers, the constitutive elements of four 
rule of law conception are identified according to the underlying dimensions and ideal types of general 
foreign policy ideology. Liberal Internationalism is centred on America’s global mission to promote the 
liberty of natural persons through IL. The principles of this conception are: the transnational 
development of IL; the promotion of liberal over sovereign equality; and, democratic checks and 
balances on the separation of powers. Illiberal Internationalism is focussed on preserving national 
security by maintaining the capacity to project global power through law. This translates into principles 
of: pragmatic development of IL; maintaining hegemonic privilege; and, consent as the basis for 
ordering international legal powers. For Liberal Nationalism the core of the rule of IL is guarding liberal 
protections afforded by American constitutional government against external corruption. The resulting 
rule of law principles are: the defensive development of IL as a shield; upholding the inviolability of 
national sovereignty; and, a vertical separation between international and municipal legal powers. 
Finally Illiberal Nationalism minimises the influence of IL as a threat to America’s national security and 
distinctive cultural identity. This translates into principles of: permissively developing IL to maximise 
US autonomy; the relativity of state sovereignty; and, upholding the supremacy of municipal over 
international legal powers. The meaning of “coherence” in American IL policy becomes that a legal 
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policymaker’s stance on any one of the three rule of IL elements is a reliable indicator of positions 
taken on remaining elements.  
 
 
THE INDETERMINACY OF THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Ambiguity in the meaning of American policymakers’ commitment to “the rule of international law” is 
symptomatic of a long standing but inconclusive wider debate about the meaning of the concept. 
References are ubiquitous by both international legal scholars and practitioners, reflecting the 
centrality of the ideal to the western legal tradition.1 The concept forms the primary focus for 
treatments of IL policy, with increasing references in works both supportive and dismissive of its 
analytical worth.2 The UN Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group emphasised that the “rule of 
law is at the very heart of the United Nations’ mission.”3 This followed the reaffirmation by states at 
the 2005 UN World Summit of their “universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at 
both the national and international levels,”4 and in 2012 their “commitment to the rule of law and its 
fundamental importance for political dialogue and cooperation among all States.”5
This apparent consensus dissolves however when attention shifts to specifying the 
substantive meaning of the aspiration in the design and development of IL. Even in relation to 
municipal law Raz warned that “promiscuous use” threatened to reduce the concept to a procrustean 
“slogan” justifying almost any exercise of government power.
 
6
meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use. It may well have become just another one of those 
self-congratulatory rhetorical devices that grace the public utterances of Anglo-American politicians. No intellectual 
effort need therefore be wasted on this bit of ruling-class chatter.
 Judith Shklar characterised the 
contemporary concept as: 
7
 
  
The force of criticism aimed at the municipal rule of law only multiplies when aimed at any notion of 
the rule of international law, including scepticism about whether and how the concept applies to IL at 
                                               
1 See Gosalbo-Bono, Ricardo ‘The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Implications for the European Union and the United 
States’ (2010) 72 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 229 at 232-240 
2 See Peerenboom, Randall P., ‘Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship?’ (2004) 36 Georgetown Journal of 
International Law 809; Murphy, John F., The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004); Waldron, Jeremy, ‘The Rule of International Law’ (2006) 30 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 15; ibid; 
Georgiev, Dencho, ‘Politics of Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in International Law’ (1993) 4 European Journal of 
International Law 1; Buchanan, Allen, ‘Democracy and the Commitment to International Law’ (2006) 34 Georgia Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 463; Quigley, John, ‘Prospects for the International Rule of Law’ (1991) 5 Emory 
International Law Review 311; Nardin, Terry, ‘Theorising the International Rule of Law’ (2008) 34 Review of International 
Studies 385; Cogan, Jacob Katz, ‘Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law’ (2006) 31 Yale Journal of International 
Law 189 
3 See UN, United Nations Rule of Law <http://www.unrol.org/> 
4 UN, United Nations Rule of Law Website and Document Repository <http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=4>; UNGA, 
A/RES/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome (24 October, 2005) 
<http://www.unrol.org/files/2005%20World%20Summit%20Outcome.pdf>At 2, par.11 
5 UNGA, A/67/L.1, Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and 
International Levels (19 September, 2012) <http://www.unrol.org/files/Official%20Draft%20Resolution.pdf> 
6 Raz, Joseph, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1979) at 210-211. Reproduced 
from Raz, Joseph, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 195 
7 Shklar, Judith N., ‘Political Theory and the Rule of Law’ in Stanley Hoffmann (ed), Political Thought and Political Thinkers 
(University of Chicago Press, 1998) at 21 
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all.8 Simon Chesterman suggests that widespread support for the concept in institutions such as the 
UN is largely symptomatic of the lack of definitional agreement.9
A prominent account of the impact of American foreign policy on the rule of IL is John 
Murphy’s The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs.
 
10 The focus of the work is the 
contradiction that, despite being the key proponent of the major twentieth century international 
institutions, the US has itself found it “increasingly difficult to adhere to the rule of law in international 
affairs.”11 Murphy’s insights are limited however by a lack of precision in the meaning of the central 
concept. He commences by declaring that, although he is prepared to “join the nearly universal 
support for the rule of law as an ideal,” he does “not intend to join the debate over its precise 
meaning.”12 It is problematic that a work seeking to evaluate American adherence to the rule of IL 
does not set up any definition of what that would mean.13 Murphy’s elusion corroborates Tamahana’s 
observation that, where the concept is raised, “everyone is for it, but have contrasting convictions 
about what it is.”14 Goldsmith and Posner point out, in responding to a review of The Limits of 
International Law,15
...what, then, is the international rule of law? Is it the idea that international law should apply to states generally and 
impartially? Regardless of their relative power, or domestic form of governance? Are states supposed to engage in 
principled deliberation in designing international institutions? Does this mean that relative power and self-interest 
should be off the table in international negotiations? How, in a decentralized world of necessarily quite different 
nation-states...are we supposed to establish this international rule of law?
 that exhortations to promote the rule of law remain incoherent in the absence of a 
clear definition: 
16
 
 
Goldsmith and Posner conclude that: “Limits does not address the ideal of the international rule of 
law...because the ideal is inadequately defined – in…[the book review in question] and more 
generally.”17 Yet despite this criticism, the concept remains an important one, with even Goldsmith 
acknowledging that the frequent invocation of “rule-of-law rhetoric” is “not empty and is not irrelevant 
to international law and politics. It often genuinely reflects the values and commitments of the nations 
uttering it.”18
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though it was ultimately unsuccessful in this endeavour”: ibid at 353 
14 Tamanaha, Brian Z., On the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 3 
15 Goldsmith, Jack L. & Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005) 
16 Goldsmith, Jack L. & Eric A. Posner, ‘The New International Law Scholarship’ (2006) 34 Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 463 at 480. See also Carr, Edward Hallett, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the 
Study of International Relations (Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1939) at 170 
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A Working Definition of the Rule of International Law 
Despite imprecision and overuse of the term, there remains great value in the “rule of law” as more 
than a mere “synonym for ‘law.’”19 At the most elementary level the concept encompasses the 
principle that arbitrary self-judging should be substituted with a “pre-agreed, principled procedure for 
decision-making.”20 However, where the concept is applied to the design and development of an 
actual legal system, some justification is required for a necessarily subjective definition of its core 
elements.21 Without denying classic municipal formulations,22 there is a strong case for proceeding 
from British Jurist A.V. Dicey as the earliest and most frequently cited in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence. Dicey emphasised “the supremacy of law” over arbitrary power as a defining element 
of the English and American constitutions;23 “equality before the law” for rulers and the ruled alike; 
and, the determination of rights through judicial power.24 The reason for drawing on this formulation is 
that it has formed the starting point for every major analysis of the concept and therefore a commonly 
understood entry point according to both its strengths and weaknesses. More particularly, key modern 
theorists including Chesterman,25 Beaulac26 and Higgins27 have externalised Dicey’s three municipal 
elements by analogy to the global level.28 Beaulac adopts Dicey’s formulation on the basis that it “is 
well known and largely accepted; it has also been analysed and criticised from a variety of angles, 
thus adding to the credibility of his formulation.”29
                                               
19 Nardin, Terry, ‘Theorising the International Rule of Law’ (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 385 at 397; Crawford, 
James, ‘International Law and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 24 Adelaide Law Review 3 at 4 
 In Chesterman’s report The UN Security Council 
20 Cosnard, Michel, ‘Sovereign Equality - “The Wimbledon Sails On”‘ in Michael Byers and Georg Nolte (ed), United States 
Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 146 
21 For various formulations see Brierly, J. L., ‘The Rule of Law in International Society’ (1936) 7 Nordisk Tidsskrift for 
International Ret 3; Fitzmaurice, Gerald G., ‘The United Nations and the Rule of Law’ (1952) 38 Transactions of the Grotius 
Society 135 at 135-136; Bishop, William W., ‘The International Rule of Law’ (1961) 59 Michigan Journal of International Law 
553 at 553-554; Crawford, James, ‘International Law and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 24 Adelaide Law Review 3; Kumm, Mattias, 
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Chesterman, Simon, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 331; Gosalbo-Bono, 
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University of Pittsburgh Law Review 229 at 296-299 
22 See Raz, Joseph, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1979) at 214-218; Fuller, Lon 
L., ‘The Morality of Law’ in Lord Lloyd of Hampstead & M.D.A. Freeman (ed), Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (Stevens, 
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at 7-9 
23 Citing De Tocqueville: Dicey, Albert.V., Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan & Co, 1st 
ed, 1885) at 172-176. See especially Chapter IV. On Dicey see Beaulac, Stéphane, ‘The Rule of Law in International Law 
Today’ in G. Palombella & N. Walker (ed), Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) at 198-200 
24 Dicey, Albert.V., Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan & Co, 1st ed, 1885) at 180-184 
25 Chesterman, Simon, The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law (Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, 
2008). See also Chesterman, Simon, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 331 
26 Beaulac, Stéphane, ‘The Rule of Law in International Law Today’ in G. Palombella & N. Walker (ed), Relocating the Rule of 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 
27 See Higgins, Rosalyn, ‘The ICJ, the United Nations System, and the Rule of Law,’ London School of Economics and Political 
Science (13 November, 2006) <www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/pdf/20061113_Higgins.pdf>; Higgins, 
Rosalyn, Speech by H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of The International Court Of Justice, At The United Nations 
University on “The ICJ And The Rule Of Law” (11 April, 2007) 
<http://archive.unu.edu/events/files/2007/20070411_Higgins_speech.pdf>. Followed approvingly by Gosalbo-Bono, Ricardo 
‘The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Implications for the European Union and the United States’ (2010) 72 University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review 229 at 290 
28 See also Allain, Jean, A Century of International Adjudication: The Rule of Law and its Limits (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2000) at 
3-5 
29 Beaulac, Stéphane, ‘The Rule of Law in International Law Today’ in G. Palombella & N. Walker (ed), Relocating the Rule of 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) at 198 
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and the Rule of Law30 the common understanding of the “international rule of law” is indentified as the 
“application of these rule of law principles to relations between States” and other legal subjects.31
Due to the gap between the ideal and the realities of global relations, Chesterman 
characterises each of his principles and the rule of law itself as more a “political ideal” than a legal 
reality, with closer adherence to ideals remaining a means rather than an end.
  
32 Higgins and Beaulac 
concur that evidence of the approximation of each element demonstrates, at most, an emergent rule 
of IL.33 For Beaulac in particular these principles only apply mutatis mutandis to the extent that 
international diverges from municipal law. The key differences are that “there is no one formal norm-
creating authority on the international level; states (not individuals) remain the principal legal actors 
and there is no enforcement mechanism.”34 Higgins concludes that, although “the phrase ‘rule of law’ 
is today very much in vogue in international relations,” the “domestic rule of law model does not easily 
transpose to international relations in the world we live in.”35
The tripartite definition nevertheless remains sufficient for the defined purpose of directly 
comparing commitment to rule of law ideals across competing IL polices. The definition that emerges 
is a “functionalist” one in the sense that it is concerned with “how and why the rule of law is used—as 
distinct from the formal understanding of what it means.”
  
36 Here Chesterman means that the term is 
articulated at the global level within a political context: “as a tool with which to protect human rights, 
promote development, and sustain peace.”37 This also responds to the warning of a former State 
Department Legal Adviser not to attribute a “talismanic meaning to the phrase ‘rule of law.’”38 Dicey’s 
formulation can be usefully adopted to analyse legal policy without refuting well-known criticisms,39
 
 or 
claiming to exhaustively capture the meaning of the term. A clear and coherent answer to three 
questions emerging from the formulation amounts to a distinct conception of the rule of IL: 
1. How should IL be developed to advance non-arbitrary global governance? 
For Chesterman the first element of the rule of IL is that there be “a government of laws.”40
                                               
30 Chesterman, Simon, The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law (Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, 
2008). See also Chesterman, Simon, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 331 
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international level the concept of “global governance” is more apt for encompassing the idea of 
31 Chesterman, Simon, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 331 at 355-356. See 
also Higgins, Rosalyn, Speech by H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President of The International Court Of Justice, At The United 
Nations University on “The ICJ And The Rule Of Law” (11 April, 2007) 
<http://archive.unu.edu/events/files/2007/20070411_Higgins_speech.pdf> at 2 
32 Chesterman, Simon, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 331 at 360-361 
33 Higgins, Rosalyn, ‘The ICJ, the United Nations System, and the Rule of Law,’ London School of Economics and Political 
Science (13 November, 2006) <www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/pdf/20061113_Higgins.pdf> at 15; 
Beaulac, Stéphane, ‘The Rule of Law in International Law Today’ in G. Palombella & N. Walker (ed), Relocating the Rule of 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) at 220-221. Crawford similarly concludes that “we have only enclaves of the rule of law in 
international affairs”: Crawford, James, ‘International Law and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 24 Adelaide Law Review 3 at 12 
34 Beaulac, Stéphane, ‘The Rule of Law in International Law Today’ in G. Palombella & N. Walker (ed), Relocating the Rule of 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) at 204 
35 Higgins, Rosalyn, ‘The ICJ, the United Nations System, and the Rule of Law,’ London School of Economics and Political 
Science (13 November, 2006) <www.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/pdf/20061113_Higgins.pdf> at 6 
36 Chesterman, Simon, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 331 at 333 & 358-359 
37 Ibid at 333 & 358-359 
38 Matheson, Michael J., Interview with Author (19 October, 2011) 
39 See Raz, Joseph, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 195; Crawford, James, ‘International Law 
and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 24 Adelaide Law Review 3 at 5 
40 Chesterman, Simon, The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law (Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, 
2008) at 4, original emphasis; Chesterman, Simon, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 331 at 342 
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“governance in the absence of formal government.”41 This is a broader concept than government 
“concerned with purposive acts, not tacit arrangements. It emphasizes what is done rather than the 
constitutional basis for doing it.”42 Applying Chesterman’s principle, this is the requirement of “non-
arbitrariness in the exercise of power” through: increasing codification of law, greater uniformity in its 
rules, and eliminating the distinction between “legality” and self-judging standards of “legitimacy.”43 
Beaulac similarly focuses on “the existence of principled legal normativity on the international 
plane.”44 This translates into the development of IL sufficient to ensure “certainty, predictability, and 
stability” while eliminating “arbitrary power.”45 Finally Higgins identifies the first principle of the rule of 
IL by analogy from “an executive reflecting popular choice, taking non-arbitrary decisions applicable to 
all, for the most part judicially-reviewable for constitutionality.”46 In these formulations the common 
focus is the question of the proper role of IL in developing non-arbitrary forms of global governance.47 
The rule of IL will be advanced to the extent that international legal rules and institutions facilitate 
global “systems of rule” consistently with this principle.48
 
 
2. What is the meaning of equality under IL? 
The second element of the rule of IL is described by Chesterman as “equality before the law.”49 This 
entails a “more general and consistent application of international law to States and other entities,” 
with less regard to disparities in power.50 Beaulac describes equality as a “primordial value of the rule 
of law” recognised by all key theorists.51 His variation is a question of “how these norms are made and 
are applicable equally to all legal subjects.”52 Finally, in Higgins’ analysis, Dicey’s second element 
requires that there be “laws known to all, applied equally to all.”53 Despite the apparent simplicity of 
these accounts, the principle of “equality” is far from clear-cut in practice, since a key meaning of 
equality is not merely identical treatment but “treating like cases alike.”54
                                               
41 Rosenau, James N., ‘Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics’ in James N. & Ernst-Otto Czempiel Rosenau (ed), 
Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1992) 
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Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in International Law’ in Michael Byers & Georg Nolte (ed), United States Hegemony 
and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 171-173 
43 Chesterman, Simon, The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law (Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, 
2008) at 4 
44 Beaulac, Stéphane, ‘The Rule of Law in International Law Today’ in G. Palombella & N. Walker (ed), Relocating the Rule of 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) at 204 
45 Ibid at 206. Original emphasis 
46 See Higgins, Rosalyn, ‘The ICJ, the United Nations System, and the Rule of Law,’ London School of Economics and Political 
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Law 331 at 342 
50 Chesterman, Simon, ‘An International Rule of Law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 331 at 360-361 
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Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) at 210 
52 Ibid at 204 
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measure what is “alike” and what is “unalike.”55 As Beaulac concedes, equality “cannot mean that all 
legal norms apply to every state in the same way; some of them may only apply to certain states 
because of their situations.” Thus the principle “entails similarly situated states being treated in the 
same way by international law, with no discriminatory treatment tolerated by the system.”56 E.H. 
Carr’s earlier formulation was that there be an “absence of discrimination for reasons which are felt to 
be irrelevant.”57 In applying this principle “equality” simpliciter is shown to be “an empty vessel with no 
substantive moral content of its own. Without moral standards, equality remains meaningless, a 
formula that can have nothing to say about how we should act.”58 Thus “equality” as an element of the 
rule of IL is not a self-contained “organising principle” for sovereign states,59
 
 but rather a question of 
the proper criteria for defining who is alike under IL, and how to achieve correspondingly equal rights 
and duties. 
3. What is the proper ordering of international legal power? 
The final element is described by Chesterman as “the supremacy of the law” which “distinguishes the 
rule of law from rule by law.”60 The meaning of this principle in Dicey’s and Chesterman’s formulation 
is “privileging judicial process”61 sufficient to provide “determinative answers to legal questions.”62 
This will be achieved through increasing acceptance of the jurisdiction of international courts and 
tribunals, and the deference to law by political institutions.63 Likewise Beaulac looks to “the way in 
which normativity is enforced through adjudication.”64 For Beaulac the clear deficiencies of judicial 
power at the “institutional level”65 present “what is without doubt the most difficult set of formal values 
associated with the rule of law.”66 Finally Higgins notes that Dicey’s third element requires 
“independent courts to resolve legal disputes and to hold accountable violations of criminal law, itself 
applying the governing legal rules in a consistent manner.”67
What is evident from these formulations is that this rule of law element requires significant 
modification when externalised to the international level. The stipulation that legal subjects must be 
able to determine legal rights matched by correlative duties assumes that judicial power can establish 
a stable conception of the content of the right, and furthermore, that non-performance of the 
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correlative duty can be vindicated through executive power.68 As Chief Justice Marshall of the US 
Supreme Court noted in Marbury v Madison, the rule of law will be destroyed if “laws furnish no 
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”69 The challenge is the severely limited 
institutionalisation of judicial power at the international level. This is not equivalent to the absence of 
these powers however, but rather that states (and the US in particular)70 underwrite the international 
legal system by directly exercising or delegating powers variously resembling the “executive,” 
“legislative” and “judicial” powers comprising municipal legal systems. The consequence is a weak 
separation of powers, since it is the legal subjects of the system who determine when and how legal 
powers are exercised: in creating legal rules, interpreting them, or executing them. The repercussion 
of power being so diffused is that all three “legal” powers are exercised concurrently by each member 
state, through a variety of institutions, and with no entity wielding supreme authority.71
 
 The 
establishment of “supremacy of the law” becomes a question of how to properly order and separate 
these various international legal powers between states and global institutions. The rule of IL requires 
a principle for determining what international judicial functions remain with states, and what functions 
should be separated into international courts and tribunals. 
 
RECEIVED CONCEPTIONS OF THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The central theme of this work has been the vital role of foreign policy ideology in structuring the 
reception of law by legal policymakers. In this context the quest for a universal and fixed meaning of 
the rule of law is explicitly set aside as chimerical. Scott alludes to such a meaning in arguing that the 
“ultimate source of the influence of international law is arguably the ideal of an international rule of 
law.”72 This assumes an authoritative meaning to the “ideal of international law” as promoted by the 
US that embodies “the concept of the rule of law, which suggests that all are equal before the law, 
and presents international law as an objective, apolitical body of rules.”73 Yet the evidence that no 
such unified ideal may exist emerges even in Scott identifying a gap “between what the United States 
says about an international rule of law and what it does in specific scenarios.”74 Rather, this study 
suggests that what appears to be commitment to a unified ideal of the rule of law is instead to 
divergent interpretations of rule of law elements as informed by ideological beliefs.75
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Georg Nolte (ed), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 
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The conception of the rule of IL as a site for political contestation is espoused by 
Koskenniemi, who describes the ideal as a “reformulation of the liberal impulse to escape politics.”76 
Accordingly it is simplistic to characterise divergent legal conceptions as necessarily demonstrating 
uneven commitment to the rule of IL. Rather, it is “impossible to make substantive decisions within the 
law which would imply no political choice…: in the end, legitimising or criticising state behaviour is not 
a matter of applying formally neutral rules but depends on what one regards as politically right, or 
just.”77
 
 Foreign policy ideology informs this choice by setting out the values and interests constituting 
law for an identified political community. Crossing the structure of four ideal type American 
conceptions of IL from Chapter Three with the foregoing three questions produces the following model 
of competing conceptions of the rule of IL: 
Developing  
Non-Arbitrary 
Global Governance 
 
Meaning of  
Equality under 
International Law 
Ordering International 
Legal Power 
Legalism 
 
 
Formalised Development Sovereign Equality Separation of Powers 
Liberal Internationalism 
 
 
Transnational Development Liberal Equality Democratic Checks and 
Balances 
Illiberal Internationalism 
 
 
Pragmatic Development Hegemonic Privilege Consent Based Division of 
Powers 
Liberal Nationalism 
 
 
Defensive Development Inviolable Sovereignty Vertical Separation of 
Powers 
Illiberal Nationalism 
 
 
Permissive Development Relative Sovereignty Municipal Supremacy 
 
A threshold objection to categorising these types as conceptions of the “rule of law” is that 
integrating political understandings into the central concept is contrary to the many definitions that 
turn directly on the exclusion of political interests from law. In Nardin’s view the claim “that law is both 
indeterminate and policy-driven erases law as a distinct mode of human relationship.”78 He instead 
separates the ideal from observed reality to define the rule of IL as “no more than that states conduct 
their relations within a framework of non-instrumental law.”79 To the extent that IL includes rules that 
encompass power based interests “such rules do not express, and are in fact antithetical to, the rule 
of law.”80 At the level of abstract theorising this is a constructive contribution to understanding basic 
rule of IL ideals. However, this thesis adopts the position that the rule of IL cannot realistically require 
the exclusion of politics, but rather entails an ongoing commitment to reconciling policy with 
processes of the international legal system.81
                                               
76 Koskenniemi, Martti, The Politics of International Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) at 37 
 The interesting question for present purposes remains 
how named states have demonstrated commitment to each element of the rule of IL as received 
through the lens of foreign policy ideology. 
77 Ibid at 61 
78 Nardin, Terry, ‘Theorising the International Rule of Law’ (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 385 at 401 
79 Ibid at 399; Nardin, Terry, ‘International Pluralism and the Rule of Law’ (2000) 26 Review of International Studies 95 at 104 
80 Nardin, Terry, ‘International Pluralism and the Rule of Law’ (2000) 26 Review of International Studies 95 at 97 
81 See Georgiev, Dencho, ‘Politics of Rule of Law: Deconstruction and Legitimacy in International Law’ (1993) 4 European 
Journal of International Law 1 at 2-4 
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Legalism 
It would be contradictory to interpret American international legal policy through divergent foreign 
policy ideologies and yet treat all other states as holding an undifferentiated conception of law. That is 
certainly not the case, with legal policymakers in each state undoubtedly interpreting IL through the 
lens of their own foreign policy ideologies.82 The claim being made here is the narrower one that 
opposition to US IL policy has converged around the beliefs of “legalism,” irrespective of culturally 
specific conceptions of the rule of IL.83 Apart from evidence of culturally entrenched commitments to 
legalism by certain states,84 there are good reasons to accept that there is a common interest among 
America’s global counterparts to diminish the advantages of preponderant power through law. 
Growing popularity for the rule of IL has been attributed in part to its perceived “utility in challenging 
American exceptionalism, which threatens...the legitimacy of the international legal order based on 
the principle of the legal equality of all states.”85 Koskenniemi identifies the power as lying behind “the 
juxtaposition between European constitutional formalism and the ‘imperial’ challenge to international 
institutions by the United States.”86 The suggestion that commitment to legalist interpretations “would 
be an automatically progressive choice is no less crude a directive to policy than the belief that law 
needs to be streamlined for the attainment of imperial preference.”87
The legalist approach has been best defined by Judith Shklar as “the ethical attitude that 
holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and 
rights determined by rules.”
 There are compelling reasons for 
treating legalism as an ideal type legal conception structuring opposition to US policy. 
88 In the context of IL specifically Cheng defines the concept as “a claim to 
apply prescriptions, through a process of reasoning and logic, neutrally to facts in an international 
problem.”89 These conceptions draw on the methodology of “doctrinalism,” which “simply describes 
doctrine or that assesses doctrine based solely on formalistic grounds having to do with the logic of its 
internal structure,”90 and that identifies the ‘black letter law’ of international law in any given domain, 
independent of actual behaviours.”91 The methodology is conspicuously less dominant in US IL 
scholarship, with the significant number of social science PhD qualifications within the faculties of 
American law schools reflecting a preference for multidisciplinary approaches.92
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Economics vs. German Doctrinalism’ (2008) 31 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 295; Bradford, Anu & Eric 
A. Posner, ‘Universal Exceptionalism in International Law’ (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal 1 
 This is both a product 
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of and reinforces the more general attention within American jurisprudence to the context and social 
effects of the law. 
Accounts have focussed predominantly on legalism at the municipal level, but remain no less 
relevant due to the tendency of international legal policymakers to externalise legalist principles via a 
“domestic analogy.”93 In the European context Koskenniemi identifies the strength of a “domestic 
analogy that persuades us – contrary to all evidence – that the international world is like the national 
so that legal institutions may work as they do in our European societies.”94 The rhetorical attraction of 
contesting American international legal power in these terms lies in the claim to a “depoliticised”95
Law aims at justice, while politics looks only to expediency. The former is neutral and objective, the latter the 
uncontrolled child of competing interests and ideologies. Justice is thus not only the policy of legalism, it is treated as 
a policy superior to and unlike any other.
 
conception of law: 
96
 
 
In this view, “the appeal of a global rule of law lies in the promise of protection against the pathologies 
of internal domestic politics.”97 These beliefs nevertheless constitute “a political ideology which comes 
into conflict with other policies” no less than do specifically American conceptions.98 Such “deliberate 
isolation of the legal system—the treatment of law as a neutral social entity—is itself a refined political 
ideology, the expression of a preference.”99 Moreover, Shklar suggests that conceptions of 
international (as opposed to municipal) law are “perhaps the most striking manifestation of legalistic 
ideology. Its ideological character is especially discernible because the principles of international law 
are not supported by effective institutions.”100
The “legalism” appellation has more often been employed from a critical perspective to 
challenge those who oppose American legal policy. Posner defines legalism as “the view that law and 
legal institutions can keep order and solve policy disputes. It manifests itself in powerful courts, a 
dominant class of lawyers, and reliance on legalistic procedures in policymaking bodies.”
 
101 In the 
externalised form of “global legalism,” the concept is defined pejoratively as “an excessive faith in the 
efficacy of international law.”102
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problems, without engaging in unnecessary conceptual debates about whether or not this mode of 
interaction is actually ‘law.’”103 This use in no way excludes the possibility of employing legalism to 
advocate policy as morally or politically superior. Importantly Shklar wrote not to defeat legalism, but 
to harness its potential to advance liberal values.104 In these terms she noted the “great paradox” that 
“legalism as an ideology is too inflexible to recognize the enormous potentialities of legalism as a 
creative policy, but exhausts itself in intoning traditional pieties and principles which are incapable of 
realization.”105 As Moyn argues, Shklar’s primary objective was “to save legalism for liberal politics by 
showing central liberal ideas like the rule of law to be useful ideologies.”106 Her criticism was directed 
only at “those of its traditional adherents who, in their determination to preserve law from politics, fail 
to recognize that they too have made a choice among political values” and the “attendant belief that 
law is not only separate from political life but that it is a mode of social action superior to mere 
politics.”107
It is instructive to compare how legalist conceptions of IL align with the jurisdictional and 
values dimensions structuring American IL policy. At the risk of stating the obvious, the legalist 
conception is internationalist, in the sense that it advocates the creation and management of global 
legal architecture. In particular, legalist conceptions envision national security decisions about war 
and peace being transferred from municipal governments to the international level.
 
108 The location of 
legalism on the values dimension is less straightforward in contrast, with formalist and cosmopolitan 
principles pulling in different directions in relation to liberalism. Legalist arguments necessarily draw 
upon cosmopolitan values as an impartial source of legitimacy separate from partial state interests. 
Koskenniemi details the “cosmopolitan ethos” in modern IL, which flows from the aspiration in the 
wider project of modernity for more than normatively agnostic rules of international order.109 
Cosmopolitanism requires that the rule of law uphold “non-instrumental” rules that treat persons as 
ends, and not merely as means for satisfying political objectives.110 The effect of these beliefs is to 
displace the necessary role of democratic accountability so central to American legal conceptions. 
Consistently with this idea a number of authors have identified the norms underpinning IL with 
“universal values,”111 and an “international value system.”112 The effect of a belief in universally valid 
principles has the same effect as faith in American exceptionalism, which is the tendency toward a 
“messianic” IL policy.113
It is important to note that included among legalist advocates are prominent American 
individuals and organisations. The theorised IL policy typology does not encompass all policies 
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capable of being recognised by American citizens, but only those influential among American legal 
policymakers. George Kennan identified an attachment to “moralistic-legalistic” beliefs as an affliction 
on American foreign policy itself.114 However the attachment to legal rules and solutions as described 
by Kennan is largely encompassed by the Liberal Internationalist type, and remains distinct from 
legalism as that term is used here.115 Although Americans other than legal policymakers can and 
have vocally advocated a range of policies in legalist terms (especially within NGOs),116
 
 that fact does 
not falsify the typology unless such positions are accepted by and structure American IL policy. 
Formalised Development of International Law 
The first element of the legalist rule of IL is that the primary and secondary rules117 of the international 
legal system should be progressively formalised as binding legal obligations. The attainment of the 
rule of law at the municipal level is not a static condition, but a process of progressively adapting and 
extending the law to achieve a complete legal system.118 The attainment of the rule of law in the 
common law world was achieved when the English Bill of rights removed the monarch’s prerogative to 
suspend the operation of the law or its application to certain categories of people. International legal 
scholarship has maintained a strong presumption against declaring a non liquet in which the law 
remains silent on rights and duties.119 This idea traces back to the “Grotian tradition” of IL which 
envisioned the “subjection of the totality of international relations to the rule of law.”120 The rationale 
behind the sometimes “unrealistic” presumption is “to ‘tame’ state sovereignty and to subject states to 
the rule of law.”121 That principle is recognised in the UN Charter, and as the central purpose of the 
International Law Commission in promoting “the progressive development of international law and its 
codification.”122
For advocates of legalism the case for displacing global politics with global law focuses on the 
principle of “formalism,” which for Shklar is the idea of law as “a self-contained system of norms that is 
‘there,’ identifiable without reference to the content, aim, and development of the rules that compose 
it.”
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garnered broad allied support, with formal cooperation through bodies such as the UNSC having no 
necessary advantage over informal arrangements. In contrast European use of the term “has a much 
more formal and legalistic cast” requiring “legitimate sanction from duly constituted international 
bodies.”124 This in part explains strident objections to the concept of “coalitions of the willing” as the 
preferred form of multilateral cooperation during the Bush 43 administration.125
What sustains the claim that legal rules and institutions represent political neutrality is that 
they are derived through a process of “autogenesis.”
 For legalism, policy 
will be legitimate for complying with formalised sources of authority rather than mere congruence with 
policy objectives. 
126 Shklar interprets Hans Kelsen’s own retreat 
into “formalism” as facilitated by his positivist jurisprudence, which saw law as “its own creation,” with 
rules progressively derived from his gründnorm.127 This theory seeks to establish legal rules “without 
the ideological bias or the historical and cultural myopia” that a non-formal approach entails.128 The 
presumption of autogenesis has further lain behind the belief that: “Custom, usage, conventions, and 
treaties provide a complete system of law, analogous to municipal law.”129 The consequence for 
Morgenthau is the claim to a “logically coherent system which virtually contains, and through a mere 
process of logical deduction will actually produce, all rules necessary for the decision of all possible 
cases.”130 These factors allow for a high degree of norm precision as the distinguishing feature of 
legal rules when compared to other normative systems.131 The treatment of rules as clear, 
comprehensive and internally consistent becomes the necessary presumption for the central legalist 
claim “that following rules impartially is a virtue.”132
 
 
Sovereign Equality 
The principle by which US IL policy has been most forcefully challenged is that all states must accede 
to international rules and institutions according to equal rights and duties. The principle flows from the 
centrality of equality before the law to municipal law, which Dicey described as the “universal 
subjugation of all classes, to one law.”133 Legalism extends that defining principle to the rights and 
duties of states as IL’s primary subjects, irrespective of external influence or internal character.134
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have equality in the vindication and ‘exercise of rights.’”135 This conception of sovereign equality 
constitutes a “basic rule of law notion.”136
The very purpose of the rule of IL in the legalist approach is to minimise the significance of 
power disparities when determining legal rights and duties. The structure of the international system 
remains an “association of independent and diverse political communities, each devoted to its own 
ends and its own conception of the good.”
 
137 Such an arrangement necessitates common constraints 
for respecting one another’s autonomy.138 “Sovereign equality” thus becomes the constitutional 
principle on which the international legal system is constructed.139 “Equality” in this sense is a legal 
fiction, but a necessary one to establish legal rights not dependent on the reality of inequality.140 To 
derive rights from actual distributions of power would result in a world with states at the periphery 
lacking legal personality, and a “corresponding gradation of rights.”141
In modern incarnations this legalist rule of law element has increasingly been held out as 
extending beyond a mere constraint to respect territorial integrity to a positive obligation to engage 
with multilateral treaties having near universal membership. A US claim to significant treaty 
reservations, or exemption entirely from treaties such as the Ottawa Landmines convention or Kyoto 
Protocol, “seems now to require some justification if it deviates from the stance of the great majority of 
states.” In this sense “freedom of contract plays an ever-decreasing role when it comes to law-like 
treaties.”
 The rule of law in these terms 
protects the structure of the international order without reference to the idiosyncratic beliefs and 
cultural commitments of particular states. 
142
 
 
Separation of Powers 
Closely related to sovereign equality is the argument for separating the legal powers of global 
governance such that judicial power can independently determine rights and duties. The two 
principles complement each other to insulate the integrity of legal rules from overweening power. No 
domestic legal system based on the rule of law would vest executive control over the judiciary, nor 
would it allow citizens to determine the legality of their own actions under the state’s civil or criminal 
jurisdiction. Likewise the supremacy of IL excludes the possibility that states can determine the scope 
of their own global privileges and obligations. Externalising the municipal separation of powers 
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principle is supported by Koskenniemi’s observation that, compared to Americans, Europeans tend to 
“read international law in the image of our domestic legalism: multilateral treaties as legislation, 
international courts as an independent judiciary, the Security Council as the police.”143
Shklar notes that legalism generally supports policies “promoting the institutionalization of the 
administration of justice.”
 Thus states, 
which continue to exercise the key “legislative” and “executive” functions of global governance, cannot 
also be the final arbiters in international judicial matters. 
144 The objective of resolving “as many social conflicts by judicial means as 
possible”145 provides the rationale for separating international legal powers and institutionalising 
judicial power in independent courts. This turns equally on the legalist presumption in municipal law 
that judges “lie outside politics; they resolve cases impartially be appealing to the rules.”146 At the 
international level this translates into supremacy of institutionalised judicial power as the only form of 
legal power independent of national politics.147 Article 20 of the ICJ Statute reflects the ideal that 
judges of that court must solemnly declare that they will exercise their powers “impartially and 
conscientiously.” For former ICJ President Roslyn Higgins this constitutes “a proper separation of 
powers.”148 Executive power in the international system is approximated in the UNSC and so, apart 
from its distortion of sovereign equality, its control cannot properly extend over an international court. 
This principle was reflected in the separate opinion of Judge Simma in The Armed Activities Case149 
in reference to the role of the ICJ as the UN’s “principal judicial organ.” It followed that the court had a 
duty “to arrive at decisions based on law and nothing but law” reflecting the “division of labour 
between the Court and the political organs of the United Nations.”150
 
  
Liberal Internationalism 
Of the four ideal American policy types, Liberal Internationalism is the most important for 
understanding the beliefs of American policymakers strongly committed to international legal order. 
This conception identifies the rule of IL in the externalisation of American constitutional government to 
establish a seamless system of law, with international and national legal systems reinforcing universal 
liberal values. Self-identified Liberal Internationalist Anne-Marie Slaughter151 defines the essence of 
the rule of law as “ordered liberty.”152 At the international level however, that ideal involves a 
“continual tension between the requirement under international law that we respect nations, meaning 
governments, and our own democratic value of respecting all peoples.”153
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both the municipal and international level: to achieve “a steady progression toward greater freedom of 
conscience, choice and country—first within America and then beyond our borders.”154
At the most fundamental level, an image of the world as a projection of the United States means that international 
order, like domestic order, requires the rule of law. From this perspective multilateralism is nothing more than the 
internationalization of the liberal conception of the rule of law.
 This is the 
foundational principle of a Liberal Internationalist conception of IL: 
155
 
 
General accounts of “Wilsonianism,” as an equivalent tradition of thought, have focussed on 
democracy promotion as the “first principle,”156 “most essential ingredient”157 and “keystone”158 of the 
tradition. Liberal Internationalism identifies democracy promotion as the conduit between the 
enjoyment of liberty by natural persons and an international system of law. In 1917 Elihu Root wrote 
that: “The world cannot be half democratic and half autocratic... If it is democratic, international law 
honored and observed may well be expected as a natural development of the principles which make 
democratic self-government possible.”159 Adherents of all American ideal types recognise a national 
interest in the increasing democratisation of the globe, albeit with starkly divergent implications. 
However Liberal Internationalism is distinctive for democracy being constitutive of the rule of IL itself. 
Slaughter pithily asserts the central belief of Liberal Internationalism as being that: “the global rule of 
law depends on the domestic rule of law.”160 Her belief is that liberal states adhere more consistently 
to the rule of law at both the national and international level in their relations with other liberal 
states.161
The vision of taming global politics through law constitutes a common ground with the legalist 
conception of IL. Both positions are internationalist in the intention to create an ever deeper 
framework of international institutions governing global politics. However, this conception diverges 
significantly in identifying the role of American power and values as central to the project. Ikenberry 
advocates the establishment of “American ‘rule’” through “the provisioning of international rules and 
institutions and its willingness to operate within them.” In short: “Liberal order building is America’s 
distinctive contribution to world politics.”
 The conception is thus a utopian one for envisioning the creation of a world of liberal states 
mutually enforcing respect for IL. 
162
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Transnational Development of Global Governance 
What unites legalism and Liberal Internationalism is a commitment to closing gaps in the law. The 
very notion that effective legal regimes can and should be crafted to respond to global challenges is 
“shaped by a liberal conception of the rule of law.”163 What distinguishes Liberal Internationalism is 
the role of formalised legal authority in achieving that outcome. Whereas legalism preferences the 
codification of all internationally related legal rights at a global level, Liberal Internationalism turns to 
the “transnational legal processes” by which international standards are integrated and enforced at 
the level of US municipal law. For Harold Koh legal compliance is determined by a process whereby 
“public and private actors, including nation states, ...interact in a variety of fora to interpret, enforce, 
and ultimately internalize, rules of international law.”164 In this view increasing establishment of non-
arbitrary global governance is achieved through formal and informal processes by which “domestic 
decision-making becomes ‘enmeshed’ with international legal norms.”165 A defining element of Liberal 
Internationalism that distinguishes it from legalism and every other American conception becomes the 
high value attached to symbolic support for IL short of formal accession to legal obligations – what 
one US legal policymaker has termed “dexterous multilateralism.”166 For legalism this degrades IL by 
permitting deformalised obligations, while for each of the alternative American conceptions it falsely 
suggests legal constraints beyond what the US is actually willing and able to accept.167
Liberal Internationalism also welcomes the penetration of foreign and international legal 
decisions through American courts, even to the extent of interpreting the US constitution in light of 
universal liberal standards.
 
168 In terms of the policy goal of ensuring uniform compliance with IL, it will 
be preferable to limit the development of supranational legal authority where transnational processes 
provide a more effective form of global governance. The rule of IL requires that the US progressively 
works to close gaps in the doctrines and enforcement of IL through the full range of national and 
international processes that make law work. This deep commitment to the development of IL has 
often led Liberal Internationalists to view all alternative American conceptions as undifferentiated “IL 
sceptics” or what Spiro memorably called “new sovereigntists.”169
 
 
Liberal Equality 
The second rule of IL principle is that the equal access of natural persons to universal liberal 
freedoms trumps the formal equality of states as juridical legal persons. For Liberal Internationalism 
the purpose of IL is to uphold basic rights of “citizens rather than states as subjects,” which is “the 
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hallmark of a new and distinctively liberal conception of a world under law.”170 To realise this principle, 
a distinction is drawn between the sovereignty of states who uphold liberal norms through democratic 
processes and those who do not. The principle of sovereign equality treats states as the legal persons 
of IL, and in so doing is “at least one remove, and often at two removes” from actual individuals.171 
Accordingly states should be treated equally to the extent that their municipal law protects the liberal 
freedoms of their own citizens, but otherwise forfeit an equal claim to their sovereign integrity.172
 The classic demonstration of this principle is the 1999 NATO led Kosovo intervention, 
spearheaded by the Clinton administration absent UNSC authorisation. Although generally treated as 
a case of humanitarian intervention, the US never proffered this justification, nor accepted the 
establishment of such a legal doctrine.
  
173 However the action to prevent a “humanitarian catastrophe” 
revealed a willingness to displace the sovereign right of Yugoslavia (as it then was) to equally enjoy 
territorial integrity to the right of its threatened ethnic Albanian population to enjoy equality in basic 
human rights. In the Princeton Project Slaughter and Ikenberry recommended the principle of a 
“supermajority” of democratic states overriding the positive obligations of the UNSC where it 
“prevented free nations from keeping faith” with liberal principles.174 On this basis multilateral 
institutions such as NATO could legitimately override UNSC decisions on the authorisation of force.175 
Slaughter later became a strong advocate for American intervention against Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad following his alleged use of chemical weapons in the country’s civil war. In that case she 
externalised ideas drawn from Thomas Jefferson and the US Declaration of Independence to argue 
that the concept of sovereignty must include the duty of a government to serve its people.176 By not 
doing so the “world would see Syrian civilians rolling on the ground, foaming at the mouth, dying by 
the thousands while the United States stands by.”177 The “rejection of legalism” and attendant 
principle of sovereign equality reveals the greater commitment to IL founded in liberal equality.178
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constitutional democracy and its global role promoting these values is a stable foundation for equality 
in the international legal order.179
 
 
Democratic Checks and Balances 
The central role of democracy means that the integrity of IL depends far more on the effective 
separation of powers at the municipal rather than international level. There is no mechanism in the 
international legal system itself to ensure that international courts determine rights and duties solely 
on a judicial basis. The liberty guaranteed in American constitutional government is achieved not 
merely through the good faith of its participants, but by ensuring that: “Ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition.”180 The primitive structure of the international legal system remains incapable of 
sustaining a design that ensures an effective separation of powers. This means that the replication of 
organs at the international level exercising the executive, legislative and judicial power of global 
governance is not sufficient to realise the rule of IL.181
In some formulations of a liberal legal order the legislative and judicial institutions establishing 
the domestic rule of law are projected onto the international plane.
 Rather the pivotal role of the domestic rule of 
law provides a basis for democratic checks and balances on international judicial institutions to 
counter their inherent political weaknesses. The rule of IL is achieved by structuring legal power to be 
responsive to deficiencies in the international legal order. 
182 This was the legalist view of 
Wilson’s contemporaries, including Elihu Root in designing the PCIJ as the judicial body attached to 
the League of Nations. However the politically influential variant of Liberal Internationalism does not 
conceive of IL as centralised in these institutions, but rather as existing foremost at the state level, 
and only secondarily in international bodies. The modern Liberal Internationalist emphasis on 
transnational legal process relies on domestic courts internalising the liberal principles of IL and 
enforcing them domestically.183 The surest strategy for promoting liberal values is to influence 
municipal law to uphold human rights law as the “core” of IL.184
Because a primary focus of Liberal Internationalism is enhancing the municipal rule of law, it 
is always preferable that IL supports the capacity for upholding international legal standards in 
domestic courts first. International institutions should therefore only fulfil this role in a “backstopping” 
capacity when municipal law fails to uphold basic liberal values.
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the case of conflict. Slaughter describes the first part of this role as the “provision of a second line of 
defense when national institutions fail.” The second is “the ability of the international process to 
catalyze action at the national level.”186
 
 The political costs of IL intervening in a domestic legal matter 
are high enough that there is an incentive for states to bring municipal law into line with international 
obligations. This strengthens the rule of IL without needing to separate international legal power into 
formal institutions. 
Illiberal Internationalism 
Illiberal Internationalism actively engages with global rules and institutions to facilitate foreign policy 
objectives, but does so for the overriding purpose of strengthening US national security. The rule of 
law for Illiberal Internationalists means an effective framework of legal institutions facilitating US 
strategic autonomy and permitting it to diplomatically justify foreign policy according to flexible rules. 
The absence of a concern for the moral purpose of states has parallels with the Realpolitik and 
balance of power politics of Continental Europe.187 In particular this preserves IL as a diplomatic tool 
between states rather than a means for vindicating the legal rights of natural persons. Former US 
Attorney General John Ashcroft rejected the legitimacy of the US Supreme Court holding that litigants 
had rights against the US government under the Geneva Conventions in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.188 
Consistent with a rule of IL centred on sovereign states, Ashcroft responded that “most of those 
treaties within themselves have provisions which limit the parties that can raise them and enforce 
them to the high contracting parties, not to the citizens of various nations.”189
The conception is also distinguished by a clear separation between the illiberalism of 
international legal policy and national political values, with no necessary consistency between them. 
Indeed the primary importance of promoting American interests abroad has translated into a greater 
willingness to suppress liberal values at home where deemed necessary. The conception justifies 
greater deference to executive power to make IL policy decisions, unimpeded by the institutional 
oversight that is otherwise integral to protecting liberty at home.
 This yields a 
fundamentally illiberal conception, addressing the interests of individual citizens only indirectly and in 
the aggregate through the principal focus on national security. This is distinct from Liberal 
Internationalism, which sees national security being indirectly served through a long term strategy of 
using law to foster a global environment that reproduces liberal values. The illiberal approach rejects 
this utopian vision, instead engaging with IL to manage rather than overcome security threats. 
190
 
 
                                               
186 Slaughter, Anne-Marie & William Burke-White, ‘The Future of International Law Is Domestic (or, the European Way of Law)’ 
(2006) 47 Harvard International Law Journal 327 at 341 
187 It is on this basis that Dueck labels adherents of his equivalent set of beliefs as “American realists”: Dueck, Colin, Reluctant 
Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton University Press, 2006) at 33 
188 Referring to Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) 548 U.S. 557 at 70-71 
per Stevens J 
189 Responding to a question posed by the author: Ashcroft, John, ‘The Constitution and the Common Defense: Who Ensures 
America’s National Security?,’ Preserve the Constitution (11 October, 2011) 
<http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/mp3/2011-10-11-Constitution%20and%20the%20Common%20Defense.mp3> at 
45:55-49:19. See also Kyl, Jon, Douglas J. Feith & John Fonte, ‘The War of Law: How New International Law Undermines 
Democratic Sovereignty’ (2013) 92 Foreign Affairs 115 at 118 
190 See Yoo, John C., The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11 (University of Chicago 
Press, 2005); Ku, Julian & John Yoo, Taming Globalization: International Law, the US Constitution, and the New World Order 
(Oxford University Press, 2012) at 113-149 
Competing Conceptions of the Rule of International Law 
 
105 
 
Pragmatic Development of International Law 
The Illiberal Internationalist preference is for a contingent international legal framework within which 
the US pragmatically determines the limits of IL. Contrary to both legalism and Liberal 
Internationalism, this approach embraces potential gaps and ambiguities in IL for enhancing 
discretion to exercise effective diplomatic power as a part of law itself. Michael Glennon has sought to 
define a “pragmatist” method that treats the development of IL as “a multifaceted method of problem-
solving rather than a formula for finding a single, correct solution.”191 The first distinguishing belief is 
that “reliance upon formal legalist categories masks the decision-making process that actually occurs, 
which is situationally contingent.”192 Applying this principle to the vexed question of whether the 
Geneva Conventions applied to Al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees during the 2001 War in Afghanistan, 
Glennon considers the full range of factors including negative reactions of US allies, and the status of 
US prisoners of war seeking reciprocal protections. For Glennon “[w]hether such factors are, strictly 
speaking, legal or political is, to the pragmatist lawyer, beside the point: in the real world, these are, to 
varying degrees, the kinds of factors that international lawyers do take into account.”193 This approach 
doesn’t however “open the door to a law-free zone,” since it relies on the default principle that “in the 
absence of a rule a State is deemed free to act.”194 In this sense the “formalists are, perversely...right 
that there are no gaps in the international legal order.”195 Anderson characterises this approach as the 
legal system “formalizing its pragmatism.”196 In so doing pragmatism “serves to protect international 
law from itself,” which is threatened by formalism to become “ever more internally “pure” but ever 
more disconnected from the world of international politics where, ultimately, it must live.”197
Pragmatic development approaches IL as a valuable tool used for arranging the relations 
between states, but otherwise lacking autonomous institutional force. Former Deputy Secretary of 
State Robert Zoellick argued that IL “can facilitate bargaining, recognise common interests, and 
resolve differences cooperatively. But international law, unlike domestic law, merely codifies an 
already agreed-upon cooperation.”
 Using 
national security interests to clearly demarcate the sphere in which the US accepts the development 
of IL, and where it does not, becomes the only consistent and non-arbitrary basis for developing IL. 
The US is especially resistant to the value of signing treaties as a symbolic act without an intention to 
be bound by them, since this blurs the boundaries of the reach of IL. The US demonstrates fidelity to 
the rule of IL in the sense of complying with carefully adapted legal obligations, thereby reaping the 
advantages of operating according to law rather than naked power. 
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cause a political backlash within Bosnia and Herzegovina.199 In other words legal policy was to 
support the tribunal pragmatically, but to resist the strict terms of its authority according to non-legal 
considerations for re-establishing peace and security. Similarly John Bellinger has endorsed a 
developing UNSC practice of altering formal treaty provisions on an ad hoc basis to address threats to 
international peace and security. Bellinger welcomes the “significant development” of “tailoring a 
specialized body of international law to better work in a specific set of circumstances.”200 Talmon 
responds critically within a legalist rubric that “adaptation” here is merely a euphemism for 
“abrogation” of formal treaty provisions pursuant to “a culture of exceptionalism” among Council 
members.201 The practice accordingly “raises serious concerns from the point of view of the rule of 
law.”202
 
 From the Illiberal Internationalist perspective, however, such practice is entirely consistent 
with identifying the rule of IL in pragmatic developments that take account of underlying objectives 
and dynamics of the international legal system. 
Hegemonic Privilege 
The fact of American power preponderance precludes any international legal arrangement that 
presumes to level political power according to a robust form of sovereign equality. Rather the guiding 
principle is that IL should achieve either de jure or de facto privileges that acknowledge the reality of 
American power preponderance. Of the four ideal legal conceptions, exceptionalist beliefs remain 
weakest in this variant, and so any such privileges are grounded in the prudence of integrating 
preponderant power rather than a normative defence of American political culture. Prior to his tenure 
as Secretary of Defence, Chuck Hagel argued that “long-term security interests” are strengthened 
where international legal institutions are developed “as extensions of our influence, not as constraints 
on our power.”203 The rule of law will never be more than an idealistic aspiration if it requires powerful 
states to submit to the interests of weaker states as sovereign equals. Neither will it be effective 
where powerful states have an incentive to remain outside of the law. Rather IL should take a realistic 
approach to global power relations, and seek to structure them without shifting the balance of that 
power. In a sense equality means according states privileges commensurate to their unequal role in 
upholding the international legal order.204
The thinking is evident in Cogan’s concept of “operational noncompliance,” defined as 
noncompliance with parts of IL for the purpose of upholding the system as a whole through “bridging 
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the enforcement gap created by inadequate community mechanisms of control.”205 The primitive 
nature of the international legal system weakens the integrity of law,206 mandating formally illegal 
actions of “law making and law termination”207 to make the system work. This principle becomes a 
defence for granting unequal legal privileges to the US in answering the question of the proper 
relationship between sovereign states. Cogan emphasises that “law is the congruence of policy, 
authority, and control, and, thus, without power there is no law.” Accordingly “international lawyers 
should acknowledge and take account of the special responsibilities of the powerful.”208 Exceptionalist 
beliefs are relevant to the extent that checks against the abuse of operational noncompliance are 
ultimately provided by the US itself as a state with “acculturation” consistent with rule of law values.209
 
 
Consent Based Division of Powers 
Both legalist and Liberal Internationalist rule of IL conceptions turn to a general principle for ordering 
international legal powers. In the former case it is to separate powers and institutionalise independent 
judicial power, and in the latter case it is to exercise those powers at the domestic level where 
possible, and at the global level subject to democratic checks and balances where necessary. In the 
case of Illiberal Internationalism the configuration of powers is not predetermined, but is instead 
subject to the general principle that states are free to consent to international legal constraints, but 
cannot otherwise be bound.210 The privileging of state sovereignty means that no obligations can be 
created except as strictly agreed to by the US government and ratified by constitutional procedures. 
Resistance to non-consensual legal authority reflects scepticism toward the idea that there are 
separate types of legal power exercised at the global level. The claim by international courts to be 
exercising independent “judicial” power is merely the act of real policymakers who represent states 
equally interested in protecting their relative power.211 Any reliance on the separation of powers to 
prevent abuse of power at the global level will itself pose a threat to US security. The principle 
extends to municipal courts directly exercising international judicial powers via “universal jurisdiction” 
which eliminates the requirement of consent.212
The emphasis on consent has manifested in significant resistance by Illiberal Internationalism 
to the penetration of IL through domestic courts. Policymakers influenced by this conception have 
placed a heightened emphasis on the distinction between “self-executing” and “non-self-executing 
treaties.”
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create rights enforceable in US courts unless the treaty is designated as “self-executing” and thereby 
effective by its own force. Treaties deemed “non-self-executing” may not be invoked in the courts 
unless implemented through legislation passed by the US Congress. The distinction is an elementary 
principle in American law, but one subject to ongoing disagreement as to the indices of a self-
executing treaty, and whether the supremacy clause of the US constitution creates a presumption that 
treaties are self-executing.214 The Illiberal Internationalist approach favours a narrow interpretation of 
the doctrine, and even the reverse presumption that generally legislative consent must be given 
before treaty obligations agreed at the international level become enforceable in domestic courts.215
Resistence to the non-consensual incorporation of IL into domestic legal rights is evident in 
Henry Kissinger’s characterisation of international adjudication as “being pushed to extremes which 
risk substituting the tyranny of judges for that of government.”
 
216 One expression is rejection of the 
otherwise settled principle that customary IL automatically forms part of the US federal common 
law.217 Ashcroft disapprovingly cites reasoning in Hamdan that the US is bound by a customary legal 
obligation contained in a treaty it has declined to ratify.218
strange that a justice of the United States Supreme Court basically is arguing there are only two kinds of international 
treaties that ought to be appropriate to shape our behaviour: the ones that we have signed and the ones we haven’t 
signed. I think that carries the international law situation far beyond what is prudent and in the interests of the 
country.
 For Ashcroft it was: 
219
 
 
Likewise Ku and Yoo reject judicial consideration of IL as undemocratic, and potentially a challenge to 
US sovereignty. They argue that “NGOs have used creative and effective litigation strategies to 
develop and enforce global governance regimes via the U.S. court system. Such litigation can result, 
and has resulted, in the adoption of an interpretation of international law over the opposition of the 
government’s chief foreign policy organ: the executive branch.”220 The penetration of IL may be rarely 
accepted where it is necessary to demonstrate a credible commitment to previous US consent,221 but 
remains unlikely where national security is at stake.222
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Liberal Nationalism 
Liberal Internationalist policy is founded on a belief that the surest guarantor of liberal values is 
fostering an international environment that complements hard-won freedoms at home. This turns on 
faith that the liberal norms comprising US constitutional government always prevail when set against 
the potentially illiberal influences of foreign and international law.223 Scepticism toward that claim is 
the basis for Liberal Nationalist legal policy, which honours liberalism by narrowly guarding American 
constitutional government against global governance. Whereas Liberal Internationalists believe a 
greater US role in international governance will strengthen democracy, Liberal Nationalists often see 
democracy and IL as being in opposition to one another.224 IL itself has a “democratic deficit,”225
Consistent with the theorised weakness of this ideal type, few contemporary legal 
policymakers have advocated an American IL policy primarily in these terms. The ideology has a long 
tradition, however, extending back to the founding fathers’ beliefs that the US represented a break 
from the European “old order of diplomacy.”
 so 
that to the extent of any conflict, IL should be subordinated to domestic laws with democratic 
legitimacy. This belief establishes a preference for elevating the role of the US Congress as a form of 
direct democratic accountability over the executive government’s control of IL policymaking. The 
Liberal Internationalist approach is therefore to disengage as far as possible from the positive 
obligations created by international legal rules and institutions, and to frame them as relevant only to 
the relations between other states. The rule of IL is realised through a legal system that remains 
faithful to legal positivist principles of state consent and the inviolability of sovereignty. 
226 The outlier status of Liberal Nationalism is 
demonstrated in the wary reception toward 2012 Presidential candidate and then Congressman Ron 
Paul and his son Senator Rand Paul, each of whom has been categorised according to equivalent 
belief types.227 Both have cast themselves as “libertarian” candidates, and for this reason oppose US 
government intervention domestically and internationally as equally a threat to liberal values.228 The 
UN in particular is a threat for drawing the President to engage internationally, while providing 
authority to bypass congressional authority to force domestic compliance with UN standards.229 On 
this basis Ron Paul repeatedly presented a bill to the House of Representatives to end US 
membership of the UN for threatening American values “from the beginning,”230 while his son has 
made similar gestures in the Senate.231
This legal conception frequently aligns with the two illiberal American conceptions, with all 
united by a scepticism toward the utopian vision of legalism and Liberal Internationalism. Legal 
policymakers advocating quite illiberal policies have accordingly tended to justify municipal 
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consequences of their positions consistently with Liberal Nationalism. Bradley and Goldsmith have 
strongly supported pragmatic US engagement with IL, yet argue that the automatic incorporation of 
customary IL into American municipal law “is in tension with basic notions of American representative 
democracy.”232 The danger is that law derived from the “views and practices of the international 
community” is “neither representative of the American political community nor responsive to it.”233 
Similarly Ku and Yoo warn that the pressure to conform to international legal obligations “could 
undermine the existing balance of powers” between the three branches of US federal government.234
The status of Liberal Nationalism as a discrete set of beliefs is apparent however in cases 
where it is incompatible with illiberal values. Somewhat incongruously, the centrality of liberal values 
leads adherents of this conception to emphasis IL as a constraint where it corrects US government 
actions seen to erode liberty.
 
In these cases Illiberal Internationalism is treated as complementary rather than in competition to 
Liberal Nationalism, since each has a different jurisdictional focus. 
235 During the 2012 Presidential campaign Ron Paul notably made one 
of the only supportive statements about IL during the series of Republican candidate debates. 
Contrary to other leading candidates, he spoke out against the Bush 43 administration’s practice of 
waterboarding, which he labelled as “torture.”236 His reasoning was that it was “illegal under 
international law and under our law...and is really un-American to accept on principle that we will 
torture people that we capture.”237 This perhaps seems contradictory given Paul’s strong stance 
against the UN, but logical when read as an implication of Paul’s own conception of the rule of IL as 
grounded in liberty. Conversely, otherwise illiberal policymakers who have drawn upon Liberal 
Nationalist arguments to defend American sovereignty have been among the strongest advocates of 
the legal right to engage in forms of torture.238
 
 
Defensive Development of International Law 
The key interest of Liberal Nationalism is limiting the reach of IL so that it does not encroach on the 
integrity of American constitutional government. IL is supported primarily as a defensive framework 
that allows states to operate as autonomous political units. The rule of IL is therefore advanced by 
developing non-arbitrary legal rules necessary to uphold the stability of global relations, but not with 
any view to shifting the legal rights and obligations of American citizens. This creates scepticism 
toward institutions of global governance, which necessarily take up functions otherwise left to states 
themselves. Rubenfeld’s scepticism of IL as a challenge to US constitutional government is claimed 
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not to be a “categorical” rejection of law.239 Rather he accepts the legitimacy of the US making 
treaties provided “the agreement is narrow in scope, and when it creates no third-party, supranational 
entities empowered to supervise U.S. policy or to make, interpret or apply U.S. law.”240
 
 In its strongest 
form, a Liberal Nationalist policy would entail isolating the US from negotiations to establish 
international institutions and treaty regimes, and engage only to oppose any attempts to encroach on 
US autonomy. 
Inviolable Sovereignty 
The principle of sovereign equality as a shield is central to the Liberal Nationalist rule of law. It is 
precisely the absence of political and normative equality between sovereign states that necessitates a 
framework of international legal rules to maintain political separation. IL should uphold sovereign 
equality in the limited sense of reciprocal rights and duties by America and its global counterparts not 
to interfere in one another’s affairs. Because the US system is sui generis this equality does not 
however extend to a positive obligation to be an equal participant in multilateral institutions. In this 
sense claims that the US is an outlier for electing to stay outside of the landmines convention and 
Kyoto protocol do not breach the conception of sovereign equality. Rather equality is expressed only 
as a negative obligation to respect the inviolability of US sovereignty. 
The logic of this principle extends outward to constrain the US itself in breaching the 
sovereignty of other states. Perennial third-party Presidential candidate Ralph Nader241 has levelled 
strident criticism at President Obama for taking actions that “violate international law because they 
infringe upon national sovereignties with deadly drones, flyovers and secret forays by soldiers.”242 In 
an analysis by Ron Paul’s own think tank, Flynt and Leverett criticise the Obama administration’s 
argument that under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treatyw Iran has no legal right to enrich uranium, 
even for civilian purposes. That interpretation creates a basis for constraining Iran through IL for 
breaching purported obligations. Flynt and Leverett disagree, arguing that “the right to indigenous 
technological development — including nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities, should a state choose to 
pursue them — is a sovereign right.”243
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interventions worldwide.”244 Paul’s institute seeks to constrain US foreign policy by denying the 
Obama administration’s “main motive” of seeking “to maximize America’s freedom of unilateral military 
initiative and, in the Middle East, that of Israel.”245
 
 In both cases states are treated as sovereign 
equals in law precisely to protect the integrity of the American polity against foreign entanglement. 
Vertical Separation of Powers 
For Liberal Nationalism international and municipal law exist as two separate realms of legal authority, 
and therefore should not conflict as a matter of course. IL governs the relations between states, while 
municipal law governs the relations between natural persons. The Liberal Nationalist rule of IL entails 
a vertical separation between international and domestic judicial power, rather than a horizontal 
separation between international executive, legislative and judicial powers. Legalist conceptions 
emphasise the separation and institutionalisation of international judicial power, while vertically 
integrating international judicial power as a check on domestic courts. Liberal Nationalism will in 
contrast strongly resist a design purporting to fuse the judicial power of international courts to 
American law. The constraints of IL are ultimately set by real policymakers who represent 
particularistic state interests and political values foreign to the traditions defining US constitutional 
government. At the same time the nationalist stance of this conception resists the legitimacy of any 
legal design capable of drawing the US into international processes. To the suggestion that the US 
could democratically elect to submit to such constraints Rubenfeld provocatively warns that the 
“crucial transition to beware is the moment when international cooperation shifts to international 
governance... A person can sell himself into slavery voluntarily, but he will still be a slave 
thereafter.”246
 
 In this way IL continues to operate as a framework for the basic structure of global 
relations without unsettling constitutionally guaranteed liberal values at the national level. 
Illiberal Nationalism 
Finally Illiberal Nationalism rejects the strategic value of a freestanding body of IL altogether, 
engaging only to defend national security, and to protect non-universal cultural values. More than any 
of the other ideal types, Illiberal Nationalists are defined by a minimalist conception of IL, and 
opposition to the creation of international judicial power specifically. In this tradition former US 
Ambassador to the UN John Bolton asserted that any submission to IL “is the first step to abandoning 
the United States of America. International law is not law; it is a series of political and moral 
arrangements that stand or fall on their own merits, and anything else is simply theology and 
superstition masquerading as law.”247
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of order based on folk wisdom and tradition.248 Adherents of Mead’s equivalent belief type maintain a 
fundamental preference for the “rule of custom” over the international rule of law.249 Former acting US 
Attorney-General and federal judge Robert Bork criticised purported international legal rules and 
institutions as an expression of global anti-Americanism aimed at eroding both American moral 
standing and national security.250 IL enthusiasts are characterised as liberal elites who, consistent 
with legalism and Liberal Internationalism, are in search of “transcendent principles and universalistic 
ideals.”251 He identified both himself and the “great mass of citizens” with a contrary conception 
centred on “particularity—respect for difference, circumstance, tradition, history, and the irreducible 
complexity of human beings and human societies.”252 These values form the populist heart of Illiberal 
Nationalism which is incompatible with the intentionally elitist objective in utopian legal conceptions of 
removing popular passions from foreign policy.253
The conception is distinct from Illiberal Internationalism to the extent that it interprets IL 
through substantive cultural values at all. Particularistic values also distinguish the conception from 
Liberal Nationalism and its grounding in liberal American government. Ignatieff observes that Senator 
Jesse Helms and Southern senators generally have made the US unique among its peers for having 
“a strong domestic political constituency opposed to international human rights law on issues of family 
and sexual morality.”
 
254 Bork specifically criticised the transformation of modern IL into “a body of 
rules about the rights of individuals against their own nations.”255 He rejected the legitimacy of courts 
reading contemporary “universal” values into the constitution in order to strike down traditional moral 
prohibitions.256 Doing so may ensure “we are all more free” but would be the improper freedom “to act 
in ways that most of us had decided were unacceptable.”257 Ultimately there “can be no authentic rule 
of law among nations until they have a common political morality or are under a common 
sovereignty,” neither of which is at hand.258 Illiberal Nationalist IL policy is therefore prepared to act 
against “short-term interest” in order to diminish the role of IL as a device which threatens to “constrict 
the United States.”259
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Security of Defence under President Bush 43, has expressed views 
which ultimately deny the status of IL as a uniquely authoritative approach to international politics.
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characterise anything that’s not multilateralism to the nth degree, as unilateralism...which is very 
often, I would say almost invariably, ineffective.” In this context “multilateralism to the nth degree” 
referred to laws on the use of force, about which he wondered “why we’re so pleased that we had a 
UN resolution” when a strategic rationale existed independently of legal authorisation.261 He 
dismissed current rules as “going to the United Nations, or previously the League of Nations, to get a 
unanimous vote to do nothing, or whatever it is that those organisations do.”262 When probed about 
the inconsistency of this argument with US legal obligations Wolfowitz reiterated that legality is simply 
a form of “multilateralism,” and therefore “if you believe that unless 140 countries are participating it’s 
not multilateral, then I just have to take strong exception to that definition of multilateralism.”263
 
 
Permissive Development of International Law 
For Illiberal Nationalism the development of global governance represents growing suppression of 
American sovereignty and its exceptional political culture. The desire to progressively develop IL is 
primarily a strategy of global adversaries to constrain the US by dictating international rights and 
duties without legitimate authority. In Bork’s view IL is part of a “transnational culture war” in which 
liberal elites seek to circumvent popular will as expressed in democratic institutions.264 Illiberal 
Nationalists aggressively oppose any claim to constrain US global autonomy through IL, particularly in 
areas such as military policy where the US maintains a material advantage. Here Bork argued that it 
was one of the “great deceptions practiced by proponents of international law that there is something 
deserving the name of ‘law’ by which the use of armed force between nations can be controlled.”265 
Illiberal Nationalists diverge from Illiberal Internationalists in being willing to incur the short term 
diplomatic and strategic costs of conspicuously opposing IL. In this regard Bodansky noted that Bork 
was clearly distinguished from Goldsmith and Posner for viewing IL as foremost a constraint rather 
than tool for American foreign policy.266
Where Illiberal Nationalists do engage with IL they seek to interpret IL permissively to deny 
that it has any possible constraining effect on American foreign and domestic policy. The view that IL 
is “infinitely flexible and indeterminate”
 
267 sustains a strategy of engaging with the rhetorical form and 
language of IL, while rejecting accepted conventions of international legal reasoning drawn from non-
American sources. The presumptively arbitrary constraints of IL are thereby neutralised through 
permissive interpretations that privilege national interests. In relation to treaties this does not mean 
flagrant breach of obligations, but rather that Illiberal Nationalists “hesitate to ratify a treaty if they felt 
that at a later date the treaty would either limit American freedom of action or put the US in the 
position of having to break its freely given word to achieve some necessary goal.”268
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word,”269 thereby leaving little in the law capable of constraining ambition. President George W. Bush 
sought to redefine UN powers in entirely permissive terms in 2002 by labelling it “irrelevant” unless it 
sanctioned an otherwise illegal use of force in Iraq.270 Likewise the notorious “torture memos” sought 
to alter a well settled definition of “torture” by adopting legalistic phrasing from an unrelated healthcare 
law to conclude that the prohibited infliction of “severe pain” was only that associated with “death, 
organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions.”271 This was rejected by Illiberal Internationalist 
lawyers such as Jack Goldsmith, among other senior legal policymakers, for failing to follow any 
accepted international conventions for interpretation.272
 
 Nevertheless, each of these cases remained 
consistent with the principle of permissively developing IL to remove any possible encumbrance on 
American foreign policy 
Relative Sovereignty 
For Illiberal Nationalists the principle of sovereign equality is foremost an attempt to artificially reduce 
the legitimate advantages afforded by US power. The mischief is to create what Bork refers to as a 
false “moral equivalence” that prevents the US from distinguishing between democratic and tyrannous 
regimes.273 Phyllis Schlafly colourfully denounced President Clinton’s enthusiasm for international 
treaties by invoking Saint Paul’s Second Letter to the Corinthians: “Be ye not unequally yoked 
together with unbelievers, for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness?”274 This 
belief is the foundation of relative sovereignty, where IL should be developed to recognise degrees of 
sovereignty based on the threat states pose to US national security and cultural values. Ronald 
Reagan’s Ambassador to the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick declared, in relation to the rule of IL, that “we are 
as committed to that proposition today as ever in our history.”275 Her defence of US intervention in 
Nicaragua was expressed in Illiberal Nationalist terms however, according to which the principle of 
“equal application of the law” was flawed for assuming that “all parties want the same thing, that what 
they really want is peace.” In circumstances where Nicaragua was seen to defy that assumption, the 
US could not “feel bound to unilateral compliance with obligations which do in fact exist under the 
[UN] Charter, but are renounced by others. This is not what the rule of law is all about.”276
The idea of states enjoying sovereignty only commensurate to their global standing has been 
expressed more recently in the concept of “rogue states.”
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law...and callously violate international treaties to which they are party” and that they “reject basic 
human values and hate the United States and everything for which it stands.”278 Despite being 
couched in terms of IL the rogue state concept provided the rationale for the so-called “Bush Doctrine” 
of a right to “pre-emptive” self defence, contrary to any generally accepted legal interpretation.279 The 
heart of the doctrine can be interpreted as a claim that states exhibiting proscribed attributes were 
“unlike” the US, and therefore enjoyed a relative diminution in sovereignty. Benvenisti suggests that 
the doctrine upholds the principle of “reciprocity” in relation to states who fail to mutually honour 
foundational obligations of the international legal system.280
The notion of relative sovereignty has clear parallels with Nazi era legal theorist Carl Schmitt, 
who envisioned a bifurcation of legal personality between the full rights enjoyed by “civilised” 
European states and the lesser rights of states deemed otherwise.
 
281 Scheuerman’s review of the 
Bush 43 response to the “War on Terror” goes so far as to suggest that “anyone familiar with 
Schmitt’s work on international law occasionally finds herself wondering whether the White House 
playbook for foreign policy might not have been written by Schmitt or at least by one of his 
followers.”282 This is consistent with Simpson’s observation that states have long been “differentiated 
in law according to their moral nature, material and intellectual power, ideological disposition or 
cultural attributes.”283 Powerful states have adopted a stance of “anti-pluralism” to reduce the 
sovereign rights of “outlaw states” deemed “mad, bad or dangerous.”284
 
 In a sense all such 
determinations by Illiberal Nationalism become a claim to respect sovereignty under IL in proportions 
equal to the threat each state poses to US national security and values. 
Municipal Supremacy 
The straightforward ordering principle for Illiberal Nationalism is supremacy of municipal over 
international legal powers. In a 2000 address to the UNSC Senator Helms declared: “We abide by our 
treaty obligations because they are the domestic law of our land, and because our domestic leaders 
have judged that the agreement serves our national interest. But no treaty or law can ever supersede 
the one document that all Americans hold sacred: the U.S. Constitution.”285
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differentiate and separate forms of power and then exercise them through independent international 
institutions. Rather American interests are best served by continuing to conduct foreign policy solely 
through national institutions. For Illiberal Nationalists the “insidious appeal of internationalism”286 is 
that IL advocates have sought to have “liberal views adopted abroad and then imposed in the United 
States.”287 The role of international courts in this process is aimed at “the wholesale reconstruction of 
American society” according to views antithetical to the traditions that define the American people.288
 
 
The proper policy approach toward institutionalised global judicial power is therefore to progressively 
restrict its influence over American government, and ultimately its relevance to questions of 
international politics. 
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
What unifies the four American conceptions of the rule of IL is the belief that the US is not a like case 
in international legal matters. Each of the ideal type conceptions in some way draws upon 
exceptionalist beliefs that justify greater autonomy and unequal treatment as a principled position for 
the US within the international legal system. The legalist principle of sovereign equality – that all 
states enjoy equal legal personality without reference to their international power – is itself founded on 
a conscious legal fiction that all states are “like cases.” Yet for that reason the presumption is 
inconsistent with conceptions of law that incorporate policy considerations about America’s role in the 
operation of the legal system itself. Krisch concluded that “the hierarchical superiority of the United 
States is either inconsistent with sovereign equality, or – if one wants to defend hierarchy – sovereign 
equality has to be abandoned as a principle of international law.”289 Any belief in the unequal 
normative status of the US entails the fiction of sovereign equality falling away in order to advance the 
rule of IL. Likewise a belief in the unequal American contribution to upholding the system requires that 
this fact be reflected in the foundations of IL.290
Each of the competing conceptions entails a distinctive definition of American national 
interests, and a strategic formulation for advancing them through law. O’Connell defends her Liberal 
Internationalism by challenging the Illiberal Internationalism of Goldsmith and Posner, not because 
they err doctrinally, but because “if the authors of this and other attacks on international law believe 
they are acting in the interest of the United States, or any state, they are mistaken.”
 In these ways the principle that “like cases are treated 
alike” is filtered through American foreign policy ideology to reconcile the rule of IL with defending 
legal privilege. 
291
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 National 
interests underpinning the concept of law remain contested, and in a way structured by foreign policy 
ideology. Each formulation set out in this chapter is founded on an alternative understanding of the 
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purpose of IL in relation to American foreign policy, and can therefore only be understood in these 
terms. Disaggregating competing conceptions of the rule of IL into constitutive elements provides a 
model for testing the coherence or otherwise of American IL policy. 
The meaning of “coherence” in the ICC case that follows becomes that a legal policymaker’s 
stance on any one of the rule of IL elements is a reliable indicator of positions taken on the remaining 
two elements. Identifying an administration’s commitment to pragmatic development of the ICC’s 
design and powers, for example, will suggest a corresponding commitment to hegemonic privilege 
and a division of international powers according to consent. Actual policy outcomes within each 
observation may well demonstrate contradictions due to compromises between competing ideologies, 
but tracing decision-making processes can be expected to reveal ideological coherence in legal 
conceptions of the ICC as held by identified American policymakers. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II: Contesting Global Legal Power through the ICC 
 
 
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION 1993-2000 
 
 
The two terms of President Bill Clinton coincided with the most decisive years for the ICC as the 
project progressed from a preliminary ILC report in 19921 to a foundational treaty signed by 139 
countries by the end of 2000.2 In 1993 the project consisted merely of provisional agreements by the 
Bush 41 administration to advance the court’s establishment. The central task for the new 
administration was accordingly to negotiate with other states to finalise the ICC’s function and design. 
These years were also notable for persistent allegations of contradictory policy: that the US was most 
prominent ICC advocate in the early years; conspicuously voted against the final treaty concluded in 
1998; then ultimately signed while warning against Senate ratification.3
International opposition to US policy was expressed in clear legalist terms by NGOs, who 
occupied a uniquely influential and officially sanctioned position in developing the court.
 This therefore raises the 
central question of how legal scholarship can best interpret these apparent contradictions in American 
IL policy. 
4 Since the 
earliest days the peak body for these NGOs has been The Coalition for the International Criminal 
Court (“CICC”), which has dedicated itself to achieving US ratification of the Rome Statute.5
1. A court that would be fair to all, not with one system for the strong (i.e. the Permanent Members of the Security 
Council) and another for others; 
 Based in 
New York, the particular significance of the CICC has been the extent to which it was directly involved 
in challenging US policy from the negotiations at Rome through to the present day. At its founding the 
CICC established core principles for a court developed in accordance with the rule of IL that included: 
2. A court that would be effective, not hampered by the veto power set forth in Article 27, 3 of the UN Charter; and 
3. Guaranteed independence from the Security Council for both the court and the prosecutor.6
 
 
These principles represented the core elements of a legalist conception of the ICC as it structured 
global challenges to the integrity of US policy. 
There was of course significant divergence between states opposing US ICC policy in this 
period, with positions during the Rome Conference ranging from a robustly legalist conception by 
Germany,7
                                               
1 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 44th Session, 47th Sess. UN 
GAOR, Supp. 10, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (4 May-24 July, 1992) 
 to a French position reflecting many of the American preferences. Nevertheless, although 
P-5 UNSC members maintained a loose coalition for much of the negotiations, the UK eventually 
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 
3 United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. See UNGA, 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/RES/51/207 (1997) 
4 See Bassiouni, M. Cherif, The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: Introduction, Analysis, and Integrated 
Text of the Statute, Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Transnational Publishers, 2005) at 74-75 
5 The CICC was formed in 1995 by Convener Bill Pace and includes 2,500 civil society organisations in 150 different countries: 
See CICC, ‘Coalition for the International Criminal Court,’ <http://www.iccnow.org/>; Benedetti, Fanny, Karine Bonneau, et al., 
Negotiating the International Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 1994-1998 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) at 68 
6 Welch, Claude E. Jr. & Ashley F. Watkins, ‘Extending Enforcement: The Coalition for the International Criminal Court’ (2011) 
33 Human Rights Quarterly 927 at 967 
7 See Dutton, Yvonne, Rules, Politics, and the International Criminal Court: Committing to the Court (Routledge, 2013) at 70-71 
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broke away, and France and Russia ultimately approved the statute after obtaining last minute 
concessions.8 France in particular thereafter defended its altered position against US demands as “a 
matter of principle.”9 The assumption of a largely united approach opposing US policy is corroborated 
by the close alignment between the ICC policy of the European Union (EU), CICC, and the bloc of 
over 60 countries comprising the so called “Like Minded States” (“LMS”).10 The LMS included every 
member of the EU (with the notable exception of France) along with middle powers such as Australia 
and Canada, and were always “sympathetic” to the position taken by NGOs at the Rome 
conference.11 Moreover, the Council of the EU cited the CICC as playing a central role coordinating 
policy between the three groups.12
It is clear that US IL policy diverged significantly from legalist principles. Struett notes that, 
despite the Clinton administration’s apparent support, “the court that was promoted by the U.S. 
government is not the one whose charter was adopted in Rome in 1998.”
 
13 There were high 
expectations by some that US involvement in treaty negotiations was undertaken with the intention of 
ultimately joining the court.14
This chapter analyses decision-making processes to demonstrate that US policy did not 
accept these ideals, but rather was structured by the theorised, ideologically-informed, conceptions of 
the rule of IL. This framework reveals that the administration’s approach often aligned with that of 
global court advocates in the commitment to ending international criminal impunity, but diverged on 
the ideal form of global governance for achieving that objective. The administration’s position crucially 
diverged in resisting a regime based on sovereign equality, instead arguing for legal recognition of 
exceptional global responsibilities and unique global power. The administration additionally insisted 
that the court’s judicial and prosecutorial powers be subjected to US checks and balances. For each 
of these elements US interests were crystallised in conceptions of law itself, which structured US 
decision-making to the exclusion of legalist principles advocated by every other major participant. 
 The subsequent experience therefore elicited disappointment as the US 
rejected the final treaty on the very basis that it included principles central to the legalist rule of IL – 
including its formalised obligations, substantial equality between the US and other court members, 
and a separation of international legal powers. The policy that emerged of supporting the principle but 
not design of the ICC appeared to contravene core elements of the rule of IL as understood by the 
majority of participants at Rome. 
 
                                               
8 Specifically a seven year “opt-out provision” against prosecution: Lietzau, William K., ‘International Criminal Law after Rome: 
Concerns from a US Military Perspective’ (2001) 64 Law and Contemporary Problems 119 at 131; Scheffer, David J., All the 
Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012) at 189 
9 Fehl, Caroline, Living with a Reluctant Hegemon: Explaining European Responses to US Unilateralism (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) at 103 & 108 
10 See Krisch QC, Philippe & Darryl Robinson, ‘Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola 
Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones (ed), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) at 70-71; Fehl, Caroline, Living with a Reluctant Hegemon: Explaining European Responses to US Unilateralism 
(Oxford University Press, 2012) at 85. Also termed the “Like-Minded Group” in some accounts 
11 van Boven, Theo, ‘The European Union and the International Criminal Court’ (1998) 5 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 325 at 325. See Krisch QC, Philippe & Darryl Robinson, ‘Reaching Agreement at the Rome Conference’ in 
Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones (ed), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2002) at 70-71 
12 Council of the European Union, The European Union and the International Criminal Court (February, 2008) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC_internet08.pdf> at 29 
13 Struett, Michael J., The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs, Discourse, and Agency (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008) at 70-71 
14 Ibid at 70-71 
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Inherited ICC Policy: Bush 41 Administration  
The Clinton administration did not instigate US engagement with the ICC, but rather faced the choice 
between adopting policies set in place by the Bush 41 administration, or of forging a new path. The 
Bush administration had reacted to the issue only as it arose partway through its term, and largely as 
a second order issue, but its response exhibited the relatively clear ideological structure evident in its 
IL policy more generally. Malawer described a “Reagan Corollary” to IL consisting of “the assertion of 
unilateral state action and a broad right of self-defense, less reliance on international institutions such 
as the United Nations, and an emphasis on a state’s right to pursue its national interests.”15 This was 
no mere “careless disregard” for law, but rather “an attempt to pressure the international legal system 
into changing in a manner beneficial to United States interests.”16 Struett reviewed interactions with 
the ICJ across both the Reagan and Bush 41 administrations to find “an entirely strategic attitude” in 
which each administration “sought to use that international court as one instrument to obtain its 
strategic objectives.”17
This analysis is corroborated by the account of Michael Scharf who, as Attorney-Adviser at 
the Office of the Legal Adviser was tasked with implementing much of US ICC policy during the period 
from the 1989 UN General Assembly recommitment to the project until the end of the Bush 41 
administration.
  
18 Although Scharf cited his “personal support for the concept of an ICC” he described 
the policy direction as one of “‘cautious scepticism’ about the feasibility and desirability of establishing 
an ICC.”19 That translated into engaging diplomatically with ICC advocates, but pragmatically 
opposing their agenda. The misgivings of State and Justice Department officials led the administration 
to consistently cite problems with UN proposals as a strategy for stalling progress. As a whole the 
establishment of the ICC “never received serious consideration by top officials.”20
The administration’s policy revealed an illiberalism in prioritising development of the law to 
enhance American national security interests, over and above the court’s stated purpose of 
addressing human rights violations. Crimes were only relevant to this IL policy to the extent that they 
impacted directly on American security, with the administration concerned primarily with the legal 
 
                                               
15 Malawer, Stuart S., ‘Reagan’s Law and Foreign Policy, 1981-1987: The “Reagan Corollay” of International Law’ (1988) 29 
Harvard International Law Journal 85 at 85. See also Kreisberg, Paul H., ‘Does the U.S Government Think That International 
Law Is Important?’ (1986) 11 Yale Journal of International Law 479; Weston, Burns H., ‘The Reagan Administration Versus 
International Law’ (1987) 19 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 296 
16 Malawer, Stuart S., ‘Reagan’s Law and Foreign Policy, 1981-1987: The “Reagan Corollay” of International Law’ (1988) 29 
Harvard International Law Journal 85 at 85. For critical reviews of the Bush 41 administration’s commitment to the rule of IL 
see: Quigley, John, ‘Prospects for the International Rule of Law’ (1991) 5 Emory International Law Review 311; Quigley, John, 
‘The New World Order and the Rule of Law’ (1992) 18 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 75 
17 Struett, Michael J., The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs, Discourse, and Agency (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008) at 68. See also Malawer, Stuart S., ‘Reagan’s Law and Foreign Policy, 1981-1987: The “Reagan Corollay” of 
International Law’ (1988) 29 Harvard International Law Journal 85 at 97-98 
18 Ferencz, Benjamin B., ‘International Criminal Code and Court: Where They Stand and Where They’re Going’ (1992) 30 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 375 at 388. Scharf himself characterises his role as “really more of wordsmith, 
marshalling legal arguments to further policy directives from higher level officials at the State Department and the department of 
Justice”: Scharf, Michael P., ‘Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court’ (1994) 6 Pace International Law Review 
103 at 103 
19 Scharf, Michael P., ‘Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court’ (1994) 6 Pace International Law Review 103 at 
103-104; Scharf, Michael P., Balkan Justice: The Story Behind the First International War Crimes Trial since Nuremberg 
(Carolina Academic Press, 1997) at 15-17 
20 Scharf, Michael P., ‘Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court’ (1994) 6 Pace International Law Review 103 at 
105 
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regime governing terrorism and international drug trafficking.21 It is notable that the administration’s 
strongest support was tied to the specific context of American preparation for the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War. Secretary of State James Baker and Under Secretary of State Robert Kimmitt both suggested 
they were open to the idea of an international court to prosecute Saddam Hussein when framed as 
part of overall military action.22 The administration nevertheless remained resistant to the idea, 
causing former Nuremburg prosecutor Professor Ferencz to express incomprehension given the 
atrocities being committed in Iraq.23 However the apparently contradictory policy cohered to an 
Illiberal Internationalist rule of IL that embraced legal architecture with a limited jurisdiction to facilitate 
narrowly defined security interests.24
An internationalist outlook was also evident in the administration’s concern for maintaining the 
existing framework governing international criminal law comprised of a loose network of treaties and 
extradition agreements. Pursuant to the General Assembly resolution of 1989, the ILC submitted a 
report on the scope and feasibility of establishing international criminal jurisdiction.
 This is distinct from supporting the court with a view to 
vindicating breaches of human rights perpetrated by Hussein as an end in itself, as would be the 
objective according to a legalist or Liberal Internationalist policy. Support for a tribunal advancing 
clearly defined strategic objectives in the aftermath of a war can be distinguished from general 
support for a standing judicial institution. 
25 The US 
representative to the UN Sixth Committee John Knox26 responded that, in the area of criminal law, 
there were already “effective national and international systems in place,” and as such it was “not 
clear to us that the court would contribute to the existing system.”27 A formalised court structure was 
seen as a threat to existing legal relations between national courts and treaty regimes.28
The intersection of illiberal and internationalist beliefs was most clearly demonstrated in the 
administration’s response to policymakers advocating competing IL policies. A key initiative of Bush’s 
opponents, led principally by Senator Arlen Specter,
 In essence 
the proposed court would derogate from the rule of IL as established by existing legal arrangements 
that enabled rather than constrained the pragmatic pursuit of national interests. 
29
                                               
21 See Scharf, Michael P., ‘The Jury Is Still Out on the Need for an International Criminal Court’ (1991) 1 Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 135 at 149-154; Mullins, Janet G., Letter from Assistant Secretary Mullins to Dante B. 
Fascell, Chairman, Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives (11 December, 1990) at 3 
 was the passage of legislation through the US 
House of Representatives in October 1990 calling for the President and US Judicial Conference to 
22 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, ‘The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court’ (1991) 1 Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review 1 at 42; Deming, Stuart H., ‘War Crimes and International Criminal Law’ (1994) 28 Akron Law Review 
421 at 422; Scharf, Michael P., ‘The Jury Is Still Out on the Need for an International Criminal Court’ (1991) 1 Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 135 at 143 
23 Ferencz, Benjamin B., ‘International Criminal Code and Court: Where They Stand and Where They’re Going’ (1992) 30 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 375 at 385-386 
24 Mullins, Janet G., Letter from Assistant Secretary Mullins to Dante B. Fascell, Chairman, Committee of Foreign Affairs, 
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25 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Second Session, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1990 (1990) 
26 The Sixth Committee is the primary forum for the consideration of legal questions in the General Assembly: See UN, ‘Sixth 
Committee (Legal),’ General Assembly of the United Nations <http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/> 
27 Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, in Margaret S. Pickering, Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart (ed), Digest 
of United States Practice in International Law: 1989-1990 (International Law Institute, 2003) at 134 
28 Scharf, Michael P., ‘Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court’ (1994) 6 Pace International Law Review 103 at 
105; Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 
2012) at 168; Ferencz, Benjamin B., ‘International Criminal Code and Court: Where They Stand and Where They’re Going’ 
(1992) 30 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 375 at 387-388 
29 See Bassiouni, M. Cherif, ‘The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court’ (1991) 1 Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review 1 at 14-15 
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explore the establishment of an international court and report their findings back to Congress.30 The 
initial bill was ultimately amended to take into account the administration’s concerns, expressed 
through Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Janet G. Mullins. She wrote to the 
chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that “it would be premature and unwise for the 
Congress to go on record” supporting the court. Reasons cited included that the proposal would 
potentially “divert attention and resources away from more practical and readily achievable means for 
combating international criminal activities.” An internationalist stance was affirmed by emphasising 
means that included strengthening “international organisations..., modernising extradition treaties, 
negotiating Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties” and “devising new international agreements.”31 At the 
same time the policy toward the court was constructed upon an illiberal view of IL as a political tool 
employed by states to further non-universal security interests. Foremost among reasons for 
scepticism were risks that the court “could develop into a politicised body, in which case we might find 
the court interpreting crimes in unhelpful ways.”32 The inevitable politicisation of an international court 
was a concern raised repeatedly, with the State Department previously warning the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee of a court “acting contrary to US interests on a whole range of issues or contrary to 
US notions of governing international law and fundamental fairness.”33 Further reasons for scepticism 
were the more “general reluctance of states to submit themselves or their nationals to the jurisdiction 
of an international authority,” and finally an extensive list of potential disagreements flowing from “the 
divergence of opinion among the international community on various aspects of international criminal 
law.”34
The overall Bush 41 policy was summed up by Scharf who, following careful consideration of 
each of Mullins’ criticisms, found these to be well founded. His recommendation during the closing 
months of the administration was that the US should continue engaging with the court to advance 
national interests, but do so while preserving strategic autonomy. Although joining the court as a 
member “might be of little utility to the United States,” it was unavoidable that the court would affect 
US interests. American policy should therefore be to influenced the “structure, procedures, and 
substance” of the court, while avoiding its most ambitious claims.
 
35
 
 Doing so became the Illiberal 
Internationalist IL policy inherited by the Clinton administration when it entered office in 1993. 
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DOMINANT FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY 
The general foreign policy worldview of the Clinton administration has been characterised as strongly 
internationalist, and more inclined toward liberal values.36 Daalder and Lindsay described the Clinton 
presidency and its initial advocacy for the ICC as “a continuation of the traditional Wilsonian approach 
of building a world order based on the rule of law.”37 Dueck highlighted that Clinton drew upon liberal 
internationalism to criticise the Bush 41 foreign policy during the 1992 Presidential election. Clinton 
pointed to conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti and Somalia, and to the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
protests, to argue that “the [Bush 41] administration is turning its back on the violations of basic 
human rights and our democratic values.”38 Clinton’s first Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
noted that it was from this period that Clinton identified democracy promotion as a “core tenet of his 
foreign policy.”39 Mead saw this as flowing from Clinton’s desire “to use the window of the ‘democratic 
spring’ [following the end of the Cold War] to strengthen the role of international judicial and political 
institutions, to usher in an era of law-based international relations.”40
[P]romoting democracy does more than advance our ideals. It reinforces our interests. Where the rule of law prevails, 
where governments are held accountable, where ideas and information flow freely, economic development and 
political stability are more likely to take hold and human rights are more likely to thrive. History teaches us that 
democracies are less likely to go to war, less likely to traffic in terrorism and more likely to stand against the forces of 
hatred and destruction, more likely to become good partners in diplomacy and trade. So promoting democracy and 
defending human rights is good for the world and good for America.
 In Clinton’s own words: 
41
 
 
This formulation of democracy promotion combines liberalism and internationalism as directly 
structuring the design and development of IL. The central importance of international legal institutions 
remained connected to a view that this would spread liberal values of respect for democracy and 
human rights, bolstering these values at home, and thereby US interests.42
Warren Christopher equally subscribed to core Liberal Internationalist beliefs about the 
connection between the municipal and international rule of law. US support for democracy and human 
rights in Asia flowed from the belief that “states that respect the rule of law at home are more likely to 
observe the rule of international law abroad.”
  
43
                                               
36 Mead, Walter R., Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (Routledge, 2002) at 282-296; 
Dueck, Colin, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton University Press, 
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See Zoellick, Robert B., ‘A Republican Foreign Policy’ (2000) 79 Foreign Affairs 63 
 This support was couched in the belief of the universal 
validity of liberal American values and the exceptional American role in realising these values 
internationally. In this policy the US was “not imposing an American model; we are supporting a 
universal impulse for freedom.” Moreover, American “involvement is essential to regional peace, 
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prosperity, and the promotion of freedom...the universal values we embody—freedom, democracy, 
and the rule of law—make us a beacon for all the peoples of the region.”44
The historical record also indicates that the administration was influenced more generally by 
internationalist principles spanning both ends of the liberal-illiberal dimension. Clinton’s second 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright appeared mindful of straddling competing variants of 
internationalism when saying: 
 
I hoped never again to hear foreign policy described as a debate between Wilsonian idealists and geopolitical 
realists. In our era, no President or Secretary of State could manage events without combining the two. Under 
President Clinton we were determined to do the right thing but in a tough-minded way.45
 
 
Albright’s rendering of these traditions is something of a strawman argument in that few policymakers 
would advocate the pure idealism or amoral realism that she claimed to reject. Nevertheless her 
characterisation does recognise the influence of beliefs underpinning the two variants of 
internationalism: promoting democracy internationally at the same time as working with 
nondemocratic states, and of defending human rights but being prepared to subordinate them to 
national security issues.46
The ideological context of these beliefs is evident in Albright’s exceptionalist portrayal of the 
US as “the indispensible nation.”
 
47 Her explanation of the phrase is revealing for both the meaning 
and legal impact of her beliefs. Albright acknowledges that the claim could be seen as “arrogant,” but 
asserts that it refers primarily to “the reality that most large-scale initiatives required at least some 
input from the United States if they were to succeed.” If this were all Albright meant it would not 
demonstrate exceptionalist thought per se, but merely an awareness of uniquely preponderant global 
power. Her more ideologically informed meaning is evident in the belief that America is “an 
exceptional country, but that is because we have led in creating standards that work for everyone, not 
because we are an exception to the rules.”48 Such rhetoric could create an impression that the US 
recognised a rule of IL ideal in legalist terms. Referring to the US obligation to promote liberal values 
through international legal rules Albright continued that: “If we attempt to put ourselves above or 
outside of the international system, we invite everyone else to do so as well. Then moral clarity is lost, 
the foundation of our leadership becomes suspect, the cohesive pull of law is weakened, and those 
who do not share our values find openings to exploit.”49
                                               
44 Ibid at 159. See also at 560 on Christopher’s internationalism. Notably Christopher fails to mention the ICC in either of his two 
memoirs – each focussing primarily on American foreign policy – and only discusses IL in passing: Christopher, Warren, 
Chances of a Lifetime: A Memoir (Simon and Schuster, 2001). Scheffer notes the same omission in the memoir of 
Christopher’s successor Madeleine Albright: Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes 
Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012) at 230 
 These statements go to the meaning of 
equality under IL, which is tested in this portion of the case study to determine whether the theorised 
framework of legal conceptions is necessary to properly understand Albright’s beliefs. 
45 Albright, Madeleine K., Madam Secretary: A Memoir (Macmillan, 2003) at 505 
46 Ibid at 505 
47 Albright attributes the phrase to President Clinton from the period when she served as UN Ambassador: ibid at 506 
48 Ibid at 506 
49 Ibid at 506 
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The most consequential figure for US ICC policy through this period was David Scheffer, who 
worked under Albright as the first Ambassador at Large for War Crimes.50 The very creation of this 
role was significant in signalling US commitment to addressing war crimes as a central component of 
its IL policy.51 Scheffer’s memoir is a valuable account of his conception of the court and the political 
machinations that contributed to the final shape of American policy. His support for the ICC was in 
furtherance of an obligation to make credible the Clinton administration’s principled claim that it “took 
the rule of law seriously.”52 Scheffer’s own beliefs are unequivocal in the American obligation to 
engage internationally through IL to uphold liberal values.53 Yet his memoir and public statements 
make it equally clear that no single set of ideas captures the logic of US IL policy during the period. In 
particular his account demonstrates that competing internationalist legal conceptions were not as 
compatible as Albright claims. Albright herself testified to the House of Representatives that any US 
position was subject to the restriction that, in relation to the Departments of Defence and Justice, “the 
key agencies have to feel comfortable.”54 For Scheffer the administration’s “commitment to 
international justice made a significant difference,” yet he conceded that through the influence of 
competing beliefs leading figures were “sometimes weakened in their resolve.”55
 
 Explaining the 
specific legal positions taken by the US therefore requires an account that disaggregates competing 
policymaking voices to reveal the role of structured beliefs about the rule of IL in decision-making 
processes. 
 
DEVELOPING NON-ARBITRARY GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
The explicit shift away from the Bush 41 administration’s obstruction to actively supporting the ICC’s 
establishment was interpreted as renewed commitment to the rule of IL – both by America’s global 
counterparts and by domestic court advocates. Van der Vyer shared these expectations in citing 
statements by President Clinton and the US Senate as evidence of an intention to “greatly strengthen 
the rule of law.”56
An alternative explanation is that US policy was always structured by a particular conception 
of the rule of IL in which formalised development was only one possible means for developing a 
system of non-arbitrary governance over international criminal law. The Liberal Internationalism 
evident in the administration’s legal policy more generally would encompass formalised obligations 
 It is thus relevant to ask whether the preferred American policy of negotiating a 
treaty binding on all parties, including itself, was evidence that US policymakers shared a common 
understanding of the requirements for developing non-arbitrary global governance. If so, the eventual 
refusal to endorse a court design greatly strengthening the formal structure of global governance 
would suggest erosion of the legal ideal by interests extraneous to law. 
                                               
50 Described by Albright as the “father of the war crimes tribunals”: Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History 
of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012) at 8-9; Benedetti, Fanny, Karine Bonneau, et al., Negotiating 
the International Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 1994-1998 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) at 106-109 
51 Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012) 
at 3 
52 Ibid at 172 
53 See ibid at 2 
54 Ibid at 178-179 
55 Ibid at 7 
56 van der Vyver, Johan D, The International Criminal Court: American Responses to the Rome Conference and the Role of the 
European Union (Inst. für Rechtspolitik, 2003) at 3 
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only as a means for achieving this end, but not a necessary one. The more consequential 
requirement for realising the rule of IL would be effective transnational processes to promote the 
integrity of law. If US policy is shown to be structured by these ideologically informed conceptions, 
then there will be robust evidence that legalist beliefs were external to American decision-making 
processes. 
 
Legalist Policy 
Global advocates for the ICC framed the project as a natural evolution to close gaps in the 
governance of international criminal law. At the time of its negotiation then UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan described the ICC as “a missing link in the international legal system.”57 This perspective 
accepted that any gap in defining and enforcing rights and duties in the international legal system 
would necessarily be filled by discretionary decisions of states, and was thereby ipso facto 
inconsistent with the rule of IL. The task of developing non-arbitrary forms of global governance 
translated into granting the ICC broad jurisdiction, as far as possible, to eliminate the scope for states 
to respond to the subject matter of international criminal law through extralegal discretion. That 
principle was demonstrated most clearly in opposition to granting amnesties from international 
prosecutions as part of negotiated peace settlements. Hafner et al. argued that, in order to eliminate 
arbitrariness in global governance, it was imperative that the ICC exclude recognition of amnesties 
“irrespective of the political implications of the situation.”58 In light of the goal of eliminating impunity 
any such recognition would “run counter to the basic objectives of the United Nations.”59 Legalist 
advocates reached these conclusions by applying a doctrinal analysis to the formal “legal effect” of 
the Rome Statute crimes, which were held to establish an erga omnes duty to prosecute.60 The case 
for removing such discretion from states was based on their view that: “Unlike the horizontal relations 
in extradition and judicial assistance, the relation between the ICC and states parties is a vertical 
one.”61 Realising the rule of IL thus required universal accession to the court’s founding statute, and 
the substitution of the court’s formal authority for political discretion in global governance.62
 
 
Beliefs of American Legal Policymakers 
The Exceptionalist Foundation of Liberal Internationalist Support 
Scharf, who continued in his role as Attorney-Adviser during the transition to the Clinton 
administration, cited a “major policy reversal” taking place from October 1993.63
                                               
57 Cited Podgers, James, ‘Praised and Prodded: U.N. Conferees Urge Lawyers to Build on Past Efforts to Bolster Human 
Rights’ (1998) 84 ABA Journal 92 at 92 
 At that time State 
Department Legal Adviser Conrad Harper announced to the UN that the new administration had 
58 Hafner, Gerhard, Kristen Boon, Anne Rübesame & Jonathan Huston, ‘A Response to the American View as Presented by 
Ruth Wedgwood’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 108 at 109 
59 Ibid at 111 
60 Ibid at 112. A category of laws so fundamental that they create universal jurisdiction, empowering all states with standing to 
enforce them: See Bassiouni, M. Cherif, ‘International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes’ (1996) 59 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 63; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belgium v. Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3 at 32 
61 Hafner, Gerhard, Kristen Boon, Anne Rübesame & Jonathan Huston, ‘A Response to the American View as Presented by 
Ruth Wedgwood’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 108 at 112 
62 Struett, Michael J., The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs, Discourse, and Agency (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008) at 71 
63 Scharf, Michael P., ‘Getting Serious About an International Criminal Court’ (1994) 6 Pace International Law Review 103 at 
103 
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“decided to take a fresh look” at supporting the court, accepting that the project was “a serious and 
important effort which should be continued, and we intend to be actively and constructively 
involved.”64 According to Scheffer on up to six occasions leading up to the Rome Conference the 
President himself expressed his personal belief that “before this decade and this century end, we 
should establish a permanent international court to prosecute crimes against humanity.”65 The US 
Senate fortified this stance by stating that the ICC “would greatly strengthen the international rule of 
law” and thereby “serve the interests of the United States and the world community.”66
The commitment to developing global governance through IL was evident in the 1993 Senate 
confirmation hearings of Warren Christopher. Chairman Claiborne Pell opened by framing the 
immediate post-Cold War world in internationalist terms as one where “we face the task of devising or 
revising mechanisms to deal with new circumstances. In particular, we have an opportunity to reclaim 
the dream of the U.N. as an effective agent for world peace.”
 However 
closer examination reveals that, despite a common desire to end impunity under the law, the 
administration’s strong support always remained distinct from that of global partners. 
67 The Chairman concluded his remarks 
by reminding the nominee that “you will take office at a time when you can truly reshape the world.”68 
The specific issue of the ICC was raised by Senator Christopher Dodd, who lamented that IL policy 
under the Reagan and Bush 41 administrations “robbed us of the moral authority to be the standard 
bearer of the rule of law internationally.”69 Dodd’s own father had been deputy prosecutor at the 
Nuremberg trials,70 with the vision of both father and son cited by Clinton as contributing to his 
ultimate support for the permanent court.71 In the nomination hearing Dodd recognised a “tremendous 
opportunity for this country to help rewrite the rules of international law,” and specifically to 
“strengthen international institutions that can then act as impartial guardians of this new world 
order.”72
...despite opposition in the past by the Bush Administration, I am firmly convinced that the time is particularly 
auspicious for the United States to call for the establishment of a permanent international crimes tribunal... Recent 
events suggest that a crimes tribunal is a critical element to restoring and maintaining the international rule of law.
 In this context Dodd continued that: 
73
 
 
It was clear even from this point that the project was understood in terms of a special US role, and 
moreover, one likely to challenge a formalised design excluding policy considerations. Dodd 
emphasised that “it will never happen, in my view, unless the United States takes the leadership role 
                                               
64 Ibid at 109 
65 Scheffer, David J., ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 
12 at 13; Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 
2012) at 178. See Clinton, William J., ‘Remarks in New York City Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,’ The American Presidency Project (9 December, 1997) 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53684> 
66 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994 and 1995, Pub L 103-236 (1994) 
67 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Warren M. Christopher to be Secretary of State: 
Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 1st Session 103rd Congress (1993) at 1 
68 Ibid at 2 
69 Ibid at 13 
70 See Dodd, Christopher, Letters from Nuremberg: My Father’s Narrative of a Quest for Justice (Random House Digital, Inc., 
2008) 
71 Clinton, William J., My Life (Hutchinson, 2004) at 674 
72 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Warren M. Christopher to be Secretary of State: 
Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 1st Session 103rd Congress (1993) at 13 
73 Ibid at 13 
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in this issue.”74
In the International Court of Justice, our refusing to cede or grant jurisdiction and our retaining the right of unilateral 
withdrawal is one of the things that sets back the entire enterprise. If the leading nation in the world feels that when it 
does not want to risk a bad outcome it simply picks up its marbles and goes home, that is a very unsatisfactory 
result... I think the United States, as the leading power in the world now, has special responsibilities that we ought to 
undertake to carry out.
 Warren Christopher concurred in rejecting the Bush 41 policy as “fairly abysmal,” while 
framing the court as realising rather than superseding American exceptionalism: 
75
 
 
The distinction from legalism matters, since this exchange supported a conception of the rule of IL in 
which the global role of the US became more important than the perceived fiction of impartial 
formalised rules. Liberal Internationalist commitments were to transnational processes of legal 
governance in which the US could preserve its unique role advancing the non-arbitrary values and 
mechanisms that made law work. 
 This more policy oriented understanding of the ICC was reiterated by Christopher’s successor 
Madeleine Albright, who tied US support to a broader Liberal Internationalist vision of “building a more 
integrated, stable, and democratic world, with increased security for all who respect the interests and 
rights of others.”76
 
 That understanding again emphasised perceived connections between 
international criminal law and democracy when promoting the liberal freedoms of real people. It was 
the court’s capacity to strengthen these institutions and values that mattered, more so than 
formalising the design of the court in a binding treaty, and obtaining as close to universal membership 
as possible. Institutionalising formal obligations remained the optimal preference for the 
administration, but not a necessary one. 
Pragmatic Development of the ICC 
Although Liberal Internationalist beliefs dominated in this period they competed throughout with 
alternative ideologically informed conceptions of IL. In particular, legal policymakers from the 
Department of Defence strongly emphasised a more pragmatic approach to developing institutions of 
global governance. Immediately before the Rome Conference the Pentagon issued a cable to the 
military representatives of over 100 states setting out concerns that advocates were expanding crimes 
within the court’s statute beyond their current state of development. The cable warned that the ICC 
“must not be used to push the envelope of international law.”77
The most detailed account of military views can be found in the jurisprudence of Major William 
Lietzau, who joined the US delegation to Rome in his capacity as Deputy Legal Counsel to the Office 
of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  
78
                                               
74 Ibid at 72 
 Following the Conference he went on to prepare the 
draft elements of crimes relied on at the Preparatory Commission for the Establishment of an 
75 Ibid at 72-73 
76 Albright, Madeleine K., Madam Secretary: A Memoir (Macmillan, 2003) at 504-505. Perhaps because Albright makes only 
this single reference to a “permanent international criminal tribunal” Scheffer in his memoir pointedly notes her complete 
omission of the subject: Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton 
University Press, 2012) at 230 
77 Dated 31 March, 1998 and reproduced as “Appendix C” in Grigorian, Ellen, The International Criminal Court Treaty: 
Description, Policy Issues, and Congressional Concerns (Congressional Research Service, 6 January, 1999) at 32 
78 United States Department of Defense, William K. Lietzau: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Rule of Law and Detainee 
Policy) <http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=246> 
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International Criminal Court between 1999-2002.79 Scheffer described Lietzau as “instrumental” in 
persuading participants at Rome and the Preparatory Commission of the need to explicitly define the 
elements of crimes falling under the court’s jurisdiction rather than leaving them to judicial discretion.80
Lietzau’s jurisprudence was firmly internationalist in advocating global institution building and 
in opposing the Rome Statute for threatening American international engagement.
  
81 His position 
along the values dimension was somewhat mixed, but he primarily emphasised the illiberal concern of 
maximising American strategic autonomy for national security purposes. He did acknowledge the 
broader context of the court as a means for addressing atrocities,82 but this liberal concern was 
addressed by advocating a rule of IL maximising US strategic autonomy rather than through the 
formalised authority of a court. Broadly, he advocated an IL policy balancing liberal concerns of 
attaining justice on the one hand with “preservation of state sovereignty and current practices that 
promote international peace and security on the other.”83
What is notable about Lietzau’s recollections of and proposals for the court is that he framed 
them as pivoting around the principle that “the rule of law must itself be preeminent.”
 
84 This became a 
touchstone in Lietzau’s criticism of the ICC design and informed his argument against US accession. 
He expressed apprehension at the “paradigm” guiding court proponents “that international 
humanitarian law progresses in a linear fashion, with progress equalling more law.”85 The process of 
establishing the municipal rule of law necessitates the taming of political power by closing gaps in the 
legal framework regulating citizens’ rights and duties. Lietzau rejected this translation of municipal 
legal doctrine to the international level as not only misguided, but a threat to the realisation of the rule 
of IL itself. Contrary to the proposition that law would overcome politics through the court, he identified 
the greatest threat posed by the court as the constraint of American foreign policy through “politically-
motivated charges.”86
The pragmatic approach was also evident in the concern among some US legal policymakers 
to preserve the flexibility to exclude the role of IL altogether where strictures of enforcing international 
criminal law were seen to impede peace agreements.
 This view was no less focussed on the idea of the rule of IL than the dominant 
approach within the administration, but eschewed the central focus on liberalism, which was promoted 
only indirectly through emphasising pragmatic considerations of national security. 
87
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leaders in Haiti to facilitate the return of ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.88 Notably, Scheffer 
acknowledged that the very idea that the court’s jurisdiction should be limited by amnesties 
“seemingly flew in the face of the entire purpose” of the ICC.89 This is certainly the case according to 
a view that IL should progressively exclude political exceptions.90 Czarnetzky and Rychlak observed 
that the ICC jurisdictional regime was “intended to make clear that a purely juridical model is the only 
appropriate method for dealing with human rights violations.”91 However, in Illiberal Internationalist 
terms, this did not equate to advancing the rule of IL. Rather the ideal was attained through 
pragmatically defining exceptions to law’s proper reach. Doing so would eliminate arbitrariness by 
prospectively and clearly defining these exceptions consistent with a stable legal system.92
 
 
Nationalist Objections 
Parallel to these competing internationalist conceptions was forceful nationalist opposition to the very 
concept of the court and its contribution to the enlargement of the international legal system. Scheffer 
encountered in principle objections to the court from key voices within the administration from the 
earliest discussions in 1994. Reasons cited included the inherent politicisation of the court as a ploy to 
degrade both America’s existing legal frameworks and global moral standing.93 At a 1998 US Senate 
hearing to review the Rome Conference, Chairman Senator Grams expressed opposition according to 
a Liberal Nationalist view that IL’s proper role was as a shield for the integrity of US constitutional 
government. Key criticisms included that the court’s jurisdiction came at the expense of US 
constitutional protections, and that judges might be selected from undemocratic countries that did not 
protect the rule of law at home.94 He concluded with the plea that the court “shares the same fate as 
the League of Nations and collapses without U.S. support for this court truly I believe is the monster 
and it is the monster that we need to slay.”95
The key voice of opposition however was Senator Jesse Helms through his role as Chairman 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from 1995-2001. Both Mead and Dueck classify Helms 
as a strong proponent of their equivalents to Illiberal Nationalism.
  
96
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court,” which would be “dead-on-arrival” in the Senate unless “a clear U.S. veto” was provided for.97 
Scheffer took the “veto” demand to mean total UNSC control, which equated the legitimacy of the 
court with its development as a permissive institution enabling but not constraining US power.98 In the 
absence of this unlikely design Scheffer concluded that Helms’ singular intention became “to kill the 
court and any American role in it.”99 For these reasons Scheffer described feeling only “soiled” when 
Helms later congratulated him for ultimately rejecting the Rome Statute.100
 
 In these examples legal 
policymakers demonstrated adherence to nationalist beliefs that diverged from legalism, but also from 
internationalist American policymakers equally opposing the final agreement at Rome. 
Conclusion 
US policy toward developing global governance has been perceived as the high-water mark of 
contradictions in its ICC policy. The US situated itself as a champion of the ICC, rejected the court’s 
founding treaty at Rome, signed it more than two years later on the last day possible after significant 
internal lobbying,101
I believe that a properly constituted and structured International Criminal court would make a profound contribution in 
deterring egregious human rights abuses worldwide, and that signature increases the chances for productive 
discussions with other governments to advance these goals in the months and years ahead.
 but did so while advising against future US membership of the court. At the point 
of signing President Clinton declared: 
102
 
 
Clinton later recalled of this statement that: “I had been among the first world leaders to call for an 
International War Crimes Tribunal, and I thought the United States should support it.”103
Yet the policy of securing an exceptional US role while standing outside formal treaty 
obligations comes closer to the legal ideals evident within the administration than submitting to the 
treaty on its own terms. Clinton’s Acting State Department Legal Adviser Michael Matheson later 
argued that the “critical question” was not whether the US ratified the Rome Statute, but rather, that 
the US sought to “be helpful, to facilitate, to cooperate, to pursue common aims...that’s much more 
important than the technical question of whether the US is a party.”
 The outcome 
is incoherent from a legalist perspective, combining commitment to the rule of law with an explicit 
refusal to submit to the formal obligations of the Rome Statute, and preserving discretionary 
approaches to international criminal justice. 
104 Scheffer was well aware that 
the distance between American policy and the legalist position created the impression that the US 
was “opposed to the whole concept” of the ICC. That view was however “simply false, as I had the 
task of trying to build the court on an alternative foundation.”105
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evidence of a genuine commitment by key US legal policymakers to design and develop a court that 
could be joined as a full member, but subject to established ideological commitments.106
 
 The 
“alternative foundation” identified by Scheffer was formed by the competition between a dominant 
Liberal Internationalist commitment to transnational legal processes and countervailing beliefs 
structured by illiberal and nationalist American foreign policy ideologies. Accordingly, senior figures in 
the Clinton Administration, including the President himself, demonstrated clear support for the goal of 
reducing impunity in the international legal system through the ICC, but did so according to competing 
conceptions of the rule of IL, none of which encompassed legalism. 
 
DEFINING EQUALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
During this period of designing and establishing the ICC the legalist principle articulated as 
indispensible by US opponents was sovereign equality. From the view of legalism a court that did not 
accord equal rights and duties to all states parties would, for that very reason, be inconsistent with the 
rule of IL. The policy outcome for the Clinton administration was, in contrast, insistence on a design 
that acknowledged and facilitated the unequal role of the US in undertaking global military operations. 
The US position translated into insistence that the ICC be structured around the UNSC and the 
unequal veto power of its five permanent members (“P-5”). Scheffer, who advocated this policy, 
conceded that the proposal amounted to a “means of carving out an exceptionalist enclave for the 
United States.”107
 
 The beliefs of US legal policymakers about the connection between sovereign 
equality and the rule of IL are therefore central to the question of whether and how distinct legal 
conceptions explain the divergent US position. 
Legalist Policy 
Michael Scharf noted that a key factor in moving from reliance on the UNSC to create ad hoc criminal 
tribunals to a permanent court was a majority of UN members wanting to eliminate unfair P-5 
privileges. A shared feature of both the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals was being creatures of the 
UNSC, and therefore subject to the veto of the P-5, including the US.108 Replicating this design would 
thus result in a court that had “lost its political independence and compromised its impartiality and 
equal application of the law to all concerned.”109 Van der Vyer compared explicit commitments to the 
rule of law by President Clinton and the US Senate to argue that US policy outcomes amounted to 
“insistence on an international legal regime deprived of the rule of law and equal justice for all.”110
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principles of state equality and judicial fairness, and thus detrimental to the court’s legitimacy.”111 
Unsurprisingly, the push to separate the ICC design from the UNSC was supported most forcefully by 
larger states, including Germany and countries of the Non-Aligned-Movement such as India, for whom 
UNSC powers were a distortion of the post-WWII distribution of international power.112 For non-
permanent members, establishing sovereign equality was always a key element of an ICC design 
consistent with the rule of IL.113 The case for a design based on state party rather than UNSC referral 
gained traction in the years leading up to the conference and largely prevailed in the Rome Statute.114 
Through this “palace revolution”115
 
 all states parties came to enjoy a degree of equality before the law 
in rights and duties established through the ICC. 
Beliefs of American Legal Policymakers 
Achieving Liberal Equality 
At the level of general legal principles Scheffer affirmed “two basic building blocks” of IL that appeared 
to align with legalism but diverged when applied by US policymakers. These were “reciprocity” in the 
rights and duties exercised between states, and “equality of nations” under international treaties.116 
Prima facie these principles meant that “no nation and no people have superior rights or exceptional 
privileges in the realm of international law.” Applied to the specific case of crimes falling within ICC 
jurisdiction however, this specifically meant that “no perpetrator of atrocity crimes should be able to 
avoid justice.”117 In Scheffer’s move from the general to the particular there is a subtle shift from the 
legalist treatment of states as the principle subjects of IL, to seeing natural persons as the primary 
perpetrators and victims of international crimes. This distinction matters for the many scenarios in 
which upholding sovereign equality is a practical barrier to prosecuting perpetrators of international 
crimes.118
Scheffer’s own conception demonstrated the internationalist belief that has been the main 
source of hypocrisy accusations: that the US faced “the paradox of being a leader for international 
justice but at the same time a leader for international peace and security.”
 
119
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 Scheffer emphasised the 
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Internationalists, the US has historically played an exceptional role in deploying power to uphold 
international norms. Thus the ICC must not “handcuff governments that take risks to promote peace 
and security and undertake humanitarian missions.” This was more explicitly pursuant to a belief that 
the “US military, in particular, is called upon to carry out mandates of the Security Council” in 
combination with other further responsibilities that advance liberal equality.120
Murphy explained the Clinton administration’s contradictory policies toward the ICC as the 
consequence of a belief that “global responsibilities for maintaining the peace” should exempt US 
military personal and civilians from appearing before the court.
 Scheffer’s paradox was 
that, to achieve equal justice, it may sometimes be necessary to recognise inequality in American 
responsibilities before the law. 
121 In Liberal Internationalist terms, this 
is pursuant to using IL to vindicate human rights in accordance with long established messianic 
beliefs. A design that reduced the status of the US to a single voice among many would thereby be 
contrary to advancing the rule of IL. It is notable that Scheffer’s reflections on the Rome Conference 
attributed significant blame, not to US insistence that its disproportionate military role be recognised 
through unequal legal protections, but on the failure to explain its unique contributions to global 
peacekeeping and humanitarian interests. The problem was a “disconnect between our military 
commanders and those of other nations because they were not confronting atrocity crimes with the 
same understandings.”122 This “disconnect” is evident in Richard Goldstone’s retort that: “What the 
US is saying is, ‘In order to be peacekeepers...we have to commit war crimes.’ That’s what the policy 
boils down to.”123
In the context of the existing post-Cold War legal architecture, the clearest way to recognise 
this status was to graft the ICC onto the structure of the UNSC and US veto power therein. Doing so 
equally aligned with alternative American legal conceptions, including most especially in the conferral 
of hegemonic privileges consistent with Illiberal Internationalism. But the liberal justification for this 
design can be clearly identified within the beliefs of key legal policymakers. It is significant that 
Warren Christopher’s guarded support for the ICC at his Senate confirmation hearing was at all times 
framed as an extension of the “U.N. system” to be achieved through “leadership at the U.N.”
 The suggestion of hypocrisy recedes only when the US position is seen as drawn 
from beliefs in America’s exceptional global role in promoting liberty. 
124
 
 Read 
in the context of US beliefs about its role promoting liberal equality, insistence on UNSC privileges 
was most consistent with a conception of the rule of law structured by Liberal Internationalism. The 
effect was the subordination of sovereign to liberal equality to uphold the rule of IL, but contrary to the 
proposed design and expectation of legalist advocates at Rome. 
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Institutionalising Hegemonic Privilege  
The outcomes of Liberal Internationalist beliefs converged neatly with Illiberal Internationalist 
policymakers who sought an institutional design preserving hegemonic privileges. The Pentagon 
made it clear from the beginning that its support for the ICC required a design where crimes were only 
referred by the UNSC.125 This in part reflected a belief that an effective rule of IL required 
acknowledging realities of international power as already reflected in US permanent membership on 
the UNSC. Toward the end of 1997 Scheffer was told by a Pentagon representative that the sheer 
global responsibilities of the US, including 200,000 troops deployed in forty countries, “had to mean 
something in the negotiations.”126
Lietzau was sceptical about the fixation on sovereign equality and any assumption that the 
court could be treated as an apolitical judicial body.
 A design that completely divorced the ICC design from the realities 
of international power could never be a realistic proposal for an effective international legal system. 
127 His conception required an awareness of 
“unique and vital national security responsibilities” of the US in maintaining international peace and 
security.128 By way of example, it was noted that the design of the UN itself integrated power relations 
that did not reflect sovereign equality – “‘fairness’ has never been the talisman of international peace 
and security.”129 It is for that reason however that the UN system, through its integration of American 
political power, had been more effective at actually achieving the order envisioned by legalist 
advocates.130 For Lietzau deference to the principle of sovereign equality actually sat in opposition to 
the rule of IL established by existing legal processes spanning municipal and international 
jurisdiction.131
 At the same time it is important not to conflate the two variants of internationalist thinking. 
Despite Scheffer’s insistence on a central UNSC role, he believed that the Defence approach “made 
little sense,” since it insisted on immunity for US forces while denying it to others.
 Looking at the evidence from decision-making it would therefore be inaccurate to say 
that Defence Department lawyers disregarded legal principles for political expediency. Rather policy 
was structured by a set of coherent beliefs about the rule of IL that rejected sovereign equality as 
necessary or even compatible with advancing the rule of IL. 
132
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 Once again, 
however, the contradiction can be understood in the light of competing views on the proper legal 
relationship to be established between states. From a liberal perspective, the special US status in the 
UNSC allowed for the extension of constitutional values into the international arena, which could be 
applied in principle to US forces who fell short of them globally. From the illiberal perspective, the fact 
of US global preponderance required recognition within the law of absolute privileges for US forces. 
Doing so was necessary to achieve a realistic institutional design that recognised US power, yet set 
out global relations according to predetermined legal principles. Throughout the Rome negotiations 
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Scheffer had long sought a compromise on Pentagon demands that the US would only join the ICC if 
it could withhold consent to the prosecution of its military personal. The compromise was ultimately to 
require consent only for non-parties to the statute in an attempt to reach a middle ground between 
Liberal Internationalist resistance to a design establishing sovereignty as a shield against criminal 
liability, and the Illiberal Internationalist demand that the law take account of America’s hegemonic 
status. Both positions were nevertheless rejected outright by other negotiating parties for the 
inequality in international legal obligations they would create.133
 
 
Conclusion 
Scheffer’s characterisation of a “paradox” in the US position cannot be understood separately from 
the context of exceptionalist beliefs about the US role vindicating liberal rights. The question of the 
proper relationship between sovereign states was framed in terms of the principle of liberal equality, 
and the need to facilitate US power to vindicate the rights of natural persons. For both variants of 
internationalism the privileged UNSC role was seen as consistent with the rule of IL, either because of 
the exceptional political role played by the US in promoting human rights globally, or because the rule 
of law couldn’t be divorced from the realities of US global military power. Through these positions US 
policy directly contradicted the central legalist tenet of sovereign equality before the law. The director 
of Human Rights Watch’s ICC campaign Richard Dicker rejected the compatibility of this conception 
with the rule of law: “The Defense Department insisted on a 100 percent foolproof mechanism [to 
protect US troops against prosecution]. To get that, they essentially needed to cut the heart out of 
equal application of the law to all who came before it.”134
To the extent that there was legal incoherence in US policy toward the issue of equality, this 
reflected the compromise between competing American conceptions, rather than an unstructured 
compromise with legalist principles. Van der Vyer recognised the importance of the belief among US 
policymakers that their nation responds to “almost all international 911 calls” as “the major or only 
peace-keeping force of our times.”
 
135 He concluded however that, due to competing internal positions 
on the ICC, American policy was “not a matter of principle or of self-interest but internal political 
expedience.”136 This distinction and his reference to the campaign led by Senator Helms137
 
 merely 
beg the question however, since it does not explain what principles guided the individuals and 
constituencies internally opposing the ICC. The most persuasive explanation remains that the 
meaning of equality in US ICC policy was defined by competing legal principles, each of which 
expressed a coherent logic when viewed on its own terms. The dynamic is therefore not the 
competition between legal principle and political expediency, but rather of divisions internal to IL itself. 
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ORDERING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POWER 
Throughout the Rome negotiations legalist advocates insisted on a design achieving a high degree of 
separation between the ICC’s judicial and prosecutorial powers and parallel legal powers exercised 
by states parties and established international institutions. This reflected a view that formally 
separating powers remained as necessary to the ICC as in municipal legal systems. These proposals 
ultimately turned on a claim that it was possible to construct a court exercising powers independently 
from the political interests of member states.138
In contrast, from an early stage, the Clinton administration settled on an institutional design 
that strictly circumscribed the court’s exercise of jurisdiction, and located primary referral power within 
the UNSC.
 On that basis, legalist proposals called for ICC powers 
that overrode inconsistent state legal systems, and for clearly separating the court’s judicial powers 
from UNSC “executive” functions. 
139 These principles were incorporated into a 1994 draft statute supported by the US, which 
had introduced the novel principle of “complementarity” privileging national over international 
enforcement of Rome Statute crimes, and had required state consent or a UNSC referral for the ICC 
to exercise jurisdiction.140 That modest design avoided any claims to true universal jurisdiction, or the 
necessity of separating and institutionalising independent judicial power.141
 
 Thus the question is 
whether US preferences to dilute judicial independence represented a tactical attempt to erode the 
rule of IL, or whether it was ideals of law itself being contested. 
Legalist Policy 
Legalist policy toward ordering international power entailed claims that it was both desirable and 
possible to institutionalise judicial power in an independent global court. Du Plessis identified “a 
growing conceptual awareness that because individuals live under the international legal system, they 
must necessarily have rights and obligations flowing from it.”142 This is an argument for the merits of 
an ICC operating separately from national governments and courts implementing criminal law. Du 
Plessis went on to cite the precedent of the post-WWII war crimes tribunals as providing a model with 
“defining characteristics that draw their inspiration from the rule of law” including “independent 
prosecutors and judges.”143 For advocates, the independence of the court became a necessary 
element of the “adequate safeguards built into the ICC system of criminal justice to protect nationals 
of all states against frivolous investigations and prosecutions.”144
The legalist position was set forth in 1999 by executive director of Human Rights Watch 
Kenneth Roth, as a key member of the CICC. At a point where the US had rejected the ordering of 
legal powers in the Rome Statute, Roth demanded the US sign “to reaffirm America’s commitment to 
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justice and the rule of law.”145 Responding to US scepticism about the plausibility of a depoliticised 
international court, Roth argued it was “not a political body, such as the United Nations, or even a 
tribunal to resolve political disputes between states, such as the International Court of Justice.” Rather 
the ICC “will have the fact-specific task of determining whether evidence exists to investigate or 
prosecute a particular suspect for a specific crime.”146 In other words the court would uphold the rule 
of IL through maintaining a clear separation of its judicial power from other powers of international 
governance. This was reinforced by a design that ensured the court’s primary and secondary rules 
were separately determined by a “‘legislature’—the governments that join the court.”147
Faith in the capacity of the court to transcend political interests was identified in a variety of 
sources. Bassiouni argued that it was “international civil society” who had “finally reached the limits of 
its tolerance for impunity and now demands some modicum of justice.”
 
148
depoliticized in an important sense: they lacked strong political interests and strategic entanglements in many parts 
of the world. Because they were not global powers, they thought of themselves as more able to construct 
international architecture that would be perceived as fair and legitimate by the rest of the world.
 For the LMS it was found in 
their own absence of great power aspirations, leading to a self-perception of being: 
149
 
 
French jurist Robert Badinter elegantly summarised the source of judicial independence in his vision 
of a court “composed of judges independent from their home States”: 
In practice, these judges will derive their whole authority from the Treaty, and thus will only be responsible for their 
decisions before their own conscience and before humanity, that entity so abstract and yet so present in these times. 
Rarely has a higher mission or a heavier responsibility been placed on judges. How may States, so proud of their 
sovereignty and their leaders, so caught up in the difficulties and complexity of their tasks, be brought not only to 
recognize this new judicial power, but also to aid it in its mission, without which the court will not be able fully to play 
its role?150
 
 
Badinter’s answer, which was the final statement in the lengthy and influential Oxford University Press 
ICC commentary,151 is that depoliticisation will be upheld by “NGO’s dedicated to humanitarian action” 
and “public opinion.”152
 
 Through these related formulations legalist advocates resisted any design that 
divided the ICC’s jurisdictional competence with states and international bodies as contrary to the rule 
of IL.  
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Beliefs of American Legal Policymakers 
Democratic Foundations of International Judicial Power 
It is telling that Bassiouni defended the possibility of ICC independence by drawing an analogy 
between its seemingly idealistic judicial aspirations and the initially ineffective separation of powers in 
the US.153 He referred to the famous 1831 retort of President Andrew Jackson dismissing the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court: “John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”154 With 
the authority of US judicial power only realised over time, Bassiouni suggested that likewise with the 
ICC “its moral authority will be established, and great expectations will be realized.”155
Lietzau’s internationalist stance encompassed liberal values that sought to establish IL on the 
tangible foundation of American constitutional government. He argued that, even though the ICC was 
likely to be governed by a judiciary adhering to the highest standards of competence and integrity, this 
was inherently inferior to American safeguards.
 What this claim 
overlooked however is the central role of democratic legitimacy to Liberal Internationalism. “Moral 
authority” in US municipal law is sustained by the continuous operation of democratic checks and 
balances on judicial power. It did not follow therefore that the same legitimacy would attach to the ICC 
simply by the fact of its existence and operation. Bassiouni’s claim assumed the possibility of 
constructing an apolitical ICC based on a foundation of cosmopolitan values. 
156 In his view “Americans, for good reason, are not 
culturally disposed toward such ‘trust’ of an institution.” Confidence was however provided by the 
separation of powers enshrined in the US constitution that were simply “not as evident in other 
democratic governments.”157 “American legal culture” was accordingly defined by a belief that judicial 
power must ultimately be tied to citizens’ democratic control.158 On this basis the “changes sought by 
the United States should be implemented not just because U.S. participation is key to an effective, 
functioning court, but because enacting them promotes the rule of law and is therefore the right thing 
to do.”159 Likewise Scheffer argued that the US “could not negotiate as if certain risks could be easily 
dismissed or certain procedures of the permanent court would be infallible.”160
 
 These legal ideals 
remained central to US challenges to ICC jurisdictional and prosecutorial independence. 
Complementarity as a Check on ICC Independence 
The legalist preference for ordering international judicial power was the principle of ICC “primacy” 
over domestic law following the precedent of the ICTY and ICTR.161
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from an early stage, proposing a court based on the novel principle of “complementarity.” This 
principle reserved the primary prosecutorial obligation to states, with ICC jurisdiction enlivened only 
when the state was deemed “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.”162 The principle expressed Liberal Internationalist preferences for international legal 
development that strengthens the municipal rule of law. For Scheffer the principle pressured states to 
“prosecute nationally, or risk international prosecution.”163 For Slaughter and Burke-White, 
complementarity was the quintessential example of IL playing a backstopping role, thereby breaking 
down any sharp distinction between municipal and international legal order.164 Complementarity 
appeared to offer a genuine reconciliation between US and legalist preferences by preserving 
municipal legal processes while also retaining the overarching authority of IL, with both jurisdictions 
assumed to be “guided by the same objectives.”165
Adriaan Bos served as Chairman of both the UN Ad Hoc Committee, which was tasked with 
primary responsibility for reviewing the draft statute throughout 1995, and of the Preparatory 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.
 However the record demonstrates that parties 
remained divided on whether the principle derogated from the integrity of the court, or strengthened it. 
166 Bos noted that, although states 
largely accepted the principle of complementarity, many remained wary of its undefined nature. The 
concern was that fracturing international judicial power would allow states to shield perpetrators 
through sham investigations. Some saw complementarity as chiefly a compromise to accommodate 
political interests,167 and therefore incapable of ensuring ICC integrity in its own terms. Indeed 
Scheffer noted that the principle was seized upon by other participants in Rome largely because they 
assumed it would secure US support for the treaty.168 For these policymakers the necessary 
counterbalance to complementarity was that the court must be given “its own discretionary power to 
determine its jurisdiction.”169 Advocates accordingly insisted on granting the ICC prosecutor proprio 
motu powers: the independent power to initiate an investigation and bring a case before the court.170
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investigations.”171
The response from US policymakers made clear that this solution was even more 
objectionable than the original perceived mischief. Jamison Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser to the State 
Department, argued that “bona fide national investigations and prosecutions will always be preferable” 
to those of the ICC. Reversing the onus would entail the fraught judgment that “a functioning national 
system is not bona fide.”
 Prosecutorial independence was thus institutionalised in the ICC design as a 
necessary check to ensure complementarity remained consistent with the rule of IL. 
172
[I]t is not a question of the court having primary or even concurrent jurisdiction. Rather, its jurisdiction should be 
understood as having an exceptional character...as long as the relevant national system was investigating or 
prosecuting a case in good faith, according to this view, the court’s jurisdiction should not come into operation.
 The US preference was thus for a narrow conception of complementarity 
consistent with the 1996 Preparatory Committee Report:  
173
 
 
To ensure that outcome, US negotiators insisted on various measures to favour domestic processes, 
including requiring a supermajority of judges before domestic investigations could be overridden, and 
a requirement that states be notified of potential ICC jurisdiction in any case where a state or the 
prosecutor intended to refer a matter to the court.174
In this context the US rejected proposals for an independent prosecutor as “utopian” and 
thereby at risk of “rejection of the Draft by States.”
  
175 For the US the nature of prosecutorial power is 
somewhat contentious even at the level of municipal law. It is nominally an extension of executive 
functions, yet the task of prosecution requires a degree of independence from executive direction. 
Executive control nevertheless remains crucial to ensure democratic accountability against “frivolous 
or vindictive prosecutions.”176 For American legal policymakers of all stripes this principle did not 
recede merely because prosecutorial power was being exercised at the level of global governance. 
The legalist view of an independent prosecutor guaranteeing ICC independence directly contradicted 
the view of American policymakers, who saw the prosecutor “making difficult public policy decisions” 
and therefore eroding both the appearance and reality of prosecutorial impartiality.177
Former chief prosecutor of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals Justice Louise Arbour 
responded to US opposition by arguing: 
  
there is more to fear from an impotent than from an overreaching Prosecutor...an institution should not be 
constructed on the assumption that it will be run by incompetent people, acting in bad faith for improper 
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purposes...the powers of the Prosecutor, and of the court itself, should be designed in a manner consistent with the 
effective enforcement of the statute.178
 
 
However the division over prosecutorial independence demonstrated that, even on the apparent 
consensus over complementarity, divergence in ideology crystallised in incompatible proposals for the 
court. Parties adopted contradictory positions whereby complementarity was seen either as a 
democratic check on the court’s independence, or as a compromise itself requiring checking by an 
independent prosecutor. In both cases policy was defended as a good faith commitment to the rule of 
IL. 
 
Delegated Jurisdiction 
The mechanism by which the ICC sought to establish its jurisdiction opened up a clear division 
between legalist and US advocates over the lawfulness of “delegating” jurisdiction.179 At earlier stages 
of negotiation there had been calls from key states and voices within the LMS and CICC for a form of 
universal jurisdiction.180 This expansive claim was rejected by the US for being “in conflict with certain 
fundamental principles of international law.”181 The final outcome under Article 12 was instead a 
regime based primarily on states granting consent to jurisdiction by virtue of court membership, but 
the extension of jurisdiction over all crimes committed in the territory of member states – irrespective 
of whether an accused was a national of a member state.182 Territorial jurisdiction became the 
dividing line between a forceful legalist defence and equal resistance by US policymakers as the 
“single most problematic part of the Rome Treaty.”183
It was largely agreed that the right to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed in a state’s 
own territory had been established as “fundamental” since at least the landmark Lotus Case.
 
184 
Furthermore, that right extended to transferring jurisdiction to a third state via extradition. On this 
basis Bassiouni claimed a right “to transfer jurisdiction to another state that has jurisdiction over an 
accused, or to an international adjudicating body.”185
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consent anymore than did the accepted territorial doctrine.186 Alternatively Germany defended the 
provision on the basis of universal jurisdiction, arguing that, because the ICC crimes were owed erga 
omnes,187 states could exercise jurisdiction irrespective of nationality or territoriality. Therefore: “Since 
the contracting parties to the Statute could individually exercise universal jurisdiction for the core 
crimes, they could also, by ratifying the Statute, vest the Court with a similar power to exercise such 
universal criminal jurisdiction on their behalf.”188 In both cases states again referred to the Lotus 
principle that: “Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”189
 The US rejected the legality of delegated jurisdiction from the beginning, and did so from a 
position said to be “grounded in law.”
 In the 
absence of a specific rule against delegation it remained presumptively legal. 
190 For David Scheffer the legalist position assumed a right under 
customary IL to the effect that states have a right to delegate territorial (or universal) jurisdiction to an 
international court. He “lit a firestorm among international law scholars” by responding that, although it 
was “indisputable” that municipal courts could exercise jurisdiction in such cases, customary IL did not 
yet recognise the equal status of an international court.191 For Scheffer, a state exercising territorial 
jurisdiction over a US national has “no legal right to extradite” to a third state “which has no 
connection to the crime or the suspect...for the sake of political expediency.” Therefore neither did 
that right exist in relation to the ICC absent “the consent of the non-party state.” 192
Former legal adviser and counsel to the US government Madeline Morris rejected the legalist 
analogy in a position endorsed by Scheffer.
 The difference 
thus came down the question of whether national courts and the ICC were analogous for the 
purposes of delegating jurisdiction, or whether they should be distinguished. 
193 In Morris’ view it was “perilous” to allow a third party 
removed from a dispute to determine states’ legal rights; ICC decisions would be “more authoritative” 
than national courts with a “power to create law in a manner disproportionate to that of any state;” and 
decisions would not be reversible by legislative processes.194
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jurisdiction could “be treated as a form of negotiable instrument” by states working in political 
factions.195 Crucially, Morris argued that these concerns could not be dismissed as irrelevant to the 
legality of delegation, since the legality of customary obligations is itself constituted by consistent 
state practice that takes account of policy.196 Thus these were “not ‘mere policy concerns’ but are, in 
fact, of fundamental legal significance.”197 The division opened by US policy represented “a genuine 
dilemma—not excuses or pretexts, but legitimate concerns on each side.”198
One explanation for contradictory US policy is that Scheffer and Morris understood the ideal 
of the rule of IL in the terms set by legalism but, due to countervailing political pressures, sought to 
compromise between that ideal and US national interests. Cassese suggested as much in his 
response to the US case that as “a legal objection, this is easily dismissed.”
 
199 Sands was more 
forceful, rejecting the “absurd notion that it is contrary to international law for the ICC to exercise 
jurisdiction over Americans who commit international crimes on the territory of countries that have 
joined the ICC.”200 Yet it is striking that Morris’ explanation for why the ICC jurisdictional regime 
contradicts the rule of IL entails precisely the factors that legalist advocates would cite as evidence 
that it conforms to it. Those concerns could equally be framed as the advantages of an international 
separation of powers: impartial third party adjudication; unique legal authority derived from separation 
from national courts; and the integrity of judicial power unaffected by parochial legal actions.201
Foreign policy ideology provides a more plausible explanation for these divisions: that legalist 
and US policy were structured by competing conceptions of IL and remained coherent in these terms. 
Wippman argues that, as between the US and its opponents, “the dispute was framed as a 
disagreement over competing legal values.” These were respectively “accountability” and 
“independence and impartiality,” upon which “[e]ach side claimed the legal high ground.”
 
202 Legalist 
arguments for jurisdiction over non-state parties were motivated not by black-letter doctrinal 
interpretation, but by an underlying belief that the rule of IL required the ICC to wield independent 
judicial power to the exclusion of parallel powers in wayward states.203
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 The beliefs underpinning US 
ICC policy in contrast distinguished the ICC from national courts for lacking any form of democratic 
checks and balances. Consistent with the expectations of Liberal Internationalism, the ICC was 
supported so far as it was a backstop to the municipal rule of law, but was illegitimate where it aspired 
to displace it. The evidence also points to lawyers representing the US Defence and Justice 
Departments drawing upon Illiberal Internationalist objections to non-consensual legal obligations. 
Here the legalist claim was rejected as inconsistent with the basic principle of treaty law that “a treaty 
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does not create either obligations or rights for a third State...without the consent of that State.”204 
Scheffer’s position was consistent with both approaches in arguing that “the establishment of, and a 
state’s participation in, an international criminal court are not derived from custom but, rather, from the 
requirements of treaty law.”205
 
 In practice the outcome for each of these policies was identical, but the 
evidence is clear that American ICC policy followed the theorised structure of foreign policy 
ideologies, with no evidence that US policymakers recognised legalist ideals for the rule of IL. 
Consent Based Division of Powers 
As with the policy toward equality under IL, US policymakers continued to assert the necessity of 
UNSC control to ensure fidelity to the rule of IL. For legalist advocates this formed a basis additional 
to sovereign equality for rejecting US arguments that the UNSC should be granted control over ICC 
prosecutions. Bassiouni warned that such a design “cannot be reconciled with the principles of judicial 
independence and judicial impartiality.”206 Borek rejected Bassiouni’s premise of ICC independence, 
arguing that the collective will of the Council would be less prone to politicisation than a design 
allowing states parties to independently initiate prosecutions.207 The UNSC role “can be defined so 
that it in no way undermines the judicial independence of the court, its judges and its prosecutor, but 
rather strengthens the court in addressing the important cases that would be part of its mandate.”208 
The proposed design to achieve this end included measures such as limiting the UNSC to only 
referring “over-all situations” to the prosecutor, while the prosecutor retained the sole power to 
determine which individuals to then indict.209
 Demands for UNSC control were voiced most strongly by US legal policymakers influenced 
by an Illiberal Internationalist conception of IL. The Liberal Internationalist position did not demand a 
design explicitly guaranteeing 100 percent protection against the prosecution of American citizens 
before the court, but rather one that depended on the robustness of American constitutional values to 
ensure that outcome. Scheffer demonstrated this faith in supporting a design that theoretically allowed 
for the prosecution of US nationals if the justice system proved incapable of investigating and 
prosecuting a suspect of atrocity crimes: “Either we are the United States of America committed to the 
rule of law, or we have transformed into another kind of nation.”
 What is implicit in this argument is that UNSC members, 
and the US in particular, would remain faithful to rule of law principles necessary to provide checks on 
the court’s powers. 
210
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The policy position from both the Departments of Justice and Defence sharply diverged on 
preferred institutional design, but each adhered to the principle that the court’s jurisdictional reach 
must be strictly subject to US consent. In terms of the method for referring cases to the ICC, Justice 
advocated UNSC control alone, while Defence additionally demanded consent of the state of 
nationality.211 The Pentagon position made it clear at the early stages of the ILC draft statute that 
primary responsibility for referring crimes to the ICC should lie with the UNSC.212 Borek for the State 
Department also set out the basis on which US policy rejected the separation of powers as 
inconsistent with the rule of IL. She noted the criticism that a central UNSC role would have the effect 
of “unduly tainting the independence of a judicial body.” In response she contended that, under 
legalist proposals, “the initiation of cases would be subject to whatever political agenda a particular 
State may have, rather than a collective decision by the Council that in fact would be less likely to 
reflect a political bias than that of an individual State.”213 This was not merely a rejection of the 
specific draft design, but of the very compatibility of a legalist institutional design with the rule of IL. 
Yet support for the UNSC centred proposal was already waning among other states in the years 
leading up to the Rome conference.214 Specifically the insistence by the Justice Department that this 
be the sole method of referral was described as being “toxic” in the eyes of “almost the entire 
world.”215
Even so, UNSC control was seen as an inadequate protection by Pentagon officials, who 
argued (also consistently with maintaining hegemonic privileges) that it was necessary to insulate US 
military personal from prosecution to uphold international policing duties. The Pentagon insisted that 
US consent be required for any prosecution of its nationals – a position accepted by the President on 
repeated occasions.
 
216
vividly remember when foes of U.S. policy in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s and Central America in the 1980s 
called for prosecution of American officials and servicemen as war criminals. They now fear that without very 
stringent and specific safeguards, an international court could be used by present-day adversaries such as Iraq or 
Libya to make similar charges.
 Leading up to the Rome conference, the Washington Post reported on the 
extent that Pentagon pressure, in conjunction with congressional support, was significantly shaping 
the US position. Explanations for the strength of the position included that defence leaders:  
217
 
  
Such historical precedents when viewed through the lens of Illiberal Internationalism bolstered a view 
that an international court was only possible pursuant to a strict consent based division of 
international powers. Scheffer admonished the Pentagon for failing to recognise “how impractical their 
insistence on the alleged war criminal’s government consenting to his prosecution sounded to the rest 
of the world.”218
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overrode a national prosecution, was presented at the Rome conference and entirely rejected by 
other delegations, who saw it as contrary to the court’s very purpose.219
 
 
Conclusion 
US policy towards the ICC at the end of this period rejected any design granting unencumbered 
judicial or prosecutorial independence to the court. Certainly some compromise was achieved 
between delegates at Rome, including that the UNSC had the right to suspend ICC investigations, but 
not control the referral process.220 The US also constrained the judicial independence of the court by 
exercising its “legislative” function in defining the elements of crimes rather than leaving it to the 
court’s discretion.221 However, US policy was fundamentally rejected on the issues of an independent 
prosecutor as a check on complementarity, the legality of delegated jurisdiction, and the controlling 
role of the UNSC. Krisch and Robinson applauded the success of finalising a founding statute that 
was “much stronger” than the initial ILC draft, thereby demonstrating the success of NGOs and the 
LMS in altering “perceptions of the international community as to what was achievable and indeed, 
necessary.” Yet they conceded that, in light of this success, “it is particularly regrettable that the 
United States could not support the Rome Statute.”222
 
 The evidence is that American legal 
policymaker’s legal ideals in the ICC had remained unmoved. US policy throughout revealed the 
strong influence of an internationalist ideological stance, expressed across both ends of the liberal-
illiberal dimension. At no point however did evidence point to the recognition by US legal 
policymakers that the legalist principle of separating international powers was an ideal compatible 
with realising the rule of IL. 
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Throughout the Clinton administration there were various claims, even among US officials, of a 
contest “between the ideal of an international criminal court and the reality of the world today.”223 
Borek warned in 1995 that the entire enterprise would be futile if states “approach the court from an 
academically pure perspective, without regard for political realities and what States are willing to 
participate in and fund.”224
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Reviewing the extensive evidence from this period leads to a more persuasive account, however, in 
which these forces intertwined through the role of foreign policy ideology. The administration 
acknowledged from the beginning that joining the ICC as a member state would give it influence to 
ensure its design and operation remained in line with US interests.225
The implication is that legalist insistence on formalised development, sovereign equality and 
independent judicial power were inherently limited as a basis for reaching common agreement with 
the US on ICC design and development. The dominance of Liberal Internationalism combined with 
competing Illiberal Internationalist pressures led to insistence on a flexible US role to develop 
international criminal law, including the preservation of amnesties as a limitation on the reach of 
formal legal obligations. American ICC support was always premised on a form of UNSC control, 
which was framed both as principled commitment to liberal values and as necessary recognition of 
relative global power. Finally US policymakers rejected the compatibility of ICC independence with the 
rule of IL, disagreeing in particular about the legitimacy of delegating core state functions to an 
international court. 
 Yet the evidence is clear that 
the very definition of these interests came to be incorporated in conceptions of IL itself.  
Bassiouni noted the frustration of the LMS who felt they “had bent over backwards to 
accommodate the US.” The perception was that the US was being held back by “completely unrelated 
domestic political reasons.”226
 
 Yet this characterisation begs the question as to how the persons and 
agencies applying domestic interests perceived US legal obligations and formulated competing 
positions. US rejection of the Rome Statute on the basis that it met every key element of the legalist 
rule of IL was indeed destined to rouse claims of hypocrisy and contradiction. Yet a close reading of 
the evidence from this period reveals that US policy hewed closely to competing and internally 
coherent sets of beliefs about the very meaning of the rule of IL. Strident criticism of Clinton’s 
persistent Liberal Internationalist IL policy in following years only corroborates evidence that the 
period 1993-2000 exhibited an underlying legal coherence. 
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BUSH 43 ADMINISTRATION 2000-2004 
 
 
The administration of President George W. Bush was presented with an ICC design largely settled 
during the Clinton years, and on the cusp of exercising far-reaching powers with the Rome Statute 
coming into force mid-2002.1 Bush’s 2000 inauguration signalled a major shift to counteract these 
developments, with a track record among the President’s senior legal policymakers of opposing ICC 
policy throughout the previous eight years. Most prominent among these was John Bolton, who 
served both as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and then as UN 
Ambassador. Bolton had sat alongside Ambassador Scheffer in the US Senate’s post-mortem of the 
Rome Conference to strongly condemn both ICC policy and the broader IL policy of the Clinton 
administration.2
From a legalist perspective the achievement of a largely settled design left the primary focus 
for ICC supporters on consolidating the status of the ICC as an institution of global governance. That 
entailed continued efforts to deepen and broaden acceptance of the ICC’s formal status and authority. 
There was also an objective of ensuring that the increasingly prominent relationship between the ICC 
and UNSC did not institutionalise legal inequality, which had been fought against so hard during the 
1998 negotiation phase. Finally court advocates continued pushing for the institutional independence 
of the court and the supremacy of its judicial power. 
 This foreshadowed the hostile opposition to the ICC that would become the hallmark 
of the first term of the Bush 43 administration. 
In contrast, the US implemented a series of policies designed to impede the realisation of the 
ICC project. First, the administration “unsigned” the Rome Statute to demonstrate it did not intend to 
be bound by the regime in any form. Secondly, through the UNSC, the US sought and obtained 
immunity from ICC prosecution for all US military personnel involved in peacekeeping operations. 
Thirdly, the administration sought and obtained bilateral agreements with its allies that overrode the 
jurisdiction of the court in relation to US nationals. Finally, the President signed domestic legislation 
authorising the recovery of US nationals should they nevertheless end up in the court’s custody. Each 
of these policies contradicted legalist principles and formed the basis for characterisations of US 
policy as contrary to the rule of IL itself. This chapter seeks to refine otherwise persuasive arguments 
that the Bush 43 administration sought a diminished role for IL by demonstrating that, in doing so, US 
legal policymakers adhered to well established illiberal and nationalist legal conceptions. The 
theorised role of foreign policy ideology is thus applied in this chapter to explain the contradiction that 
legal policymakers sought to dismantle the ICC, yet continued to defend US actions by reference to 
upholding international legal obligations. 
                                               
1 On 1 July when the number of states acceding to the statute reached the requisite number of 60: Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (1998), Art.126 
2 See Chapter 5 supra; United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the 
U.S. National Interest?: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations 
United States Senate, 2nd Session 105th Congress (1998) 
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DOMINANT FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY 
President Clinton perceived that Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney “saw the world very differently 
from the way I did,” and in particular would adopt a more unilateral IL policy opposing key 
international institutions.3
The Administration did not take international law seriously and routinely disregarded it whenever it was thought to 
conflict with the national interests of the country. In doing so, the Administration substantially undermined the rule of 
law and the United States’ standing in the international community.
 This is consistent with what Curtis Bradley sceptically described as the 
“standard view” of the Bush era IL policy: 
4
 
 
The evidence is that the administration’s policies distinctly diverged from its predecessor in the 
perceived value of advancing foreign policy interests through law. Although the administration 
maintained engagement with key international institutions, they were primarily valued to the extent 
that “they served immediate, concrete American interests.”5 This is consistent with Kagan’s 2002 
thesis said to resonate with senior policymakers.6 Kagan claimed that, in contrast to European 
conceptions of IL, Americans continued to perceive a “Hobbesian world where international laws and 
rules are unreliable and where true security and the defence and promotion of a liberal order still 
depend on the possession and use of military might.”7
In rejecting the strategic desirability of formalised or transnational development of IL, the 
administration was particularly influenced by a characterisation of such developments as a form of 
“lawfare.”
  
8 The term was popularised in a 2001 essay by Major General Charles Dunlap, as Deputy 
Judge Advocate General, and later defined to mean “the strategy of using – or misusing – law as a 
substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective,” including through 
exploiting US commitment to rule of law values.9 Specifically, Dunlap observed “disturbing evidence 
that the rule of law is being hijacked into just another way of fighting (lawfare), to the detriment of 
humanitarian values as well as the law itself.”10 The concept became popular among the 
administration’s legal policymakers,11
                                               
3 Clinton, William J., My Life (Hutchinson, 2004) at 951 
 with Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld in particular 
4 Bradley, Curtis A., ‘The Bush Administration and International Law: Too Much Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy’ (2009) 4 
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy 57 at 57 
5 Daalder, Ivo H. & Lindsay, James M., America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 
2003) at 44 
6 Goldsmith, Jack L., The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration (W.W. Norton & Co, 2007) at 
126-127. It is cited approvingly by former Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of 
Justice during the Bush 43 administration: Yoo, John C., War by Other Means: An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror 
(Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006) at 47 
7 Kagan, Robert, ‘Power and Weakness’ (2002) June-July Policy Review 3 at 3. See Chapter 2 supra 
8 See Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 
2012) at 417-418. For a sceptical response see: Scheffer, David J., ‘Whose Lawfare is It, Anyway’ (2010) 43 Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 215 
9 Dunlap Jr., Charles J., ‘Lawfare Today: A Perspective’ (2008) 3 Yale Journal of International Affairs 146 at 146; Dunlap Jr., 
Charles J., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Conference on 
Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, Washington D.C., 29 November, 2001) at 5; See also for a useful discussion: Wittes, Benjamin et.al., 
‘About Lawfare: A Brief History of the Term and the Site,’ Lawfare: Hard National Security Choices (2010) 
<https://www.lawfareblog.com/about-lawfare-brief-history-term-and-site> 
10 Dunlap Jr., Charles J., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Conference 
on Humanitarian Challenges in Military Intervention, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, Washington D.C., 29 November, 2001) at 6 
11 Many of whom now contribute to a blog with the same title: Wittes, Benjamin et.al., Lawfare: Hard National Security Choices 
(2010) <www.lawfareblog.com>. For an example of the term’s use see Bolton, John R., ‘Israel’s Increasing Vulnerability,’ 
Washington Times (3 May, 2011 ) <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/3/israels-increasing-vulnerability/>; See 
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defining the concept as “a new kind of asymmetric war” that “uses international and domestic legal 
claims, regardless of their factual basis, to win public support to harass American officials—military 
and civilian—and to score ideological victories.”12 Like Dunlap, Rumsfeld identified the source of 
power in the strategy as “America’s laudable reverence for the law” which rendered the nation 
especially vulnerable to accusations of illegality.13
The evidence of Bush’s personal beliefs about the rule of IL suggests the thin conception 
entailed in Illiberal Nationalism.
 The adoption of the lawfare moniker thereby 
encapsulated the idea that legalist conceptions of the rule of law had the capacity to contradict the 
very principles that underpinned true fidelity to the rule of IL. 
14 Bush demonstrated this ideology in his more general foreign policy, 
through a more forceful stance against American enemies, and in his preference for military over 
diplomatic pressure to achieve US interests.15 Dueck identifies that, following the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks, “liberal humanitarian concerns would henceforth take a back seat to considerations 
of US self-interest.”16 In legal terms, Bush’s overriding belief was that the US should aim to 
consolidate hegemonic power “into a more durable system,” but that unlike his predecessors, this 
would not be achieved by strengthening complementary institutions of IL.17
One recurrent characterisation of the administration is that its general foreign policy was 
structured by a hawkish strand of Liberal Internationalism – on the basis that it remained globally 
committed to spreading American democratic values.
 
18 An example of the type of statement 
supporting this conclusion is Secretary of State Colin Powell identifying a “guiding principle” of Bush’s 
foreign policy as being that “there is no country on earth that is not touched by America, for we have 
become the motive force for freedom and democracy in the world.”19 Subsequent military action 
seeking democratisation in Afghanistan and Iraq does indeed appear to exemplify a form of 
“Wilsonianism with boots.”20 The characterisation does not hold up for the Bush 43 IL policy however, 
since the diplomatic history of Liberal Internationalist thought is inextricably intertwined with 
multilateralism and a robust role for IL.21
                                                                                                                                                  
Goldsmith, Jack L., The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration (W.W. Norton & Co, 2007) at 53-
64 
 There is no evidence that the Bush administration ever 
adopted a strategy to strengthen democracy as a constitutive element of the rule of IL, or a belief that 
12 Rumsfeld, Donald, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (Penguin, 2011) at 629 
13 Ibid at 629 
14 See Rice, Condoleezza, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years in Washington (Random House LLC, 2011) at 158-159; 
Mead, Walter R., ‘The Tea Party and American Foreign Policy - What Populism Means for Globalism’ (2011) 90 Foreign Affairs 
28 
15 See Bush, George W. & Herskowitz, Michael, A Charge to Keep (Morrow, 1999) at 239; Foley, Michael, ‘President Bush, The 
War on Terror, and the Populist Tradition’ (2007) 44 International Politics 666 at 683 
16 Dueck, Colin, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton University Press, 
2006) at 150 
17 See Mead, Walter R., Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (Routledge, 2002) at 307 
18 See Smith, Tony, ‘Wilsonianism After Iraq’ in G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie Slaughter & Tony Smith (ed), 
The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century (Princeton University Press, 2009); Dueck, 
Colin, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton University Press, 2006) at 
148; Hoff, Joan, A Faustian Foreign Policy/ From Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush: Dreams of Perfectibility (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) at 9-12 
19 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Colin L. 
Powell to be Secretary of State, 1st Session 107th Congress (2001) at 17 
20 Hassner, Pierre & Nicole Gnesotto, ‘The United States: The Empire of Force or the Force of Empire’ (2002) 54 Chaillot 
Papers 5 at 43 
21 Slaughter, Anne-Marie, ‘Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century’ in G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, Anne-Marie 
Slaughter & Tony Smith (ed), The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century (Princeton 
University Press, 2009); Knock, Thomas J., ‘“Playing for a Hundred Years Hence”‘ in G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter & Tony Smith (ed), The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century 
(Princeton University Press, 2009) 
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IL would in turn strengthen democratic norms. Without these elements the Bush policy is 
distinguished from core elements of Liberal Internationalist IL policy: “Clinton, not Bush, therefore was 
the true Wilsonian of our time.”22
More broadly, the administration rejected the internationalist consensus of the Bush 41-
Clinton years in which global legal institutions had been actively developed for a combination of liberal 
and illiberal purposes.
 
23 Rather the Bush 43 administration explicitly rejected the desirability of 
international legal frameworks as a tool for advancing national security interests. The jurisdictional 
location of IL policy shifted to a nationalist stance in the sense used here of emphasising the 
sufficiency of municipal legal power for upholding American interests. At the same time this was done 
for illiberal purposes of enhancing national security interests, and to preserve non-universal cultural 
values threatened by purported cosmopolitan values of IL. Thus, although the administration 
repeatedly expressed its faith in the strategic advantages of global democratisation, this did not 
structure key legal policymaker’s conceptions of IL. Even Mead’s characterisation of an attempted 
Illiberal Nationalist/Liberal Internationalist ideological fusion acknowledges that the former shaped 
policy in decisions such as the 2003 Iraq War, and it was only after the fact that justifications were 
made in terms of the latter.24
The most well known demonstration of the administration’s IL policy was in the 2002 National 
Security Strategy of the US (“NSS 2002”) which referred to IL only twice.
 
25 The first reference was to 
“rogue states” who “display no regard for international law,” therefore justifying the legal principle of 
relative sovereignty that facilitated much of the administration’s military policy in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.26 The second reference to IL was in the context of developing the so-called “Bush Doctrine.”27 
This was expressed by Bush in a 2002 WestPoint speech outlining a new US strategic policy to 
“confront the worst threats before they emerge.”28 In the NSS 2002 the doctrine was elaborated as a 
policy for meeting the threat of weapons of mass destruction, requiring that the US “adapt the concept 
of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”29 By removing any of the 
conventional constraints on self defence requiring “imminence,”30
At the same time, alternative conceptions of IL competed for influence throughout the first 
Bush 43 term. Mead characterises Colin Powell as the leading proponent of Liberal Nationalist beliefs 
 the administration sought to 
develop law permissively, as an enabling framework rather than one capable of constraining US 
policy.  
                                               
22 Lieven, Anatol, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 1st paperback ed, 
2005) at 12. Alternatively Hoff draws a distinction between “good” and “bad” Wilsonianism, with the Bush 43 administration 
falling into the latter category: Hoff, Joan, A Faustian Foreign Policy/ From Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush: Dreams of 
Perfectibility (Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 9-12 
23 See Mead, Walter R., Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (Routledge, 2002) at 176 
24 Mead, Walter R., ‘The Carter Syndrome,’ Foreign Policy (4 January, 2010) 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/the_carter_syndrome> 
25 See Rojas, Federico, ‘Obama’s Pledge to International Law: A Look at the First Sixteen Months in Office’ (2009) 2 
Amsterdam LF 23 at 24 
26 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, The White House (2002) at 14 
27 Ibid; Taubman, Jarrett, ‘Towards a Theory of Democratic Compliance: Security Council Legitimacy and Effectiveness after 
Iraq’ (2004) 37 International Law and Politics 161 at 162. See generally Meiertöns, Heiko, The Doctrines of US Security Policy: 
An Evaluation under International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 179-224 
28 Bush, George W., Graduation Speech at West Point (1 June, 2002) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>; The White House, The National Security Strategy of 
the United States of America 2002, The White House (2002) at ii 
29 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, The White House (2002) at 15 
30 See Crawford, James, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 2012) at 750-752 
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within the administration.31 This constituted a rejection of the Clinton administration’s Liberal 
Internationalist “overreaching” in favour of conserving the status quo of US power and global 
alliances.32 Contrarily, Dueck classifies Powell’s beliefs as more in line with Illiberal Internationalism – 
accepting the desirability of multilateralism but according to a pragmatic worldview consistent with that 
of Bush 41.33 The preferable approach is to place Powell’s beliefs about IL somewhere between these 
characterisations. Powell accepted the strategic desirability of working through international 
institutions to advance US national security, including convincing the cabinet in 2002 of the diplomatic 
advantages of disarming Saddam Hussein through UN processes rather than proceeding immediately 
to overthrow him militarily.34 At the same time he expressed wariness that closer engagement with IL 
could erode liberal values at home, including rights guaranteed by the American constitution.35
Clinton administration legal scholars have cultivated the notion at home and abroad that murky ‘‘obligations’’ divined 
from so-called customary international ‘law’ and the unratified Vienna Convention on treaties effectively supersede 
Article II of our Constitution... Will your State Department continue to perpetuate this unconstitutional myth?
 That 
combination of beliefs provided a basis for Powell to support the principle of the rule of IL, but in 
particularistic terms. Powell explicitly distinguished his cautious approach from Helms’ opposition to 
even basic principles of international legal doctrine, including the status of customary international law 
as law. In the course of Powell’s confirmation hearings Helms posed the question:  
36
 
 
In response Powell fully accepted that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties expressed the 
US obligation to “refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty.”37 For 
Powell this “logical” position had been accepted as declaratory of customary IL by every 
administration from President Johnson onward and was therefore binding on the US.38
Powell’s beliefs were reflected in positions adopted by his State Department Legal Adviser 
William Taft IV, who has cited his attraction to Powell’s “commitment to the rule of law.”
 
39 Taft 
explicitly identified American interests in a strategy “to promote and strengthen international law and 
international institutions.” Motives for this included that this represented “a morally attractive position 
and that the rule of law in international as well as national affairs is a desirable thing... A stable world 
where international obligations are undertaken and relied upon is in the interest of the United States 
as a matter of its own security and prosperity.”40
                                               
31 In the form of his equivalent “Jeffersonian” tradition 
 At the same time Taft has emphasised that IL 
remained primarily a consent based order so that “a state is not subject to international law unless it 
32 Mead, Walter R., Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (Routledge, 2002) at 307-308; 
Daalder, Ivo H. & Lindsay, James M., America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 
2003) at 45-46 
33 In the form of his equivalent “Realist” tradition: Dueck, Colin, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American 
Grand Strategy (Princeton University Press, 2006) at 150 & 152. See Chapter 5 supra  
34 Woodward, Bob, Bush at War (Simon & Schuster, 2003) at 332-336; Mann, James, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of 
Bush’s War Cabinet (Viking, 2004) at 351 
35 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Colin L. 
Powell to be Secretary of State, 1st Session 107th Congress (2001) at 88. See infra 
36 Ibid at 104 
37 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art. 18 
38 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Colin L. 
Powell to be Secretary of State, 1st Session 107th Congress (2001) at 104 
39 Scharf, Michael P. & Paul R. Williams, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of International Law and the State 
Department Legal Adviser (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 32 
40 Taft IV, William H., Interview with Author (22 November, 2011) 
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agrees to be, and even then it can withdraw its consent as a rule and go back to other remedies for 
dealing with whatever problems it confronts.”41
 The figure representing the most dominant approach to US ICC policy during the first term 
however, was then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, 
who had an influence over the administration beyond his designated office.
 
42 Taft has explained his 
own more limited role in ICC policy as the consequence of Bolton’s decisive opposition, such that 
“there was little point in discussing the subject in the abstract.”43 Then National Security Adviser 
Condoleezza Rice described a deep ideological “schism” in the State Department, with Powell 
representing a more conciliatory approach to international engagement, and Bolton representing the 
“neocons” and a hawkish uncompromising global stance.44 In academic writings predating his 
appointment, Bolton attacked not only the ICC but the “‘agenda’ of constraining the US through 
international law.”45 Reviewing the previous administration specifically, Bolton charged that Clinton 
“forgot that the UN was an instrument to be used to advance America’s foreign policy interests, not to 
engage in international social work and ivory-tower chattering.”46 Bolton often adopted legal outcomes 
consistent with Illiberal Internationalism, but his views are most consistent with the same Illiberal 
Nationalist beliefs as Helms. Helms himself described Bolton as “the kind of man with whom I would 
want to stand at Armageddon, or what the Bible describes as the final battle between good and 
evil.”47
 
 Significantly Bolton’s legal conception ultimately prevailed in key administration decisions 
central to establishing the rule of IL. 
 
DEVELOPING NON-ARBITRARY GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
Following the 1998 Rome Conference, states and NGOs who had advocated a legalist ICC design 
continued to emphasise the formalised development of global governance as necessary to 
establishing the rule of IL. US policy, however, appeared to reverse entirely from the Clinton years by 
explicitly opposing the further development of the ICC and any obligations created by its founding 
statute. At his Senate confirmation Colin Powell bluntly stated that, as far as Bush’s own views on the 
ICC went: “The new administration will be opposed.”48 Most notoriously Bolton “unsigned” the Rome 
Statute in 2002, describing it as “the happiest moment of my government service.”49
                                               
41 Ibid. For a report on US ICC policy that Taft sees as closely aligning with his own views see: Taft IV, William H. & Patricia M. 
Wald, U.S. Policy Toward the International Criminal Court: Furthering Positive Engagement (The American Society of 
International Law, 2009) 
 No legal 
policymakers within the Bush administration demonstrated any commitment to the Liberal 
42 Cerone, John P., ‘Dynamic Equilibrium: The Evolution of US Attitudes Toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals’ 
(2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 277 at 293 
43 Taft IV, William H., Interview with Author (22 November, 2011) 
44 Rice, Condoleezza, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years in Washington (Random House LLC, 2011) at 158. Bolton plays 
down this distinction but agrees that he and Powell held different “philosophies”: Bolton, John R., Surrender Is Not an Option: 
Defending America at the United Nations (Simon & Schuster, 2007) at 58 & 60 
45 Bolton, John R., ‘Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?’ (2000) 10 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 1 at 
48 
46 Bolton, John R., ‘The Creation Fall Rise and Fall of the United Nations’ in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed), Delusions of Grandeur: 
The United Nations and Global Intervention (Cato Institute, 1997) at 51 
47 Cited in Blumenthal, Sidney, How Bush Rules: Chronicles of a Radical Regime (Princeton University Press, 2006) at 151 
48 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Colin L. 
Powell to be Secretary of State, 1st Session 107th Congress (2001) at 89 
49 Bolton, John R., Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations (Simon & Schuster, 2007) at 95 
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Internationalist belief that American interests were advanced through strengthening transnational 
international criminal law processes. With this being the closest of the American conceptions to 
legalism there was the perception that the rule of law itself had been rejected. Yet, through this 
period, American legal policymakers consistently emphasised US compliance with international legal 
obligations, thereby creating grounds for accusations of hypocrisy. The issue considered here is, 
accordingly, whether US legal policymakers recognised the rule of IL in the legalist terms articulated 
by global counterparts, or alternatively whether legal conceptions were always those drawn from 
American foreign policy ideology. 
 
Legalist Policy 
The policy of formalising a global institution governing international criminal law was expressed in a 
2003 EU common position and subsequent 2005 cooperation treaty with the ICC, each confirming the 
goal of “consolidation of the rule of law and respect for human rights.”50 To this end, the EU reaffirmed 
that “principles of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, as well as those governing its 
functioning, are fully in line with the principles and objectives of the Union.”51 Among the principles for 
realising the rule of law were that “universal accession to the Rome Statute is essential for the full 
effectiveness of the International Criminal Court.”52 Article 2(1) of the common position set out the 
obligation on EU states “to further this process by raising the issue of the widest possible ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession to the Statute and the implementation of the Statute in 
negotiations or political dialogues with third States, groups of States or relevant regional 
organisations, whenever appropriate.”53 This conception of the rule of IL focussed on formalised and 
universal obligations provides the context for understanding EU expression of “disappointment and 
regret” when the US publically “unsigned” the Rome Statute in May 2002.54 The action was 
characterised as having “undesirable consequences on multilateral treaty-making and generally on 
the rule of law in international relations.”55 In particular, the action was perceived as contradictory for 
the “potentially negative effect” of US policy on a cause “which the United States shows itself strongly 
committed.”56
 
 These statements revealed an understanding of the rule IL as requiring the progressive 
extension of global governance to eliminate the right of states to take discretionary actions in lieu of 
formalised rules and authority. 
                                               
50 EU Commission, ‘Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP of 16 June 2003 on the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 5 
Official Journal of the European Union 67 at 67; Council of the European Union, Agreement between the International Criminal 
Court and the European Union on Cooperation and Assistance (6 December, 2005), at preamble. See also Council of the 
European Union, Action Plan to Follow-Up on the Common Position on the International Criminal Court (February, 2004) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC48EN.pdf> 
51 EU Commission, ‘Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP of 16 June 2003 on the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 5 
Official Journal of the European Union 67 at 67; Council of the European Union, Agreement between the International Criminal 
Court and the European Union on Cooperation and Assistance (6 December, 2005), at preamble 
52 EU Commission, ‘Council Common Position 2003/444/CFSP of 16 June 2003 on the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 5 
Official Journal of the European Union 67 at 67 
53 Ibid at 68 
54 EU, Statement of the European Union on the Position of the United States towards the International Criminal Court, P 64/02 
Brussels 8864/02 (Presse 141) (14 May, 2002) at 1 
55 Ibid at 2 
56 Ibid at 4 
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Beliefs of American Legal Policymakers 
Rejection of Internationalism 
A report prepared for the US Congress in this period identified the “main issue” to be determined as 
“the level of cooperation to allow between the United States and the ICC.”57 The options presented 
were: “to withhold all cooperation from the ICC and its member nations in order to prevent the ICC 
from becoming effective, to continue contributing to the development of the ICC in order to improve it, 
or to adopt a pragmatic approach based solely on U.S. interests.”58
 The Illiberal Nationalist preference of the Bush 43 administration highlighted a growing 
distinction with the Illiberal Internationalism that had characterised the Bush 41 ICC policy.
 These effectively encompassed 
the competing policies drawn from foreign policy ideology: nationalist opposition to the court, a 
continuation of Liberal Internationalist support without acceding to the Rome Statute, and pragmatic 
Illiberal Internationalist development of the ICC relationship. Legalist policies, however, remained 
outside the range of possibilities. 
59 In 
Michael Scharf’s Recommendation for the Bush Administration the primary architect of the former 
policy posed a choice between being an “influential insider or hostile outsider.”60 For Scharf, the 
hostility of figures such as Senator Helms epitomised the “hostile outsider” strategy which would 
“transform American exceptionalism into unilateralism and/or isolationism” through disengaging US 
contribution to international institutions and processes. Moreover, it would “erode the moral 
legitimacy” of the US that had facilitated concrete military and economic interests.61 This was a 
criticism of Illiberal Nationalism and its rejection of any strategy for advancing US interests though 
global legal integration. Because the ICC was already a confirmed reality of the international system, 
Scharf concluded that the US could only really sustain its policy by hostility against the international 
order itself. That possibility sharply divided internationalist and nationalist forms of illiberalism, with 
Scharf summarising his Illiberal Internationalist intervention as a “detached” analysis “based on 
realpolitik considerations.”62
The rejection of Liberal Internationalism was already evident in the weeks leading up to 
Clinton’s decision to sign the Rome Statute when Helms objected that “the President has effectively 
given his approval to this unprecedented assault on American sovereignty.”
 This made clear that apparently similar policy outcomes across 
consecutive periods masked ideological divisions between internationalist and nationalist ICC 
scepticism. 
63
                                               
57 Elsea, Jennifer, U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court (Congressional Research Service, 9 July, 2002) at 3 
 This view of American 
interests saw global governance as an existential threat that would ultimately erode the sovereignty 
underwriting national security and the preservation of American cultural values. During his 1998 
appearance alongside David Scheffer before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, John 
Bolton expressed his view that IL was mere “sentimentality,” and the ICC motivated by an “unstated 
agenda of creating ever more comprehensive international structures to bind nation states in general 
58 Ibid at 3 
59 See Chapter 5 supra 
60 Scharf, Michael P., ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court: A Recommendation for the Bush Administration’ 
(2000) 7 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 385 at 386 
61 Ibid at 386-387 
62 Ibid at 388 
63 Helms, Jesse, ‘Helms Opposes Clinton’s Approval of the ICC Treaty ‘ Washington File (1 February, 2001) 
<http://wfile.ait.org.tw/wf-archive/2001/010102/epf206.htm> 
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and one nation state in particular.”64 Rather than interpreting IL in terms of universal values as 
recognised by liberalism, Bolton adopted the prism of particularistic American values, dismissing 
overwhelming support of European allies by saying “that is a major reason why they are Europeans 
and we are not.”65 The attitude was shared by Bolton’s former professor and colleague Robert Bork66 
for whom the ICC illustrated the “futility and danger of pretending that there is law” when there 
remained “pervasive anti-Americanism in much of the world.” Allowing the ICC to stand would have 
costs for American soldiers and officials through “propaganda defeats that may carry weight in both 
international and domestic politics.”67
Once appointed as Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Bolton 
redoubled his opposition, describing the ICC as “an organization that runs contrary to fundamental 
American precepts and basic Constitutional principles of popular sovereignty, checks and balances, 
and national independence.”
 These statements signalled the trend away from the 
internationalist worldview prevailing since the end of the Cold-War toward beliefs that domestic laws 
and institutions were sufficient to advance American foreign policy interests. 
68 Consistent with the administration’s “lawfare” concerns, Bolton 
identified the threat in a strategy of external forces using IL to constrain US power. The EU was 
singled out to make the case that increasing secularism in the continent had contributed to a new 
“theology” centred on “the pursuit of global governance, and in particular the International Criminal 
Court.” More particularly, this objective was “repeatedly and cynically designed to put the United 
States in an impossible position, with only unpleasant and inconsistent alternatives, in the hope and 
expectation that we would acquiesce in progress for the ICC in order not to frustrate other important 
American objectives.”69 Where the US was compelled to formulate policy responses to the subject 
matter of international criminal law, Bolton expressed a preference for transferring cases to domestic 
courts “grounded in sovereign consent.”70 This went beyond mere criticism of the ICC’s particular 
design and instead sought to severely constrict global governance in addressing international crimes. 
Bork again concurred, attributing “great credit” to Bush for withdrawing from the treaty regime.71 He 
substantiated his claim that the court was intertwined with anti-American sentiment by interpreting the 
“cheers and rhythmic stomping” at the conclusion of the Rome conference as directed at the US’ 
defeat in the final vote.72
 
 
Compatibility of US Policy with the Rule of International Law 
Rejection of the ICC as a constraint on US foreign policy did not however constitute a denial of the 
reality of IL as an institutional structure with which the US must engage. Throughout his campaign 
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against the ICC, Bolton emphasised that US policy remained in accordance with existing legal 
obligations.73 In particular Bolton noted the problem that, although the Bush campaign had removed 
any question of US support, the continued presence of its signature left some room for ambiguity.74 
For this reason Bolton was “determined to establish the precedent, and to remove any vestigial 
argument that America’s signature had any continuing effect.”75 As Daalder and Lindsay argue, the 
Bush administration rejected the idea popular in the Clinton years that “committing good words to 
paper would create international norms capable of shaping state behaviour.”76 In Liberal 
Internationalist terms, signing and creating an obligation “not to defeat the object and purpose of a 
treaty” progressed transnational development of IL, even in the absence of ratification.77 Rather the 
Bush position shifted to the idea that “the benefits of flexibility far outweigh the diplomatic costs of 
declining to participate in international agreements that are popular with friends and allies.”78
The ultimate “unsigning” of the Rome Statute was achieved against the wishes of the State 
Department, but with the urging of the Secretary of Defence
 More 
particularly this aligned with the Illiberal Nationalist belief that IL should be developed as a permissive 
framework, and that the US should avoid signing any treaties suggesting otherwise. 
79 and support of the President.80 At his 
confirmation hearings Powell noted that the effect of Ambassador Scheffer’s signature was that “in 
legal terms you sort of bind yourself not to defeat the purpose and objectives of the treaty. But we 
have no plans to ask for ratification of this treaty.”81 Helms responded not by denying the obligation, 
but rather by quipping: “We are going to send somebody down there to strike the signature of that 
ambassador.”82 A May 2002 letter to the UN Secretary General from Bolton relevantly communicated 
that the US had no intention to become a party to the treaty and therefore had “no legal obligations 
arising from its signature.”83 This act renounced the legal obligation that arose with Clinton’s 2000 
signature that the US not engage in actions inconsistent with the Rome Statute “until it shall have 
made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.”84 In following this procedure Bolton 
emphasised that the US had complied with “legitimate mechanisms provided for in the Rome Statute 
itself.”85
On the day of the unsigning Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman set 
out the beliefs structuring the Bush ICC policy, with a commitment to “justice and the rule of law” 
 
                                               
73 See Noyes, John E., ‘American Hegemony, U.S. Political Leaders, and General International Law’ (2004) 19 Connecticut 
Journal of International Law 293 at 299 
74 Bolton, John R., Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations (Simon & Schuster, 2007) at 95 
75 Ibid at 95 
76 Daalder, Ivo H. & Lindsay, James M., America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 
2003) at 45 
77 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art. 18: “Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty 
prior to its entry into force” 
78 Daalder, Ivo H. & Lindsay, James M., America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 
2003) at 45 
79 Rumsfeld, Donald, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (Penguin, 2011) at 632 
80 Bolton, John R., Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations (Simon & Schuster, 2007) at 95 
81 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Colin L. 
Powell to be Secretary of State, 1st Session 107th Congress (2001) at 61 
82 Ibid at 61 
83 Bolton, John R., ‘International Criminal Court: Letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,’ U.S. Department of State: Archive 
(6 May, 2002) <http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm> 
84 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art. 18 
85 Bolton, John R., Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute: American Justice and the International Criminal Court (3 
November, 2003) <http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/25818.htm>. This correctness of this legal conclusion has generally been 
supported: See Swaine, Edward T., ‘Unsigning’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 2061 
Bush 43 Administration 2000-2004 
 
161 
 
being foremost. Also listed, however, were beliefs that “states, not international institutions” upheld 
this principle, with the ICC itself lacking the “checks and balances” present in US domestic law. 86 The 
crux of Grossman’s argument was that the US was compelled to unsign the statute precisely to 
uphold its “leadership role in the promotion of international justice and the rule of law.” Grossman’s 
reasoning reflected elements of Liberal Nationalist beliefs – about the sufficiency of municipal law for 
upholding democratic rights, and the corrosive effect of IL on these rights. No US legal policymaker 
advocated a pure form of “isolationism,” which would entail structuring IL to achieve a complete 
separation between the US and global affairs. Liberal Internationalism does however reflect elements 
of isolationist sentiments in seeking to define US legal interests in terms of the self-contained 
character of states. Grossman defined US commitment to “promotion of the rule of law” as the 
privileging of independent states that accept “the challenges and responsibilities associated with 
enforcing the rule of law.” Limiting global governance in this way was seen to provide a more effective 
barrier to impunity than the ICC, and therefore legal responsibilities “should not be taken away from 
states.” Grossman’s argument shared much with a Liberal Internationalist policy in focussing on “self-
governing democracies” as the foundation of the rule of law, but remained distinct through an 
emphasis on the defensive development of IL rather than its role in strengthening transnational 
connections.87
Former Bush 43 State Department counsellor on international law, Curtis Bradley, defended 
the compatibility of the Bush policy with the rule of IL by arguing that at no point did the 
administration’s actions amount to “repudiations of international law.”
 
88 In this respect he concurred 
that “unsigning” the Rome Statute was entirely consistent with Article 18 of the Vienna Convention to 
make “its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.”89 The central point for Bradley was that 
the administration “did not contravene or disregard international law; rather it carefully followed 
international law governing ‘unsigning.’”90 However, this argument only refutes claims that US policy 
eroded the rule of IL if one understands Bradley’s own legal conception. His arguments were 
consistent with Illiberal Internationalism and the commitment to pragmatically developing IL by clearly 
identifying limitations to the reach of global governance. In this Bradley noted that the worldview of US 
critics “assumes that having more, and more expansive, international rules is always better for the 
world.”91
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 Bradley’s position both preserved hegemonic privileges secured by remaining outside of 
legal constraints, and ultimately turned on consent as the lynchpin of international legal power. For 
the actual legalist critics cited by Bradley, these elements each fall short of demonstrating affinity for 
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Bradley’s argument is less persuasive in his conclusion that the administration “was not 
antagonistic to international criminal law, but simply had particular concerns about the structure of the 
International Criminal Court, concerns that also had been expressed by the Clinton Administration.”92
 
 
This conclusion flows from an analysis at the level of IL policy outcomes – according to which there 
are broad similarities between successive administrations. But disaggregating the apparent beliefs of 
legal policymakers reveals a distinction between the two administrations comprised of a shift from 
competition between Liberal and Illiberal Internationalist preferences in the previous era, to the 
primary contest between Illiberal Nationalism and Internationalism in the latter. Bradley readily 
conceded that Bolton was “openly hostile” toward the UN, but without considering the degree to which 
that hostility was constitutive of the content of IL. Key positions influencing the Bush administration 
were antagonistic toward a formalised status for the ICC, and in a way quite distinct from the previous 
era. Unsurprisingly broad continuities can be identified in policy outcome, but the decision-making 
process was marked by a meaningful ideological shift. 
Conclusion 
The meaning of developing non-arbitrary forms of global governance remained contested throughout 
this period between legalism and competing American foreign policy ideologies. Legalist policy 
remained committed to the formalised development of the ICC through progressive institutionalisation 
of the court’s judicial supremacy, and universal acceptance of its authority. In contrast, US policy 
sought to curtail the aspirations of the court so far as they placed what were considered arbitrary 
constraints on US autonomy. Sands observed critically that the general approach of the 
administration was inconsistent with the rule of law for insisting that IL “be enforceable only 
selectively, and not across the board.”93
 
 Such selective development did indeed reflect the view of 
key US legal policymakers, but this does not support the further conclusion that the rule of IL was 
being consciously rejected. US policymakers maintained the methods and framework of IL while 
actively opposing the displacement of municipal governance. In this approach American policy 
maintained fidelity to long established nationalist conceptions of legal obligation that rejected the 
legitimacy of an expansive formalised rule of IL. Rather US legal policymakers operated according to 
a structure of beliefs in which the permissive development of ICC obligations was necessary to 
uphold, not merely US interests, but legal principle. 
 
DEFINING EQUALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Fundamental elements of the relationship between states parties and the ICC were largely settled in 
the Rome Statute itself, finalised prior to the Bush administration entering office. What did capture the 
attention of parties was the increasingly prominent, but largely undefined, relationship between the 
ICC and UNSC, with debate turning to the legal privileges of the P-5. From the outset, the legalist 
position insisted on equality before the law in the form of equal rights and duties of all signatories to 
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the Rome Statute. In particular limits were established on the power of the P-5 to approve ICC 
investigations and prosecutions. The US resisted these arguments from the time of the Clinton 
administration onward, consistently pushing for varying degrees of UNSC control over the court. 
During the Bush 43 administration this translated into demands that all US military personnel involved 
in peacekeeping operations be granted formal immunity from prosecution. That was achieved through 
the passing of Resolution 1422 of 2002, renewed as Resolution 1487 in 2003.94
 
 As such, the issue 
arises of whether and how US legal policymakers squared legal privileges with equality as an element 
of the rule of IL. 
Legalist Policy 
For legalist advocates, the guiding principle remained that of upholding equality in the rights and 
duties of all sovereign states before the court. On the eve of resolution 1422 being passed, EU 
representative Javier Solana argued that, although the US was “quite right to point to its special global 
responsibilities,” equally “European nations also have peacekeeping responsibilities, but see no threat 
to these from the Court.” Solana thus made an appeal to the US to honour the fact that it had 
“probably done more than any other country to strengthen the rule of international law in the post-war 
era... So I hope that the United States will think again and let the Court prove its worth.”95
Only those governments who have a disregard for the international rule of law coupled with the arrogance of power, 
and more particularly for international humanitarian law, could have led these governments to impose these two 
resolutions.
 Bassiouni 
described the eventual capitulation to US demands for absolute immunity as “shocking”: 
96
 
 
Similarly, Sands described preclusion of ICC jurisdiction through the UNSC as a question of: “When 
can brute political power override the rule of law and legal processes?”97
 
 Bassiouni and Sands’ 
characterisation of US policy disregarding the rule of IL turned in large measure on its inconsistency 
with the principle of sovereign equality. Although the resolutions did not single out named states, the 
intent and effect was clearly to establish unequal legal rights for the US. The critiques makes clear 
that the primary charge against the US was of pitting political interest against legal principle, with the 
triumph of the former. 
Beliefs of American Legal Policymakers 
Hegemonic Privileges through UNSC Control 
Murphy argued that securing exemption from ICC prosecution for US peacekeeping personnel 
revealed the American belief “that it is the exceptional, indeed ‘indispensable,’ nation entitled to the 
benefit of special rules.”98
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evidence from this period points to a combination of beliefs informing IL policy drawn from Illiberal 
Internationalism and variants of nationalism. Of these the only meaningful support for the court came 
from Illiberal Internationalist policymakers, with the exemplar being Jack Goldsmith as legal adviser in 
the Department of Defence and later head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of 
Justice. His contemporaneous and subsequent writings demonstrate the process by which the 
administration sought to carve out forms of hegemonic privilege, contrary to the principle of sovereign 
equality, and yet in furtherance of a particularistic conception of the rule of IL. 
 Goldsmith recognised that at the heart of ICC disagreement was a conflict between sovereign 
equality as the core of an ICC consistent with the rule of IL, and a countervailing belief that 
hegemonic privilege was the necessary guarantor of international justice. Here he adopted Kagan’s 
2002 argument that transatlantic divisions in ICC policy reflected “a broader pattern of middle power 
(and especially European) efforts to use international law to limit the power of militarily superior 
nations.”99 Although this statement was made critically, it would likely be agreed to by the states in 
question, who did indeed view formal equality as a proper legal constraint on military might. Goldsmith 
acknowledged that states taking a principled stand was one plausible explanation for opposition to US 
policy, with legalist “commitment to the equality of all nations before international criminal law” viewed 
by other states as a necessary element of the “rule of law.”100
To this claim he responded that a court designed in such terms was “unrealistic,” above all 
else, because its design as of 2002 “is, and will remain, unacceptable to the United States.”
 
101
[T]he ICC depends on U.S. political, military, and economic support for its success. An ICC without U.S. support—
and indeed, with probable U.S. opposition—will not only fail to live up to its expectations. It may well do actual harm 
by discouraging the United States from engaging in various human rights-protecting activities. And this, in turn, may 
increase rather than decrease the impunity of those who violate human rights.
 By way 
of explanation: 
102
 
 
This was an argument for granting hegemonic privileges as a necessary element for realising the rule 
of IL. Consistent with Kagan’s argument, Goldsmith noted that the outcome of the Rome Conference 
was “dominated by weak and middle powers” as well as NGOs.103 That pointed observation fitted 
within a broader conception of IL as requiring a foundation not in high-minded aspirations, but in 
effective political power. As an illustration he observed that the appearance of former Serbian and 
Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević before the ICTY was not achieved through the 
“gravitational pull” of properly constituted judicial power, but rather “U.S. military, diplomatic, and 
financial might.”104 This reads as a rebuttal to Liberal Internationalist arguments that transnational 
processes create a sense of legal obligation capable of imbuing a “compliance pull” in IL, independent 
from enforcement mechanisms.105
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potential “chilling effect” on America’s “unique international policing responsibilities” to uphold human 
rights.106 In circumstances where the US was uniquely exposed while fulfilling this global role, the 
court “appears to expose the only nation practically able to intervene to protect human rights to the 
greatest potential liability for human rights violations.”107
The argument was thus one for institutionalising American hegemonic privilege as a core 
element of the rule of IL. The unstated belief that squared this account was that equality under IL 
meant according rights equal to the unequal duties performed by each state in upholding the integrity 
of the system. Goldsmith certainly did not characterise his position in this way, and in fact conceded 
that he was arguing for a “benign hypocrisy that appears to reconcile rule-of-law values with the 
enforcement asymmetries of international politics.”
 Contrastingly, states which breached 
international criminal law, but were not globally engaged, would largely avoid the reach of the court. 
108
The influence of exceptionalist beliefs on US legal policymakers flowed into the substantive 
content of resolutions 1422 and 1487. The resolutions noted the differential legal position of states 
depending on whether or not they were parties to the Rome Statute – which in itself granted no 
privileged status to non-parties. However, in this context, the resolutions then emphasised the guiding 
principle that “it is in the interests of international peace and security to facilitate Member States’ 
ability to contribute to operations established or authorized by the United Nations Security Council.”
 In other words, he stated his position in terms of 
the null hypothesis of this thesis: that the rule of IL had a unified meaning, but that US policy must 
necessarily erode the ideal according to political interests. The power of ideology as defined here 
however is in structuring the beliefs of adherents without any necessary consciousness of a culturally 
shared worldview. The clear structure of Goldsmith’s beliefs is congruent with ideas about IL long 
established by Illiberal Internationalist ideology. The clear implication of Goldsmith’s argument is that 
the idealism of a court constructed upon the principle of sovereign equality was not problematic 
merely because it diminished American political influence: it diminished the rule of IL itself. 
109 
This understanding set up the basis for tailoring special immunity rights to facilitate continued US 
international engagement. This outcome was consistent more generally with a policy orientated view 
of IL in which US responsibilities upholding effective international peace and security were recognised 
within law – to the exclusion of formal sovereign equality. The influence of these legal beliefs was 
further evident in the way the resolutions ordered international legal powers in relation to the ICC. The 
resolutions made a clear distinction between the obligations of states parties who “have chosen to 
accept” ICC jurisdiction and those who have not. The latter were explicitly excluded from the reach of 
the Rome Statute, but nevertheless undertook to “continue to fulfil their responsibilities in their 
national jurisdictions in relation to international crimes.”110
The Illiberal Internationalist policy advocated by Goldsmith and others frequently melded with 
more nationalist legal conceptions in this period, but did remain distinct from them through a focus on 
maintaining America’s global legal presence. From an Illiberal Nationalist perspective states should 
 The influence of Illiberal Internationalism 
was consistent in dividing international legal powers according foremost to state consent. 
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possess a relative sovereignty depending on their alignment with American values and national 
security. Any design which granted equal legal status irrespective of character would thus be contrary 
to this conception of IL. Jesse Helms warned of “a court run amok,” that should be resisted for being 
controlled by states that included “dictatorships.”111
 
 This problem was acute where the ICC remained 
“immune to a U.S. veto” through the UNSC due to the success of legalist principles. Complete UNSC 
control was equally consistent with the Illiberal Nationalist view that the ICC should be designed to 
preserve legal hierarchies with hostile states. 
Conclusion 
Defining the relationship between states under the ICC regime proved one of the most difficult issues 
for the first term of the Bush 43 administration. The position of legalist advocates articulated an 
absolute commitment to sovereign equality as a necessary and inflexible requirement for upholding 
the rule of IL. A later UNSC debate about the ICC and the rule of IL described resolutions 1422 and 
1487 as “the most controversial and questionable resolutions to come out of the Council... [and] 
contrary to both the Charter of the United Nations and the Rome Statute.”112
The price for a more plausible enforcement mechanism in the ICC context is to make the United States functionally 
immune, at least in the ICC (as opposed to domestic and other fora), from the enforcement of international criminal 
law.
 In contrast, the strength 
of Illiberal Internationalist conceptions within the administration translated into a belief that institutional 
recognition of American hegemonic privilege was a necessary element of an effective rule of IL. 
Goldsmith unapologetically asserted that: 
113
 
 
In these circumstances, ideology set hard limits to reaching a united position on the proper 
development of states’ rights and duties before the court, with political preferences crystallised in 
competing meanings of “equality” as a necessary element of the rule of IL. 
 
 
ORDERING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POWER 
Through the early years of the court’s operation, advocates of a legalist policy continued demanding a 
clear separation in international legal powers, with judicial power isolated in the ICC and clearly 
distinguished from the executive and legislative influence of states. This policy assumed the 
independence of the ICC, and therefore legitimacy of the supremacy of its judicial power. In contrast 
the Bush administration supported domestic legislation intended to reverse that relationship and 
subordinate the court’s powers to US municipal legal authority.114
The American Service-Members’ Protection Act (2002) (“ASPA”) – colloquially known as the 
“Hague Invasion Act” – represented a clear shift from the Clinton administration, which had opposed 
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the bill in 2000.115 The effect of ASPA was to penalise countries that declined to sign bilateral “Article 
98 agreements” granting ICC immunity for American citizens, while also authorising the recovery of 
US nationals “by all means necessary and appropriate” should they nevertheless end up in the court’s 
custody.116 Through these actions the ICC’s judicial power would be divided and reserved to the US 
government insofar as it purported to apply to US citizens. The administration went so far as to write 
to EU governments expressing “dismay” at what it saw as a campaign “actively undermining” US 
initiatives to establish immunities for its peacekeeping forces.117
 
 These policies contradicted legalist 
principles of a separation of powers, which therefore cast US policy as contradicting the rule of IL 
itself. 
Legalist Policy 
In this period Donald Rumsfeld rejected the Rome Statute on the basis that: the court lacked 
adequate checks and balances on its power; diluted the authority of the UNSC; and opened the door 
to politicised prosecutions of American nationals. To this Sands responded that what Rumsfeld really 
rejected was “that the rules will not allow the United States or other countries to use political power to 
control the proceedings.”118 Underlying this argument was an opposition between a legalist 
conception of law and the contaminating influence of other forms of control over the court’s judicial 
power. Sands reasoned by analogy with municipal law that, in relation to the court’s prosecutorial 
powers, they “have to be independent if there is to be any semblance of a rule of law.”119
Following the passage of ASPA, the European Parliament declared that the Act “goes well 
beyond the exercise of the US’s sovereign right not to participate in the Court, since it contains 
provisions which could obstruct and undermine the Court and threatens to penalise countries which 
have chosen to support the Court.”
 
120 In legal terms this was a criticism of US policies that aimed to 
reclaim elements of the court’s judicial power which purported to exclude US municipal legal authority. 
In a July 2002 European Parliament debate Europe Minister Bertel Haarder noted the contradictory 
nature of the ASPA in circumstances where both the US and EU “uphold freedom, democracy, human 
rights and the principles of the rule of law.”121 Then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer 
corresponded personally with Secretary Powell to warn against the “rift” that ASPA would cause with 
the EU. Fischer’s primary argument was that, in the joint fight against global terrorism, US obstruction 
would deny “an opportunity to fight with judicial means.”122
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The Council of the EU ultimately responded to the Article 98 campaign by setting out guiding 
principles stipulating that only persons sent by the US government in an official capacity were to be 
covered.123 The effect of the guideline was to accept the exemption of military personnel and 
diplomatic officials from ICC jurisdiction, but to entirely exclude US citizens acting in a non-
governmental capacity. The Council reached this position by reluctantly conceding124 that limited 
privileges could be reserved to the US in cases where officials were accused of crimes within the 
court’s jurisdiction. The compromise, spearheaded by British diplomats, was criticised by Amnesty 
International for allowing “the US to shift the terms of the debate from legal principle to political 
opportunism.”125 Nevertheless, the Council continued to defend supremacy of the court’s judicial 
power in relation to US nationals not acting as government representatives. The EU’s offer was 
ultimately that it would continue to work with the US where the objective was “developing effective 
and impartial international criminal justice.”126
 
 This fortified the underlying commitment to a separation 
of powers and independent court as a defining element of the rule of IL. 
Beliefs of American Legal Policymakers 
The Threat of an Independent Court 
The authoritative US position on the ICC’s legal powers was set out in the NSS 2002 in a section 
entitled “Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities 
of the Twenty-First Century.”127
We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect 
Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept.
 The section starts with the principle that the US must “reaffirm the 
essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond 
challenge.” In this context the section continued: 
128
 
 
These sentiments replicated statements the President delivered earlier that year where he gave an 
assurance that no member of the American military would appear before an “unaccountable” ICC or 
any such “international courts and committees with agendas of their own.”129
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 These interpretations of 
international jurisdiction dealt directly with the proper ordering of international legal powers exercised 
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125 Black, Ian, ‘Britain Accused of Sacrificing New Court,’ The Guardian (1 October, 2002) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/01/usa.ianblack>. See Dutton, Yvonne, Rules, Politics, and the International 
Criminal Court: Committing to the Court (Routledge, 2013) at 92 
126 EU, Statement of the European Union on the Position of the United States towards the International Criminal Court, P 64/02 
Brussels 8864/02 (Presse 141) (14 May, 2002) at 6. Emphasis added 
127 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, The White House (2002) at 29 
128 Ibid at 31 
129 Bush, George W., Remarks to the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York (19 July, 2002) 
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=73067&st=&st1>  
Bush 43 Administration 2000-2004 
 
169 
 
The underlying contention with the ICC’s structure of legal power was the implausibility of 
separating purely judicial power, with the court exercising a form of political power by definition. The 
root of objections was the belief that preponderant power made the US a permanent target for political 
attacks, including through legal institutions. On this basis Bolton characterised the ICC as “an 
unaccountable prosecutor, possibly politically motivated, posing grave risks for the United States and 
its political and military leaders.”130 For Rumsfeld the ICC constituted “a potential lawfare weapon 
against the United States.”131 Guided by the principle of protecting “America’s sovereignty,” Rumsfeld 
rejected any legal arrangement that granted legal powers to courts not held accountable by the 
consent of Americans themselves. Drawing equally on a claim for hegemonic privilege he concluded 
that such “growing international judicial encroachments on our sovereignty” will erode “America’s 
willingness to use our military as a force for good around the world.”132
In the same period John Yoo wrote to Alberto Gonzales, then legal counsel to the President, 
to argue that ICC independence could threaten the administration’s use of decidedly illiberal 
“enhanced interrogation” techniques.
  
133 Yoo argued that these possible acts of torture “cannot fall 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, although it would be impossible to control the actions of a rogue 
prosecutor or judge.”134 Chief among the reasons given was that “one of the most established 
principles of international law is that a state cannot be bound by treaties to which it has not 
consented.” Where the US had “withdrawn its signature from the agreement” the US could not “be 
bound by the provisions of the ICC Treaty nor can U.S. nationals be subject to ICC prosecution.”135 
The chief mischief lay in the fact that “the ICC is not checked by any other international body, not to 
mention any democratically-elected or accountable one.” Citing various scenarios, including that of a 
“rogue prosecutor,” Yoo concluded that the Office of Legal Counsel “can only provide the best reading 
of international law on the merits. We cannot predict the political actions of international 
institutions.”136 Yoo later maintained with Posner that the ICC would “not be an effective tribunal” for 
reasons that could be “traced directly to the independence of the court.”137 Sands described these as 
“extreme views on the ICC” and Yoo’s memorandum of advice as “error-ridden.”138
 The administration’s preferred policy was not to consign the subject matter of international 
criminal law to a legal black hole, but to assert the merits of the supremacy of municipal legal powers. 
In 2001 David Scheffer was succeeded as Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues by Pierre-
Richard Prosper, who proceeded to advocate hybrid courts constituted at the municipal level as an 
 The arguments 
from both Rumsfeld and Yoo however were consistent with illiberal interpretations of IL drawn from 
the administration’s foreign policy ideology, which rejected the necessity or even compatibility of 
independent judicial powers with the rule of IL. 
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alternative to the ICC.139 In testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Prosper 
reiterated the administration’s commitment to be a leader in “efforts to end impunity by holding 
perpetrators of war crimes accountable.” His testimony rejected a central role for the ICC in favour of 
“lasting initiatives, especially securing the rule of law.” The US would not abdicate its responsibilities 
to this task as part of the “international community,” but nor “should that responsibility be taken away” 
from states through international courts.140 Elsewhere Prosper elaborated that a strengthened ICC 
threatened to “undermine the legitimate efforts of member states to achieve national reconciliation 
and domestic accountability by democratic means.” This returned to previous calls for limiting the 
reach of formal international rules in order to allow resolution of conflicts through non-binding 
measures such as truth and reconciliation commissions. Such would ultimately be more likely to 
create “a lasting benefit to the rule of law.”141 It is notable that in a subsequent public address on the 
topic “War Crimes in the 21st Century,” Prosper failed to even acknowledge the existence of the ICC, 
let alone US objections, even as he reiterated US commitments to accountability in Sudan and to the 
rule of law more generally.142
 
 This was ultimately a conception that was opposed to the 
institutionalisation of international legal power outside of national courts for being contrary to the rule 
of IL. 
Reordering International Judicial Power through the ASPA 
The failure of American negotiators to achieve an ICC design matching its ideological preferences led 
to efforts during the Bush administration to block what were considered to be illegitimate powers of 
the court through the ASPA; legislation that engaged the influence of all four American ideological 
conceptions. In its preamble ASPA warned against exposure of American citizens to international 
judicial power in terms consistent with the principle of a vertical separation of powers central to Liberal 
Nationalism. This included “procedural protections to which all Americans are entitled under the Bill of 
Rights to the United States Constitution, such as the right to trial by jury.”143 The preamble also drew 
upon illiberal conceptions of law in structuring the ICC regime to ensure that American armed forces 
and senior government officials remain unimpeded in protecting the “vital national interests” and 
“national security decisions” of the US.144 The legislation warned in these terms that the ICC itself 
threatened to breach IL – either by usurping the role of the UNSC through defining the crime of 
“aggression,” or by purporting to override consent by binding the US as a non-treaty member.145
There was a great deal of convergence between Liberal and Illiberal Nationalist legal 
conceptions, with distinct sets of beliefs equally supporting the outcome of domestic legislation 
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constraining ICC jurisdiction. Illiberal Nationalist conceptions remained dominant in shaping policy 
nevertheless, especially as they opposed legalist and Liberal Internationalist policy. Introducing the 
ASPA was one of Helm’s final victories over the ICC through the prohibition it created against US 
legal authorities cooperating with the court.146 During congressional debate Helms made clear that the 
ASPA was a response to the failure to secure a preferred court design, describing it as an “insurance 
policy for our troops and our officials—such as Secretary of State Powell—to protect them from a U.N. 
Kangaroo Court where the United States has no veto.”147 Without intervention there was a real threat 
that US military and civilian personnel would become “the subject of second-guessing by United 
Nations judicial bodies.”148
The influence of Liberal Nationalist beliefs over ICC policy remained important nonetheless, 
evident in Powell’s support for legislation preventing the external prosecution of American military 
personnel. Although accepting the principle of an international court, he remained cognisant of the 
dangers it could pose to liberties established by the American constitution: 
 The beliefs underpinning this Illiberal Nationalist stance were not seen as a 
call for the impunity of American citizens, but as a measure to reverse the legalist ordering of powers 
and ensure the supremacy of American judicial power in international criminal matters. 
it seems to me to be a very difficult thing to say to an American family, oh, by the way, that youngster may not have 
the constitutional rights that were given to him at birth or her at birth. So I have always been troubled by that aspect 
of the court. I could not quite square it with my understanding of the obligations we had to those youngsters and to 
their families.149
 
 
This returned to the principle of maintaining a vertical separation of powers whereby an international 
court could legitimately exercise judicial power, but only in a way clearly separated from that 
exercised under the US constitution. This reflected both liberal values in seeking to structure IL to 
preserve basic rights, and a nationalist position that defined American interests in terms of the 
sufficiency of municipal law. 
 A more hardline Liberal Nationalist approach was espoused by then Congressman Ron Paul, 
who argued that the ICC was “inherently incompatible with national sovereignty.” Specifically the 
potential for competing judicial authority presented a “conflict between adhering to the rule of law and 
obeying globalist planners” so that “America must either remain a constitutional republic or submit to 
international law, because it cannot do both.”150 Paul presented a resolution to Congress in February 
2001 calling on the President to “declare to all nations that the United States does not intend to 
assent to or ratify the treaty and the signature of former President Clinton to the treaty should not be 
construed otherwise.”151 The resolution focussed centrally on the impermissibility of “a supranational 
court that would exercise the judicial power constitutionally reserved only to the United States.”152
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particular this offended the Liberal Nationalist principle that international and municipal law govern 
separate spheres, with the ICC exercising jurisdiction “within the legislative and judicial authority of 
the United States.” Importantly the resolution relied on the authority of IL itself to demonstrate the 
illegality of the court, rebutting the suggestion that policymakers in this period were simply IL sceptics. 
Paul’s resolution emphasised that the ICC design contravened the principle of sovereign inviolability, 
with specific reference to consent requirements under the Vienna Convention,153 and “accepted 
norms of international law” that a treaty cannot extend jurisdiction over “nationals of countries that do 
not sign and ratify the treaty.”154
The contours of these illiberal and nationalist approaches became clearest when contrasted 
with the persistence of Liberal Internationalist beliefs as a minority position during the Bush 43 
administration. Senator Dodd remained the leading US senator championing the ICC cause arguing 
that, since the time of the Founding Fathers, the “long-term security needs of the Nation” had been 
strengthened by globally extending “inalienable rights” established by the US constitution. That 
principle, when combined with unrivalled power, created a leadership responsibility in the US to 
establish a system of international criminal justice.
 For sponsors of the congressional resolution the rule of IL meant 
upholding the minimum and agreed framework within which domestic jurisdictions exist, and allowing 
states to continue exercising full judicial powers, including over the subject matter of international 
criminal law. 
155 Dodd recognised that his acceptance of the 
reality and advantages of US engagement in international legal institutions was incompatible with 
nationalist attempts to “become a gated community and retreat from international agreements.”156 
With the establishment of the ICC, and its broad jurisdictional regime a political inevitability, the ASPA 
would have the effect of placing US military personnel “in greater jeopardy than they would be if we 
were to participate in trying to develop the structures of this court to minimize problems.” On that 
basis Dodd concluded that the US should remain committed to staying “at the table to try to work it 
out so that it becomes a viable product which we can support and gather behind.”157
The disjunct between these competing approaches led Dodd to readily accept the existence 
of a fundamental division in US IL policy. The intention to minimise international legal institutions in 
the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks was “stunning,” with the US traversing 
from once leading the creation of the UN system to now “shirking its international duty.”
 
158 More 
acutely, it was contradictory for the US to call for greater international solidarity against terrorism, yet 
at the same time signal an intention to act unilaterally through the ASPA provisions.159 These Liberal 
Internationalist beliefs were ultimately legislated in the “Dodd Amendment,” which made an exception 
to prohibitions against US cooperation with the ICC where the US could provide “Assistance to 
International Efforts” in advancing criminal justice.160
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These observations certainly confirm a form of political incoherence in US policy, with 
competing definitions of US interests leading to inconsistent IL policies over time. However the shifts 
identified by Dodd also reveal that each distinct policy is coherent when interpreted according to the 
influence of the identified structure of foreign policy ideology. Dodd’s own position emphasised the 
importance of ideological context, with his confirmation that, as the Rome Statute stood in 2001, he 
“would vote against it because it is a flawed agreement.” That appeared equally contradictory from a 
legalist standpoint, but was consistent with scepticism about the legal integrity of an international 
court lacking adequate democratic checks and balances.161
 
 As such, even this most forceful 
American advocate contradicted legalist rule of law principles, but remained faithful to his ideological 
beliefs. 
Article 98 Agreements and the Supremacy of American Judicial Power 
From the time of the Rome negotiations Scheffer recalled that the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Defence 
Department made clear that they would give in principle support for the ICC provided it was designed 
as “subordinate” to and “strictly an adjunct to national prosecutions.”162 This was significant evidence 
that defence officials were prepared to support some form of the court and were not motivated by in 
principle opposition. A specific stipulation was that the ICC could not eclipse a Status of Force 
Agreement (“SOFA”) with any country on whose territory US soldiers were based. These upheld the 
“sacrosanct” principle that the criminal investigation and prosecution of US military personnel would 
remain the sole province of US military or federal courts.163 Equally the Department of Justice insisted 
on a design that allowed municipal legal processes to prevail over those of an international court.164 In 
both cases the relevant legal advisers expressed a form of commitment to IL, yet did so according to 
restrictions rejecting legalist proposals for the separation and privileging of the ICC’s international 
judicial power. Through US insistence, this principle of a consent based division of powers was 
ultimately enshrined in Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute, which prevented the ICC from requesting 
surrender of an accused person if the state having custody had pre-existing obligations not to do so – 
such as those established under a SOFA.165
The US seized upon the provision to conclude over 100 “Article 98 agreements” in which 
global allies pledged to honour this form of ICC immunity.
 
166 The strategy was fortified by 
congressional support in the APSA, which mandated that military assistance be cut-off to states that 
failed to sign such agreements.167
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strict interpretation of the statute in accordance with established principles of law.168 Rather the 
original intent of the provision has been to cover official US personnel from ICC jurisdiction, but not 
individuals acting in a private capacity.169 This avoided the appearance of asking for blanket immunity 
for all Americans, while still addressing Illiberal Internationalist concerns being raised at the time. 
Importantly, the narrower immunity also remained consistent with Scheffer’s own Liberal 
Internationalist conception of the proper relationship between sovereign states under the ICC regime. 
The principle of liberal equality required that IL be structured so as to permit states to exercise 
international executive powers in enforcing rights afforded by international criminal law. From the 
perspective of Liberal Internationalism, this principle justified a degree of immunity for military 
personnel and diplomatic staff carrying out these functions, as argued for in the final years of the 
Clinton administration.170
 This conception of Article 98 immunities was clearly distinguished from the Illiberal Nationalist 
conception evident in the initiative as spearheaded by John Bolton. The Bolton position was to seek 
immunity for every American through the agreements: “private citizens such as missionaries, 
journalists, NGO members, businesspeople, even tourists, who could be swept up in a conflict and 
used as scapegoats simply because they were Americans.”
 Such a rationale for protecting US citizens would not thereby justify 
extending immunity to non-government representatives, who did not perform any legally relevant 
actions. 
171 During this period Lincoln Bloomfield, 
as Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (and head of the bureau within which 
Bolton worked), further elaborated on the rationale for the broad immunity and its foundation in 
exceptionalist beliefs. He made reference to the unparalleled global engagement of American citizens 
and the exceptional functions of the US upholding the international legal system, emphasising that: 
“One does not have to hold a view of American exceptionalism to acknowledge the profile and 
symbolic resonance of the American identity in the world.”172 The bureau was ultimately animated by 
the perception of an existential threat to all Americans, thereby justifying the structuring of IL to 
ensure the supremacy of American courts. In circumstances where the ICC was seen to lack checks 
against politicisation, and the US was said to have a demonstrated record of prosecuting international 
crimes, granting blanket immunity for US citizens became defensible as necessary to the integrity of 
IL.173
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Conclusion 
Czarnetzky and Rychlak have described the absence of “a meaningful political check” on ICC power 
during its formative years as its most serious deficiency. Their argument was that, at the municipal 
level: “Political negotiations are essential to building a nation where the rule of law can be established 
and human rights can be respected.”174 All American legal conceptions shaping the Bush 43 policy 
challenged the ICC for instead relying merely on the good faith exercise of judicial power.175 By the 
end of the period, US policy toward ordering ICC legal powers was most consistent with both 
ideological variants of nationalism. American policymakers from all four ideological conceptions 
rejected the claim that a court exercising independent judicial power was necessary or compatible 
with the rule of IL. The process of developing and promoting the ASPA as a response to the ICC 
design was supported most forcefully by an Illiberal Nationalist commitment to the supremacy of 
municipal legal power. The Article 98 agreements had “almost nil” practical effect on ICC 
operations,176
 
 emphasising the degree to which they represented a principled stand by administration 
officials. The inconsistency of the court’s agenda with perceived US interests, and the inability of the 
US to tailor its consent to its jurisdiction, excluded the possibility of American support for the design 
set out in the Rome Statute. Judicial arrangements confirmed at the municipal level were thus held 
out by American legal policymakers as effective and enforceable against the world. In a 
complementary way, ASPA was also supported by Liberal Nationalist preferences for developing IL to 
ensure a vertical separation between the judicial power of the court and municipal judicial power. 
Rejecting the separation of powers and ICC independence thereby directly contradicted the legalist 
position, but followed well-defined conceptions of the rule of IL drawn from American foreign policy 
ideology. 
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The first term of the Bush 43 administration was marked by a clear rejection of legalist interpretations 
of an ICC based on the rule of IL, but also by rejection of the previous administration’s Liberal 
Internationalism. The legalist position continued to focus on: a court that progressively developed 
non-arbitrary global governance through universal acceptance of formalised rules; sovereign equality 
that prevailed over UNSC privileges; and an independent court that separated the ICC’s international 
judicial powers from competing legal and political institutions. American ICC policy in contrast lacked 
the direction of a single conception of the rule of IL and yet, among the ideologies that did compete for 
influence among US legal policymakers, the legalist formulation never gained any serious recognition. 
The evidence surveyed in this chapter thus does not support the claim that American policy outcomes 
were formed by tactical political calculations compromising commonly held legal ideals. Even in the 
dramatic act of “unsigning” the Rome Statute, US policymakers showed deference to the conventions 
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of IL and the legality of opposing the court for its perceived failure to advance a form of non-arbitrary 
global governance. In arguing for privileges through the UNSC, policymakers adhered to beliefs in 
America’s unique global role and exceptional character as the basis for rejecting the principle of 
sovereign equality. Finally, policymakers variously justified the ASPA by reference to the principle of 
ordering the court’s judicial power according to US consent, of maintaining a vertical separation from 
municipal law, or simply upholding the supremacy of municipal law. 
Sands argued that the only way to explain the virulence of Bush 43 administration opposition 
was that the court had become “a useful stalking horse for a broader attack on international law and 
the constraints which it may place on hegemonic power.”177
 
 The evidence from this chapter refines 
that conclusion to argue that the ICC policy was indeed couched in a broader strategy, not of 
defeating IL per se, but of forcefully rejecting the expansive aspirations of legalism and Liberal 
Internationalism. The Bush administration’s aggressive ICC opposition represented not merely a clash 
in politics, but the hardening of ideological divisions in the concept of the rule of IL. That 
uncompromising stance meant that, even as the first term came to an end, legal policymakers within 
the administration had begun to question the success of Illiberal Nationalist IL policy as a strategy for 
advancing national interests, and whether a shift in legal conceptions was merited. 
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 CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
BUSH 43 ADMINISTRATION 2004-2008 
 
 
The generally held view among legal commentators is that ICC policy shifted significantly between the 
first and second terms of the Bush 43 administration. Whereas US ICC policy during the first term was 
one of aggressive opposition, the second term saw a more pragmatic engagement and even tacit 
endorsement of the court. The Wall Street Journal reported this shift in 2006, observing the turn from 
a preference “that countries apply their own versions of international law in their own courts” to 
acknowledging the legitimacy of international prosecutions in defined circumstances.1 The perception 
that US diplomatic influence was being eroded was confirmed by incoming Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice when she described Ambassador Bolton’s antagonistic ICC policy as “shooting 
ourselves in the foot.”2
The shift in policy fuelled optimism among global court advocates that the US was taking 
greater account of legalist principles. These remained unchanged, emphasising the progressive 
formalisation of global governance through the court, the principle of sovereign equality – especially in 
opposing immunities for non-States-Parties in UNSC referrals, and the greatest possible separation of 
the court’s judicial power from parallel international legal powers. Apparent softening of attitudes to 
the ICC did indeed more closely resemble elements of legalism in acknowledging a role for the ICC in 
global governance. However, despite adopting a more tempered rhetoric, the US ultimately settled on 
an arm’s length relationship with the court that never included any intention to submit to its 
jurisdiction. 
 
From the US perspective the key issue to be dealt with in the second term was adjusting to an 
internationalist conception of law. Despite the administration’s previous “unsigning” of the Rome 
Statute, allowing it as a matter of IL to act contrary to the objects and purposes of the treaty, the 
administration moved to support the treaty both directly and indirectly. Demands for further renewal of 
UNSC immunity as a precondition to military support for peacekeeping operations were also removed. 
The ASPA was modified to allow for greater cooperation with US allies and the “Article 98” campaign 
was wound down and eventually halted. The US thus rejected its insistence on the sole legitimacy of 
domestic legal processes and recommitted itself to the ICC as a real source of influence in the 
international legal system.  
Despite these various acts of re-engagement, the US continued to make clear its intention not 
to join the ICC as a state party and to forcefully oppose the positions of court advocates at every 
stage. In circumstances where US policymakers continued to express fidelity to the rule of law there is 
a prima facie case of a shift between competing ideologically informed conceptions of the rule of IL, 
                                               
1 Bravin, Jess, ‘U.S. Warms to Hague Tribunal,’ Wall Street Journal (14 June, 2006) 
<http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB115024503087679549>. This piece was reportedly read and discussed by Condoleezza Rice 
and John Bellinger: Bosco, David, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court’s Battle to Fix the World, One Prosecution at 
a Time (Oxford University Press, 2014) at 123 
2 Rice, Condoleezza, ‘En Route to San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 10, 2006,’ Trip Briefing (2006) <http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/63001.htm> 
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none of which aligned with dominant beliefs expressed by global counterparts. This chapter enters the 
debate to argue that the ICC policy outcome is best explained through the role of predominantly 
Illiberal Internationalist principles structuring legal beliefs, rather than as a tactical political 
approximation of legalist ideals. 
 
 
DOMINANT FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY 
There was a large degree of continuity in beliefs about IL across both terms of the Bush 
administration. During his 2004 re-election campaign Bush continued to dismiss the very concept of 
the ICC as “a body based in The Hague where unaccountable judges and prosecutors can pull our 
troops or diplomats up for trial...it’s the right move not to join a foreign court...where our people could 
be prosecuted.”3 There was however a turnover in key legal policymakers dealing with the ICC 
entering the second term, which “allowed room for the pragmatists to assume a greater role” in 
shifting policy back toward a more internationalist and therefore accommodating stance toward the 
court.4 Sands noted that the reality of having to work within a rules based order was “belatedly” 
recognised by this period, although he remained sceptical that this amounted to a meaningful shift in 
IL policy.5
The first key personnel change was the replacement of Colin Powell with Condoleezza Rice 
as Secretary of State. Statements on IL made across Rice’s career reveal a strong adherence to 
Illiberal Internationalist legal conceptions. In an influential 2000 Foreign Affairs article she drew a 
sharp distinction between her conception of IL and the “Wilsonian thought” of the Clinton 
administration.
 
6 Her criticism of “at best, illusory ‘norms’ of international behavior” appeared to 
replicate Bolton’s antagonism toward IL, but remained distinct in a commitment to internationalism. 
Her criticism is of legal policy structured by liberal values of “humanitarian interests” or a notion of an 
“international community.” At the same time she did support the development of “multilateral 
agreements and institutions,” but where they were “well-crafted” to advance narrowly defined national 
interests, and not merely as “ends in themselves.”7
                                               
3 Bush, George W., ‘Transcript: What is Kerry’s Position on Pre-Emptive War?,’ CNN Politics (1 October, 2004) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/10/01/debate.transcript.13/index.html?iref=mpstoryview> 
 In her first town hall meeting as Secretary of 
State, Rice stated that IL “is critical to the proper function of international diplomacy... We depend on 
a world in which there is some international legal order.” The explanation revealed the extent to which 
IL was developed as a tool for advancing American national security interests. Where “there are so 
many countries in the world that don’t have our own domestic order, legal order, we depend on norms 
of behavior in international politics.” On that basis Rice declared the administration would be “a strong 
voice for international legal norms, for living up to our treaty obligations, to recognizing that America’s 
moral authority in international politics also rests on our ability to defend international laws and 
4 Cerone, John P., ‘U.S. Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals’ in Cesare P.R. Romano (ed), The Sword 
and the Scales: The United States and International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 304 
5 Sands, Philippe, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (Viking, 2006) at xix 
6 Rice, Condoleezza, ‘Promoting the National Interest’ (2000) 79 Foreign Affairs 45 at 47 
7 Ibid at 47-48 
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international treaties.”8 Notably these statements were interpreted by outsiders as evidence of US 
“commitment to the international rule of law.”9
The simultaneous influence of Illiberal Nationalist ideology is arguably evident in Rice’s stated 
beliefs, although to a lesser degree. In an illuminating exchange during her confirmation hearings 
Senator Chris Dodd set his Liberal Internationalist conception of IL, expressed since the time of the 
Clinton administration, against Rice’s role in developing detainee policy during the first term. Rice 
described her own understanding of her legal policymaking role as National Security Adviser, which 
was not to give legal advice to the President, but to consider independent legal advice “in a policy 
context.”
 
10 Rice asserted that the decision not to apply the Geneva Conventions to certain classes of 
detainees, and the approval of waterboarding as an interrogation technique, had been cleared by the 
Justice Department as “consistent with our international obligations and American law.”11 To this 
Dodd responded that fidelity to the rule of IL is not about “what the law says, not dotting the I’s and 
crossing the T’s [sic], but speaking more fundamentally as to who we are as a people.”12 In discussing 
the establishment of international criminal justice specifically, the Senator argued that what matters is, 
not “legalisms” but rather, developing an IL policy expressing the principle that America was “very, 
very different not just in terms of our economic plans and political plans, but how we viewed 
mankind.”13
 In contrast, Rice emphasised the extent to which illiberal national security values overrode the 
idea that IL must always give effect to universal liberal principles. She readily accepted the 
proposition that Americans “are and have been different” in their liberal values, but did not accept the 
further proposition that these values must prevail in IL policy. For Rice there were “tensions between 
trying to live with the laws and the norms that we have become accustomed to and the new kind of 
war that we are in.”
 In taking that view, Dodd identified the legitimacy of IL in the extension outward of the 
liberal values at the heart of American constitutional democracy. 
14 Yet in resisting Dodd’s argument that Americans and non-Americans alike must 
be granted liberal equality,15 Rice responded obliquely that the administration intended to “look at 
what other kinds of international standards might be needed to deal with this very special war 
because we are a country of laws.”16
                                               
8 Rice, Condoleezza, Remarks at Town Hall Meeting, Dean Acheson Auditorium, Washington, DC (31 January, 2005) 
<http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/41414.htm> 
 Here the nominee sought to remove the assumption that IL 
would apply equally to all natural persons, while emphasising US commitment to a rule of law that 
permitted forms of inequality. This revealed a nationalist strand of illiberalism in addition to the 
otherwise internationalist outlook of Rice. As Mead argues in relation to his equivalent ideal type, 
Illiberal Nationalist duties are owed based on respect for “an honour code in international life” and that 
those who violate it, “who commit terrorist acts against innocent civilians” for example, “forfeit its 
9 Sands, Philippe, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (Viking, 2006) at 240 
10 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Dr. 
Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State, 1st Session 109th Congress (2005) at 117 
11 Ibid at 118; Rice, Condoleezza, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years in Washington (Random House LLC, 2011) at 117, 
121 & 497 
12 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Dr. 
Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State, 1st Session 109th Congress (2005) at 146 
13 Ibid at 146 
14 Ibid at 147 
15 See Dodd’s argument for the application of the Geneva conventions without discrimination as to nationality ibid at 118-119 
16 Ibid at 147 
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protection.”17 The limitation of IL in cases involving “enemy combatants” was defended by Rice on the 
basis that the persons in question were not themselves “living up to the laws of war.” Rice defended 
the President for reaching an understanding of the law that “was consistent with both living up to our 
international obligations and allowed us to recognize that the Geneva Conventions should not apply to 
a particular category of people.”18 This is inconsistent with either legalist or Liberal Internationalist 
conceptions of law, which resist the sanctioning of gaps in the legal framework determining basic 
rights. In contrast, the idea that the US could designate gradations of legal rights based on the 
character of adversaries is entirely in line with illiberal conceptions of law. Through this understanding 
Rice was led to conclude that increasingly strained transatlantic relations stemmed from “the mistaken 
perception that the United States’ detention and interrogation policies operated outside the bounds of 
international law.”19 Certainly, despite some misgivings about Bolton’s clashes with Powell,20 Rice had 
some sympathy for his hardline views against IL. She supported his nomination as UN ambassador in 
this period on the basis that “his skepticism about the organization was an asset with conservatives 
and, from my point of view, a corrective to the excessive multilateralism of our diplomats in New 
York.”21
At this time William Taft was also succeeded as Legal Adviser to the State Department by 
National Security Council Legal Adviser John Bellinger who, above all others, drove the shift in ICC 
policy in this period.
 
22 Yoo observed that Bellinger “often shared Taft’s accommodating attitude 
toward international law,” thereby resisting Illiberal Nationalist impulses within the government.23 Rice 
had a longstanding close working relationship with Bellinger, characterising his worldview as being 
“neither a skeptic nor an unthinking proponent of the international community’s supposed code of 
conduct.”24 Bellinger was sceptical about elements of Liberal Internationalism, denying that there was 
“an incredibly tight connection between promoting the rule of law in individual countries and promoting 
international law.”25 He appeared to accept Robert Kagan’s thesis,26 arguing that “in some European 
countries, largely as a result of United States’ efforts after World War Two, there has been a tendency 
to ‘apotheosise’ international law...as an incredibly holy body. One merely needs to say the words 
‘international law’ and many Europeans will sort of worship the concept.”27 Yet, as head of the Legal 
Advisor’s office, he remained committed “to observe international law because we see that it is in our 
interests to do so and to always ensure that US actions, to the extent possible, are consistent with 
international law.”28
                                               
17 Mead, Walter R., Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (Routledge, 2002) at 246 
 
18 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Dr. 
Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State, 1st Session 109th Congress (2005) at 117 
19 Rice, Condoleezza, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years in Washington (Random House LLC, 2011) at 497 
20 Paris, Erna, The Sun Climbs Slow: The International Criminal Court and the Struggle for Justice (Seven Stories Press, 2009) 
at 60 
21 Rice, Condoleezza, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years in Washington (Random House LLC, 2011) at 306 
22 Scharf, Michael P. & Paul R. Williams, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of International Law and the State 
Department Legal Adviser (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 137; Feinstein, Lee & Tod Lindberg, Means to an End: U.S. 
Interest in the International Criminal Court (Brookings Institution Press, 2009) at 52 
23 Yoo, John C., War by Other Means: An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006) at 41-42 
24 Rice, Condoleezza, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years in Washington (Random House LLC, 2011) at 303 
25 Bellinger III, John B., Interview with Author (12 January, 2012) 
26 Kagan, Robert, ‘Power and Weakness’ (2002) June-July Policy Review 3. See Chapter 2 supra 
27 Bellinger III, John B., Interview with Author (12 January, 2012) 
28 Ibid 
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Bellinger’s views were significant in particular because of his greater influence in shaping 
State Department ICC policy compared to his predecessor. Bellinger attributed the increased role of 
the Legal Adviser to recognition that previous marginalisation of State Department lawyers had 
eroded national interests.29 Under Bellinger there was a renewed commitment to “international legal 
diplomacy” as a guiding principle for IL policy.30 This is consistent with the Illiberal Internationalist view 
of IL as a diplomatic tool to facilitate hegemonic power. In an interview for the International Bar 
Association Bellinger also revealed the influence of his exceptionalist beliefs in addressing charges of 
US “hypocrisy.” This he defined as the charge of wanting “justice for others but not for the US.” His 
reply treated exceptionalism as constitutive of IL: “The problem is that the US really is differently 
situated and...we are uniquely called upon to be the policeman around the world.”31 The US has 
thereby demanded that IL encompass its “unique role and interests” flowing from global power, as 
well as its “historically rooted suspicions of institutions with unchecked powers.”32
 
 These sets of 
beliefs about the rule of law became pivotal to the increasingly internationalist policies that came to 
define the second term. 
 
DEVELOPING NON-ARBITRARY GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
The ongoing vision of legalist court advocates remained the consolidation of the ICC as a core 
component of the architecture of global governance. That entailed measures to formally integrate the 
ICC into established governance frameworks to ensure uniformity in the application of international 
criminal law. For its part the US continued strongly expressing support for the principle of international 
criminal accountability, and shifted to publicly acknowledge the ICC as a legitimate feature of the 
international system. However the Bush administration also continued to argue for the equal 
legitimacy of alternative forms of accountability that limited the reach of global governance. The 
seeming legal inconsistency in the US position again raises the question of what role ideological 
beliefs about the rule of IL played in decision-making processes that produced such divergent 
outcomes. 
 
Legalist Policy 
During this period the ICC concluded agreements with the UN and EU to consolidate its role in 
existing networks of global governance.33
                                               
29 Scharf, Michael P. & Paul R. Williams, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of International Law and the State 
Department Legal Adviser (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 136 
 The preamble to the UN agreement affirmed that “the 
International Criminal Court is established as an independent permanent institution in relationship with 
the United Nations system.” Article 2(1) confirmed that the UN “recognizes the Court as an 
independent permanent judicial institution” possessing “international legal personality.” The EU 
agreement specifically set out in its preamble that the formalisation of relations with the ICC was 
30 Ibid at 137 
31 Bellinger III, John B., ‘Interview with John Bellinger,’ International Bar Association (2011) 
<http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=37f4f087-bc3a-4c21-a108-92f15391785c>. Emphasis added 
32 Bellinger III, John B., ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going,’ 
Remarks to the DePaul University College of Law (25 April, 2008) <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/l/rls/104053.htm> 
33 Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations (2004); Agreement 
between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on Cooperation and Assistance (2006) 
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pursuant to “the fundamental importance and the priority that must be given to the consolidation of the 
rule of law and respect for human rights and humanitarian law.” In recognising the ICC’s role in global 
governance, the EU further reaffirmed its commitment to advancing “universal support for it by 
promoting the widest possible participation in the Rome Statute.” Both agreements identified an 
objective of “facilitating the effective discharge of their respective responsibilities” (of the ICC, UN and 
EU) toward the development of a form of global governance.34 The intention to entrench the authority 
of the ICC did not escape the attention of the US State Department, as communicated by America’s 
UN ambassador John Danforth in classified communications. Danforth warned that the EU was 
regularly succeeding in incorporating language in UN resolutions that “treats the ICC as an integral 
part of the international landscape.”35
Legalist advocates clearly set themselves against any design that attempted to address the 
subject matter of international criminal law through institutional arrangements derogating from 
formalised global governance. In 2004 the UNSC commissioned the International Commission of 
Inquiry on Darfur to investigate alleged atrocities in Sudan and to recommend appropriate 
accountability measures.
 In this process the European conception of the court remained 
consistent with a legalist conception requiring the formalised development of global governance. 
36 The commission was chaired by leading ICC advocate Antonio Cassese, 
and concluded that the ICC was “the only credible way of bringing alleged perpetrators to justice.”37 In 
reaching that conclusion the commission rejected US preferences to strengthen criminal 
accountability through non-global institutional arrangements. Here the commission made reference to 
the legal flaws in permitting areas of international affairs to remain the province of non-uniform or 
diplomatic solutions. To the US preference for a hybrid court the commission noted that “many of the 
Sudanese laws are grossly incompatible with international norms.” In contrast the implementation of 
IL through a formalised institution constituted at the global level would ensure uniformity in legal rights 
and duties: “the ICC constitutes a self-contained regime, with a set of detailed rules on both 
substantive and procedural law that are fully attuned to respect for...fundamental human rights.”38
 
 The 
realisation of the rule of IL was seen to require the formalised development of global governance to 
ensure that international rights and duties were determined as widely as possible by predetermined 
and universal legal rules. This was not merely a matter of practical justice but went to the heart of the 
meaning of an established rule of IL. 
Beliefs of American Legal Policymakers 
Acknowledging the Court’s Authority subject to Pragmatic Limits 
The re-emergence of Illiberal Internationalism was most succinctly contained in the statements of 
John Bellinger, who contended that the administration’s “general approach to international courts and 
tribunals is pragmatic.” International courts were foremost “potential tools to advance shared 
                                               
34 Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations (2004), Art.3; 
Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on Cooperation and Assistance (2006), Art.4 
35 Danforth, John C., Peace and Accountability: A Way Forward (7 January, 2005)  
36 Pursuant to SC Res 1564, UN Doc S/RES/1564 (18 September, 2004) 
37 Cassese, Antonio, et.al., Report of the International Commission on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (25 January, 2005) at 146; SC Res 1593, UN Doc 
S/RES/1593 (31 March, 2005) 
38 Cassese, Antonio, et.al., Report of the International Commission on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (25 January, 2005) at 147 
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international interests in developing and promoting the rule of law, ensuring justice and accountability, 
and solving legal disputes.”39 That attitude did not equate to the role for the court recognised in the 
UN and EU ICC agreements however. There the court was given a privileged status as the 
embodiment of the progressive development of global governance in the domain of criminal law. The 
Illiberal Internationalist conception advocated by Bellinger instead maintained that US accession to 
the Rome Statute would not have demonstrated “deeper commitment to the rule of law and proved us 
to be better international citizens.” To the contrary, US scepticism was said to show “how seriously we 
take international law. Embracing the Rome Statute in spite of our serious concerns could only reflect 
a cavalier attitude towards the Court and international law more generally.”40
Although Bellinger acknowledged that the ICC “has a role to play in the overall system of 
international justice,”
 This foremost rebuffed 
legalist demands for the progressive formalisation of legal obligations, but also contradicted Liberal 
Internationalist beliefs in the value of symbolically aligning US policy with legal principles. Rather, for 
Bellinger, global governance was only assigned to the ICC to the extent that it complemented 
American national security interests, with the US otherwise seeking to clearly demarcate the 
pragmatic limits of a strict legal regime. 
41 he did so seeking to “agree to disagree” – favouring the term “modus vivendi” 
to describe the new position.42 The principle underlying this approach was that the shared ends of 
“promoting international criminal justice” remained “far more important than the means by which we 
seek them.”43 In practical terms, this was an argument for circumscribing the role of the ICC, not in 
opposition to international criminal justice, but in the belief that it would enhance its practical 
realisation. The goal of securing universal membership of the court was expressed in the EU 
agreement with the ICC as a path to establishing unchallenged court authority. Holding that hope out 
however was characterised as “counterproductive” by Bellinger where it impeded a practical working 
relationship with the US. Rather “ICC supporters will ultimately have to decide which they value more: 
hewing to an idealistic commitment to universality or pursing practical efforts to build an effective 
court.”44
The documented shift in US legal policy clearly illustrated that the theorised conceptions of IL 
played a significant role in structuring distinct policy outcomes. Analysis at the level of legal beliefs is 
particularly important where officials have focussed on policy outcomes to make the case for 
continuity. Bellinger has consistently argued, both during his time in office and subsequently, that US 
ICC policy has been essentially unchanged – across and within US administrations.
 Provided the US then complied with these predetermined obligations, the conception 
remained consistent with a form of non-arbitrary global governance.  
45
                                               
39 Bellinger III, John B., ‘International Courts and Tribunals and the Rule of Law’ in Cesare P.R. Romano (ed), The Sword and 
the Scales: The United States and International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 2 
 In his view 
Presidents and Congresses have differed according to “the tone and means” by which they express 
40 Bellinger III, John B., ‘Reflections on Transatlantic Approaches to International Law’ (2007) 17 Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law 513 at 520 
41 Bravin, Jess, ‘U.S. Warms to Hague Tribunal,’ Wall Street Journal (14 June, 2006) 
<http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB115024503087679549> 
42 Bellinger III, John B., Interview with Author (12 January, 2012); Bellinger III, John B., ‘The United States and the International 
Criminal Court: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going,’ Remarks to the DePaul University College of Law (25 April, 2008) 
<http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/l/rls/104053.htm> 
43 Bellinger III, John B., ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going,’ 
Remarks to the DePaul University College of Law (25 April, 2008) <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/l/rls/104053.htm> 
44 Ibid 
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concerns, but there is otherwise a “relatively straight line” running through US ICC opposition.46 
Focussing at the level of competing ideologies however reveals the extent of policy discontinuity, 
even between the first and second terms. Bellinger argued that “people misread the Bolton letter” 
(notifying the decision to unsign the Rome Statute) as evidence of a deeply conflicted US attitude 
toward the ICC. The letter has been treated as expressing “in aggressive or confrontational terms 
U.S. rejection of the ICC,” whereas Bellinger saw it as merely an attempt to clarify the nature of US 
obligations in conformity with treaty law.47 Nevertheless, Bellinger’s own stance on the ICC’s role in 
global governance does reveal a shift to the principle of pragmatic development, whereby the US 
should readily support global institutions so far as they advance national security interests, while 
clearly indentifying areas that remain the domain of diplomatic or other non-legal forms of resolution. 
Bellinger suggested that the “warming” of relations reported in the 2006 Wall Street Journal article 
“overstates the case,” but that it did accurately reflect the strong desire to reach a practical 
understanding with the court.48
At the level of analysing legal conceptions, Bolton’s permissive interpretation of ICC 
obligations drawn from Illiberal Nationalist beliefs were intended to be “aggressive or confrontational.” 
Bolton had been nominated as UN ambassador at a time when the US had shifted from unyielding 
ICC opposition to allowing the UNSC to refer an investigation into alleged crimes in Darfur, Sudan. 
Behind the scenes Bolton strongly rejected the very principle of responding to the Darfur situation by 
international legal means, dismissing EU advocates as frivolously “getting out their wig boxes and 
preparing to go to court.”
 This policy toward the ICC reflected a categorical shift in the 
understanding of American interests in IL in a way that was inconsistent with legal beliefs structuring 
decision-making processes in the first term of the Bush administration.  
49 US acquiescence amounted merely to “a gesture to the EUroids, which 
they cynically pocketed, knowing they had a precedent they could and would use against us later.” 
Instead the US “should have voted ‘no,’ insisting on actually doing something,” such as establishing 
an ad hoc international tribunal following the model of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia.50
 The predominant strategic conclusion by this period was that aggressive opposition to the 
ICC was harming American interests. Ambassador Danforth warned that the US position of actively 
opposing the ICC was forcing it to abstain or vote against any UN resolutions mentioning the court, 
even where they advanced international legal accountability consistent with US interests. On this 
basis he recommended that the US pass an “agreement to disagree” resolution that would allow the 
US to avoid voting against its interests.
 Bolton was guided by a belief that IL should develop permissively to enlarge US 
autonomy, which was distinct from the pragmatic development advocated by Bellinger. 
51
                                               
46 Ibid 
 The central feature of the proposed resolution was to affirm 
that states were governed by separate jurisdictional regimes depending on whether they were parties 
to the Rome Statute, but that each approach equally represented a commitment to accountability for 
international crimes “in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and due process of 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid 
49 Bolton, John R., Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations (Simon & Schuster, 2007) at 360-361 
50 Ibid at 360-361 
51 Danforth, John C., Peace and Accountability: A Way Forward (7 January, 2005)  
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law.”52
 The new attitude was seen in US responses to the 2004 negotiated agreement between the 
ICC and the UN and its objective of consolidating the place of the ICC in global governance.
 This reasoning revealed that the shift in strategy represented not merely a change in political 
calculation, but a shift in US policymakers’ conception of the principles necessary to advance fidelity 
to law. Permissive development had previously been followed, whereby officials avoided any 
acknowledgement of the court lest it embolden pretensions to constrain US policy. Policy now shifted 
to a pragmatic development of global governance as being most consistent with an effective 
international legal system. 
53 Deputy 
Legal Adviser to the US Mission to the UN, Eric Rosand, addressed the General Assembly, reiterating 
that the ICC “is not part of the UN Charter System” and as such should not be treated as having an 
equivalent status.54 Most significantly in his address Rosand reiterated the “U.S. commitment to 
accountability for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity,” but in a form contrary to the 
progressive development of global governance advocated by ICC supporters. Rather this commitment 
was demonstrated in a US record “second to none in holding its own officials and citizens accountable 
for such crimes, as well as for supporting properly constituted international war crimes tribunals.” 
Rosand concluded: “Properly understood, therefore, our decision not to support the ICC reflects our 
commitment to the rule of law, not our opposition to it.”55
 Resistance to the ICC being accepted as a core institution of global governance remained 
strong right through to the end of this period. US Deputy Representative at the UN, Ambassador 
Alejandro Wolff, responded forcefully to a 2007 General Assembly resolution that confirmed “the role 
of the International Criminal Court in a multilateral system that aims to end impunity, establish the rule 
of law, promote and encourage respect for human rights and achieve sustainable peace.”
 This reasoning is a contortion of the rule of 
IL conception underpinning the UN agreement itself, which depends on measures to progressively 
formalise the global role of the ICC. Viewed within the structure of ideologically informed conceptions 
of law, however, the reasoning assumes a coherence it otherwise lacks. 
56
view such a basic expression of respect as inconsistent with their aspiration of universal membership of the ICC, as if 
it is, in fact, somehow illegitimate for a state to choose not to become party to the Rome Statute. By their actions, 
they have made clear that the pragmatic modus vivendi that we have been seeking to promote is simply not 
working.
 In 
response Ambassador Wolff argued that failure to acknowledge the right of the US to remain outside 
the regime demonstrated that sponsors of the resolution, as well as members of the LMS: 
57
 
 
The frustration arose directly from the fault line between the legalist conception that did view US 
obstruction to the development of global governance as illegitimate, and the belief by US legal 
policymakers that the pragmatic development being then advocated was the most legitimate strategy 
for advancing the rule of IL. 
                                               
52 Ibid 
53 Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations (2004), see supra 
54 Cited in Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, in Sally J. Cummins (ed), Digest of United States Practice in 
International Law: 2004 (International Law Institute, 2006) at 177 
55 Ibid at 178 
56 GA Res 62/12, UN Doc A/RES/62/12, (26 November, 2007) 
57 Cited in Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, in Sally J. Cummins (ed), Digest of United States Practice in 
International Law: 2007 (International Law Institute, 2008) at 181 
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The Legal Structure of Political Explanations for Shifting US Policy 
The main alternative explanation for outcomes in this period is that US legal policymakers engaged in 
tactical political adjustments in an attempt to mitigate growing global criticism. This is the argument 
that American IL policy is best explained as an ongoing pragmatic and instrumental compromise 
between an established rule of law ideal, and US political interests. A specific characterisation made 
by policymakers in this period is of a progression from excessive attention to law in the first term to 
more politically informed decision-making in the second term. 
Philip Zelikow was Counselor of the United States Department of State through the second 
term58 and had previously drafted the NSS 2002 that introduced the legal argument for “pre-emptive” 
self-defence in the War on Terror.59 Zelikow argues that there was unwarranted reliance on lawyers in 
the first term who thought in terms of “a binary division between the world of policy judgment and the 
world of legal analysis.”60 The consequence was an approach to national security questions “less as a 
detailed analysis of what should be done, and more as a problem of what could be done.”61 Bradley 
concurs, arguing that the administration demonstrated “an almost obsessive attention to international 
legal process.”62 The lesson learnt was that, although the “rule of law promotes important values, 
framing questions in legal terms can sometimes produce undesirable outcomes.”63 The shift in the 
second term was characterised by Zelikow and Bradley as a “pragmatic” return to privileging 
diplomatic interests over legal doctrine.64
This argument turns legalist critiques on their head by claiming that the problem was one of 
too much concern for legality in the first term followed by greater political awareness in the second. 
Rice corroborated this to some degree in recalling that President Bush’s first question when faced 
with proposed “enhanced interrogation” techniques was whether they were legal, and then holding off 
interrogations until assurance was received.
  
65 Rice was equally adamant that she was guided by the 
Justice Department, since she “would never have engaged in—or encouraged the President to 
undertake—activities that I thought to be illegal.”66 In contrast, the conclusion reached by Sands and 
others is that the first term substituted any concern for legality with political interests, and only 
subsequently demonstrated an awareness of legal obligations.67
                                               
58 See United States Department of State, ‘Counselors,’ Office of the Historian 
<https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/principalofficers/counselor> 
 This contradiction cannot be 
resolved merely by analysing US policy in terms of the opposition between law and politics, as each 
side has sought to do. The most coherent explanation is instead that there were competing underlying 
conceptions of law, which were themselves constituted by politics. First term IL policy did rely on 
59 Rice, Condoleezza, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years in Washington (Random House LLC, 2011) at 153; Mann, 
James, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (Viking, 2004) at 316-317 & 331. Zelikow attributes authorship 
of the doctrine to Bellinger: Zelikow, Philip D., In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11 (13 
October, 2011) <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/uncertain-times-american-foreign-policy-after-the-berlin-wall-and-911>. That 
claim is expressly refuted by Bellinger: Bellinger III, John B., Interview with Author (12 January, 2012) 
60 Zelikow, Philip, ‘Codes of Conduct for a Twilight War’ (2012) 49 Houston Law Review 1 at 5 
61 Zelikow, Philip, ‘Legal Policy for a Twilight War’ (2007) 30 Houston Journal of International Law 89 at 94; Zelikow, Philip, 
‘Codes of Conduct for a Twilight War’ (2012) 49 Houston Law Review 1 at 5 
62 Bradley, Curtis A., ‘The Bush Administration and International Law: Too Much Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy’ (2009) 4 
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy 57 at 74 
63 Ibid at 74 
64 Ibid at 58; Zelikow, Philip, ‘Legal Policy for a Twilight War’ (2007) 30 Houston Journal of International Law 89 at 94; Zelikow, 
Philip, ‘Codes of Conduct for a Twilight War’ (2012) 49 Houston Law Review 1 at 107-109 
65 Rice, Condoleezza, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years in Washington (Random House LLC, 2011) at 117-118 
66 Ibid at 117-120 
67 See Sands, Philippe, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (Viking, 2006) at xix supra 
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legalistic justifications, but it would be implausible to characterise these as politically neutral for that 
reason.68 Rather the commitment to a legal framework was consistently guided by a strategy of 
developing IL as a permissive framework that removed legal constraints to American foreign policy. 
This reflected the Illiberal Nationalist conception of IL as an existential constraint to be developed into 
a permissive framework allowing the substance of foreign policy to be determined as far as possible 
by extralegal criteria. Zelikow’s analysis focused largely on the justification of detainee treatment in 
the War on Terror according to legal criteria, but is equally relevant to legal justifications for ICC policy 
in this period.69
Equally the return to “pragmatism” in the second term is more coherently explained as a shift 
to a competing conception of the rule of IL rather than as tactical rebalancing between law and 
politics. This is more consistent with a shift between legal conceptions than a shift away from reliance 
on legal advice. The preferences expressed by Bellinger and other leading legal policymakers 
recognised the value in pragmatically developing institutions of global governance as a tool for 
advancing US national security interests. The Illiberal Internationalist conception of the rule of law was 
to promote US action through international institutions properly developed to advance US interests, 
while taking account of necessary diplomatic concessions. The renewed relationship between the 
UNSC and ICC in this period reflected that willingness to strengthen the court according to carefully 
circumscribed limits to the reach of global governance over US foreign policy. This was consistent 
with the Illiberal Internationalist recognition that IL afforded an opportunity, where managed 
effectively, within a selection of diplomatic tools. The most coherent analysis of this period is to say 
that first term policy was consistent with the permissive legal conception of Illiberal Nationalism, and 
that the subsequent shift was to the pragmatism of Illiberal Internationalism. In both cases legal 
policymakers consciously defended US policy in terms of fidelity to law. Bellinger’s summary of the 
UNSC referral of Sudan to the ICC was that, where there were “no other ways to achieve 
accountability for the genocide in Sudan, then we don’t have any problem abstaining.”
 In both cases administration lawyers defined IL so permissively that policy could be 
defended as consistent with law despite being determined exclusively by reference to unilateral 
preferences rather than universal standards. This is a conception of IL as malleable almost without 
limit in order to accommodate the substantive national security and cultural values of Illiberal 
Nationalism. 
70
 
 This policy 
clearly retained accountability under IL as a priority, and yet rejected the value of formal constraints of 
global governance to achieve that end. Even as US policy transitioned from active opposition to a 
form of pragmatic development, it at no point encompassed the legalist rule of IL conception. 
Conclusion 
During the second term of the Bush administration the ICC sought to consolidate its status as the 
premier institution of global governance in international criminal law. This was reflected in agreements 
                                               
68 On this see Cole’s response to Zelikow: Cole, David, ‘The Taint of Torture: The Roles of Law and Policy in Our Descent to 
the Dark Side’ (2012) 49 Houston Law Review 53 
69 See Bradley who treats them together: Bradley, Curtis A., ‘The Bush Administration and International Law: Too Much 
Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy’ (2009) 4 Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy 57 
70 Cited in Bosco, David, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court’s Battle to Fix the World, One Prosecution at a Time 
(Oxford University Press, 2014) at 111-112 
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with the UN and EU confirming that status in the formalised development of IL. As for the US, there 
was a meaningful shift in IL policy along the jurisdictional dimension – from the more nationalist 
conception of the first term that treated municipal law as sufficient to advance American interests, to 
an internationalist stance that sought to advance those interests through leveraging IL. In Bellinger’s 
terms the shift was to “a very pragmatic approach to the ICC in the second term that was really 
substantially different from the first term.”71
 
 Softening of objections to the ICC that this entailed 
appeared to signal a US position moving closer to the legalist conception of the court. Yet the 
consistency of the underlying beliefs of policymakers with Illiberal Internationalist legal conceptions 
provides evidence that US policy continued to be structured by fundamentally different conceptions of 
the rule of IL itself. On the evidence, at no point in this period did legalist conceptions form a 
meaningful part of American IL policy. 
 
DEFINING EQUALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
From the earliest years of negotiating the Rome Statute, US demands to carve out unequal legal 
privileges through UNSC resolutions were strongly opposed by other states. During the second term 
of the Bush administration legalist policymakers strengthened their opposition to US demands for a 
further renewal of Article 16 UNSC immunity as a precondition to supporting peacekeeping 
operations.72
 
 The continuation of the practice was rejected for institutionalising legal inequality in the 
ICC. At the same time the UNSC decided in this period to refer the situation in the Darfur region of 
Sudan to the ICC as a possible genocide case. That became a test for the US to demonstrate how 
committed it was to opposing a court based on the principle of sovereign equality. Bush’s IL policy 
notably relented, dropping demands for renewal of ICC immunity through the UNSC, and acquiescing 
to the Darfur referral. In both cases the outcome for US policy was to move toward a position more 
consistent with legalist preferences for the court. The outcome raises a potential challenge to the 
argument that foreign policy ideology creates hard limits to reaching a common conception of the rule 
of IL. An examination of beliefs structuring decision-making is necessary to determine whether these 
cases confirm or falsify the central hypothesis about the role of ideology. 
Legalist Policy 
UNSC exemptions granted to US peacekeepers were always seen as contrary to the rule of IL by 
policymakers guided by the principle of sovereign equality. In June 2004, when the US insisted on its 
third annual renewal, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan responded that in light of a developing 
prisoner abuse scandal in Iraq it would be improper both for the US to request an exemption, and for 
the UNSC to grant it: “It would discredit the Council and the United Nations that stands for rule of law 
and the primacy of rule of law.”73
                                               
71 Bellinger III, John B., Interview with Author (12 January, 2012) 
 Entailed in this admonition was an insistence that the rules of IL 
within the court’s jurisdiction be applied equally to all states without allowances for any claimed 
72 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), Art.16 “Deferral of investigation or prosecution” 
73 Lynch, Colum, ‘Annan Opposes Exempting U.S. From Court,’ Washington Post (18 June, 2004) A24; See generally CICC, 
‘Chronology of the Adoption of Security Council Resolutions 1422/1487 and Withdrawal of the Proposed Renewal in 2004,’ 
Factsheet (2004) <http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-1422and1487Chronology_26March2008.pdf> 
Bush 43 Administration 2004-2008 
 
189 
 
special character, rights or duties. NGO groups similarly approached the issue by reference to legalist 
principles defining the proper relationship between sovereign states. The CICC commended eventual 
US withdrawal of the renewal request arguing that it “reflected the growing international support for 
the ICC and the diminishing capacity of the US to stand above international law.”74 Similarly Amnesty 
International argued that the immunity resolutions were problematic not merely for undermining the 
ICC and IL more generally, but because they were for that reason “unlawful.” Amnesty head Irene 
Khan described the ultimate failure of the US to gain a renewal as “a victory for international justice 
and the rule of law.”75
 At this same time the UNSC moved to use its powers under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute 
to refer the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
 
76 This 
followed the recommendation of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in circumstances 
where the only way to exercise jurisdiction over Sudan, as a non-State Party to the ICC Statute,77 was 
via a UNSC referral under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. That power had been a concession at 
the Rome negotiations to permit a narrow form of UNSC control, potentially contradicting legalist 
insistence on sovereign equality. However support for the referral as the only option in Darfur 
emphasised the way in which the power was to be exercised on behalf of all states equally, rather 
than by the P-5 in their own right. The International Commission report, for example, supported the 
appropriateness of the referral as a statement on behalf of “the whole world community through its 
most important political organ.”78 Similarly, in an open letter to Condoleezza Rice, the Executive 
Director of Human Rights Watch challenged the legitimacy of the US exercising its veto powers as an 
expression of parochial interests.79
US insistence on a form of immunity in Resolution 1593 led Brazil, which then held the 
rotating UNSC presidency, to abstain from the vote. Despite confirming its support for the referral 
Brazil’s representative protested at the precedent of a resolution specifically granting privileges to the 
US on the basis of its unique global role. The representative argued that the “maintenance of 
international peace and the fight against impunity cannot be viewed as conflicting objectives.”
 The P-5’s powers were interpreted as being subject as far as 
possible to the interests of all states in the ICC, rather than as being entirely the prerogative of a 
privileged few members. 
80
 
 Brazil 
“rejected initiatives aimed at extending exemptions of certain categories of individuals from ICC 
jurisdiction” as contrary to international criminal justice. Divergence between the assumption of 
sovereign equality and the competing principles structuring American IL policy underpinned claims the 
US ICC stance contradicted its claimed commitment to the rule of IL. 
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Rule Of Law,” Says AI,’ Amnesty International Press Release (24 June, 2004) 
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76 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998); SC Res 1593, UN Doc S/RES/1593 (31 March, 2005) 
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Beliefs of American Legal Policymakers 
Contradiction of Exceptionalist Beliefs in US Prisoner Abuse Scandals 
In 2005 then Senator Hillary Clinton continued to defend American IL policy in broadly internationalist 
terms, emphasising both principles of liberal equality and hegemonic privilege. Clinton reminded 
European critics that: 
the United States has global responsibilities that create unique circumstances. For example, we are more vulnerable 
to the misuse of an international criminal court because of the international role we play and the resentments that 
flow from that ubiquitous presence around the world. 81
 
 
In these sentiments Clinton alluded to elements of American exceptionalism and the implications for 
an ICC design consistent with her understanding of the rule of IL. “Global responsibilities” referred to 
were the duties involved in exercising international executive power to uphold IL. Clinton’s concern for 
“misuse” of the ICC was effectively a charge of “lawfare”: of legalist judicial institutions being used to 
constrain the US and thereby erode not merely its global power, but the international legal system 
underpinned by US power.82 The possession of exceptionalist beliefs limited recognition of sovereign 
equality, but did go hand in hand with the granting of hegemonic legal privileges. At the same time, 
where Clinton sought to speak for “all of those people looking at us and yearning to be part of what 
we are,”83
The significance of such exceptionalist beliefs to American legal conceptions became strongly 
apparent in the second Bush 43 term, but in the unique circumstances of their elimination from 
policymaking assumptions. Schabas documented that the first sign of a shift in US ICC policy came in 
2004 in backing down on requested renewal of UNSC resolutions granting US peacekeepers ICC 
immunity.
 her determination of the proper relationship between sovereign states equally revealed an 
acceptance of the principle of liberal equality. 
84 He cited the decisive factor as revelations about the abuses in Abu Ghraib Prison in the 
aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War: “Shamed and humbled by the tales of abuse” the US withdrew its 
deferral resolution.85
                                               
81 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, German Media Prize Dinner: Remarks of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (13 February, 2005) 
<http://www.amicc.org/docs/Clinton%202_13_05.pdf>. Taft has responded “I don’t think she really believed that...it’s more of a 
political judgement” when asked if this statement demonstrated a belief that it was necessary to exempt the US from ICC 
jurisdiction to uphold the rule of IL: Taft IV, William H., Interview with Author (22 November, 2011) 
 The significance of the prisoner abuse scandals in Afghanistan, Guantanamo, 
but especially Abu Ghraib, was that they provided compelling evidence against US political culture 
being a sufficient check against international illegality. In terms of the theoretical framework adopted 
here, any piercing of the exceptionalist veil would be expected to cause the US to turn away from 
legal conceptions relying on associated ideologies. If legal conceptions play a meaningful role in 
structuring IL policy then the US would be more likely to accede to a policy outcome aligned with 
legalist demands for sovereign equality – even as political interests were held constant. 
82 See Chapter 6 supra 
83 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, German Media Prize Dinner: Remarks of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (13 February, 2005) 
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Rice admitted that the images from Abu Ghraib diminished global perceptions of “America as 
something different.”86 She later lamented that lasting damage was caused when “the image of the 
U.S. soldier around the world became associated with the depravity of Abu Ghraib.”87 The translation 
of this recognition into IL policy was evident in Ambassador Danforth’s classified communications 
advising the State Department that failure to renew UNSC Resolution 1487 was “principally because it 
came up at the same time as the Abu Ghraib abuses came to light.”88 Bassiouni explained that the 
examples “evidenced to the international community the need for accountability,” and most especially 
for the US, despite holding out that “its system of criminal justice is better than that of most other 
countries and that its system of military justice can be relied upon to perform its mission without 
international monitoring.”89 To the contrary, Amnesty International argued that the scandal 
demonstrated “blatant disregard being shown for the rule of law, and the Bush Administration should 
be doing everything in its power to support the principles embodied in the ICC.”90
That these circumstances led to the withdrawal of US demands for hegemonic privilege, or 
even for deference to a form of liberal equality, is compelling evidence of the extent that foreign policy 
ideology structured conceptions of IL. Once the foundation of exceptionalist beliefs was dissolved, the 
entire edifice of distinctive interpretations of the rule of law collapsed. The only influential legal policy 
remaining that did not depend on exceptionalist beliefs was that of legalism. Following the lapsing of 
Resolution 1487 US policy accepted a legal status in UN peacekeeping missions that, formally at 
least, was as a sovereign equal. The policy outcome in this narrowly defined area therefore provided 
an insight into US legal policy absent an exceptionalist foundation, but for that reason reinforced the 
power of foreign policy ideology in structuring law. 
  
 
Reframing UNSC Referral of the Darfur Situation 
The shift in US policy culminated in tacit support for a referral of Darfur by the UNSC in March 2005 
despite previous declarations never to work with the court.91 Bosco described the success in gaining 
US acquiescence to the Darfur referral as a “major breakthrough” in relations.92 The congruence of 
the shift with the model of legal conceptions is evident in a prescient statement five years earlier by 
Michael Scharf, which had advocated the very Illiberal Internationalism that made such a comeback in 
Bush’s second term. In reference to evidence of rising Illiberal Nationalist hostility in the first term, 
Scharf warned that IL must be preserved as a diplomatic tool since “when the next Rwanda-like 
situation comes along, the Bush administration will find value in having the option of Security Council 
Referral to the ICC in its arsenal of foreign policy responses”93
                                               
86 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Dr. 
Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State, 1st Session 109th Congress (2005) at 147 
 That was precisely the realisation 
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91 See Schabas, William, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press, 4th ed, 2011) at 32 
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reached in coming to see the ICC as the best forum for fulfilling US interests in the case of a 
humanitarian crisis not directly involving American security interests. 
 Goldsmith has provided the most explicit defence of the Darfur referral in Illiberal 
Internationalist terms. In the Washington Post he reminded the administration that a successful UNSC 
referral would reinforce the wisdom of the original US position of supporting an international court 
under UNSC control.94
this double standard is woven into the fabric of international politics and is the relatively small price the international 
system pays for the political accountability and support that only the big powers, acting through the Security Council , 
can provide.
 In advocating that position Goldsmith readily acknowledged the inconsistency 
of UNSC control with sovereign equality, which critics would likely reject as “a double standard for 
Security Council members, who can protect themselves by vetoing a referral.” Yet he in no way 
attempted to defend the US position as consistent with the principle of sovereign equality. Rather he 
observed that: 
95
 
 
This is an assertion of hegemonic privilege as an element of the rule of IL: that IL must be structured 
to reflect the realities of political power if it is to be a meaningful force in ameliorating raw political 
ambition. Bosco argued that Goldsmith had effectively called for the US “to informally merge the court 
into the system of major-power privilege.”96
In reviewing these policy outcomes Heyder adopted the standard legalist critique of the US, 
which was to characterise US acquiescence to the Darfur referral as contradictory in jurisprudential 
terms, and only coherent when understood as tactical manipulations of the law in order to “maintain 
hegemonic power over international criminal justice.”
 This was an accurate analysis at the level of the political 
dynamics underpinning American foreign policy. But, at the level of the interplay between law and 
politics, it did not explain the logic of legal argumentation adopted in reaching this outcome. 
Identifying Goldsmith’s argument as structured by Illiberal Internationalism allows for analysis of legal 
reasoning that reconciles political interests with expressed commitment to IL. 
97 Her conclusion was that the referral “must be 
interpreted as an attempt to safeguard American exceptionalism and enable the United States to 
more easily advance its particular interest.”98
The power of exceptionalist beliefs as the lynchpin for American legal conceptions was laid 
bare in Rice’s explanation for why citizens of Sudan, as a non-party to the Rome Statute, should be 
 She was indeed correct to identify the causal role of 
exceptionalist beliefs in structuring US IL policy, but her conclusion fell short of recognising the way 
that exceptionalist beliefs were constitutive of American conceptions of the rule of IL itself. The 
problem was not one of legal policymakers compromising their perception of the rule of IL according 
to political interests. Rather it was that policymakers were guided by conceptions of IL encompassing 
exceptionalist beliefs from the beginning. 
                                               
94 Goldsmith, Jack L., ‘Support War Crimes Trials for Darfur,’ Washington Post (24 January, 2005) 
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95 Ibid 
96 Bosco, David, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court’s Battle to Fix the World, One Prosecution at a Time (Oxford 
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subject to ICC jurisdiction whilst the US adamantly denied that jurisdiction over American citizens. For 
Rice it was “important to uphold the principle that non-parties to a treaty are indeed non-parties to a 
treaty,” but that, “Sudan is an extraordinary circumstance.”99 Reference was made to the protections 
of non-parties to the treaty in the referring UNSC resolution, but this was hardly an answer given that 
those protections were directed at the US itself. The further explanation was that, as a practical 
matter, Sudan represented “a humanitarian crisis, it is a moral crisis, and it is a crisis that is 
extraordinary in its scope and in its potential for even greater damage to those populations. So I think 
this is a different situation, frankly.”100 Sands described this response as “flummoxed.”101
America is a country of laws...when we respect our international legal obligations and support an international system 
based on the rule of law, we do the work of making the world a better place, but also a safer and more secure place 
for America.
 A consistent 
principle can be identified in the unequal treatment, however, which was that, because the US was 
believed to occupy an unequal position, the meaning of equality under IL entailed a commensurate 
adjustment of legal rights and duties. Certainly Rice appeared satisfied that US policy was guided by 
principles consistent with the rule of IL when she addressed the Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of International Law later that same day: 
102
 
 
Beyond objections to the principle of UNSC control, Bosco noted that Resolution 1593 
created an important precedent whereby the US was effectively able to circumscribe the rights and 
privileges to be enjoyed by specific states before the ICC. This appeared to go beyond the UNSC’s 
proper power to simply refer situations under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, which falls short of a 
power to set the terms for an ICC prosecution.103 Robert Cryer specifically cited this as a key reason 
for raising “serious questions” about the resolution’s “compliance with basic principles of the rule of 
law.”104 He reviewed previous statements by Scheffer which seem to suggest an interpretation of 
Article 13(b) permitting the US to specifically “define the parameters” of ICC jurisdiction over states 
who play a special enforcement role in the international legal system.105 In weighing up the value of 
fidelity to the rule of IL against UNSC action Cryer, rejected the legitimacy of the US interpretation for 
elevating “exceptionalist claims” over respect for sovereign equality.106
Reviewing Cryer’s argument demonstrates very clearly the limitations of divorcing law and 
politics when explaining US ICC policy. He noted that the possibility of selective justice resulting from 
exceptionalist beliefs was “a sobering reminder that the international legal order is not one in which 
the rule of law is easy to realize.” Yet this was immediately followed with the counterpoint that 
“prosecutions for extremely serious crimes are likely now to occur, when they were unlikely to have 
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done so if the Security Council had no role in referring cases to the ICC.”107 Cryer was eager to avoid 
“being too precious about principle” where practical justice was being advanced,108
For US legal policymakers that nexus between exceptionalism and the operation of IL is not 
unique to the Darfur referral but is constitutive of the international legal system. In this view there is no 
conceivable scenario where the legalist rule of law conception would usefully provide principles for US 
policy to establish the rule of IL. In short, a system defined by reference to sovereign equality is not 
merely a poor description of law: it is an account incompatible with the realisation of the ideal. Cryer’s 
refusal to adjust the purity of legal principles, even while admitting their failure to capture the way law 
operates, is precisely the limitation that sustains US claims that a meaningful account of the rule of IL 
must incorporate policy considerations within the central concept. In this case it was precisely by 
preserving hegemonic privilege that global politics was seen to be most effectively ordered according 
to predetermined legal rights and duties. 
 yet he ultimately 
retained the binary distinction between the concept of the rule of IL and American political power. The 
quandary he posed is that exceptionalist claims are incompatible with sovereign equality as an 
element of the rule of IL, and yet the veracity of those claims is reinforced wherever the UNSC is 
called upon to make the legal system effective. 
Prior to the referral Heyder opined that it was “difficult to understand” why the US would not 
support such a resolution on at least an ad hoc basis when a commitment to international criminal 
justice “is a deeply rooted part of U.S. foreign policy.”109 The apparent contradiction stemmed from the 
commentator’s assumption that the operation and strengthening of the ICC, as it was structured in 
2005, was consistent with US policymakers’ commitments to international criminal law. However, so 
long as the court remained structured according to the principle of sovereign equality, any vote for the 
court referral at that point was tantamount to an endorsement of that definition of equality. It was 
ultimately this divergence in legal principles that lay behind the appearance of contradictions in 
American condemnation for the situation in Darfur and wariness toward an ICC resolution. The 
consolidation of US hegemonic privilege as a principle for upholding the rule of law was complete by 
2008 when the US supported the ICC in blocking African Union attempts to provide immunity from 
prosecution for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir flowing from the Darfur referral. Scheffer 
observed that by this period “the Bush administration had finally rid itself of Bolton” and thereby was 
able to exercise its international legal privileges to facilitate the functioning of the court.110
 
 
Conclusion 
The shift in US policy regarding the proper relationship between sovereign states demonstrated the 
significant influence of exceptionalist beliefs underpinning competing conceptions of IL. During the 
first term of the Bush 43 administration the US had assertively sought and obtained unequal 
immunities from ICC jurisdiction through the UNSC. From a political perspective this could be 
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explained broadly as the predictable behaviour of a powerful state manipulating international legal 
rules. However, in legal terms, the foundation of the US position was a conception of IL drawn from 
exceptionalist beliefs justifying either an exceptional US role as the guarantor of liberal equality, or a 
form of hegemonic privilege. The revelations of prisoner abuse in the “War on Terror” fundamentally 
undermined beliefs that US democratic norms were a protection against such breaches, or that 
concessions to hegemonic privilege strengthened the international legal system as a whole. As the 
exceptionalist veil was pierced US IL policy fell in line with the legalist rejection of UNSC immunity for 
being contrary to sovereign equality. 
 In permitting the referral of the Darfur situation, the shift in US policy reasserted underlying 
exceptionalist beliefs and thereby remained distinct from legalist preferences even as policy became 
more accommodating. Where US policymakers were guided by one or more of the ideal type 
American legal conceptions the act of allowing the referral, without positively endorsing it, was 
capable of sustaining each of those alternative conceptions. The US did ultimately allow the referral, 
choosing to abstain from any vote against the action. Yet despite this advancing the ICC cause, critics 
argued that the “selective enforcement of international criminal law” in the referral demonstrated that 
the international legal system “has a long way to go before it represents a system that truly reflects 
rule of law principles.”111
 
 The enhanced enforcement of criminal liability was not recognised by legalist 
advocates as advancing the rule of law so long as US policy ignored the principle of sovereign 
equality. The beliefs structuring the US position revealed most strongly the influence of Illiberal 
Internationalism, which saw the circumstances as an opportunity to reassert the role of the ICC as a 
diplomatic tool advancing US national security interests. 
 
ORDERING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POWER 
Disagreement over ordering of the court’s international legal powers during the second term centred 
on overcoming harsher measures in the ASPA designed to curtail ICC powers altogether. That 
legislation sought to alter the hierarchy of powers between the court and sovereign states by 
restricting forms of political cooperation that strengthened the court’s judicial and prosecutorial 
functions. For legalist advocates this was a clear contradiction of the separation of judicial powers in 
the ICC necessary to sustain the rule of IL. By the second term the consequence of US insistence on 
the supremacy of its own legal powers was eroded cooperation with key partners who had refused to 
formalise the revised ordering of powers in bilateral agreements. The problem had been flagged as 
early as Rice’s confirmation hearings when Senator Dodd referred to disruptions to vital military 
relationships due to US “fixation with the international criminal court, as codified by the American 
Servicemen’s Protection Act.”112
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 The US relented and modified application of the ASPA to allow for 
greater cooperation with allies and a more conciliatory policy permitting exceptions for US assistance 
to the ICC. Rice announced the changes noting the negative impact upon counterterrorism and drug 
112 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Dr. 
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operations, and on military cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan.113 The ASPA had to yield to the 
preservation of “relationships that are really important to us from the point of view of...improving the 
security environment.”114
 
 However, even as US policy sanctioned the legitimacy of ICC judicial power, 
it continued to deny the plausibility of impartial international judicial power and to reserve judicial 
authority over its nationals to US courts. Policy outcomes showed some evidence of increased 
deference to the ICC’s judicial power, but this remained distinct from relinquishing parallel judicial 
powers exercised at the US municipal level. This again created a potential contradiction and a case 
for examining the role of ideological conceptions of law in structuring decision-making processes. 
Legalist Policy 
Legalist advocates in this period continued to adhere to the idea that the ICC was capable of 
exercising independent judicial power as a counterbalance to political interests. The developing 
UNSC-ICC relationship contained in the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur115 was 
defended as being consistent with the UNSC as “the highest body of the international community 
responsible for maintaining peace and security” and the ICC as “the highest criminal judicial institution 
of the world community.”116 That view was equally reflected in the position of NGOs, who continued to 
advocate separation of the court’s judicial power, and thereby the need to place it above the exercise 
of parallel powers by states. The head of Amnesty International Irene Khan expressed hope that 
apparent softening of US policy “will prompt the US to review its opposition to the ICC and join the 
world community in reaffirming the primacy of international law.”117
 The inadequacy of any legal policy that fell short of a separation of powers was also evident 
in the reactions of states engaging with the US at this time. France’s permanent representative to the 
UN, Jean-Marc de La Sablière, noted that immunity requested by the US in resolution 1593 was 
acceded to only on pragmatic grounds, with an expectation that such clauses would not be included in 
future referrals.
 In these statements advocates 
revealed the extent to which their conception of the rule of IL turned on separating powers into 
defined global bodies. 
118
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 Brazil was less compromising in its abstention to protest the precedent of 
specifically reserving judicial power to the US while excluding ICC authority. This was despite 
acknowledging the desirability of the resolution and the practical effect it would have in the particular 
circumstances. Brazil nevertheless affirmed the need to preserve the character of the ICC as “an 
independent judicial body,” which already “provides all the necessary checks and balances to prevent 
possible abuses and politically motivated misuse of its jurisdiction.” On this basis the Brazilian 
representative rejected a reference to Article 98 agreements in the preamble as contradicting the fight 
114 Rice, Condoleezza, ‘En Route to San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 10, 2006,’ Trip Briefing (2006) <http://2001-
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115 Cassese, Antonio, et.al., Report of the International Commission on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 
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against impunity by limiting the jurisdictional reach of the court. Neither could Brazil support operative 
clause 6 “through which the Council recognizes the existence of exclusive jurisdiction, a legal 
exception that is inconsistent in international law.”119 Together these measures were likely to “have 
the effect of dismantling the achievements reached in the field of international criminal justice.”120 
Likewise the Algerian representative abstained for reasons including that, in the endeavour to achieve 
practical justice, the terms of the referral improperly established a form of “two-track justice.”121
 
 States 
were not merely looking for practical US support for the ICC in the immediate case. Rather there was 
a clear conception of the contribution of the ICC to the rule of IL and what was required of the US to 
meet that principle. 
Beliefs of American Legal Policymakers 
Sanctioning of ICC Judicial Power as Limited by US Consent to Jurisdiction 
US approaches to the Darfur referral uniformly insisted on terms contrary to a court design based on 
an effective separation of international legal powers. Any legal disputes amongst American 
policymakers were thus not about how to accommodate the supremacy of the ICC’s judicial power, 
but rather between entirely separate ordering principles drawn from ideological interpretations of 
American strategic interests. The chief policy shift in this period was from a belief that municipal legal 
powers must remain supreme without exception, to an acceptance that US interests were advanced 
by consenting to defined ICC legal functions. Bellinger emphasised that, in the second term, the 
administration only resisted the ICC’s “method for achieving accountability” rather than its aspiration 
to do so.122 This was an argument about the proper ordering of international legal power according to 
a “deeply held American belief that power needs to be checked and public actors need to be held 
accountable.”123
Initially, the US continued to resist the UNSC referral according to its long held insistence that 
only municipal law could be relied on in matters of criminal justice. The US had been among the first 
and most prominent states to declare that the situation in Darfur amounted to genocide. Rice 
endorsed this action by emphasising that the facts fulfilled the twin elements of the formal legal 
 In the first term of the Bush administration there was insistence that judicial 
determination of the subject matter of international criminal law must be the sole province of municipal 
law – of American courts or tribunals in the case of US nationals, and of locally constituted courts in 
the case of international prosecutions. Subsequent US action was thereby structured by the legal 
obligations to resist any ICC role. The shift in the second term was to recognise that, in the latter 
case, there were strategic advantages to employing the ICC in lieu of locally constituted courts, 
provided the terms of any such prosecution continued to clearly exclude matters falling under US 
judicial power. There was a shift along the jurisdictional dimension from an Illiberal Nationalist to 
Illiberal Internationalist conception of American interests, which thereby bolstered the operation of the 
court while still denying the supremacy of ICC judicial power. 
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definition of genocide.124 Accordingly, policymakers were at great pains to deny a lack of US 
commitment to international criminal justice. Rather Rice’s recollection is that Bush’s rejection of the 
Rome Statute was in large measure due to the unaccountability of the prosecutor to an identifiable 
government. Opposition to the ICC “was an issue of sovereignty and a step that looked a bit too much 
like ‘world government.’”125 Acting UN Ambassador Anne Patterson similarly reiterated a US 
preference for domestic based resolutions, such as a hybrid tribunal in Africa.126 The evidence is that 
the US was presented from the beginning with a choice between blocking the referral in preference 
for a hybrid court using the infrastructure of the ICTR, or to “carve out US exemption” within a referral 
it could support.127 The State Department went to great lengths to achieve the former option, and it 
was only after failing to do so that it switched to the conception of the ICC role initially recommended 
by Ambassador Danforth.128 Notably Rice ultimately decided to support the referral on the basis that a 
change in strategy promised greater accountability under IL for Darfur perpetrators. To do otherwise 
would be “just to make an ideological point about the construction of the court or the Rome 
Statute.”129
On US insistence the terms of UNSC Resolution 1593 explicitly took note of “agreements 
referred to in Article 98-2 of the Rome Statute.” This was inserted as a measure to preserve US 
judicial authority over potential cases of US nationals committing crimes within the territory of state 
parties to the ICC.
 This is revealing for the extent to which both ideology and a commitment to the idea of 
greater legal accountability were taken into account in the shift from one policy stance to another. 
130
Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which is not a 
party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that 
contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or 
authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that 
contributing State
 More directly, the resolution reiterated the limits of US consent to ICC judicial 
authority in the sixth of its operative clauses which stated that the Security Council: 
131
 
 
On the one hand the resolution as a whole was designed to legitimise the ICC’s exercise of 
international judicial power, but on the other hand, this clause denied an effective separation of that 
power from the states exercising international executive and legislative functions. The effect of clause 
six was to ensure that judicial power over international criminal matters was retained by the US in 
relation to its own nationals. This was potentially consistent with the influence of a number of the 
American legal conceptions, but was most strongly influenced by the return to an Illiberal 
Internationalist stance. 
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Acting Ambassador Patterson emphasised that consent to jurisdiction set the limits of US 
support for the Darfur referral, noting that any alternative arrangement struck “at the essence of the 
nature of sovereignty.” On those terms the US would still not vote for the referral but ultimately: 
decided not to oppose the resolution because of the need for the international community to work together in order to 
end the climate of impunity in Sudan, and because the resolution provides protection from investigation or 
prosecution for U.S. nationals and members of the armed forces of non-state parties.132
 
 
Notably, the explanation provided by Patterson was structured around the theme of US commitment 
to end impunity for violations of IL, with the principle of a consent based allocation of powers being 
central to that end. In general the US remained committed to the principle that: “Violators of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law must be held accountable.” In this context 
Patterson reminded her audience that the US had long argued for UNSC control of referrals and that, 
by doing so in relation to Darfur, “firm political oversight of the process will be exercised.” Immediately 
thereafter however she reiterated that, where the US was concerned, continued objections to the ICC 
were due to the weakness of “sufficient protections from the possibility of politicized prosecutions.” In 
this sense her beliefs identified politics as both the guarantor of the rule of IL in the UNSC, but its 
enemy in the ICC. This apparent incoherence is resolved by viewing the underlying conception of IL in 
terms of the role of foreign policy ideology and exceptionalist beliefs in structuring conceptions of law. 
The US rejected the suggestion that this position equated to sanctioning impunity, since the US itself 
would “continue to discipline our own people where appropriate.”133
 
 As a whole the arrangement 
achieved in the Darfur referral normalised and institutionalised a situation of parallel exercises of 
international judicial power by both the court and US municipal processes. 
Conclusion 
This period saw the realisation of the Illiberal Internationalist preference for the ordering of 
international legal powers in the ICC, with the court confirmed as a legitimate source of international 
judicial authority, yet with clear limitations on the exercise of that power. This did not correspond with 
the principled objections of US global counterparts, which continued to insist that the ICC had an 
oversight role in exercising independent international judicial powers. Despite optimism about the 
apparent US shift toward a legalist ICC policy, some advocates recognised that these circumstances 
revealed the hard limits to further cooperation. Heyder began her analysis from the legalist position of 
arguing that, by removing any exceptional US control through the UNSC, “the ICC has the authority to 
act exclusively based on purely factual and judicial motives, at any time, and free from political 
influence.”134
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long run.”135
 
 Optimism that the US would review its position was misplaced insofar as it failed to take 
account of structural constraints – in the form of ideologically informed conceptions of the proper 
ordering of international legal power. 
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The shift in policy outcomes during the second term of the Bush 43 administration followed an 
assessment by administration policymakers that previous Illiberal Nationalist responses to the ICC 
had not optimised American national security interests. There was a concerted effort to reengage with 
the court and accept its legitimacy as an element of global governance.136
 There were undoubtedly many American voices representing NGOs and academic 
perspectives calling for the US to accede to the ICC according to a view structured by legalism. There 
is no evidence however that US policymakers accepted this set of beliefs, even in narrow cases 
where policy acceded to legalist preferences. Bosco’s review of this period affirms this conclusion in 
recognising that, although US ICC policy became “more pragmatic,” it remained the case that “no 
influential voices on the American political spectrum advocated membership.”
 However, the decision-
making process underpinning this shift closely followed the principles comprising competing 
ideologically informed conceptions of IL, and in no way was an attempt to approximate legalist 
principles in the ICC design. At the level of analysing legal principles, it is not useful simply to 
describe the period as the weakening of political objections to global legalism in favour of greater 
adherence to the rule of IL. Such would assume the universality of a particular rule of law ideal as a 
guiding principle for IL policy. Instead, the dynamic was of a shift between discrete sets of beliefs 
about the nature of the rule of IL and a corresponding change in ICC policy. 
137
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 The veracity of these 
conclusions, and the role of legalist ideals, were to come under even greater scrutiny as the 
presidency transitioned back to the control of a candidate who had staked himself out as an advocate 
of an enlarged role for IL and who even appeared to mirror legalist ideals. 
136 Cerone suggests that continued anti-ICC rhetoric may have been a mere “smokescreen” to mask the first term 
miscalculations: Cerone, John P., ‘U.S. Attitudes toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals’ in Cesare P.R. Romano 
(ed), The Sword and the Scales: The United States and International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
at 305, n.168 
137 Bosco, David, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court’s Battle to Fix the World, One Prosecution at a Time (Oxford 
University Press, 2014) at 132 
 CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 2008-2012 
 
 
Even prior to becoming a Presidential candidate in 2008, Barack Obama, and the figures who 
ultimately became his key legal policymakers, had expressed strong commitment to the rule of IL and 
a specific enthusiasm for the ICC. The change in administration accordingly raised expectations that 
Obama possessed “a genuine concern to bring US policy into line with fundamental principles of 
international law, and thus represent a significant change from his predecessor.”1
Multilateral diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United Nations and other 
international institutions can play... The USA is now paying its bills to the UN. It is joining various committees, and 
acceding to important conventions. International standards are again respected. Torture is forbidden; the President is 
doing what he can to close Guantanamo. Human rights and international law are guiding principles.
 The perception 
became tangible in the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the President in 2009. In making the 
presentation the Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee noted that: 
2
 
 
Specifically this translated into high hopes for a realignment of US-ICC policy with the rest of the 
world, up to and including possible US ratification of the Rome Statute.3 By this period the nature of 
the ICC project itself had changed, from negotiation over the court design during the Clinton era, to 
the attempts to quash the project in the first term of the Bush 43 administration, to the accommodation 
of the court’s first investigations in the second Bush term. By the time of Obama’s election, US 
policymakers were developing policy toward a court actively engaged in prosecutions and further 
defining its powers in the process. Harold Koh, as Legal Adviser to the State Department, described 
the shift in policy as having “reset the default on the U.S. relationship with the court from hostility to 
positive engagement.”4
 The focus of legalist ICC policy during this period continued to emphasise the core rule of law 
elements of: formally developing global governance; advancing sovereign equality; and, separating 
the court’s powers from competing sources of international legal power. These principles were 
focussed particularly on defining the crime of “aggression,” which had been set aside for later 
consideration at the 1998 Rome Conference. This was achieved at the 2010 Review Conference of 
the Rome Statute, held in Kampala, Uganda (“Kampala Conference”),
 
5
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(European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009) at 10; Gosalbo-Bono, Ricardo ‘The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its 
Implications for the European Union and the United States’ (2010) 72 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 229 at 354 
 where a definition was 
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confirmed and set to take effect after a further final decision in 2017.6
For its part the Obama administration began for the first time attending annual states parties 
meetings as an observer, actively advocating and voting in favour of UNSC referrals to the ICC, and 
contributing substantially to debates over the crime of aggression at the Kampala Conference. The 
President broke sharply from his predecessor in releasing statements personally calling for 
international support for ICC investigations and prosecutions.
 In so doing, global advocates 
achieved what many had considered the pinnacle of the rule of IL in subjecting decisions to use 
international force to judicial determination as a check not only on national governments, but also on 
previously unfettered UNSC power. 
7
the commitment of the Obama Administration to the rule of law and the principle of accountability is firm, in line with... 
[a] historic tradition of support for international criminal justice that has been a hallmark of United States policy dating 
back at least to the time of Nuremberg.
 Explaining the renewed support, US 
policymakers declared that: 
8
 
 
Yet, parallel to these changes, the US strongly resisted the definition of aggression agreed at the 
Review Conference, reaffirmed opposition to joining the ICC and, despite forcefully criticising the 
previous administration, declined to recant the 2002 “unsigning” notification of John Bolton. ICC policy 
outcomes accordingly continued to diverge from global advocates in ways that potentially confirmed 
the influence of foreign policy ideology on underlying conceptions of the rule of IL. 
 
 
DOMINANT INTERNATIONAL LAW POLICY 
The defining feature of the Obama IL policy was a rejection of Illiberal Nationalist conceptions of the 
Bush 43 years,9 which proved a more consistent theme than any positive set of guiding principles. 
The ideological beliefs guiding the administration’s general foreign policy have proven to be a major 
interpretive challenge, with commentators describing policy variously as “Liberal Internationalist,”10 
“pragmatic internationalist,”11 “progressive pragmatist,”12 “Jeffersonian,”13 “accommodationist,”14 and 
guided by “realpolitik.”15
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the liberal-illiberal and internationalist-nationalist dimensions across a range of foreign policy 
challenges. This may in part reflect bureaucratic politics, with political circumstances resulting in 
former Bush 43 appointees continuing in some key policymaking positions so that policy was “far 
more diffuse and diverse than ideologically doctrinaire.”16
 The dominant ideological position of the administration has been Liberal Internationalist: 
identifying the purpose of IL policy in externalising universal values. Yet the means for achieving this 
objective have often followed competing logics of Illiberal Internationalism and Liberal Nationalism: 
both ideologies setting limitations to American global responsibilities. Obama’s own beliefs suggest 
that the reality of illiberalism in global politics often necessitates more pragmatic and illiberal 
applications of law to progress a liberal vision, or alternatively, that IL should be employed defensively 
to protect liberalism at home: the challenge “of being a liberal leader in an often illiberal world.”
 However the outcome is also consistent 
with the theorised role of foreign policy ideologies, which are categorised as discrete ideal types, but 
may be received in unique configurations within the worldview of a particular policymaker or 
administration. 
17 In 
consequence ideology has sometimes manifested itself in uncomfortable configurations of strategic 
ideas.18
In the context of IL policy specifically, it is useful to isolate Obama’s own worldview from 
policy outcomes, particularly in circumstances where the President has assumed greater personal 
control over decision-making than many of his predecessors.
 
19 A reliable account of Obama’s 
conception of IL is in his Nobel Peace Prize oration, which according to a variety of sources, was 
almost entirely authored by the President and has been characterised by his closest advisers as a 
“template” or “framework” for his foreign policy beliefs.20 This is particularly useful where the balance 
of the speech directly addressed the relationship between international power and the “just war” 
tradition, and conflicts internal to American IL policy. In his address Obama challenged the supposed 
tension in American thinking between “realists or idealists – a tension that suggests a stark choice 
between the narrow pursuit of interests or an endless campaign to impose our values around the 
world.” This binary is a well-worn strawman adopted by US leaders to demonstrate the nuance of their 
own middle ground position,21
                                                                                                                                                  
Daniel W., ‘Why Obama is Arming Syria’s Rebels: It’s the Realism, Stupid.,’ Foreign Policy (14 June, 2013) 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/14/why_obama_is_arming_syrias_rebels_its_the_realism_stupid> 
 but Obama’s formulation nevertheless revealed his dominant position 
as a Liberal Internationalist. 
16 Lynch, Timothy J., ‘Obama, Liberalism, and US Foreign Policy’ in Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller & Mark Ledwidge (ed), 
Obama and the World: New Directions in US Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2014) at 48 
17 Ibid at 44 
18 See Dueck, Colin, ‘Regaining a Realistic Foreign Policy,’ Hoover Institution (1 August, 2010) 
<http://www.hoover.org/research/regaining-realistic-foreign-policy> 
19 See Indyk, Martin S., Kenneth G. Lieberthal & Michael E. O’Hanlon, ‘Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy: A Progressive 
Pragmatist Tries to Bend History’ (2012) 91 Foreign Affairs 44 at 31; Milne, David, ‘Pragmatism or What? The Future of US 
Foreign Policy’ (2012) 88 International Affairs 935 at 936 
20 Obama, Barack H., ‘Nobel Lecture: A Just and Lasting Peace,’ Nobelprize.org (10 December, 2009) 
<http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html>. See Kaplan, Fred, ‘The Realist: 
Barack Obama’s a Cold Warrior Indeed,’ Politico Magazine (27 February, 2014) 
<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/barack-obama-realist-foreign-policy-103861.html#ixzz3HXRG5oxz>; Koh, 
Harold H. in Donovan, Donald F., ‘Retrospective on International Law in the First Obama Administration’ (2013) 107 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 131 at 146 
21 See the precise same formulation by Madeleine Albright at Chapter 5 supra 
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At first glance the speech appeared to reject forms of exceptionalist thinking. Obama 
indentified an effective international legal system as the fulcrum of global peace and security, 
believing that “all nations – strong and weak alike – must adhere to standards that govern the use of 
force.” America cannot “insist that others follow the rules of the road if we refuse to follow them 
ourselves” which would appear “arbitrary.”22 He specifically rejected Illiberal Nationalist policies that 
set aside torture prohibitions for enemies that failed to reciprocate respect for IL.23 Rather, for Obama, 
“even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of 
America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war. That is what makes us different from 
those whom we fight.”24
Obama’s conception was however of a rule of IL in which the US played an exceptional role 
upholding the system and developing it according to universal liberal values. The halting 
establishment of the rule of IL was attributed to the exceptional American role after each of the world 
wars, wherein it “led the world in constructing an architecture to keep the peace.” In this premise 
Obama departed in key ways from legalism in asserting American values and power as constitutive of 
the rule of IL itself: 
 
it was not simply international institutions – not just treaties and declarations – that brought stability to a post-World 
War II world. Whatever mistakes we have made, the plain fact is this: The United States of America has helped 
underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms… We 
have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest – 
because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if 
others’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.25
 
 
Read in the context of a warning against “reflexive suspicion of America, the world’s sole military 
superpower,” this was not merely a political observation, but an expression of the elements of an 
effective international legal system. 
 The understanding of how that system has brought greater global peace drew upon the 
Liberal Internationalist belief in democracy as the link between the municipal and international rule of 
law. The evidence was said to be that greater adherence to IL between nations across the twentieth 
century was achieved through US support for “ideals of liberty and self-determination, equality and the 
rule of law.” Ultimately Obama’s liberal vision drew on a foundational belief “that the human condition 
can be perfected” and in a “fundamental faith in human progress.”26
The evidence that Obama nevertheless departed from the pure logic of Liberal 
Internationalism is an equal emphasis within the speech on the disjunct between liberal purpose and 
the reality of an illiberal world. For Obama, promoting liberal values must sometimes be set aside on 
 This animating purpose of IL 
remained distinct from Illiberal Internationalism, which does not accept that IL can progressively 
extend shared values as a strategy for overcoming geopolitical interests. In this utopian vision Obama 
is foremost a Liberal Internationalist. 
                                               
22 For an example of this interpretation see Kitfield, James, ‘Nobel Speech Articulates Obama Doctrine,’ National Journal (11 
December, 2009) <http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/no_20091210_2200.php> 
23 See Chapter 7 supra 
24 Obama, Barack H., ‘Nobel Lecture: A Just and Lasting Peace,’ Nobelprize.org (10 December, 2009) 
<http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html> 
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid 
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national security grounds, in particular where it is necessary to alter the global balance of power in 
America’s favour: 
I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. For make no mistake: 
Evil does exist in the world... To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a 
recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.27
 
 
Quoting President Kennedy, Obama warned against idealistic adherence to liberal values in IL policy, 
favouring “a more practical, more attainable peace, based not on a sudden revolution in human 
nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions.” In this vein he noted that, although 
“engagement with repressive regimes lacks the satisfying purity of indignation,” it was sometimes 
necessary to pragmatically advance illiberal interests in the short term, with faith that this would better 
ensure that “human rights and dignity are advanced over time.”28 In this way he sought to reconcile 
illiberal means with the liberal ends of the administration’s IL policy. Liberal Nationalist beliefs were 
also evident in Obama’s call to rethink the enforcement mechanisms of IL, in order to reduce the 
burden on US global engagement. He warned that states “who claim to respect international law 
cannot avert their eyes when those laws are flouted.” Rather than relying solely on the US military, 
responsibilities should be shared: “the closer we stand together, the less likely we will be faced with 
the choice between armed intervention and complicity in oppression.”29
That Obama’s IL conception is primarily Liberal Internationalist, but influenced by 
countervailing strategies, is corroborated by his preface to the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS 
2010),
 
30
The rule of law—and our capacity to enforce it—advances our national security and strengthens our leadership... 
Around the globe, it allows us to hold actors accountable, while supporting both international security and the stability 
of the global economy. America’s commitment to the rule of law is fundamental to our efforts to build an international 
order that is capable of confronting the emerging challenges of the 21st century.
 which drew connections between democracy, promoting these rights through transnational 
processes, and American national security: 
31
 
 
In this way the NSS 2010 departed from the strategies of the Bush 43 years in setting out a 
commitment to “an international order based upon rights and responsibilities” and the “modernization 
of institutions, strengthening of international norms, and enforcement of international law.”32 
Nevertheless, as Gray notes, these references were not to IL as a constraint, but were rather all made 
in the context of enforcing IL.33
The strategy also spanned both variants of liberalism in drawing upon the appeal of Liberal 
Nationalist foreign policy ideals. Principally in an attempt to draw a distinction with the previous 
administration the NSS 2010 stated that “national security begins at home” and that accordingly 
“moral leadership is grounded principally in the power of our example—not through an effort to 
 
                                               
27 Ibid 
28 Ibid 
29 Ibid 
30 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2010, The White House (2010) 
31 Ibid at 37. See also at ii & 2 
32 Ibid at 3. See Colucci, Lamont, The National Security Doctrines of the American Presidency: How They Shape Our Present 
and Future (Praeger Security International, 2012) at 488 
33 Gray, Christine, ‘President Obama’s 2010 United States National Security Strategy and International Law on the Use of 
Force’ (2011) 10 Chinese Journal of International Law 35 at 37 
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impose our system on other peoples.”34 On the other hand the strategy emphasised that “America 
has never succeeded through isolationism...we must reengage the world on a comprehensive and 
sustained basis.”35 To that end the US “must pursue a rules-based international system that can 
advance our own interests by serving mutual interests.”36
Reviewing this evidence, Mead confirmed the strong influence of Liberal Internationalist 
beliefs among key Administration legal policymakers, up to and including the President.
 This was consistent with the Nobel oration 
in reflecting both a liberal recognition of the universality of American political values, and cautious 
endorsement of fostering an international environment consistent with them. 
37 He 
concluded however that, in practice, although Obama’s general foreign policy has been influenced by 
the aspirations of Liberal Internationalism (“Wilsonianism”), it has also been heavily influenced by 
Liberal Nationalism (or “Jeffersonianism”).38 Obama has been attracted to transformative Liberal 
Internationalist ideals, but combined them with incomplete commitment to policies necessary to 
realise them.39 The tendency to look inward fails to appreciate that a “world based more on the rule of 
law and less on the law of the jungle requires an engaged, forward-looking, and, alas, expensive 
foreign policy.”40 Dueck has similarly characterised the Obama foreign policy strategy as “overarching 
American retrenchment and accommodation internationally, to allow for progressive policies at 
home.”41 For Dueck the implication for IL is that Obama has unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile the 
internationalist and nationalist variants of liberalism by using “multilateralism as an excuse for 
inaction.”42 Nau concludes that, despite his liberal values, Obama is not a “traditional liberal 
internationalist” in the sense of placing primary emphasis on promoting “freedom and democracy and 
human rights.” Rather he is a “functional internationalist” in the sense of engaging to solve material 
problems rather than “moral challenges.”43 Nau himself expressed his nostalgia for Reagan’s 
moralistic foreign policy, corroborating evidence that the Obama IL policy has clearly rejected such 
Illiberal Nationalist promotion of culturally specific values.44
                                               
34 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2010, The White House (2010) at 9-10 & 
36 
 
35 Ibid at 11 & 40 
36 Ibid at 12 
37 Mead, Walter R., ‘Liberal Internationalism: The Twilight of a Dream,’ The American Interest (1 April, 2010) <http://www.the-
american-interest.com/wrm/2010/04/01/liberal-internationalism-the-twilight-of-a-dream/>. Note that Mead’s approach departs 
from that adopted in this thesis by treating “liberal internationalism” as a distinct strand of his “Wilsonianism” along with 
“neoconservatism.” 
38 Mead, Walter R., ‘The Carter Syndrome,’ Foreign Policy (4 January, 2010) 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/the_carter_syndrome>. For a response from President Carter and his then 
National Security Adviser see Carter, Jimmy & Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘Presidential Debate,’ Foreign Policy (22 February, 2010) 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/presidential_debate> 
39 Mead, Walter R., ‘The Carter Syndrome,’ Foreign Policy (4 January, 2010) 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/the_carter_syndrome> 
40 Mead, Walter R., ‘The President’s Foreign Policy Paradox,’ Wall Street Journal (28 March, 2014) 
<http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303725404579457950519734142> 
41 See Fischer-Zernin, Maxime, ‘The Obama Doctrine: Retrenchment and Accommodation,’ Duke Political Review (2 October, 
2014) <http://dukepoliticalreview.org/the-obama-doctrine-retrenchment-and-accommodation/>, citing Dueck, Colin, The Obama 
Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today (Oxford University Press, 2015, forthcoming) 
42 Cited in Fischer-Zernin, Maxime, ‘The Obama Doctrine: Retrenchment and Accommodation,’ Duke Political Review (2 
October, 2014) <http://dukepoliticalreview.org/the-obama-doctrine-retrenchment-and-accommodation/> 
43 Holmes, Kim R., Henry R. Nau & Helle C. Dale, ‘The Obama Doctrine: Hindering American Foreign Policy,’ The Heritage 
Foundation (29 November, 2010) <http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2010/11/the-obama-doctrine-hindering-american-
foreign-policy> 
44 Ibid at 12-13 
Obama Administration 2008-2012 
 
207 
 
Along with the President the change in senior legal policymakers in this period signalled a 
more robust role for IL in US foreign relations and enthusiasm for the ICC in particular.45 These 
policymakers held an array of beliefs about IL that largely complemented but at times competed with 
the President’s conception of IL. The most consequential appointment for IL policy was Hillary Clinton 
as Secretary of State. Clinton was given a direct opportunity at her confirmation hearing to identify the 
administration’s general foreign policy among variants of the four theorised ideal types when Senator 
Robert P. Casey, Jr. adopted Posen and Ross’ formulation:46
Historically, the United States has adopted one of four grand strategies, or some combination of the four: 
Neoisolationism (avoidance of foreign entanglements), selective engagement (traditional balance of power realism 
that works to ensure peace among the major powers), cooperative security (a liberal world order of interdependence 
and effective international institutions), and primacy (American unilateralism and continued hegemony). Which grand 
strategy, or combination of strategies, do you think best describes how you would seek to promote U.S. national 
security today?
 
47
 
 
Unsurprisingly, Clinton declined to categorise herself in these terms, arguing that “the paradigms of 
the past neither adequately describe our present realities, nor provide a comprehensive guide to what 
we should do about them.”48
The indication of where to place Clinton’s beliefs was in her promise of a “new direction” 
which rejected the Illiberal Nationalism of the first Bush 43 term: “That America is a nation of laws is 
one of our great strengths, and the Supreme Court has been clear that the fight against terrorism 
cannot occur in a ‘legal black hole.’”
 In naively asking a policymaker to isolate instinctive ideological beliefs 
and consciously identify themselves as a discrete “type,” Casey’s question held little probative value. 
By the same token Clinton’s dismissive response was neither a useful account of the role of foreign 
policy ideology, nor consistent with evidence of continuity in diplomatic thought.  
49 Rather Clinton echoed Obama in introducing her signature 
concept of “smart power,” centred on diplomacy, and on “marrying principles and pragmatism to 
advance our security and interests in an increasingly complex and interdependent world.”50 The 
distinctive form of Clinton’s conception of IL became clear in her analogy for explaining what she 
meant by her commitment to “a rules-based global order that could manage interactions between 
states, protect fundamental freedoms, and mobilize common action.”51 For Clinton the “old 
architecture” of global governance is akin to the “Parthenon in Greece, with clean lines and clear 
rules.” In contrast the rules and legal institutions that Clinton sought should resemble the 
deconstructivist architecture of a “Frank Gehry”52
                                               
45 Schabas, William, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press, 4th ed, 2011) at 34; 
Bosco, David, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court’s Battle to Fix the World, One Prosecution at a Time (Oxford 
University Press, 2014) at 153-154 
: “a dynamic mix of materials, shapes, and 
46 See at Chapter 3 supra: Posen, Barry R. & Andrew L. Ross, ‘Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy’ (1996/97) 21 
International Security 5 
47 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Hillary R. 
Clinton to be Secretary of State, 1st Session 111th Congress (2009) at 212 
48 Ibid at 212. See also Clinton, Hillary Rodham, Hard Choices: A Memoir (Simon and Schuster, 2014) at 32-33 
49 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, Hard Choices: A Memoir (Simon and Schuster, 2014) at 184 
50 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Hillary R. 
Clinton to be Secretary of State, 1st Session 111th Congress (2009) at 212; Clinton, Hillary Rodham, Hard Choices: A Memoir 
(Simon and Schuster, 2014) at x-xi & 33-34 
51 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, Hard Choices: A Memoir (Simon and Schuster, 2014) at 33 
52 See Gehry, Frank, Gehry Partners, LLP (2008) <https://www.foga.com/> 
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structures.”53
 The single most influential figure shaping US ICC policy was Clinton’s legal adviser Harold 
Koh. Koh is credited with founding the school of “transnational legal process” as a successor to the 
New Haven School of policy-oriented jurisprudence.
 This pragmatic and functional approach to IL thus provided the context for Clinton’s 
beliefs about the rule of IL as largely consistent with Illiberal Internationalism, while encompassing 
elements of Obama’s liberal vision. 
54 He forcefully contested the legality of the 2003 
Iraq War during the Bush years,55 a position he maintained at his Senate confirmation hearing.56
respect for the rule of law should not be limited to domestic constitutional law. The next President should recall the 
words of our founders in the Declaration of Independence to pay “decent respect to the opinions of mankind” by 
supporting, not attacking, the institutions and treaties of international human rights law.
 
Koh’s conception of the rule of IL was explained to the Senate Judiciary Committee in the months 
prior to Obama’s election in a hearing entitled Restoring the Rule of Law: 
57
 
 
Koh’s understanding of what that meant in practice was set out in a speech entitled: The Obama 
Administration and International Law.58
1. Principled Engagement; 2. Diplomacy as a Critical Element of Smart Power; 3. Strategic Multilateralism; and 4. the 
notion that Living Our Values Makes us Stronger and Safer, by Following Rules of Domestic and International Law; 
and Following Universal Standards, Not Double Standards.
 There Koh elaborated on Clinton’s concept of “smart power” 
and argued that the administration marked a fundamental departure from the Bush 43 administration 
in its “approach and attitude toward international law.” This was captured in what Koh termed an 
“emerging ‘Obama-Clinton Doctrine’” comprised of four elements: 
59
  
 
The element of “following universal standards, not double standards” emphasised the degree to which 
America was “stronger and safer” by expressing fidelity to the rule of law at home while extending it 
outward according to common liberal values. The failure of the Bush administration to do likewise was 
criticised as contrary to the rule of IL for converting the US from “the major supporter of the post-war 
global legal exoskeleton into the most visible outlier trying to break free of the very legal framework 
we created and supported for half a century.”60 Conversely, Koh also made clear that the 
interpretation of IL remained subject to the “smart power” concept such that policy considerations and 
diplomatic interests shaped the interpretation of law itself.61 The most fundamental principle remained 
a “commitment to living our values by respecting the rule of law.”62
                                               
53 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, Hard Choices: A Memoir (Simon and Schuster, 2014) at 33 
 
54 See Chapter 4 supra; Koh, Harold H., ‘Trasnational Legal Process’ (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181; Koh, Harold H., ‘Is 
there a “New” New Haven School of International Law?’ (2007) 32 Yale Journal of International Law 559  
55 Koh, Harold H., A Better Way To Deal With Iraq (21 October, 2002) <http://www.law.yale.edu/news/4407.htm> 
56 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Harold H. 
Koh to be Legal Adviser to the Department of State, 1st Session 111th Congress (2009) 
57 Koh, Harold H., Statement of Harold Hongju Koh before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution 
on Restoring the Rule of Law (16 September, 2008) <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/091608koh.pdf> 
58 Koh, Harold H., The Obama Administration and International Law (25 March, 2010) 
<http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm> 
59 Ibid. Original emphasis. See also Koh, Harold H. in Donovan, Donald F., ‘Retrospective on International Law in the First 
Obama Administration’ (2013) 107 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 131 at 139-140 
60 Koh, Harold H., ‘Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process after September 11th’ (2004) 22 Berkeley Journal 
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61 Koh, Harold H., The Obama Administration and International Law (25 March, 2010) 
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DEVELOPING NON-ARBITRARY GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
By the time Obama entered office the ICC had evolved, from an untested forum cautiously seeking 
state support for its legal authority, to a fully operational international body engaged in multiple 
investigations and prosecutions. Legalist advocates sought to harness renewed US support to 
consolidate the formal status of the court as a universally authoritative institution of global 
governance. For the Obama administration the most pressing task was demonstrating that the US 
had shifted to supporting IL in terms of universal liberal values rather than parochial national security 
interests. The clearest demonstration of this change, and one sought by existing states parties, was to 
reverse the 2002 act of “unsigning” the Rome Statute and thereby recommit the US to an ICC policy 
that, at minimum, complied with the objects and purpose of the treaty, even if not its strict terms. The 
US assumed its rights as an observer state at the annual Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”) 
governing the ICC, attending and participating in sessions for the first time, while actively supporting 
the referral of matters to the court. Yet it fell short of explicitly “re-signing” the statute or of supporting 
its eventual ratification, thereby remaining at odds with a commitment to the rule of IL as understood 
by legalist counterparts. Key US legal policymakers nevertheless continued to frame the shift in US 
policy as a recommitment to the rule of IL. 
 
Legalist Policy 
The full spectrum of beliefs about the role of the ICC in developing the rule of IL were set out before 
the UNSC in the October 2012 agenda item: The promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the 
maintenance of international peace and security: Peace and justice, with a special focus on the role of 
the International Criminal Court (“UNSC rule of law meeting”).63 The statements of the UN Secretary 
General, ICC President and prosecutor, and 50 state representatives (including the EU) provided a 
wide-ranging account of the state of ICC development and of ongoing tensions with US IL policy. The 
meeting followed on from the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the 
National and International Levels, which had convened one month earlier.64 That meeting’s final 
resolution committed to “an international order based on the rule of law,” for which the ICC was 
specifically recognised as integral to “a multilateral system that aims to end impunity and establish the 
rule of law.”65 At the subsequent UNSC meeting the Secretary General went further and described the 
ICC as “the centre of the new system of international criminal justice.”66
A theme repeated by the Secretary General, ICC officials, and most of the 50 countries 
represented at the UNSC rule of law meeting was the need to progressively formalise ICC authority to 
realise the rule of IL. The Secretary General described a new “age of accountability” in which the UN 
itself would no longer “promote or condone amnesty for genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes or gross violations of human rights” when negotiating peace agreements.
  
67
                                               
63 UN, 6849th Meeting, United Nations Security Council (17 October, 2012) & UN, 6849th Meeting (Resumption 1), United 
Nations Security Council (17 October, 2012) 
 Similarly, the 
Togolese representative warned against the continued reliance on “informal mechanisms and 
64 See UN, ‘High-level Meeting on the Rule of Law, 24 September 2012,’ United Nations Rule of Law (24 September, 2012) 
<http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=168> 
65 Clause 23 at 4 
66 UN, 6849th Meeting, United Nations Security Council (17 October, 2012) at 2 
67 Ibid at 2 
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arrangements that run the risk of bypassing transparency or control and open the way to 
arbitrariness.”68 The Sri Lankan representative was more explicit in declaring that in this area 
“codification of international law and legal obligations is an important aspect of the rule of law at the 
international level.”69
 The specific expression of this rule of IL principle was in repeated calls from representatives 
for more states to formally join the Rome Statute.
 
70 At the Kampala Conference the EU representative 
set out its primary objective as: “Promoting the universality and preserving the integrity of the Rome 
Statute.”71 At the UNSC rule of law meeting the UK argued that: “Achieving the universality of the 
Rome Statute is the key to deepening and broadening the reach of the rule of law.”72 From a legalist 
perspective, it was not mere engagement with the court, but the universality of formal obligations 
under the Rome Statute that was necessary to transform the ICC from a mere diplomatic forum into a 
global governance institution. Germany, which already believed the ICC had “strengthened the rule of 
law in international relations,”73 alluded to this distinction in accepting that, although UNSC referrals to 
the ICC were a welcome addition, they remained merely a “tool of last resort, as an act of political 
responsibility.” In contrast the creation of legal obligation required “ratification of the Rome Statute by 
the greatest possible number of States so that referrals become more and more obsolete.”74 Similarly, 
Liechtenstein described UNSC referrals as a “mixed blessing” for advancing criminal justice while 
being “driven by political convenience” of powerful ICC non-member countries.75
 
 In these positions it 
was not sufficient that the ICC was already being used by states such as the US to alter international 
behaviour and increase compliance with existing legal norms. Rather the rule of IL would remain 
unrealised so long as the court’s authority was not formally and universally established. 
Beliefs of American Legal Policymakers 
Maintaining Ambiguous Obligations under the Rome Statute 
The official Obama administration position on the ICC was set out in the NSS 2010 in terms that 
became something of a mantra among legal policymakers:  
Although the United States is not at present a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
and will always protect U.S. personnel, we are engaging with State Parties to the Rome Statute on issues of concern 
and are supporting the ICC’s prosecution of those cases that advance U.S. interests and values, consistent with the 
requirements of U.S. law.76
 
 
The terms of renewed ICC support fell well short of recognising the court as an authoritative institution 
of global governance. The assertion of US ICC support was couched within a reminder that the US 
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remained unconstrained by the strict legal terms of the Rome Statute and the need to shield military 
personal.  
The divergent path of US policy can be most clearly isolated in the ambiguity of the Obama 
administration’s retraction of the 2002 “unsigning” statement of John Bolton combined with emphatic 
assurances that a clear policy shift had occurred.77 The act of “unsigning” during the first term of the 
Bush 43 administration was widely accepted as effective in removing minimal US obligations to not 
frustrate the objects of the treaty.78
at the earliest opportunity, the new Secretary of State should withdraw the Bush Administration’s May 2002 letter to 
the United Nations “unsigning” the U.S. signature to the Rome Treaty creating the ICC, restoring the status quo ante 
that existed at the end of the Clinton Administration.
 As the Bush 43 era came to a close this remained the most 
conspicuous signal of the hostility flowing from Illiberal Nationalist conceptions of the ICC. 
Immediately prior to assuming the role of State Department Legal Adviser, Koh had emphasised that: 
79
 
  
Doing so was framed as a necessary step for shifting to an IL policy “that lives up to America’s 
historically high standards of international responsibility and respect for the rule of international law.”80 
In Scheffer’s opinion “a new letter could nullify the effect of Bolton’s missive and resurrect the legal 
authority of the signature on the treaty.”81 The call by Koh and Scheffer was therefore for the formal 
re-acceptance of legal obligations created by Clinton’s 2000 signature, which would equally send the 
strongest political signal of US commitment to the rule of IL. In the years following these statements, 
US policy can best be described as political recommitment to the substance of Rome Statute 
signatory obligations, but ambiguous commitment to legally binding obligations. Koh had previously 
characterised the Bush administration’s increased ICC cooperation during its second term as “de 
facto repudiation of the political act of unsigning” that brought the US largely back in line with its 
international obligations before the change in administration.82
Actions taken early in the Obama administration to signal a policy shift included attending the 
8th Session of the ASP in November 2009, New York.
 The subsequent Obama policy, led by 
Koh, suggests that this “de facto” shift was adopted as a sufficient basis for the policy “reset” without 
further formalised obligations.  
83 This was the first such attendance by the US, 
with the stated goal of “listening to gain a better understanding of the issues being considered by the 
ASP and of the workings of the International Criminal Court.”84
                                               
77 See Chapter 6 supra 
 Inevitable questions soon followed 
about what this signified about US legal obligations in circumstances when the administration had 
never formally annulled the Bolton letter. The issue was deftly avoided in 2009 by US Ambassador-at-
78 Under Art.18 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). See Crawford, James, Brownlie’s Principles of Public 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 2012) at 372, n.39; Harris, David John, Cases and Materials on International 
Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) at 651; Swaine, Edward T., ‘Unsigning’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 2061 
79 Koh, Harold H., Statement of Harold Hongju Koh before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution 
on Restoring the Rule of Law (16 September, 2008) <http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/091608koh.pdf> at 11 
80 Ibid at 12 
81 Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012) 
at 243 
82Koh, Harold H., ‘Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process after September 11th’ (2004) 22 Berkeley Journal 
of International Law 337 at 351 
83 Fairlie, Megan, ‘The United States and the International Criminal Court Post-Bush: A Beautiful Courtship but an Unlikely 
Marriage’ (2011) 29 Berkeley Journal of International Law 529 at 542 
84 Koh, Harold H., The Obama Administration and International Law (25 March, 2010) 
<http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm> 
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Large for War Crimes Issues Stephen Rapp when he emphasised to reporters that the US was 
entitled to participate in the ASP and related conferences irrespective of the status of its original 
signature – by virtue of signing the Final Act at the 1998 Rome Conference.85 When pushed on the 
unsigning he stated only that the effect of the Bolton letter was the limited one of making it “clear that 
we did not, that the Bush administration did not, believe that we were bound to act as others expected 
a signatory to act.” 86
We should make clear that there is no legal decision involved in our being here [at the Kampala Conference]. It’s not 
a decision about whether to change any law, to ratify any treaty, or to change any statute or change any other 
agreement. But it is part of a broader policy, as I said, for closer engagement with this important international 
institution.
 He pointedly did not repudiate the release from legal obligations. When later 
asked about the same issue Koh agreed that the US was legally entitled to engage as an observer 
nation, but was more explicit that US cooperation arose from discretionary decisions alone: 
87
 
 
This is consistent with the administration’s overall policy of “principled engagement” in multilateral 
forums to advance American interests. Yet in legalist terms this remains a diplomatic stance, and not 
a commitment to be bound by IL stricto sensu. This point was picked up by a questioner at the post-
Kampala press conference who noted that the “reset” in ICC policy had “more of a political tinge” than 
constituting a legal position.88 Koh’s and Rapp’s response appeared to confirm that the US reset 
entailed accepting the ICC as “a tool in the international toolbox” but not as a regime binding on the 
US.89
 Later that year some commentators saw Koh as moving closer to a de jure shift in obligations 
by picking up the words of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention to distinguish the Obama policy from 
his predecessors: 
 
You do not see what international lawyers might call a concerted effort to frustrate the object and purpose of the 
Rome Statute. That is explicitly not the policy of this administration. Because although the United States is not a party 
to the Rome Statute, we share with the States parties a deep and abiding interest in seeing the Court successfully 
complete the important prosecutions it has already begun.90
 
 
This carefully-worded phrase was quoted by Koh in subsequent speeches, but without further 
clarification.91
                                               
85 The official agreement on the record of proceedings: UN, The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on 
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Final Act, UN Doc A/CONF.183/10 (17 July, 1998) 
 In the limited considerations of these words there is some divergence in interpretation 
of the legal significance. It is worth noting, however, that the statement was made in the context of a 
quote from the NSS 2010: a document that studiously avoided any suggestion that the US was legally 
86 Rapp, Stephen J., ‘Press Briefing with Stephen J. Rapp Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues,’ Mission of the United 
States Geneva (22 January, 2010) <http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/01/22/stephen-rapp/> 
87 Koh, Harold H. & Stephen J. Rapp, Briefing on the International Criminal Court Conference in Kampala, Uganda (2 June, 
2010) <http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/us_releases/remarks/2010/142585.htm> 
88 Ibid 
89 Ibid 
90 Koh, Harold H., The Challenges and Future of International Justice (27 October, 2010) 
<http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/150497.htm>. Emphasis added. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(1969), Art. 18: “A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty” 
91 See Koh, Harold H., International Criminal Justice 5.0 (8 November, 2012) 
<http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/200957.htm> 
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bound by the ICC.92 At the time of Koh’s statement Van Schaak raised but did not answer the 
question of “whether Koh has said the magic words” necessary to annul the 2002 Bolton letter. She 
found that the policy of obstructing the court was at an end, but that no further legal inferences could 
be conclusively drawn about legal obligations accepted by the US.93 Trahan described Koh’s words 
as having “orally negated” the unsigning, but conceded that the statements lacked “the weight of a 
counter-note.” Rather she reiterated her previous call as chair of the American Branch of the 
International Law Association’s International Criminal Court Committee to make a legally binding 
commitment to formally send such a note.94 Finally, Amann drew the conclusion that “top Obama 
Administration officials have made clear that the United States now acts toward the ICC treaty as any 
good signatory should.”95
The combined force of these statements and legal opinions is that: (a) the Obama 
administration firmly committed to an IL policy consistent with the objects and purposes of the Rome 
Statute; and, (b) the Obama administration conspicuously avoided accepting any formal legal 
obligations commensurate to its stated policy. This contravened legalist commitment to formalised 
development of global governance as an element of the rule of IL, since it preserved the autonomy to 
act outside of the constraints of the ICC. Moreover, beyond this ambiguity, policymakers were much 
clearer that there was no intention to ratify the statute at any time in the foreseeable future which 
remained “not a question of when” but of “if.”
 So much had already been made clear, but this goes no further than the 
non-binding undertakings of policymakers. 
96 This position has been variously attributed to the 
gridlock of domestic politics and the intractability of US Senate opposition to ratification.97
 
 Those 
impediments are undeniable, but neither is there any evidence that the Obama administration would 
move to ratify the treaty in its current form absent congressional opposition. It is an open question 
therefore how American legal policymakers have squared outcomes with simultaneous statements 
that the Obama ICC policy does represent a recommitment to the rule of IL. 
Transnational Development of Global Governance 
The consistent American position emphasised through this period was the deep engagement of the 
US in supporting the court’s activities, and the process through which this had brought US actions in 
compliance with the entire project of international criminal justice. This exemplifies the “transnational 
legal process” explanation for how IL shapes the behaviour of states. Increased US interactions with 
states-parties and the ICC itself reflected the process by which the US was brought in compliance 
with legal norms and, through its engagement, became a part of mechanisms making the court 
                                               
92 Koh, Harold H., The Challenges and Future of International Justice (27 October, 2010) 
<http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/150497.htm>. See discussion of The White House, The National Security Strategy 
of the United States of America 2010, The White House (2010) supra 
93 van Schaack, Beth, ‘The U.S. Says It Is Not Its Goal to Undermine the ICC,’ IntLawGrrls (12 November, 2010) 
<http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2010/11/us-says-it-is-not-its-goal-to-undermine.html> 
94 Trahan, Jennifer, ‘U.S. Affirms that It Adheres to Rome Statute Signatory Obligations: It Should Put This In Writing,’ Opinio 
Juris (27 February, 2013) <http://opiniojuris.org/2013/02/27/u-s-affirms-that-it-adheres-to-rome-statute-signatory-obligations-it-
should-put-this-in-writing/> 
95 Amann, Diane M., Officials Treat United States as Once & Present Signatory of ICC’s Rome Statute (27 February, 2013) 
<http://dianemarieamann.com/2013/02/27/officials-treat-united-states-as-once-present-signatory-of-iccs-rome-statute/> 
96 Rapp, Stephen J., ‘Press Briefing with Stephen J. Rapp Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues,’ Mission of the United 
States Geneva (22 January, 2010) <http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/01/22/stephen-rapp/> 
97 Ibid 
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effective.98
 During the first term of the Bush 43 administration, Koh explicitly argued for acceptance of, 
and support for, the transnational development of IL, whereby the US municipal rule of law was 
formally and practically connected to institutions of global governance. At that time Koh argued that, in 
order to remedy the Bush 43 administration’s legal failings, “the United States and those within it who 
are committed to the rule of law should now invoke transnational legal process as a way to address 
the continuing problems.”
 This was consistent with Liberal Internationalist beliefs that the process of US policy 
aligning with the global governance role of the ICC was ultimately a more significant factor in 
advancing the rule of IL than formally acceding to legal obligations under the Rome Statute. 
99 Applying that principle to the ICC, Koh believed that US constitutional 
values had already been imbued in the ICC through transnational legal processes so that, “as much 
as the Bush administration may wish to be free of the legal exoskeleton that the United States has 
helped create, already that legal framework is visibly pushing back.”100
 This is not to suggest that formally signing the Rome Statute, and even moving to ratification, 
were not genuine goals for Liberal Internationalists. The Clinton administration always aimed its 
efforts at the ideal of a treaty drafted in such terms that the US could formally accept its obligations. 
However, for these policymakers such steps were meaningful only insofar as they advanced an 
effective regime shaping international legal behaviour through transnational processes. On that basis 
the Obama administration placed its strongest emphasis on the degree to which it was influenced by 
and continued to influence the development of legal norms through the court. Secretary Clinton 
confirmed early in the administration that the US intended to “end hostility towards the ICC, and look 
for opportunities to encourage effective ICC action in ways that promoted US interests by bringing war 
criminals to justice.”
 This highlighted a conceptual 
distinction between the IL conception of Koh and his predecessor John Bellinger in circumstances 
where their ICC policies of re-engaging with the ICC appear functionally identical. Bellinger’s 
approach reflected Illiberal Internationalist commitment to pragmatically develop the court, by 
reference to clearly identified strategic interests, and limiting its reach to that extent. Koh on the other 
hand saw the shift in the second term of the Bush 43 administartion less as a calculated decision and 
more as a consequence of the milieu of transnational forces drawing the US back toward universal 
liberal values. 
101
actively engaged with the ICC Prosecutor and Registrar to consider how we can support specific prosecutions 
already under way, and we responded positively to informal requests for assistance. We will continue working with 
the ICC to identify practical ways to cooperate, particularly in areas such as information-sharing and witness 
protection on a case-by-case basis, as consistent with United States policy and law.
 In the UNSC rule of law meeting Ambassador Susan Rice characterised the 
ICC as “an important tool for accountability,” even as the US repudiated formal membership. Rather 
the US had: 
102
                                               
98 Koh undertakes a similar analysis in relation to shifting compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972 from the 
Reagan through to Clinton administrations, along with some additional examples from the Clinton administration: Koh, Harold 
H., ‘Trasnational Legal Process’ (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181 at 194-195 
 
99 Koh, Harold H., ‘Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process after September 11th’ (2004) 22 Berkeley Journal 
of International Law 337 at 351 
100 Ibid at 351 
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Through these statements US policymakers reiterated the ways in which the policy of remaining 
outside of formalised legal arrangements was nevertheless consistent with a commitment to 
advancing the rule of IL. 
 Running through this policy are strands of exceptionalist belief that reconcile a special US role 
with legal principle. Koh described US policy as shifting to an “integrated approach to criminal justice,” 
by which was meant reconciling “incongruous” historical support for the Nuremberg, Tokyo and ad 
hoc tribunals with equivocation about the ICC. The objective was to “align, integrate, and make 
congruent our approach towards these institutions.”103
Our historic commitment to the cause of international justice remains strong. ... Although the United States is not a 
party to the Rome Statute, the Obama Administration has been actively looking at ways that we can assist the ICC in 
fulfilling its historic charge of providing justice to those who have endured crimes of epic savagery and scope.
 Each of Koh’s statements downplaying the 
importance of formal obligations was accompanied by reference to a unique global mission: 
104
 
 
Likewise Rapp noted that the US had been “a leader in international justice” in establishing tribunals 
from Nuremberg to Rwanda and Sierra Leone and in undertaking the leadership and logistical tasks 
to make them operational. In the case of the ICC “the opportunity to do some of those same things 
presents itself” with the US again leading the initiative.105
 Koh corroborated the transnational development interpretation of US policy in responding to a 
reporter’s statement that it was “curious that an administration would become so engaged in shaping 
the kind of format of a court that it’s not a signatory to.” Koh again asserted the exceptional role of the 
US in global justice where other states recognised that “international institutions and courts with which 
the United States is not involved tend not to be as effective” whereas the ad hoc tribunals “have been 
more successful by virtue of deep U.S. engagement.” For Koh the proper understanding of US policy 
was that it represented a “process” rather than an “end game” intended to result in membership.
 These are telling comparisons given that the 
US was generally excluded from the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals by their very subject matter, 
whereas no such limitation would exist for a criminal court with general jurisdiction. Yet the US sought 
to position itself as equally excluded from ICC constraints in part due to belief in its exceptional role 
fostering the institutions that made international criminal justice effective. 
106 By 
necessary inference the answer to the involvement in criminal justice in the absence of a formal 
capacity is that the US saw itself as becoming enmeshed in the transnational legal processes shifting 
behaviour in line with legal norms, with this ultimately being a decisive indicator of support for the rule 
of IL. In each subsequent address to the Assembly of States Parties the US continued to outline 
measures undertaken to advance global justice, but to date none has amounted to the recognition of 
formal legal constraints on US political autonomy.107
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Conclusion 
A reoccurring argument made by commentators on the Obama administration has been that the real 
break in policy was between the two terms of the Bush 43 administration, with no meaningful change 
thereafter.108 There is some merit to the observation that the shift in ICC policy outcomes between the 
two terms of the Bush administration was more pronounced than the shift seen in the Obama 
administration. However, this is not conclusive on the question of continuity of legal beliefs between 
administrations. Across both periods the US largely continued to work from without the system, 
essentially unconstrained by the regime, while maintaining forms of support for developing the ICC.109
 
 
However in the latter period the beliefs structuring US policy distinctively revolved around 
transnational legal processes creating greater compliance with universal norms of international 
criminal law – from the municipal through to the global level. In legalist terms, US policy remained 
inconsistent with the rule of IL as long as the constraints of formal ICC membership were rejected and 
support for the court was on a discretionary basis only. In contrast, the relationship described by US 
officials at the UNSC rule of law meeting and elsewhere remained entirely consistent with the Liberal 
Internationalist belief that it was transnational development of global governance which foremost 
advanced the rule of IL. In so doing the US remained fundamentally outside of the vision of its global 
counterparts. 
 
DEFINING EQUALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
From the earliest days of the ICC project participating states and NGOs were motivated by a desire to 
“democratise” the oligarchic configuration of the UNSC.110 This opportunity arose in the initiative set 
aside at the Rome Conference to extend the court’s jurisdictional reach to include the crime of 
aggression.111 The goal was ambitious, and would have significantly expanded the scope of matters 
properly treated as subjects of international criminal law. More fundamentally, the initiative was in 
large part directed at divesting the UNSC of sole legal control over this most consequential crime, and 
subjecting it to the equal control of all ICC members.112 As numerous accounts have recalled, the P-5 
were united in their insistence on an exclusive “Security Council trigger” for cases of aggression.113
                                               
108 See especially John Bellinger who has repeatedly made this case: Bellinger III, John B., ‘The United States and the 
International Criminal Court: Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going,’ Remarks to the DePaul University College of Law 
(25 April, 2008) <http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/l/rls/104053.htm>; Neack, Laura, ‘The Future of Human Security: Taking 
Advantage of a States-First World’ in Courtney Hillebrecht, Tyler R. White & Patrice C. McMahon (ed), State Responses to 
Human Security: At Home and Abroad (Routledge, 2013) at 179 
 
This is consistent with the rational actions of states seeking to entrench political power through law. 
However, that fact does not explain the central question of whether and how American legal 
policymakers reconciled this political motive with an explicit commitment to the rule of IL. US policy 
109 Koh, Harold H., ‘Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process after September 11th’ (2004) 22 Berkeley Journal 
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112 Under Charter of the United Nations (1945), Art.39 
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adamantly held out the UNSC as the cornerstone of the international legal system.114
 
 Policymakers 
defended the privileged role this secured for the US in determining acts of aggression, including the 
exclusive power to delegate such matters to an international court. Moreover the definition of the 
crime of aggression itself was contested on the basis that it could constrain existing US autonomy to 
employ force to uphold IL. US policy, nominally aimed at advancing the principles of the ICC and 
international criminal law, remained steadfastly opposed to sovereign equality. 
Legalist Policy 
Challenges to the UNSC had long fixed on sovereign equality as a guiding principle for the legitimate 
exercise of international legal power. At the UNSC rule of law meeting Lesotho challenged the 
UNSC’s inconsistency with sovereign equality by arguing that, when making referrals, “the aspirations 
of the general membership of the United Nations should override the individual national interests of 
Council members.”115 This amounted to a demand for constructive sovereign equality – requiring the 
P-5 with formally unequal privileges to exercise them by reference to the inferred will of the equally 
weighted voices of all states. In setting out principles for guiding ICC development, Sri Lanka stated 
that the “principle of sovereign equality..., which is intrinsic to international rule of law, must be 
maintained, as international rules are made and implemented. It is a principle that protects all States, 
especially the small and the weak.”116
The opportunity to restructure international criminal law in line with these desires arose in 
proceedings to agree on and finalise the crime of aggression at the Kampala Conference. At 
Nuremberg it was declared that to “initiate a war of aggression...is not only an international crime, it is 
the supreme crime.”
 These views were united by the legalist belief that, for the ICC 
to develop consistently with the rule of IL, it was necessary that all states remained subject to equal 
rights and duties under the law, irrespective of supposedly disproportionate global responsibilities. 
117 Azerbaijan echoed these sentiments in supporting the prohibition as 
necessary to address the “most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force between 
States.”118 Doing so promised to transform determinations about aggression from the political 
decision-making processes of the UNSC to a formalised legal process through the ICC. Former 
delegates to the Kampala conference reflected that the agreement on aggression allowed for “the 
completion of the codification of the existing body of crimes under customary international law and for 
the closure of the last remaining important lacuna contained in the substantive part of the ICC 
Statute.”119 For the Portuguese representative, the achievement of the Kampala Conference was to 
“successfully fill the gap left open in Rome on the set of crimes covered by the Statute.”120
                                               
114 Koh, Harold H., Closing Intervention at the Review Conference of the International Criminal Court (11 June, 2010) 
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rule of IL by allowing the subject matter to be resolved though diplomatic and other discretionary 
responses. 
A leading factor motivating delegates at the Kampala Conference was more particularly a 
view that the UNSC’s sole authority over this subject matter remained a stumbling block to realising 
the rule of IL. Brazil directly addressed the charge that aggression was an inherently political crime by 
arguing that “world peace and security are by definition political in nature, but are best addressed 
through a legal framework that enjoys broad support and legitimacy.” By this was meant that the 
“universality of the Court lies in the widely held values that it espouses. Its reach will grow as a result 
of fulfilling its promise and not by submitting to false pragmatism and the so-called realities of 
power.”121 Likewise Liechtenstein, then President of the ASP, conceded that, despite the UNSC’s long 
established authority in this area, the proposal would ensure that “jurisdiction is not ultimately 
contingent upon the Council’s decisions.”122
 
 In these statements states drew upon the legalist 
principle of sovereign equality to defend circumventing the UNSC as necessary to protect the court’s 
integrity 
Beliefs of American Legal Policymakers 
The American Interpretive Gloss on the Crime of Aggression 
US policymakers argued for an exclusive UNSC filter over aggression from as early as the 1994 draft 
statute, which first proposed that design.123 The position was maintained from the Obama 
administration’s very first reengagement with the ASP in late 2009 where the US delegation set out 
the legal case for maintaining the status quo.124 Rapp’s argument to the ASP was prefaced with the 
statement that “the commitment of the Obama Administration to the rule of law and the principle of 
accountability is firm, in line with my country’s historic tradition of support for international criminal 
justice that has been a hallmark of United States policy dating back at least to the time of 
Nuremberg.”125 On that basis he reasserted that “jurisdiction should follow a Security Council 
determination that aggression has occurred.”126 The outcome of the Kampala negotiations was 
ultimately a compromise between this preference for a controlling UNSC role, and the legalist 
demands to reform global legal architecture. The final resolution created two routes for an ICC 
prosecution of aggression. The first was through an exclusive UNSC trigger in the same terms as that 
governing the existing Rome Statute crimes.127 The second route was through the ICC prosecutor’s 
own motion where the UNSC failed to take action within a six month period, but subject still to the 
existing power to halt any ICC investigation under Article 16 of the Rome Statute.128
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UNSC role over cases of aggression was almost entirely maintained, with only a marginal step taken 
in the direction of sovereign equality. 
 The compromise outcome does not however support the further inference that participants 
reached an agreed position on the legal principles for guiding the court’s enlarged subject matter 
jurisdiction. The US response, and strategies employed at the negotiations, reveals the extent to 
which US decision-making was structured by the distinct legal conceptions influencing Obama’s IL 
policy more broadly. Much of the distance between the US and other States Parties and observers to 
ICC processes can be seen in what became Annex III to the 2010 amendments entitled: 
Understandings regarding the amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on 
the crime of aggression (“the Understandings”). During the Kampala conference Koh fixed upon a 
suggestion from the conference Chair to address concerns about the proposed amendments through 
written “understandings” that placed a gloss on the meaning of draft articles without disturbing their 
language. On that basis Koh stated: “we believe that without agreed-upon understandings, the current 
draft definition remains flawed” and that “apparent consensus on the wording of Article 8bis masks 
sharp disagreement on particular points regarding the meaning of that language.”129 US absence from 
a decade of prior negotiations probably precluded any alteration of the aggression definition, with the 
understandings becoming a backdoor means for registering concerns.130 Moreover, as a matter of 
strict legal interpretation, Heller has rightly pointed out that the status of the understandings remains 
uncertain. At present they are “nothing more than supplementary means of interpretation that the 
Court would have the right to ignore once the aggression amendments entered into force.”131
 
 
However they are valuable as formulations of the divergence in legal views held by American 
policymakers about the ideal design of the ICC. 
Exceptional Humanitarian Responsibilities 
Substantive US demands in the Understandings focussed on confirming circumstances of exclusive 
UNSC control, and on limiting ICC jurisdiction where authority was to be shared. Understanding 2 
stated that the ICC could exercise jurisdiction pursuant to a UNSC referral “irrespective of whether the 
State concerned has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in this regard.” As Heller noted, it is unlikely this 
understanding has “any substantive effect” as it merely mirrors the “default position under the Rome 
Statute.”132
The more significant assertion of legal principles was in understandings that sought to limit 
ICC jurisdiction by reference to exceptionalist beliefs, and thereby indirectly bolster UNSC privileges. 
A consistent theme in the defence of the status quo was the exceptional role of the US in making the 
system of international criminal law effective. On a number of occasions Koh and Rapp framed US 
opposition to the aggression definition by reference to Obama’s Nobel oration and the argument that 
 However it does reveal the degree of concern American policymakers had about any 
erosion of existing legal privilege. 
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there are “times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only 
necessary but morally justified.”133 The US argument was that the definition, as it then stood, could be 
used to reinforce the principle of non-intervention in a wide variety of circumstances. That would be 
the strongest form of protection of a rule of IL based on sovereign equality. In contrast the US position 
was structured by beliefs that IL should properly facilitate an exceptional American role in upholding 
liberal equality of natural persons as a trump over sovereign equality.134 Koh proposed that the 
definition of aggression contained in Article 8bis should be accompanied by written and agreed 
understandings making clear that “those who undertake efforts to prevent war crimes, crimes against 
humanity or genocide—the very crimes that the Rome Statute is designed to deter” had not breached 
any crime within ICC jurisdiction.135
The initial draft understanding was phrased to exempt any actions “undertaken in connection 
with an effort to prevent the commission of any of the crimes contained in Articles 6, 7 or 8 of the 
Statute.”
  
136 That explicit exemption was forcefully rejected by other states, which recognised that in 
practice this amounted to creating special legal rights exercisable by few states other than the US.137
6. It is understood that aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force; and that a 
determination whether an act of aggression has been committed requires consideration of all the circumstances of 
each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and their consequences, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Understanding 6, as it ultimately became, instead read: 
 
The emphasis on “consequences” was directly aimed at the exemption of unilateral humanitarian 
intervention from ICC aggression jurisdiction including, potentially, illegal uses of force not condoned 
by the UN Charter.138 Koh himself pointed out that: “Regardless of how states may view the legality of 
such efforts, those who plan them are not committing the “crime of aggression” and should not run the 
risk of prosecution.”139 The type of case American policymakers appeared to have in mind was the 
US-backed 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo.140 The legalistic negotiations over the scope of the 
aggression definition never disconnected from a consciousness of the history of American global 
engagement and a specific understanding of how IL could facilitate that role.141
At the end of the Kampala Conference Koh maintained that the “final resolution took 
insufficient account of the Security Council’s assigned role to define aggression” but had been 
 
                                               
133 Obama, Barack H., ‘Nobel Lecture: A Just and Lasting Peace,’ Nobelprize.org (10 December, 2009) 
<http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html>. See Koh, Harold H. & Stephen J. 
Rapp, Briefing on the International Criminal Court Conference in Kampala, Uganda (2 June, 2010) 
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Research Service, 10 March, 2011) at 7 
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narrowed through US efforts. He more particularly defended the privileged UNSC role sustained by 
the resolution by stating the exceptionalist premise underpinning US policy: 
The big picture going forward, I think we should keep in mind, is that as the country of Nuremberg prosecutor Justice 
Jackson, we are the only country that has successfully prosecuted the crime of aggression at Nuremberg and Tokyo. 
Of course, we do not commit aggression and the chances are extremely remote that a prosecution on this crime will, 
at some point in the distant future, affect us negatively.142
 
 
It is here that Koh most explicitly emphasised the substantive beliefs that reconcile US arguments for 
legal privilege with a stated commitment to the rule of IL. The assertion of the legitimacy of UNSC 
privileges turned on a belief in both the capacity of the US to uphold liberal norms without the 
oversight of sovereign equals, and its unique global role in advancing compliance with international 
criminal law. This reflects the strong influence of a Liberal Internationalist interpretation of the proper 
relationship between states under IL, and the privileging of liberal over sovereign equality. It was also 
consistent with the evidence of more illiberal ideological influences within the administration and the 
principle of upholding hegemonic privilege commensurate to global responsibilities. 
 
Conclusion 
The 2010 negotiations over the crime of aggression were in many ways the climax of tensions about 
UNSC privileges that had simmered since the earliest days of the ICC project. Attempts to grant the 
court power over the crime of aggression became a tangible method for transferring the system of 
international criminal law onto a foundation aligned with the principle of sovereign equality. That 
initiative was strongly opposed by all P-5 members consistent with the expectations of rational state 
incentives to maintain legal privileges. However, the particular beliefs structuring US policy reflected 
the ideal type conceptions of IL influencing policymakers in the Obama administration more broadly. 
The argument for retaining the status quo drew strongly upon the principle of liberal equality, and the 
exceptional role of the US as facilitated by its UNSC privileges. Scheffer sought to frame the outcome 
in a conciliatory light, arguing that, although the “result is a slap at the equality of states, or at least the 
theory of equality,” it remained the case that “most major shifts in the international system begin that 
way.”143
 
 However, at the level of legal beliefs, there is no evidence that the outcome at Kampala 
signalled even the embryo of converging beliefs about the proper relationship between sovereign 
states under the ICC regime. Forceful rejection of the principle of sovereign equality by American 
policymakers was consistently approached not as mere political expediency, but as a core legal 
principle for advancing the rule of IL. 
 
ORDERING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POWER 
The final area of disagreement over ICC policy concerned ordering international legal powers in the 
fully operational court. The predominant policy approach of international advocates was to emphasise 
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the role of the ICC as ultimate guarantor of international judicial power through its independence from 
competing powers exercised by states. In this context many states argued against the legitimacy of 
states exempting themselves from ICC jurisdiction over aggression, both as parties and as non-
parties. Insistence on sovereign equality had provided a basis for opposing the creation of differential 
rights under UNSC referrals. Equally however, the debate in this period can also be understood in 
terms of a charge that special immunities breached the separation of international legal powers. By 
reserving sole authority to the US to adjudicate ICC crimes committed by its own nationals, 
international judicial power became intermingled with parallel executive and legislative functions 
exercised by American policymakers. For their part US policymakers did not join their global 
counterparts in endorsing the independent judicial character of the ICC. Rather they defended 
mechanisms for constraining the independence of the court, including preserving US courts’ exclusive 
jurisdiction over US nationals, particularly in relation to the crime of aggression. The US also 
remained almost alone in continuing to advocate hybrid and locally constituted courts exercising 
international judicial power separately from the ICC. Yet even as the legalist demand for independent 
judicial power was denied, US policymakers defended each of these measures as consistent with and 
indeed necessary to uphold the rule of IL. 
 
Legalist Policy 
The particular contention motivating states to resist a growing UNSC role in ICC operations was the 
emerging practice of “double standards” in referrals that granted immunities to non-states parties.144 
These had been a feature of the original Darfur referral in 2005 in order to secure US acquiescence, 
but had been repeated in almost identical terms in a 2011 Libyan referral voted for by the US.145 This 
fuelled a “growing disquiet about how power politics and international justice were mixing.”146 In 
relation to both referrals, Brazil expressed the desire to “promote respect for international law,” and on 
that basis challenged US attempts to carve out distinct rights. In voting for the Libyan referral the 
Brazilian representative reiterated “strong reservation” to the exclusion of jurisdiction over non-party 
states,147
We oppose the exemption from jurisdiction of nationals of those countries not parties to the Rome Statute... We 
reiterate our conviction that initiatives aimed at establishing exemptions of certain categories of individuals from the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court are not helpful to advancing the cause of justice and accountability and 
will not contribute to strengthening the role of the Court.
 and the perceived inconsistency of US policy with the rule of IL: 
148
 
 
From a legalist perspective, the effect of such reservations was to defeat the vision of 
impartial and universal application of criminal justice through an international court.149
                                               
144 See for example UN, 6849th Meeting (Resumption 1), United Nations Security Council (17 October, 2012) at 30 per the 
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Conference general debate Brazil reminded delegates of the need to make legal obligations universal 
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and that, like “a la carte multilateralism, cherry-picking when it comes to rules is ultimately self-
defeating.”150 This was reiterated at the UNSC rule of law meeting in Brazil’s “commitment to the 
integrity of the Rome Statute and our firm opposition to any form of exemption from the jurisdiction of 
the ICC.”151 Liechtenstein urged that that the UNSC stop the practice of creating differentiated rights 
of immunity since they “corroborate the suspicion of selectivity in creating accountability” and were 
thereby “contrary to international law.”152 Bangladesh concluded that these exemptions were 
“undermining the rule of law by infringing on the work of the ICC and are undermining the perception 
of the Court as an independent legal body free of political considerations.”153
Representatives at the UNSC rule of law meeting identified a key distinction between the 
independent “judicial” powers of the ICC on the one hand, and the “political” powers of the UNSC to 
maintain “international peace and security” on the other.
 The foundation of the 
legalist approach was the belief that isolating international judicial power in the ICC was both 
possible, and necessary, to realise the rule of IL. The exclusion of certain criminal acts from ICC 
jurisdiction necessarily condoned non-states parties to the Rome Statute exercising international 
judicial power parallel to and free from ICC oversight. 
154 The principle of separating international 
judicial power in the court was breached wherever the UNSC exercised its powers in a way that 
altered the ICC’s prosecutorial and judicial independence.155 The Secretary General emphasised that 
the ICC was “a judicial body, independent and impartial. Once set in motion, justice takes its own 
inexorable course, unswayed by politics. That is its strength, its distinctive virtue.”156
There is an independent Prosecutor, an independent defence and an independent judiciary. The Prosecutor decides 
which cases to pursue, but it is the judges who have the final say on whether to issue an arrest warrant or summons 
to appear, or whether there is sufficient evidence for charges to proceed to a trial.
 ICC President 
Judge Sang-Hyun Song concurred on the need to separate international powers in the ICC: 
157
 
 
This particular view relied on a belief not only in the principle of separating judicial power, but the 
feasibility of an international court doing so while excluding “political or other factors extraneous to the 
proceedings.”158 Japan cautioned that UNSC referrals to the ICC were “not for purely legal 
reasons.”159
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 Similarly, India emphasised the “need to strengthen the rule of law at the international 
level by avoiding selectivity, partiality and double standards” and freeing the ICC from “the clutches of 
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political considerations.”160 At the most basic level these states argued for “the complete separation of 
the ICC’s judicial process from the functions and decisions of the Security Council.”161
 Delegations were equally opposed to setting a higher threshold for ICC jurisdiction than that 
required for a UNSC finding – such as requiring a “flagrant” or manifest” violation.
 
162 The effect would 
be to condone the UNSC exercising judicial and non-judicial powers parallel to the ICC. The 
importance of the legalist ordering principle was significant enough for the Togolese representative to 
state that “in the name of the principle of the separation of powers, the International Criminal Court 
should, in principle, not have relations with the Security Council.” To the extent that the UNSC was 
granted control over the ICC through Articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute this was a power “not 
always in accord with international law.” In this view the breach of the separation of powers doctrine 
rendered the exercise of power inconsistent with basic principles of IL. Indeed Togo argued that the 
inability of the UNSC to reflect ICC membership “should cause the Council to declare itself not 
competent” to exercise its powers under the Rome Statute. To do otherwise “is comparable to a 
regime’s executive and political bodies applying laws to citizens while exempting themselves from 
those same laws.”163
 
 
Beliefs of American Legal Policymakers 
Continued Role of Ad Hoc and Hybrid Tribunals 
From the very first attendance at the ASP in 2009 the US reiterated the preference to order 
international legal powers in a configuration that denied the ICC supranational judicial authority.164 
The “greatest importance” was placed not on an international court in upholding criminal justice, but 
on “assisting countries where the rule of law has been shattered to stand up for their own system of 
protection and accountability.”165
working to strengthen national justice systems and is maintaining our support for ad hoc international tribunals and 
hybrid courts. Those who intentionally target innocent civilians must be held accountable, and we will continue to 
support institutions and prosecutions that advance this important interest.
 It was only where this option proved impossible that the ICC was to 
approximate domestic courts as a necessary compromise. In the NSS 2010 the Obama 
administration stated foremost that, in light of America’s historical support for international justice, it 
was: 
166
 
 
Only secondarily to this principle was the administration prepared to favour “supporting the ICC’s 
prosecution” of appropriate cases.  
That stance was followed through in the UNSC rule of law meeting, where the US position 
was distinguished from every other participant by its primary emphasis on addressing international 
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criminal justice through national justice systems and “hybrid structures where appropriate.”167 Even in 
relation to prosecuting ongoing atrocities in Syria the US was careful to make clear it was not 
“prejudging the ultimate venue for it.”168
 
 This indicates the extent to which US policy continued to 
challenge the concentration of judicial power over international crimes in an international court acting 
independent of municipal legal control. The resistance was borne of a particular scepticism toward the 
idea that judicial power could exist as a self-contained source of legitimacy when divorced from any 
political context. Rather than seeing an independent ICC as the purest form of international criminal 
justice, US policymakers instead saw it embedding particular forms of politics into the law, and ones 
likely to be foreign to victims of atrocities. The ordering principle to achieve the rule of IL remained 
international judicial power that was not independent of state control but, to the contrary, was subject 
to democratic checks and balances. 
Dividing In Personam ICC Jurisdiction  
US support for the court reached new levels of engagement in relation to the 2011 Libyan Civil War 
when, for the first time, it voted through the UNSC to refer a situation for ICC investigation.169 Yet the 
resolution equally sought to divide the judicial power presumptively reserved to the court. Consistent 
with a rejection of formal legal obligations the resolution was written “recognizing that States not party 
to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute” while still urging “all States and concerned 
regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor.”170
Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a State outside the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which 
is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
that State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
established or authorized by the Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by the 
State.
 
More particularly the US denied the institutional separation of international judicial power by 
preserving the capacity of the US legal system to exercise these powers parallel to the ICC. In 
substantive clause six the UNSC: 
171
 
 
This replicated limitations in the Darfur referral172
                                               
167 UN, 6849th Meeting, United Nations Security Council (17 October, 2012) at 8 
 that upheld ordering principles other than a 
separation of international legal powers. There was no suggestion that the US was carving out the 
right for its military personal to act with impunity, contrary to accusations by some states-parties. 
Rather the objective was always defended in terms of preserving the jurisdiction of domestic courts 
and military tribunals to try such matters. This design was capable of supporting all four ideal 
American conceptions of IL such that: international criminal justice could be subjected to democratic 
checks and balances; the jurisdiction of the ICC was limited by US consent; there was a clear 
168 Ibid at 9 
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separation between international and domestic judicial authority; and the supremacy of municipal over 
international law was maintained. 
Ambassador Rapp expressed the ordering of international legal power in liberal terms that 
expressed a commitment both to a vertical separation of powers and to democratic checks and 
balances. In response to a question on whether there was any conceivable situation where 
international judges would be better placed to deal with American nationals, Rapp reiterated that it 
was the US “constitutional system that establishes who can be judges and generally these positions 
are restricted to American citizens.”173 The clear implication was that there was a hard limit to treating 
international judicial power as a continuation of municipal powers. The essence of a vertical 
separation of powers is that these remain distinct and not interchangeable in relation to the same 
subject matter. At the same time Rapp gave an assurance that the administration would “conduct 
ourselves in terms of our adherence to international law in such a way that we will never give cause to 
any legitimately motivated prosecutor to bring a case or to seek admission of a case against an 
American citizen in an international court.”174
 
 This point is distinct from the first in seeking to check 
international legal powers through the integrity of the American system, as compared to the absolute 
separation of that system from international powers. In neither case however did the administration 
turn to the illiberal principles shaping the Bush 43 ICC policy of in principle supremacy of municipal 
legal power or a bare right to withhold consent, while equally it rejected legalism’s complete 
separation of international judicial power in the ICC. 
The Indivisibility of Legalism and the Crime of Aggression 
Although the US maintained a constructive dialogue defining and implementing the crime of 
aggression, it became clear that its very inclusion in the Rome Statute ran counter to any conception 
of legal power held by American policymakers. In a series of statements concerning the crime of 
aggression, Koh and Rapp emphasised that, even apart from actual politicisation of aggression 
prosecutions, it would be impossible to avoid the apprehension of such bias. In his 2010 statement to 
the Assembly of States Parties Koh warned of the risk that any ICC prosecution for the crime of 
aggression “by its very nature, even if perfectly defined, would inevitably be seen as political.”175 Rapp 
explained that aggression would take the ICC “into the political area” dealing with “crimes not against 
individual civilians, as in war crimes or crimes against humanity or genocide, but crimes against 
states.”176
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 This reflected the continued scepticism that an international court could truly maintain the 
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court such powers. US scepticism translated into a policy of maintaining direct and indirect barriers to 
realising the crime in any meaningful form.177
 American opposition to ICC prosecutions was no less pronounced in relation to equivalent 
actions taken at the municipal level. Complementarity had provided a common ground for agreeing 
that states had primary responsibility to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
with the ICC stepping in only where this arrangement proved inadequate.
 
178 US policymakers long 
argued however that inadequate consideration had been given to how complementarity could actually 
work in the case of aggression. The nature of the crime was such that political leaders would rarely be 
prosecuted by their own states, and thus it would fall to other states to do so.179 US policymakers 
warned that this scenario would contravene basic principles of sovereign immunity by allowing “the 
domestic courts of one country to sit in judgment upon the state acts of other countries in a manner 
highly unlikely to promote peace and security.”180
5. It is understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as creating the right or obligation to exercise 
domestic jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression committed by another State. 
 Understanding 5 was thus instituted to deal directly 
with “domestic jurisdiction over the crime of aggression” and the risks of an expansive application of 
complementarity: 
 
The Understanding contravened legalist principles by effectively denying any exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by states parties.181 The US fear however was that states would seek an exemption to 
sovereign immunity in the case of aggression by claiming that, by acting under the complementarity 
principle, jurisdiction was empowered by the impartial judicial powers of the ICC. The US faced the 
possibility of states exercising universal jurisdiction so that “under expansive principles of jurisdiction, 
government officials will be prosecuted for alleged aggression in the courts of another state.”182
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of the ICC.183 Because official state involvement is an element of the crime itself, there is a real risk of 
adversaries seizing the crime as an opportunity to engage in “lawfare.”184 Koh was at pains to 
emphasise that any power to prosecute aggression at the municipal level “derives from national 
jurisdiction” and not from notionally impartial ICC power. The general rule that a state must consent to 
another state exercising jurisdiction over its leaders should hold for domestic prosecutions.185
The eventual outcome of the Kampala negotiations was a compromise between the states 
who opposed a UNSC monopoly on aggression cases and US insistence that it be able to check ICC 
jurisdiction. The UNSC’s monopoly over cases of aggression was loosened by allowing the 
prosecutor to proceed where the UNSC had declined or failed to act.
 
186 This minor concession came 
however at the cost of granting the US immunity from all aggression prosecutions for so long as it 
remained a non-state party, and even as a state party through an opt out provision.187 The agreement 
transformed ad-hoc immunities of non-state parties set out in UNSC referrals and crystallised them in 
the Rome Statute itself. US policymakers had ensured “total protection for our Armed Forces and 
other U.S. nationals going forward.”188
The outcome should not be seen as evidence of a common understanding on the proper legal 
principles for ordering ICC legal powers however, but rather as a highly contentious political trade-off. 
Paulus warned of the risk of “politicization” if the US and other UNSC members were granted the 
power to control the judicial independence of the ICC, but ultimately accepted that the legal principle 
must give way to political expediency. The ideal of “complete freedom” needed to be weighed against 
the risk that it would endanger “vital support of the P5 for ICC investigations in the first place, and 
further alienate the United States, in particular.”
 The arrangement was adopted by “consensus” in the final 
resolution at the Kampala Conference.  
189 At the Kampala Conference states that had 
opposed US negotiators throughout viewed their agreement as representing an instrumental 
concession to political power. Minutes before the final resolution was adopted Japan intervened to 
declare as its “sad duty” that compromises within represented “the undermining of the credibility of the 
Rome Statute and the whole system it represents.”190 Throughout the conference Japan had 
highlighted its “strong belief that the activities of the ICC contributes to the establishment of the rule of 
law in the international community.”191
                                               
183 Koh, Harold H., Statement at the Review Conference of the International Criminal Court (4 June, 2010) 
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Such a concession “unjustifiably solidifies blanket and automatic impunity of nationals of non States 
Parties: a clear departure from the basic tenet of article 12 of the Statute.” The method by which this 
was incorporated amounted to “suicide of legal integrity.”192 It was only with “a heavy heart” therefore 
that Japan allowed the adoption by consensus, but warned that Japan’s future cooperation would 
“hinge” on addressing these concerns.193
 
 
Conclusion 
Whereas states parties argued for separation of international judicial power into a court with supreme 
authority, policymakers in the Obama administration continued to argue for the merits of ad hoc and 
hybrid tribunals exercising those same international powers. As states parties argued that the ICC 
should sit above all countries as a check over international criminal acts, US policymakers carved out 
exclusive rights to adjudicate those matters in relation to its own nationals. Finally, the US argued for 
the right to effective immunity from ICC jurisdiction for the crime of aggression, but did so only at the 
expense of a court design rejected by key states as contrary to the rule of IL. Ultimately, the parties at 
the Kampala conference could only reach agreement by deferring implementation of the crime of 
aggression until a further “decision to be taken after 1 January 2017.”194 This was consistent with the 
US approach of tactically obstructing recognition of the crime in the ICC’s ordinary jurisdiction. Under 
Obama, the US continued to increase non-binding support for the ICC, even as it challenged the 
desirability or feasibility of establishing independent judicial power at the apex of the system of 
international criminal justice. Fairlie notes that the court subsequently focussed exclusively on crimes 
where the perpetrator and victim were of the same nationality; therefore making it highly unlikely 
American peacekeepers would ever be prosecuted. Yet, where US resistance was based in liberal 
legal principles, and where “concerns regarding the potential for politicized prosecutions are at the 
core of U.S. opposition,” altering practices within the court remains unlikely to alter US policy.195
 
 
 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Bosco notes, perhaps cynically, that during the Obama administration “US officials were becoming 
adept at framing efforts to guide the court as expressions of concern for its well-being.”196
                                               
192 Cited in Barriga, Stefan & Claus Kreß, The Travaux Préparatoires of the Crime of Aggression (Cambridge University Press, 
2012) at 812 
 This is 
suggestive of the hypothesis that legal policymakers consciously disregarded their commitment to the 
law in order to advance political power. However, the most plausible interpretation of evidence 
remains that of political interests being channelled through ideologically entrenched conceptions of 
the law itself. Analysing the dynamics of foreign policy ideology in this period is especially difficult for 
two key reasons. Interpretations of the Obama administration’s ideological beliefs remain unsettled, 
193 Cited in ibid at 810-812 
194 Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the crime of aggression (2010), Arts.15bis(3) & 
15ter(3); Weed, Matthew C., International Criminal Court and the Rome Statute: 2010 Review Conference (Congressional 
Research Service, 10 March, 2011) at 12-13 
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with evidence of a mainly reactive distancing from Illiberal Nationalism replaced by an eclectic 
blending of beliefs. The second reason is that global positions toward the ICC were equally eclectic in 
the mix of positions adopted by states. Van Shaack notes that, compared to Rome, the “negotiating 
dynamics in Kampala were considerably more complex.” The previously united opposition to the US 
by LMS and NGOs “splintered” into more diverse positions.197 The largely united P-5 stance was 
drawn to “two irreconcilable positions.” The first “idealistic, if not hopelessly naïve” position envisioned 
an independent ICC exercising universal jurisdiction. The other position accepted that some degree of 
state consent was required.198
In what reads as a veiled criticism of the legalist position, Koh intervened in the Kampala 
Conference to remind delegates that the ultimate objective remained “making international criminal 
law for the real world.” That goal was threatened by any “unworkable and divisive compromise that 
weakens the Court, diverts it from its core human rights mission, or undermines our multilateral 
system of peace and security.”
 The fact that it was no longer the “US versus the rest” did not however 
mean that US policy was any less structured by the established dynamic of competition between 
legalism and ideal American conceptions of law. 
199
 
 These were all charges laid by American policymakers against 
states and organisations that insisted on formalised development of global governance, sovereign 
equality between states and the separation of international legal powers, as necessary elements of an 
ICC compliant with the rule of IL. Rather, across this period US policymakers emphasised the process 
of transnational development as more significant than the formal obligations of a signed treaty. The 
perception of an exceptional US role in upholding liberal values was maintained as a reason for 
opposing the equal application of legal rights. Finally, scepticism about the merit of independent 
judicial power was held out as a reason for maintaining immunities from ICC jurisdiction. In all these 
ways the hegemonic impulses of US power continued to be interpreted through the lens of 
distinctively American versions of the rule of IL. 
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BETWEEN POWER & TRANSCENDENT VALUES 
 
 
IDEOLOGICAL LIMITS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
The very existence of the ICC could cast doubt on the argument that competing foreign policy 
ideologies set hard limits to its development. In 1964 Shklar identified a motive behind the Nuremberg 
trials as “a desire to do something for the future of the rule of law in international relations.”1 Yet the 
extraordinary circumstances in the aftermath of WWII suggested to Shklar that the Nuremberg 
achievements were unlikely to be replicated in a standing international criminal court: “nothing 
effective along these lines is even imaginable at present.” To expect otherwise “was unreasonable, an 
extravagance of the legalistic imagination.”2
 The evidence from a quarter-century of American ICC policy does suggest progress is 
possible in terms of strengthening the institutional architecture of international criminal justice. 
Moreover the US has demonstrated a practical capacity to work with other states to fight impunity and 
advance accountability for perpetrators of “atrocity crimes.”
 The establishment of the court in 2002, tracing its lineage 
to Nuremberg, seems to vindicate the possibility of real progress toward a global consensus on the 
meaning of the rule of IL. 
3
The more the ICC becomes like a real criminal court, operating under the rule of law, the more American politicians 
are likely to shelve their fears of politicized prosecution and support the ICC as an important instrument of 
international peace and harmony.
 However this thesis has found no 
evidence of progress toward a universal conception of the “rule of IL” as an ideal guiding the design 
and development of international criminal justice. Rather the court, as realised, uncomfortably 
straddles the interstices and political compromises between competing and often incompatible 
ideologies. Legalism and the four American ideological types each crystallise interests in legal 
principles that divide adherents according to internally coherent but mutually conflicting legal ideals. 
Fletcher and Ohlin reviewed the tentative progress in US ICC policy to conclude that: 
4
 
 
Such optimism conflates difficult political compromises on both sides with a progress toward legal 
consensus on the meaning of a court “operating under the rule of law.” 
The contribution of interpreting American ICC policy through foreign policy ideology becomes 
clear by comparing Jürgen Habermas’ related analysis of policy contradictions.5
                                               
1 Shklar, Judith N., Legalism (Harvard University Press, 1964) at 176 
 Habermas agreed, 
2 Ibid at 177 
3 The term is Scheffer’s in reference to the slate of ICC crimes: Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of 
the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012) at 2 
4 Fletcher, George P. & Ohlin, Jens David, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’ (2005) 3 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 539 at 561. See also Fairlie, Megan, ‘The United States and the International Criminal 
Court Post-Bush: A Beautiful Courtship but an Unlikely Marriage’ (2011) 29 Berkeley Journal of International Law 529 at 576 
5 Habermas, Jürgen, America and the World: A Conversation with Jürgen Habermas (2004) 
<http://www.logosjournal.com/habermas_america.htm>. For Habermas’ views on IL more generally see: Habermas, Jürgen, 
‘The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a Constitution for World Society’ (2008) 15 
Constellations 444; Habermas, Jürgen, ‘The Crisis of the European Union in the Light of a Constitutionalization of International 
Law’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 335 
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consistent with this thesis, that Kagan’s characterisation of a transatlantic divide was too crude for 
legal analysis.6 For Habermas the greatest conflicts over the conception of IL “occurred, not between 
the continents, but, rather, within American policy itself”7
Kagan is suggesting a false continuity. The newly-elected Bush administration’s definitive repudiation of 
internationalism has remained its keynote: The rejection of the (since established) International Criminal Court was 
no trivial delict. One must not imagine that the offensive marginalizing of the United Nations and the cavalier 
contempt for international law which this administration has allowed itself to be guilty of, represent the expression of 
some necessary constant of American foreign policy.
: 
8
 
 
However, Habermas departed from the insights of this thesis in citing policymakers such as Woodrow 
Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt as examples of a countervailing commitment to legalism in 
American diplomatic history. For him the question at the end of the Cold War was whether “the one 
remaining superpower would turn away from its leading role in the march toward a cosmopolitan legal 
order, and fall back into the imperial role of a good hegemon above international law.”9 The ICC case 
has not supported that characterisation, finding no evidence that American policymakers were ever 
committed to a rule of IL founded on cosmopolitan values. Habermas was right to remind us that the 
Bush administration could “be replaced in the coming year by an administration that gives the lie to 
Kagan,” but wrong to suggest that shift could be to legalism. As in Max Weber’s analogy, policy has 
switched between the finite number of tracks provided by American ideologies, none of which leads to 
a global consensus.10
 
 
The Status of Contradictions in US Policy 
Analysing American ICC policy through foreign policy ideology does not dispel the criticism that it is 
often contradictory, but it redefines the nature of inconsistencies. The evidence suggests far greater 
coherence in legal principles, but greater political incoherence than is generally posited. Legal 
scholarship claims jurisprudential incoherence in American policy: that policymakers have pledged 
fidelity to the principle of the rule of IL, but that legal principle has been subverted to tactical political 
compromises in designing and developing the ICC. The conclusion from the ICC case is that charges 
of hypocrisy do not stand up, with strong evidence that legal policymakers were committed to the 
processes of the international legal system according to distinct and internally coherent conceptions 
of the rule of law. Policy outcomes often revealed contradictory legal principles due to domestic 
ideological competition, but decision-making processes were structured by multiple coherent legal 
commitments, rather than by an absence of them.  
 The process of these ideological types competing within and between administrations however 
demonstrated that the political coherence of American IL policy cannot be assumed. The standard 
explanation for contradictory outcomes in legal scholarship has been the role of political power: that 
the consistent logic of national interests is privileged over law. Van der Vyver identifies the logic in US 
                                               
6 Referring to Kagan, Robert, Of Paradise and Power (Vintage Books, 2004). See Chapter 2 supra 
7 Habermas, Jürgen, America and the World: A Conversation with Jürgen Habermas (2004) 
<http://www.logosjournal.com/habermas_america.htm> 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 Weber, Max, ‘The Social Psychology of the World Religions’ in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (ed), From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology (Oxford University Press, 1946) at 280 
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policy as electing to “place considerations of self-interest above everything else.”11 However, each 
ideology entails its own definition of the national interest and strategies for achieving it through IL. 
Due to the same dynamic that establishes forms of legal coherence, it cannot be assumed that the 
interests guiding US IL policy are fixed. Rather American IL policy has exhibited contradictory 
outcomes over time by shifting between alternative definitions of interests.12
 Scheffer’s recollection of the Rome Conference demonstrated the way that competing legal 
conceptions among American legal policymakers contributed to the appearance that American IL 
policy was bereft of any principled commitment to law. Scheffer was accompanied in the Rome 
negotiations by Senator Helms’ staffers, whom he was expected to accommodate as a courtesy to the 
US legislature.
 Incorporating the 
explanatory role of American foreign policy ideology precisely reverses the conclusions of legal 
analysis. Where legal scholars have seen contradictions in American fidelity to the rule of IL they have 
tended to overlook underlying legal rationality. But, when they explain this as the rational process of 
national interests trumping law, they overlook fundamental contradictions in what policymakers 
believe interests are. 
13 Unsurprisingly Scheffer found himself correcting misperceptions among foreign 
diplomats that Helms’ confrontational Illiberal Nationalist language represented the true US position, 
rather than the accommodating language in official communications.14 Likewise, in Scheffer’s view, 
the 1998 Pentagon letter demanding total immunity for US military personnel in Illiberal 
Internationalist terms “undercut my negotiating posture with other governments.15 These cases 
signalled to other states that official US statements masked a degree of hypocrisy and increased 
wariness toward making further concessions.16 Clearer understanding by global counterparts of the 
competing legal commitments of US policymakers may have facilitated more constructive 
engagement with the dominant Liberal Internationalist ideology of the administration.17
 Conversely, the shift from internationalist to nationalist legal conceptions between the Clinton 
and Bush 43 administrations revealed contradictions between understandings of the national interest. 
Scheffer’s successful effort lobbying the US government to sign the Rome Statute was done with the 
clear strategic objective of bolstering US credibility and support for transnational legal development.
 
18
                                               
11 van der Vyver, Johan D, The International Criminal Court: American Responses to the Rome Conference and the Role of the 
European Union (Inst. für Rechtspolitik, 2003) at 4 
 
The Bush 43 reversal toward Illiberal Nationalism rendered US policy incoherent and self defeating 
and severely strained relations with American allies. The conspicuous act of signing the statute was 
12 Simpson, Gerry J., ‘Throwing a Little Remembering on the Past: The International Criminal Court and the Politics of 
Sovereignty’ (1999) 5 UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 133 at 142-143; Luck, Edward C., ‘American 
Exceptionalism and International Organization: Lessons from the 1990s’ in Rosemary S. Foot, Neil MacFarlane & Michael 
Mastanduno (ed), US Hegemony and International Organizations: The United States and Multilateral Institutions (Oxford 
University Press, 2003) at 48; Wippman, David, ‘The International Criminal Court’ in Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The Politics of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 181-182 
13 Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012) 
at 229 
14 Ibid at 188 
15 Ibid at 190. See Schonberg, Karl K., ‘The General’s Diplomacy: US Military Influence in the Treaty Process, 1992-2000’ 
(2002) 3 Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 68 at 78-79 and Chapter 5 supra 
16 Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012) 
at 167 
17 For a complementary study seeking to reduce US misunderstanding of European motivations see: Fehl, Caroline, Living with 
a Reluctant Hegemon: Explaining European Responses to US Unilateralism (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 7-8 
18 Scheffer, David J., All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton University Press, 2012) 
at 236 
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worse than no action at all where it could be used by opponents to challenge US motives once the 
statute was conspicuously “unsigned.” Interpreting the shift in policy as being drawn from competing 
ideologies allows legal scholars to move beyond presumptions that law is trumped by consistent US 
interests. The evidence emphasises the limitation of drawing conclusions about legal principles or 
political interests from “American ICC policy” as a single object of analysis.19
 
 The dynamic of 
competing ideological approaches necessitates taking account of the logic and objectives of multiple 
ICC policies. 
Implications for ICC Scholarship and Legal Policymakers 
The significance of this study for legal scholarship is that it reveals the valuable insights from 
conceiving US disputes with the ICC as a battle internal to law rather than as an external battle 
against politics. The difference was exemplified in the long standing debate over the proper ICC 
relationship with the UNSC, which clearly demonstrated the role of foreign policy ideology in 
translating international power through the beliefs of American political culture. At the level of policy 
outcomes, relative power was shown to matter, with the US consistently joining with the P-5 to justify 
various levels of legal privilege. Likewise, the US supported UNSC privileges across the four periods 
of the case study, irrespective of changes in dominant foreign policy ideologies. The implication is that 
US policy could be explained as the expected behaviour of a powerful state institutionalising its 
position through law.20
 The significance of disaggregating and setting out distinct legal principles defining equality 
and the ordering of legal powers in the UNSC is that criticisms and challenges to US policy framed in 
rule of law terms were shown not to resonate with American policymakers so long as they drew solely 
from legalism. Exhortations to honour sovereign equality and the separation of international legal 
powers were not rejected by American policymakers merely as politically undesirable, but as contrary 
to received understandings of an ICC designed in conformity with the rule of IL. In particular, 
moralistic appeals to set aside political expediency and recommit to the law assumed a distinction that 
in many cases simply did not exist. The charge of hypocrisy in American insistence on UNSC 
privileges projected an understanding of the rule of IL onto American policymakers, and then levelled 
the charge of incoherence when US policymakers failed to meet that imputed ideal.  
 However, legal scholarship is not directly interested in outcomes, but rather in 
explicating the legal doctrines and principles that guided state conduct. At that level, competing 
ideological conceptions of law did establish distinct legal principles separating the US from its P-5 
counterparts, and US administrations from each other. 
What the UNSC example reveals is that the key to challenging American IL policy is to 
understand the structure of American foreign policy ideology in order to challenge policymakers for 
contradicting their own terms. The concern of legalist advocates was not that the US was breaching 
                                               
19 For examples of this approach see Dutton, Yvonne, Rules, Politics, and the International Criminal Court: Committing to the 
Court (Routledge, 2013) at 47-60; Orentilicher, Diane F., ‘Unilateral Multilateralism: United States Policy Toward the 
International Criminal Court’ (2003) 36 Cornell International Law Journal 415 
20 Likewise Bosco persuasively demonstrates the strong negative correlation between population size and military spending, 
and likelihood of membership of the ICC: See Bosco, David, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court’s Battle to Fix the 
World, One Prosecution at a Time (Oxford University Press, 2014), Figures 5.2 & 5.3 at 133-134. On the other hand, although 
the US was joined by India, Russia and China in rejecting court membership, each did so according to a distinct legal rationale 
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international criminal law with impunity through these years,21 but that its proposals for the rule of IL 
rejected institutional constraints in favour of America’s own good faith adherence to exceptionalist 
values. Bosco notes that US legal principles were “competing with the narrative of accountability” 
throughout and thus remained unconvincing. Outside of American policymaking these principles 
appeared as “little more than an exercise in exceptionalism: the United States wanted international 
justice, but only if it could control how it would be applied.”22
 The power of that strategy was demonstrated in the 2004 example of the US withdrawing 
demands for ICC immunity following the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal.
 The veracity of exceptionalism thus lay at 
the heart of divergence between legalist demands for more formalised legal relations, and the 
American defence of more flexible and contextual arrangements. Challenging US legal policy required 
not pointing out contradictions with legalist principles, but demonstrating incoherence in exceptionalist 
assumptions. 
23 The passing of 
previous UNSC resolutions granting ICC immunity to US peacekeepers had been defended in terms 
of internationalist principles about the unequal US role in upholding liberal values and the value of 
hegemonic privilege. The integrity of IL in both cases was guaranteed by exceptionalist beliefs in 
“America as something different”24 and therefore its own check against abuse. When the UNSC 
granted immunity in the 2002-2003 resolutions, opposition had been expressed in terms of 
contravening the principle of sovereign equality and failed to resonate on each occasion.25
 The power of holding a mirror up to American legal policymakers’ own legal ideals is not a 
means for establishing the legalist rule of IL. This is a reactive strategy that ameliorates only 
unambiguous cases of hypocrisy. The historical record, however, is that in the vast majority of cases, 
discomfort with US policy has been a principled objection to the absence of independent institutions 
rather than recognition of actual lawlessness. Conversely, the greatest threat to the rule of IL, as 
conceived by any involved party, is precisely those rare cases where US actions truly contradict not 
only legalism, but American ideological commitments.
 In 2004, 
however, opponents pointed to the growing scandal as evidence that US privileges were no longer 
proportionate to any role in advancing international criminal justice. In American policymakers’ own 
terms, the only means of avoiding hypocrisy became the equal application of internationally 
determined rights and duties to American military personnel. 
26
                                               
21 See Fehl, Caroline, Living with a Reluctant Hegemon: Explaining European Responses to US Unilateralism (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) at 92 
 Engaging through foreign policy ideology will 
not align parties’ conceptions of the rule of IL, but can influence policies that achieve more acceptable 
compromises. In particular, this may entail pragmatically appealing to the ideas of Liberal 
Internationalism and internationalism more generally as the legal approaches having most common 
ground with legalism. Conversely, legal policymakers can work to delegitimise nationalist and 
specifically Illiberal Nationalist beliefs as the conceptions most incompatible with the legalist rule of 
22 Bosco, David, Rough Justice: The International Criminal Court’s Battle to Fix the World, One Prosecution at a Time (Oxford 
University Press, 2014) at 179 
23 See Chapter 7 supra 
24 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination of Dr. 
Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State, 1st Session 109th Congress (2005) at 147 
25 See SC Res 1422, UN Doc S/RES/1422 (12 July, 2002); SC Res 1487, UN Doc S/RES/1487 (12 June, 2003) 
26 The Congressional Research Service cites the example of the 1968 My Lai massacre in this context: See Grigorian, Ellen, 
The International Criminal Court Treaty: Description, Policy Issues, and Congressional Concerns (Congressional Research 
Service, 6 January, 1999) at 11-12, n.46 
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IL.27
 
 Through this dynamic it does ultimately matter that American legal policymakers from all 
persuasions are committed to dialogue over the meaning of the rule of IL, and that none identifies US 
interests in explicit lawlessness. 
The Future of American ICC Policy 
The future of the ICC relationship is likely to remain one of political compromises straddling competing 
legal ideals.28 In 2005, during the height of transatlantic tensions over American legal policy, the 
Atlantic Council sought to fulfil its mission of “renewing the Atlantic community” through its report: Law 
and the Lone Superpower: Rebuilding a Transatlantic Consensus on International Law.29
Since at least the end of World War II, the United States and Europe have been strong partners and advocates — in 
word and usually in deed — in support of international institutions and the rule of law in relations between states. Yet, 
in recent years, the United States and European governments have found themselves at odds over a range of 
international legal issues. While the European Union has taken the role of enthusiastic promoter of the ICC, for 
instance, the United States has refused to join and sought immunity for its citizens from potential Court action.
 In noting 
many of the same power based and cultural explanations set out in this thesis, the report articulated 
the heart of the challenge: 
30
 
 
Reviewing key recommendations for “building a consensus” on the ICC, it is clear that no consensus 
on the rule of IL was evident according to any ordinary meaning of that term.31 The report did point 
the way forward, with key recommendations including that the US: “Review its own legal code for 
compatibility with the standards set by the Rome Statute...; Seek promises of U.S. jurisdiction rather 
than immunity when negotiating Article 98 agreements; and Provide technical and evidentiary 
assistance to ICC procedures.”32 These are principles for a pragmatic agreement to split the 
difference in a court capable of advancing international criminal justice. They are in no way a formula 
for “a new transatlantic consensus on the role and scope of the international legal system.”33 
Limitations are not a product of the special history of the ICC, or the idiosyncrasies of legal 
policymakers,34
The Obama administration’s National Security Strategy released in February 2015 mentions 
the ICC only once, and in terms that consolidate the preference for transnational and pragmatic 
development of the court. In the context of American promotion of liberal values the strategy commits 
to “work with the international community to prevent and call to account those responsible for the 
worst human rights abuses, including through support to the International Criminal Court, consistent 
 but fundamental to the nature of the rule of IL. 
                                               
27 Schabas describes the shift away from the Bush 43 administration’s Illiberal Nationalism as a “great diplomatic defeat for the 
United States”: Schabas, William, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press, 4th ed, 
2011) at 34 
28 See Kaye, David, ‘America’s Honeymoon with the ICC,’ Foreign Affairs (16 April, 2013) 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139170/david-kaye/americas-honeymoon-with-the-icc> 
29 Taft IV, William H. & Frances G. Burwell, Law and the Lone Superpower: Rebuilding a Transatlantic Consensus on 
International Law (Policy Paper, The Atlantic Council of the United States, April, 2007) at 15. See Atlantic Council, About the 
Council <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/> 
30 Taft IV, William H. & Frances G. Burwell, Law and the Lone Superpower: Rebuilding a Transatlantic Consensus on 
International Law (Policy Paper, The Atlantic Council of the United States, April, 2007) at 3 
31 Ibid at 10 
32 Ibid at 3 
33 Ibid at 15 
34 As has been suggested in some accounts: See Benedetti, Fanny, Karine Bonneau, et al., Negotiating the International 
Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 1994-1998 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) at 140 
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with U.S. law and our commitment to protecting our personnel.”35 This commitment to flexible 
obligations under the ICC is couched within, and is given meaning by, a broader exceptionalist role in 
upholding the rule of IL. Noting “undeniable strains” in international legal architecture, the strategy 
stakes out beliefs that: “Strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based 
international order that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the dignity and human 
rights of all peoples. The question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead.”36
 
 
 
CONTESTING THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Areas for Future Research 
The greatest contribution from identifying the role of foreign policy ideology in the ICC is providing a 
framework capable of explaining American IL policy more generally. It is possible that the findings are 
limited to circumstances specific to the ICC, or are more relevant to explaining US policy toward 
international courts than broader legal issues. In relation to the first suggestion, the beliefs shaping 
ICC policy were hardly unprecedented. Congressional refusal to ratify the Genocide Convention for 
over 40 years was in large part due to fears it would expose American citizens to international 
prosecutions. The objection was only overcome through reservations denying that eventuality.37 
Likewise, from 1946 to 1986, the US accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ subject to the 
“Connally reservation,” which allowed the US to determine on a case-by-case basis whether any legal 
dispute was the sole province of domestic courts.38 Where the US was unable to rely on even this 
reservation to reorder international legal power it withdrew consent to compulsory jurisdiction entirely 
in 1986, while defending its decision as “commitment to the rule of law.”39
As to the question of broader relevance, a range of puzzles in post-Cold War IL policy provide 
fertile ground for further research. The leading case which could corroborate the ICC findings is IL 
policy in the “long war with Iraq,” lasting from 1990 to 2011 (and perhaps to the present day).
 Accordingly, the case is 
highly convincing for applying foreign policy ideology to explain future policy toward international 
courts generally. 
40
                                               
35 The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2015, The White House (2015) at 22 
 The 
legal policy of each President from Bush 41 onward has provoked voluminous analysis about 
implications for the rule of IL. An example of the type of puzzle that foreign policy ideology could 
address is convergent legal justifications for the use of force against Iraq during the Clinton and Bush 
43 administrations. The legality of airstrikes carried out throughout the 1990s under Clinton was 
36 Ibid at i 
37 Struett, Michael J., The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs, Discourse, and Agency (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008) at 69 
38 See Murphy, Sean D., ‘The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping with Antinomies’ in Cesare P.R. 
Romano (ed), The Sword and the Scales: The United States and International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009) at 65-66 
39 US Department of State, cited in Leich, Marian N., ‘U.S. Withdrawal of Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua’ (1985) 79 
American Journal of International Law 431 at 441. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. United States of America) [1984] ICJ Rep 392. Although the declaration under Charter of the United Nations (1945), Article 
36(2) was withdrawn, the US did continue to accept ICJ jurisdiction under several treaties, including the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (1963) at issue in subsequent cases: Lagrand (Germany v. United States of America) [2001] ICJ Rep 466; 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) [2004] ICJ Rep 12 
40 Lynch, Timothy J., ‘Obama, Liberalism, and US Foreign Policy’ in Inderjeet Parmar, Linda B. Miller & Mark Ledwidge (ed), 
Obama and the World: New Directions in US Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2014) at 47 
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based in part on implied and revived authorisation of UNSC resolutions from the Persian Gulf War41 
which became the explicit foundation for the 2003 invasion.42 Yet, despite commonalities, there was a 
conspicuous contrast between intense criticism of the 2003 War, both domestically and externally, 
and minimal criticism of the Clinton airstrikes. Bellinger has argued that “there was either legal 
authority to use force, or there was not...[and] if there was not legal authority to use force, then the 
legal problem did not begin in 2003 – it went all the way back through the 1990s.”43
A further question raised in this study is whether the theorised ideological structure extends 
beyond the executive and legislative branches to the judiciary as “legal policymakers”: Do judges’ 
conceptions of IL exhibit the same ideological dimensionality and structure as general foreign policy? 
Within the US Supreme Court in particular, views on IL and its reception into the common law have 
animated intense disagreements that parallel beliefs within each administration. There is some truth 
to Sands’ description of certain members of the US Supreme Court refusing to follow IL pursuant to 
an “exceptionalist and isolationist perspective that sees America as an island of law hermetically 
sealed off from the rest of the world.”
 Identifying 
ideological shifts can move beyond doctrinal analysis to distinguish these periods according to 
competing conceptions of the rule of IL. 
44 Conversely, other judges have argued forcefully for the 
integration of American law into transnational processes.45
As a prima facie case, the divergence between majority and minority judgements in 
Hamdan
 
46 correlates with the ideological structure of foreign policy.47 The majority judgement found 
that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions constrained the US government, and 
moreover, that the standard for a “regularly constituted court” trying detainees was found in the 
additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions that the US had accepted in policy statements, but 
had declined to ratify.48 In contrast, the dissent of Justice Thomas interpreted Common Article 3 
permissively as being inapplicable pursuant to a “duty to defer to the President’s understanding of the 
provision at issue.”49 Certainly the Bush 43 administration recognised in its second term that its shift in 
support for the rule of IL mirrored the majority judgement. When the Justice Department first 
conducted a review of detainee practices, Rice rejected the resulting executive order for failing to 
accord with the principles set out in the Supreme Court ruling.50
                                               
41 Symes, Gavin A., ‘Force Without Law: Seeking a Legal Justification for the September 1996 US Military Intervention in Iraq’ 
(1997) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 581 at 602-608 
 Compliance with Common Article 3 
was considered necessary to reassure European allies of US fidelity to the rule of law and thus for 
42 Through the combined operation of UN Security Council Resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991), and 1441 (2002): Taft IV, 
William H. & Todd F. Buchwald, ‘Preemption, Iraq and International Law’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 557 
at 559-560. Notably Taft has conceded that this interpretation “certainly did have a weakening effect” on the institution of the 
UNSC by likely increasing reluctance to pass future resolutions: See Taft IV, William H., Interview with Author (22 November, 
2011) 
43 Bellinger III, John B., ‘Interview with John Bellinger,’ International Bar Association (2011) 
<http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=37f4f087-bc3a-4c21-a108-92f15391785c> 
44 Sands, Philippe, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (Viking, 2006) at 252 
45 For a useful profile see: Toobin, Jeffrey, ‘Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the 
Supreme Court’ (2005) September 12 New Yorker 42 
46 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) 548 U.S. 557 
47 Abebe and Posner appear to interpret Hamdan in these terms: See Abebe, Daniel & Eric A. Posner, ‘The Flaws of Foreign 
Affairs Legalism’ (2010) 51 Virginia Journal of International Law 507 at 532-533 
48 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) 548 U.S. 557 at 633 per Stevens J. Referring to Article 75 of Protocol I to Geneva Conventions 
(1949) 
49 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) 548 U.S. 557 at 718-719. See also Ku, Julian & John Yoo, Taming Globalization: International 
Law, the US Constitution, and the New World Order (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 221 
50 Rice, Condoleezza, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years in Washington (Random House LLC, 2011) at 503 
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advancing US legal interests.51
 Moving beyond American IL policy, this research has the potential to bring greater 
understanding to the international legal system more generally. The focus of the work has been 
inward, looking at the ideological structure of American international legal practice. But the correlative 
is the impact of American policy on the design and development of IL. One possible application of 
these findings is to refine accounts of the American IL “epoch.” This extends Grewe’s foundational 
work in identifying the particularistic features of the current period in what is otherwise the consistent 
story of great powers shaping law.
 Beliefs evident in the judicial ruling were at least correlated with the 
executive’s worldview. 
52 The American footprint can be seen in the P-5 privileges of the 
UNSC, in increasingly permissive rules on the use of international force,53
 
 and in the design of the 
ICC itself. The structure of legal beliefs set out herein provides a tool for understanding the principles 
that moulded each of these areas of law into its particular form. 
The Rule of International Law as Process 
In 2005, US legal policymakers faced the task of redressing perceptions among allies that Illiberal 
Nationalist attitudes in the early years of the Bush 43 administration signalled a retreat from the rule of 
IL. Secretary Rice used her address to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law to emphasise what she described as America’s: 
strong belief that international law is vital and a powerful force in the search for freedom. The United States has been 
and will continue to be the world’s strongest voice for the development and defense of international legal norms. We 
know from history that nations governed by the rule of law are nations that are just.54
 
  
The gesture, in the context of a turn to Illiberal Internationalism, received a tepid response. In his 
concluding chapter entitled “Window Dressing,” Sands noted that these were “important words, but 
they remain just that.”55
                                               
51 Ibid at 501; Scharf, Michael P. & Paul R. Williams, Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis: The Role of International Law 
and the State Department Legal Adviser (Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 194-195 
 This thesis has made the case that the very meaning of the rule of IL is 
contested such that statements of legal obligation, including that by Rice, are not mere words to mask 
a conscious repudiation of legal ideals, but a manifestation of divergent political interests within the 
very meaning of the rule of IL. American legal policymakers’ expressed commitments are to distinctive 
legal principles informed by the structure of four competing foreign policy ideologies: Liberal 
Internationalism, Illiberal Internationalism, Liberal Nationalism and Illiberal Nationalism. These 
conceptions set the parameters of possible commitments to legal ideals in American IL policymaking, 
52 Grewe, Wilhelm G., The Epochs Of International Law; Translated and Revised by Michael Byers (Walter de Gruyter, 2000) at 
701-703. For the current leading example of this endeavour see: Byers, Michael, ‘Introduction: The Complexities of 
Foundational Change’ in Michael Byers & Georg Nolte (ed), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
53 See recent developments relating to military action in Iraq and Syria from 2014: Lederman, Marty, ‘The War Powers 
Resolution and Article 51 Letters Concerning Use of Force in Syria Against ISIL and the Khorasan Group,’ Just Security (23 
September, 2014) <http://justsecurity.org/15436/war-powers-resolution-article-51-letters-force-syria-isil-khorasan-group/>; 
Ohlin, Jens David, ‘The Unwilling or Unable Doctrine Comes to Life,’ Opinio Juris (24 September, 2014) 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/23/unwilling-unable-doctrine-comes-life/>; Jorgensen, Malcolm A., ‘Ungoverned Space: US 
Request to Join Fight in Syria Carries Legal Risk,’ Canberra Times (26 August, 2015) 
<http://www.canberratimes.com.au/comment/ungoverned-space-us-request-to-join-fight-in-syria-carries-legal-risk-20150826-
gj7wxm.html> 
54 Rice, Condoleezza, Remarks at Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Lowes L’Enfant Plaza Hotel, 
Washington, DC (1 April, 2005) <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/44159.htm> 
55 Sands, Philippe, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (Viking, 2006) at 253 
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and are united in accepting that the rule of IL “cannot rest upon an unbridled faith in legalism.”56 The 
political foundation of IL is confirmed by Sands’ own position that he in contrast “unashamedly makes 
the case for international rules” in the belief that they “reflect common values, to the extent that these 
can be ascertained.”57
 This thesis has equally emphasised that the task of defining legal principles to guide the 
design and development of international institutions should not be abandoned as futile. As 
Koskenniemi has argued, something must be built up beyond the recognition that law is politicised: 
“From the fact that law has no shape of its own, but always comes to us in the shape of particular 
traditions or preferences, it does not follow that we cannot choose between better or worse 
preferences, traditions we have more or less reason to hope to universalize.”
 Each side of this divide has the capacity to express good-faith commitment to 
legal principle, but the substance of those commitments remains indivisible from ideological context. 
58 Intervening to argue 
that foreign policy ideology is ingrained in IL has been done to sharpen analytical understanding, not 
to defeat the political project of lawyers such as Sands looking to a rule of IL based on “common 
values.” That vision ultimately emerges as the core of contestation over the rule of IL: as a 
paradoxical quest to reconcile global power and transcendent values. Law is inevitably “always part of 
a political project that connects the present via the past to a future ‘utopia.’”59
The value of legalism is as a vehicle for contesting concentrated global power and its 
ossification in IL. What is required is a consciousness that formalised legal rules, sovereign equality, 
and the separation of international legal powers, are harnessed to a common political purpose. Moyn 
cautions that: 
 The claim made by 
each of the ideological types, and by legalist advocates, is to have melded power and principles within 
law. Yet each formulation necessarily represents partial values and particularistic interests. The rule 
of IL is thus better reconceived as a commitment to the process of debating the meaning of non-
arbitrary global governance, equality under IL, and the proper ordering of international legal power. 
No participant has a monopoly on legitimate conceptions of the rule of IL, but value can be found in 
both the legalist commitment to formalised rights and duties, and in harnessing unrivalled American 
power to advance an effective international legal system. 
no one approaches international criminal law as a political enterprise. Its supporters, almost to a man and woman, 
appear to believe that the best way to advance it is to deny its political essence, as if talking about international 
criminal law exclusively as extant law would by itself convert passionately held ideals into generally observed 
realities. So long as no one interested in the topic openly discusses international criminal law as a political 
matter...the project will lack plausibility.60
 
 
                                               
56 Czarnetzky, John M. & Ronald J. Rychlak, ‘An Empire of Law: Legalism and the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 79 Notre 
Dame Law Review 55 at 126 
57 Sands, Philippe, Lawless World: Making and Breaking Global Rules (Viking, 2006) at xviii 
58 Koskenniemi, Martti, ‘International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal’ (2005) 16 European Journal of 
International Law 113 at 119 
59 Kratochwil, Friedrich, ‘Legal Theory and International Law’ in David Armstrong (ed), Routledge Handbook of International 
Law (Routledge, 2009) at 56 
60 Moyn, Samuel, ‘Judith Shklar versus the International Criminal Court’ (2013) 4 Humanity: An International Journal of Human 
Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 473 at 494-495. See also Moyn, Samuel, ‘The International Law That Is America: 
Reflections on the Last Chapter of the Gentle Civilizer of Nations’ (2013) 27 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 
399 
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Shklar recognised the power of legalism to translate political values into a more desirable international 
order if adherents freed themselves “from the illusions of the ‘rule of law’ ideologists”61 in order to 
“promote legalistic values in such a way as to contribute to constitutional politics and to a decent 
political system.”62 In these terms Koskenniemi reasserts the value of legalism because of, rather than 
despite, its political foundation: “You need to choose the law that will be yours; you need to vindicate 
a particular understanding, a particular bias or preference over contrasting biases and preferences. 
The choice is not between law and politics, but between one politics of law, and another.”63 By 
uncovering the role of foreign policy ideology a return to the formalised conception of the rule of law is 
no longer possible.64 Yet there can be a second life for formalism, not as a “jurisprudential doctrine of 
the black and white of legal validity” but “as a culture of resistance to power, a social practice of 
accountability, openness, and equality whose status cannot be reduced to the political positions of 
any one of the parties whose claims are treated within it. As such, it makes a claim for universality 
that may be able to resist the pull towards imperialism.”65
On the other hand, American conceptions of the rule of IL remain central and indispensable to 
the dialogue. The evidence is incontrovertible that American power put in the service of commonly 
agreed legal objectives has unmatched potential for realising an operational system of law. But it is 
also true that particular forms of American legal belief stray so far from the political views of global 
counterparts that they will be seen as inherently threatening, and as a barrier to even pragmatic 
compromises on global institutions. Nevertheless, in cases where US IL policy becomes 
conspicuously arbitrary, unequal or imperial, the promised release valve for other states remains 
genuine belief in American exceptionalism. For Kagan, the belief that national values are universal 
values means that “Americans have been forced to care what the liberal world thinks by their unique 
national ideology.”
 
66 Through that mechanism, policy toward the international legal system can be 
directed back toward politically acceptable bounds by “the steady denial of international legitimacy by 
fellow democracies.”67
 The advancement of the rule of IL remains an iterative process between irreconcilable 
positions that will challenge each other, occasionally align, but never converge on the precise 
conception of legal ideals. Yet consensus cannot be the ideal for law. The end state of each concept 
of IL is a utopian vision that could only be realised by levelling the rich diversity of ideological 
commitments and values of real people making up the international legal system: legal utopia 
presupposes a form of totalitarianism. The opposition of ideologies preserves the vision of reconciling 
power and transcendent values precisely because it is a contest that cannot be resolved. 
 
 
 
                                               
61 Shklar, Judith N., Legalism (Harvard University Press, 1964) at 142 
62 Ibid at 145 
63 Koskenniemi, Martti, ‘International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal’ (2005) 16 European Journal of 
International Law 113 at 123 
64 See Koskenniemi, Martti, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations 1870-1960 (Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 495 
65 Ibid at 500 
66 Kagan, Robert, Of Paradise and Power (Vintage Books, 2004) at 151 
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